


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UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI GENOVA

**The Mediterranean maritime community of Camogli:
evolution and transformation in the age of transition
from sail to steam (1850s-1910s)**

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Introduction

Between February and March 1785, Gio. Batta Lavarello and Francesco Repetto conducted their tiny vessels to the nearby shores of Tuscany to retrieve charcoal, then sold in Genoa for domestic heating. Together with them, many other shipmasters born in the small Ligurian town of Camogli engaged in the same traffic. One hundred years later, in 1892, Gaetano Lavarello and Andrea Repetto – perhaps distant descendants of the formers – landed at the world’s remotest island, Tristan da Cunha, after shipwrecking. In the middle of these two events lies the extraordinary maritime history of Camogli, whose evolution pushed a community of people to transcend every previously set limit, along a run that led a small seafaring town to grow and expand up to the world outskirts. This story of ships and people, their advancement throughout time and space are at the core of the present dissertation; either provoked by global processes or local events, the enormous transformation of Camogli has been inherently related to the irreplaceable relationship of its inhabitants with the sea. Thus, the sea, the global and the local are the primary elements of this dissertation, which grounds upon the adoption of a maritime perspective to analyse the dialectic between the global and local dimensions – an approach stimulated by recent historiography. In the last years, historians have been increasingly attracted by global questions, and, in force of that, many historical disciplines tried to readjust to the contemporary debate. The so-called “global turn” invested and transformed the pre-existent fields and created whole new ones. Even the roots of transnational studies and the success of comparative approaches might be reconducted to historians' need to investigate global issues to understand the present.

Within this theoretical framework, maritime historians' opportunity to assume a leading role in the field of historical studies is clear, and the discussion was embraced – now a decade ago – in the

pivotal volume *Maritime History as Global History*, edited by Maria Fusaro and Amelia Polonia¹. The dialogue between maritime and global history could not be more natural, as the two disciplines converge on the same prerequisites, grounded on geographic mobility and wide-ranged entanglements². In the age of global matters, maritime history can definitively offer its contribution. However, the success of “globalism” in historical studies raised several methodological concerns about the actual feasibility to do practical archival research on global themes. As a response to these concerns arose the discipline of “micro-global history”, which aimed to individuate and implement micro-historical methodologies to investigate global questions³. Accordingly, the studies on phenomena and subjects that can be reconducted to the local scale but show global entanglements occupied a central position within the most recent publications and research directions⁴. Small-scale maritime communities possess all the requirements to be contextualised within the micro-global methodological framework. Firstly, as communities, they are framed within the local scale and, therefore, can be researched using micro-historical analysis tools. Secondly, they have the potential for global investigations because of the outward projection deriving from the practice of

¹ M. Fusaro and A. Polonia (eds.), *Maritime history as global history*, St. John's Newfoundland: IMEHA, 2010. The same topic is addressed in: P. Manning, “Global History and Maritime History”, *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 25: 1, 2013, pp. 1-22.

² Frank Broeze, in a pioneering article of 1989, had provided a sort of manifesto for maritime history. See: F. Broeze, “From the periphery to the mainstream: the challenge of Australia's Maritime History”, *The Great Circle*, No. 11:1, 1989, pp. 1-13. See, also: G. Harlaftis and C. Vassallo, “Maritime History since Braudel”, in Idem (eds.), *New Directions in Mediterranean Maritime History*, St. John's Newfoundland, IMEHA, 2004, pp. 1-20; G. Harlaftis, “Storia marittima e storia dei porti”, *Memoria e ricerca*, No. 11, 2002.

³ F. Trivellato, “Is there a future for Italian Micro-history in the age of Global History?”, *California Italian Studies*, No. 2:1, 2011; C. De Vito, “Verso una microstoria trans-locale (micro-spatial history)”, *Quaderni Storici*, No. 150: 3, 2015, pp. 815-833. See also, the debate published in a recent volume of *Past and Present*: J.P. Ghobrial, “Introduction: Seeing the World like a Micro-Historian”, *Past and Present*, No. 242: 14, 2019, pp. 1-22; J. De Vries, “Playing with Scales: The Global and the Micro, the Macro and the Nano”, *Past and Present*, No. 242: 14, 2019, pp. 23-36; G. Levi, “Frail Frontiers”, *Past and Present*, No. 242: 14, 2019, pp. 37-49.

⁴ Take into account the creation of the “global commodities” and “global lives” research axis, as the most recurrent implementation of micro-global methodologies. See, F. Trivellato, “Is there a future for Italian Micro-history in the age of Global History?”.

maritime activities. In other words, maritime communities can be the exemplar subjects for micro-global approaches since they are spatially limited and, at the same time, framed within broader networks.

The transition from sail to steam in navigation, a real watershed in nineteenth-century maritime history, represents the primary global question to which the present doctoral thesis aims to further understand. Inscribed within the broader process labelled as “transport revolution”, the application of steam technology to navigation transformed seafarers' life and activities, disrupted centuries-old maritime traditions, and promoted the emergence of new protagonists. Furthermore, the transition spread outside the maritime sector and raised further transformations in other human activities. Technological advance revolutionised the mobility of objects and human beings: steamships became «agents of *globalisation*» – by reformulating the famous definition of Armstrong and Williams⁵.

Therefore, the adoption of seafaring communities to investigate the effects of the transition from sail to steam could not be more natural. British, Northern-American and Scandinavian maritime historians contributed to the development of these studies⁶; instead, the Mediterranean environment and seafaring communities lying at its shores were rarely contemplated within these designs. The ERC project *SeaLiT (Seafaring Lives in Transition. Mediterranean maritime labour and shipping during globalisation, 1850s-1920s)*, coordinated by Apostolos Delis, within which the present doctoral thesis is framed, aims to fill this gap. The project identified the Mediterranean

⁵ J. Armstrong and D.M. Williams, “The Steamship as an agent of modernisation”, *International Journal of Maritime History*, 19, No. 1, 2007, 145-160.

⁶ A short selection: J. Armstrong and D.M. Williams, *The impact of technological change. The early steamship in Britain*, St. John's Newfoundland: IMEHA, 2011; L.R. Fischer and G.E. Panting (eds.), *Change and adaptation in maritime history. The North-Atlantic fleets in the nineteenth century*, St. John's Newfoundland: IMEHA, 1984; Y. Kaukiainen, *Sailing into twilight. Finnish Shipping in the Age of Transport Revolution, 1860-1914*, Helsinki: SHS, 1994; L.U. Scholl and M.L. Hikkanen (eds.), *Sail and steam. Selected maritime writings of Yrjo Kaukiainen*, St. John's Newfoundland: IMEHA, 2004; D.J. Starkey and G. Harlaftis (eds.), *Global markets: the internationalization of the sea transport industries since 1850*, St. John's Newfoundland: IMEHA, 1998. See, also the historiographical account of Gelina Harlaftis about the publications of the *International Journal of Maritime History*: G. Harlaftis, “Merchant shipping in the *International Journal of Maritime History*”, *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 26: 1, pp. 139-147.

seafaring communities as the core objects of analysis to investigate the transition under a comparative perspective. Thus, the case study of Camogli will be compared with other Mediterranean communities, including Galaxidi, La Ciotat and Barceloneta. Their consistency and differences with the Camogli case will be of crucial significance for the advancement of the current knowledge in this field of studies.

In the nineteenth century, the historical evolution of Camogli had all the requirements to be selected for this purpose. In the late eighteenth century, it was a fishing village whose inhabitants engaged in coastal fishing and cabotage. Then, it underwent an unprecedented escalation of shipping which culminated into the 1870s: at that time, its fleet counted more than three hundred vessels engaging in oceanic tramp shipping. Then, it entered into a steady decline: its fleet was marginalised to low profitable market sectors, and its financial resources were progressively drained. Meanwhile, the shipping world was invested by new technologies, which disrupted the previous dynamics and power relationships. The integration within the international shipping market, which Camogli had acquired throughout its rise, also determined its decline.

Scholarly historians paid scarce attention to the nineteenth-century evolution of Camogli. Conversely, several local historians devoted their energies to identifying the local sailing fleet and collecting “great stories of great individuals” to reconstruct a mythological history of the Ligurian community within the “golden age of sail”⁷.

On the national scale, Paolo Frascani was the first to call for the adoption of a maritime perspective to investigate nineteenth-century Italian history: his collective volume *A vela e a vapore* contains several contributions crossing various themes (fishing, cabotage, high-seas shipping, the Italian maritime institutions, maritime education) and regional areas (more represented the south, less the Ligurian and the Adriatic maritime regions)⁸. However, even the pioneering contribution of Marco

⁷ The most complete attempt in this sense can be found in: P. Schiaffino (ed.), *I mille bianchi velieri della città di Camogli*, Genova: Nuova Editrice Genovese, 2009.

⁸ P. Frascani (ed.), *A vela e a vapore. Economie, culture e istituzioni del mare nell'Italia dell'Ottocento*, Roma: Donzelli, 2001.

Doria about Ligurian sailing shipping in the nineteenth century was primarily based on secondary sources⁹.

Camogli can claim to be the hometown of Gio. Bono Ferrari, one of the most representative figures of the Italian non-academic maritime literature. Born in 1882, Ferrari dedicated the years of his maturity to collecting oral testimonies and old newspapers about the history of Camogli and the nearby communities. Rather than “history”, Ferrari gathered several “stories”: the amount of information is enormous, but the news is presented unsystematically – even randomly – and with no references to historical sources other than non-specified eye-witnesses¹⁰. Nevertheless, Gio. Bono Ferrari is still the primary reference for the Ligurian nineteenth-century maritime history, a fact bearing witness to the unhealthy conditions of its historiography¹¹.

Compared to the international maritime studies' status and accomplishments, the primary distinction emerges about sources and their utilisation. In this case, maritime-related sources such as crew lists, logbooks, and career registers have been long implemented into international scholars' methodology and resources. Conversely, apart from a groundbreaking article of Paolo Frascani¹², who underlined the outstanding potential of logbooks to develop maritime research on nineteenth-century Italy, there are no comparable studies.

Instead, the present doctoral thesis will primarily draw on this set of sources in compliance with their availability. The crew lists, kept – in the State Archives of Genoa – between 1828 and 1866, will

⁹ M. Doria, “La marina mercantile a vela in Liguria dalla metà dell'Ottocento alla prima guerra mondiale”, in P. Frascani (ed.), *A vela e a vapore*, pp. 83-107.

¹⁰ G.B. Ferrari, *La città dei mille bianchi velieri: Camogli*, Genova: Tipografia Nazionale, 1935; Idem, *Capitani di mare e bastimenti di Liguria del secolo XIX*, Rapallo: Arti Grafiche Tigullio, 1939.

¹¹ About the conditions of the Italian maritime historiography about the nineteenth century, see, particularly, the contribution of Maria Elisabetta Tonizzi in: M. D'Angelo and M.E. Tonizzi, “Recent maritime historiography in Italy”, in G. Harlaftis, C. Vassallo (eds.), *New Directions in Mediterranean Maritime History*, pp. 55-82. See also: M.E. Tonizzi, “Lavoro e lavoratori del mare nell'età della globalizzazione”, *Contemporanea*, No. 12: 4, pp. 691-701, where she neatly declares: «Nel caso specifico dell'Italia, per la tarda età della navigazione a vela, bisogna ancora, con qualche eccezione, ricorrere alle descrizioni dei “classici” della letteratura marinaresca».

¹² P. Frascani, “Tra la bussola e il negozio: uomini, rotte e traffici nei giornali di bordo delle navi a vela dell'800”, *Società e storia*, 100, 2003, pp. 487-510.

be essential to investigate Camogli's maritime labour and routes. The logbooks, kept between 1880 and 1914, are crucial to examine the declining phase of Camogli across various perspectives. The career rolls, covering the 1843-1914 period, represent a fundamental tool to analyse the career paths and other critical features of maritime labour.

Upon these premises, the present dissertation aims to implement, for the very first time in a study about nineteenth-century Italian maritime communities, several innovative elements and approaches, whose purpose would be to develop a model to address seafaring communities in transition: firstly, since sources represent the cornerstone of historical studies, to critically readdress localistic amatorial traditions based on solid documentary evidence; secondly, to propose an analytical toolkit to deal with maritime communities in the nineteenth century, based upon the distinction between maritime activities, shipownership and maritime labour as different, albeit interconnected, object of investigation; thirdly, to approach seafaring communities as micro-historical characters within a global perspective, in light of the recent methodological solicitations of global-microhistory and maritime history.

These elements, wishfully intended to suit a broader set of studies, will be tailored on the specific historical framework of the transition from sail to steam in the Mediterranean countries (1850s-1920s), for the analysis of which, as we will demonstrate, Camogli represents an outstanding point of observation and case-study. Furthermore, in the process of outlining Camogli's unique historical evolution, I will tackle, throughout the chapters, various unexplored or understudied arguments which, although would deserve books on their own, are nonetheless presented as far as the history of Camogli is concerned: this is the case, for instance, of the pivotal reconstruction of the Ligurian maritime region in the nineteenth century – in the opening chapter –, or, otherwise, the representation of the Ligurian trade and shipping business in the Black Sea, in the third chapter. Conversely, topics of equal importance to Camogli's history, such as Ligurian transoceanic migrations, will be treated more rapidly, owing to the immense and in-depth existing studies on this matter.

Ideally, the structure reflects the adoption of a double perspective. On the one hand, the fleet and the shipping business of Camogli will be taken into account to outline the integration of the Ligurian community within the international shipping market, from the late eighteenth century to

the First World War. On the other hand, it will deal with shipowners, maritime labourers and migrants, thus transferring the focus from the ship to the individuals.

Nonetheless, these parts are preceded by a most-needed introductory and methodological chapter, which addresses some primary elements of the Ligurian geography and history as far as maritime activities are concerned. In drawing these pages, I postulate the existence of a Ligurian maritime region, organised according to principles of functional interdependence between the centre (Genoa) and periphery (the two rivieras) and within the periphery itself.

Then, the adoption of a multi-scale analysis led to identifying three different historical phases, which correspond to the first three chapters.

The second chapter (late 18th century – 1830) addresses the conditions of Camogli before the nineteenth century and contextualises its shipping activities within the Ligurian geo-historical framework. The examination of two distinct models of Ligurian seafaring communities will be fundamental to outline the characteristics of the late eighteenth century maritime activities of Camogli, based on fishing and cabotage. Firstly, the main features of Camogli's coastal and high-seas fishing will be taken into account. Secondly, after a general overview of Camogli's cabotage routes, the traffic of charcoal from Tuscany to Genoa will be treated more in details.

The second chapter (1830-1870) deals with establishing Camogli's shipping into the Black Sea. From the first contacts to the consolidation, this chapter will outline the Black Sea grain trade's pivotal role to determine the evolution of the community and its specialisation in shipping. In the first section, the fleet's growth, by numbers and tonnage, will be addressed. Then, the second and third sections will provide a geo-historical background of the Black Sea trade. The fourth will present its merchant networks, focusing on Greeks and Italians for their relationships with Camogli. The analysis of Camogli's participation in the Black Sea trade covers the fifth and sixth sections: import and export trade from and to the Black Sea will be taken into account by examining inbound and outbound cargoes and the analysis of loading ports. The seventh section is dedicated to the business's readjustment to the Crimean War (1853-1856). Finally, the last section analyses the transfer of the discharging ports from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic.

The fourth chapter (1870-1914) outlines the global phase of Camogli's shipping, marked by rapid growth, in the beginning – following the readjustment to the establishment of steam navigation into the Black Sea grain trade – and, then, steady decline, in response to the increase of steam

competitiveness on longer routes. The first section provides a general and technical framework about the transition from sail to steam within the broader nineteenth-century transport revolution. The second section analyses Camogli's fleet's numbers and characteristics to outline the readjustment to oceanic shipping and its resilience until the First World War. The integration to oceanic routes and the specialisation of Camogli to oceanic tramp shipping are examined in the third and fourth sections: the former outlines the rising phase (1870-1880), the latter its steady decline (1880-1914), which took the form of a gradual marginalisation of sailing shipping to the market periphery.

Afterwards, despite remaining crucial in the broader framework, maritime activities are put aside to focus on the community's people: the last three chapters analyse the nineteenth-century transformations from the side of Camogli's shipowners and seafarers. Accordingly, it takes into account three main subjects: shipownership, maritime labour and migration.

The fifth chapter deals with Camogli's shipowners and aims to delineate the mechanisms of local shipownership and its transformation over time. The first section reconstructs the evolution of some selected shipping families to highlight the persistence of familiar and communitarian structures to shape the shipping business in Camogli. The forms of shared ownership, the tools implemented to minimise entrepreneurial risks and the development of mutualistic institutions constitute the primary objects of investigation of the second section. The third section deviates from the shipping business and addresses the political, social and cultural involvement of shipowners in the community's development. Finally, the fourth section considers the 1880-1914 period to outline the entanglements between the global and local scales to shape the community's crisis, with particular regard to the incidence of path-dependency in determining the shipowners' choices.

The sixth chapter investigates maritime labour. It postulates the existence of an endogenous maritime labour market where demands and supplies of sea labourers remain within the community's borders. Then, it analyses the transformations observed in the essential elements of maritime labour: the transition from share to salary, the proletarianisation of labour, the professionalisation of captains and the consequences of technological transition. Finally, the career paths will be investigated in their last sections, with a specific focus on the rates of abandonment and the professional destinations of seafarers after the exit from Camogli's endogenous maritime labour market.

The seventh and last chapter will deal with the labour migration and diaspora of Camogli. The first section will analyse desertion and emigration patterns to observe the practical ways of leaving the community and analyse the geographical and professional destinations. The second section will deal with Camogli's labour migration to the European foreign fleets; the third section will analyse more extensively labour migration and entrepreneurship in Latin America, particularly in Peru and Argentina. The last section will elaborate on Tristan da Cunha's case study where a small migrant community of Camogli was created in the aftermath of the shipwreck of the barque *Italia*.

1. Liguria and Camogli: a maritime region (late 18th-19th century)

1.1. Introduction

Before moving in-depth in the representation of Camogli's evolution as a maritime community, it is worth laying out the historical and geographical framework to contextualise the distinguishing characteristics which concurred to its success in the Ligurian, national and international context. This introduction addresses two basic needs: the lack of an updated overview about the Ligurian geography and its shipping system during the period under consideration; secondly, and most importantly, it constitutes a primary tool of analysis to deal with a maritime community as Camogli. Indeed, provided that, despite the adoption and implementation of the micro-historical approach and methodologies, maritime communities cannot be investigated as isolated spots; on the contrary, one must reconstruct the broader framework within which they are located and within which they establish interdependent relationships.

Firstly, the late eighteenth-century Ligurian maritime framework will be sketched out, with specific regard to the participation of numerous seafaring communities in the Tyrrhenian seaborne trade; within this context, a functional-based subdivision between eastern and western Ligurian seafaring towns will be theorised upon existing bibliography.

Then, through the adoption of a functionalistic model, Camogli will be contextualised within the nineteenth-century shipping industry of Liguria: accordingly, the shipping business will be divided into four primary sub-sectors which perform different functions, namely seaborne trade, shipowning, shipbuilding and maritime labour. The interplay between their distribution along the Ligurian territory and their coexistence in specific places resulted in the creation of relationships of functional interdependence between ports, seafaring communities, and other typologies of

maritime-related sites to be addressed throughout the following pages. Substantially, these elements are tackled to outline the characteristics of a shipping framework operating on the regional scale, the Ligurian maritime region. To do so, the first gaze to the nineteenth-century evolution of the shipping business is given to the entire Italian maritime movement to visualise Liguria's leading role. Secondly, shipping sub-sectors are charted according to the characteristics emerging from Liguria's structural and geographical composition to trace the territorial distribution of each functional specialisation. Finally, the focus will move onto Camogli to point out the main characteristics of the community and its positioning and functions within the Ligurian maritime system.

1.2. Ligurian communities and merchant shipping in the late 18th century

Leaving to the next section a brief presentation about the history of Genoa – whose political and economic power was dominant in the region – in the late eighteenth century, the Ligurian area was crawling with several seafaring places which had developed for centuries community-centred maritime traditions, occasionally tied with international shipping and in most of the cases marked by multi-activity. The Ligurian ships were scattered all around the Mediterranean shores, and the captains engaged in all sorts of seaborne business¹³.

Under this light, it is worth reconsidering the Ligurian merchant fleets' role within the Mediterranean trade networks. The widespread notion of “northern invasion”¹⁴, a legacy of Braudel's

¹³ Among the most recent works about the maritime activities in which the coastal communities engaged see: L. Lo Basso, *Gente di bordo: la vita quotidiana dei marittimi genovesi nel XVIII secolo*, Roma: Carocci, 2016; Id., *Capitani, corsari e armatori. I mestieri e le culture del mare dalla tratta degli schiavi a Garibaldi*, Novi Ligure: Città del Silenzio, 2011; A. Carassale and L. Lo Basso, *Sanremo, giardino di limoni: produzione e commercio degli agrumi all'estremo Ponente ligure (secoli XII-XIX)*, Roma: Carocci, 2008.

¹⁴ The first definition of the “Northern Invasion” concept is in F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the age of Philip II*, trans. S. Reynolds, New York: Harper and Row, 1972, pp. 615-642. See also M. Greene, “Beyond the Northern Invasion: the Mediterranean in the Seventeenth Century”, *Past and Present*, No. 174, 2002, pp. 42-71. See

interpretation of the Mediterranean world, might not be questionable. However, as Katerina Galani pointed out in her book about the British shipping at the end of the eighteenth century¹⁵, the adoption of a multi-scale approach might lead to different interpretations: indeed, the English vessels – engaging to the intra-Mediterranean trade – were mainly concerned into linking the Central Mediterranean area (which in her definition overlaps with the Tyrrhenian region of this chapter) with North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean¹⁶. The internal connections were left to the local merchant fleets, which participated in the general movement with vessels of minor dimensions. The functional role played by the “Mediterraneans” invites to propose new interpretations aimed to acknowledge the existence of a Tyrrhenian shipping system, self-sufficient but conditioned to interregional networks.

The idea of a Tyrrhenian shipping system – a model to organise trade routes and maritime activities in a given area, which is divided into multiple units to form the entire structure – has found a lavish reception in Italian historiography. More generally, the adoption and definition of systemic approaches to maritime studies have been recently revived by Amèlia Polonia’s reconsideration of port systems in a functionalist model¹⁷. Accordingly, Italian historians now conceive the Tyrrhenian

also the latest: M. Fusaro, C. Heywood and M.S. Omri (eds.), *Trade and cultural exchange in the Early Modern Mediterranean. Braudel’s maritime legacy*, London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2010 and in particular the essays of Maria Fusaro and Colin Heywood: M. Fusaro, “After Braudel: a Reassessment of Mediterranean History between the Northern Invasion and the Caravane Maritime”, pp. 1-22; C. Heywood, “The English in the Mediterranean, 1600-1630: a Post-Braudelian Perspective on the «Northern Invasion»”, pp. 23-44.

¹⁵ K. Galani, *British Shipping in the Mediterranean during the Napoleonic Wars. The Untold Story of a Successful Adaptation*, Leiden: Brill’s Studies in Maritime History, 2017.

¹⁶ Idem, p. 108. The author draws on the British trade at the port of Livorno from 1770 to 1815: in reconstructing the routes through the sanitary records of the Tuscan port, Katerina Galani illustrates how 59 percent of the British vessels calling at Livorno engaged in intra-Mediterranean trade. However, only a limited portion of the ships were actually coming from the Central Mediterranean (12%), whereas North Africa (40%) and the Eastern Mediterranean (35%) represented the overwhelming majority areas of the ports of departure.

¹⁷ See A. Polonia, “The Northwestern Portuguese Seaport System in the Early Modern Age” in B. Tapio, L. R. Fischer and E. Tonizzi, (eds.), *Making Global and Local Connections: Historical Perspectives on Ports*, Research in Maritime History series (No. 35), Newfoundland: International Journal of Maritime History, 2008, pp.113-136 and Id., “European seaports in the early modern age: concepts, methodology and models of analysis”, *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, No. 80, 2010, pp.

region as an organic area, where distinct political entities (from Sicily up to the French region of Marseille) and transnational subjects gave life to communications and networks through sea activities¹⁸. Some preliminary approaches can be found in Paolo Calcagno¹⁹, as far as the stable linkages between Tuscany, Liguria and Provence are concerned. Annastella Carrino and Biagio Salvemini adopted the same approach²⁰: through observing the more enduring routes linking together the agricultural regions of the Kingdom of Naples with Marseille, they developed a three-level Tyrrhenian system. Its main elements were: a) a *port-to-port* northward trade in foodstuff and agricultural supplies from Naples, Messina and Palermo to Marseille and Genoa²¹; b) *periphery-to-port* cabotage linking the productive areas of the countryside with the main regional seaports; c) a *port-to-periphery/port* transit and redistribution trade of cereals, colonial genres, spices and every sort of goods arriving in international scale ports– mainly Livorno.

Far from constituting enclosed systems on their own, every level was entangled with the others. For example, the second axis (b) was instrumental in delivering agricultural products to the seaports, from which they were destined to international exports (a). Cabotage played a central role, particularly in the Italian south: it was fundamental to compensate the region infrastructural limits in terms of land communications. Accordingly, the Neapolitan and Sicilian marines developed large fleets of small-tonnage vessels. Local production was steered toward the main regional seaports,

17-39. Also, see: R. Lee and R. Lawton, *Port development and the demographic dynamics of European urbanization*, in Id. (eds.), *Population and society in Western European Port-Cities, c. 1650-1939*, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2002, pp. 1-36.

¹⁸ The main reference goes to the collective volume edited by B. Salvemini (ed.), *Lo spazio tirrenico nella "grande trasformazione". Mercati, uomini e istituzioni nel Settecento e nel primo Ottocento*, Bari: Edipuglia, 2009. The same approach is more directly addressed in A. Carrino and B. Salvemini, "Come si costruisce uno spazio mercantile: il Tirreno nel Settecento", *Studi Storici*, No. 53, 2012, pp. 47-73.

¹⁹ P. Calcagno, "Uno dei «Tirreni» di Braudel: scambi commerciali nell'area marittima ligure-provenzale tra XVII e XVIII secolo", *Mediterranea Ricerche Storiche*, No. 33, 2015.

²⁰ A. Carrino and B. Salvemini, "Come si costruisce uno spazio mercantile", p. 49.

²¹ The crucial distinction between port-cities and the countryside landing-places lacking of harbor infrastructures is directly addressed in A. Carrino and B. Salvemini, "Porti di campagna, porti di città. Traffici e insediamenti del Regno di Napoli visti da Marsiglia (1710-1846)", *Quaderni storici*, No. 1, 2006, pp. 209-254.

primarily Naples, the leading collecting centre of the Kingdom, followed by far from Messina²². Therefore, the northward trade in staples and low-value merchandises encouraged establishing a chained structure where coastal trade was necessary. More importantly, while being international, this kind of trade involved endogenous (to the system) actors, as the Kingdom of Naples embodied the supplier, the “Genoese” the carriers, and Marseille’s industrial region, the primary consumer. Most of the Italian research about the Tyrrhenian economic world and the maritime exchanges in the late eighteenth century had devoted a great spark of attention to this specific trade axis, emphasising the role of Ligurian maritime actors to the system’s subsistence²³.

The last level (c) concerned the international trade – of which the Tyrrhenian constitutes a transit unit – accomplished by foreign carriers who held a large proportion of the Levant trade to the Western Mediterranean and the Central and Atlantic Europe. The growth of Livorno’s maritime movement is emblematic to outline its evolution. Since the Tuscan city was granted the free port status (1676), many English and Dutch vessels called to Livorno and filled the harbour warehouses with colonial goods and cereals. Thus, on account of the favourable tax regime granted by the Tuscan authorities, Livorno became an international emporium and the primary destination for the Mediterranean transit trade: hence, the city developed into a fundamental collecting centre for the regional economy and, as a result, attracted several ships aiming to continue the westward trade flow of colonial goods and to redistribute these commodities in the other ports of the system, like Genoa and Marseille²⁴.

²² Compare with the data shown in A. Carrino and B. Salvemini, “Porti di campagna, porti di città”, pp. 224-226.

²³ Despite the activities of “Genoese” presence and networks in the Mediterranean maritime trade in the nineteenth century have never been systematically collected in a singular monograph, there is abundance of articles and essays which represent indispensable tools to deal with this subject: L. Lo Basso, “Tra Santo Stefano e l’Europa”; A. Carassale and L. Lo Basso, *Sanremo, giardino di limoni*; P. Calcagno, “Uno dei «Tirreni» di Braudel: scambi commerciali nell’area marittima ligure-provenzale tra XVII e XVIII secolo”, *Mediterranea Ricerche Storiche*, No. 33, 2015; A. Carrino, “Fra nazioni e piccole patrie. «Padroni» e mercanti liguri sulle rotte tirreniche del secondo settecento”, *Società e storia*, No. 131, 2011.

²⁴ The port activities of Livorno are clearly underlined in: J.P. Filippini, *Il porto di Livorno e la Toscana (1676-1814)*, Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1998.

Within this framework, the people of Liguria specialised in the trade and transport of foreign goods and moved them from port to port within and beyond the Tyrrhenian shipping system. The “Genoese”, as this miscellaneous group was commonly and erroneously labelled²⁵, held a relevant proportion of the Tyrrhenian trade, especially in the southern Italian markets where, relying upon centuries of favourable relationships between the Republic of Genoa and the Spanish monarchy, they had developed a long-lasting presence. However, there is a distinction between the two areas of the region: the Western riviera was more integrated within the Mediterranean economy than its counterpart, which was specialised in fishing and short-range cabotage.

For instance, to the former group belong the communities of Santo Stefano²⁶, Laigueglia²⁷ and Sanremo²⁸. Here, the local shipowning elites joined the ranks of merchants and commercial entrepreneurs rather than limiting their range of interests to shipping. Their trajectories are in line with most Mediterranean and European businessmen, to which shipownership was an ancillary activity to engage in commerce and trade. In most cases, the unique geographical environment of the western communities of Liguria allowed the inhabitants to cultivate the ground and to produce specific agricultural commodities (olives, fruit and later flowers). On the other side of the region, cultivation was limited to subsistence horticulture, with little or no market integration. For the western elites, the passage from shipowners to traders was facilitated by marketable commodities in their territory. The studies developed on their commercial correspondence outline that they could integrate within international trade networks, which even transcended the Mediterranean borders to reach Central and Northern Europe²⁹. These “Genoese” expanded their range of interests

²⁵ A. Carrino, “Fra nazioni e piccole patrie”, p. 37.

²⁶ L. Lo Basso, “Tra Santo Stefano e l’Europa. Le attività commerciali di Giovanni Battista Filippi attraverso la documentazione privata (1762-1771)”, *Intermelon*, No. 13, 2007, pp. 83-109.

²⁷ A. Carrino, “Fra nazioni e piccole patrie. «Padroni» e mercanti liguri sulle rotte tirreniche del secondo settecento”, *Società e storia*, No. 131, 2011.

²⁸ A. Carassale and L. Lo Basso, *Sanremo, giardino di limoni: produzione e commercio degli agrumi all’estremo Ponente ligure (secoli XII-XIX)*, Roma: Carocci, 2008.

²⁹ L. Lo Basso, “Tra Santo Stefano e l’Europa”, p. 85. The author has found 38 different places, among which there were Marseille, Livorno, Naples, Bordeaux, Antwerp, Amsterdam, London, Hamburg, Copenhagen, Havre, Nantes and other lesser centres.

through the commercialisation of domestic products, as observed in the case of Sanremo, whose citruses and lemons found profitable marketplaces in Northern Europe³⁰.

If it were the case for most of the western maritime communities of Liguria – to carry out trade with northern Europe, to actively participate in the northbound commerce from southern Italy to Genoa and Marseille, and to handle the redistribution of colonial merchandises from Livorno to the Mediterranean – the eastern part of the region would display an utterly different scenario. Sparse along the coast, the Eastern riviera hosted many villages and poorly populated centres whose maritime activities and economic subsistence depended on coastal and deep-sea fishing and short-range cabotage. The social composition of these communities was strikingly dissimilar to that of their western counterparts. There was no space for the merchant elites, which elsewhere had a great significance and played a central role in the community economic activities.

In this regard, their economic and social evolution seems to be in line with the historiographical assumption concerning the inverse relation existing between fishing and commerce in terms of diffusion and practice. In the Mediterranean, when a maritime community was able to develop a solid commercial structure, it rarely engaged to fishing³¹. This pattern is recurrent in the Mediterranean – despite the alleged coexistence of sea economies (fishing, cabotage, trade) and land economy (agriculture and manufactures) – and was prompted by the fact that fishing, especially in the Tyrrhenian Sea, was scarcely cost-effective and did not represent a relatively profitable economic option. Compared with the Northern seas, the Tyrrhenian waters had a scarcity of fishery resources, more various but less abundant. Indeed, this environmental factor led to contrasting results in the two maritime worlds: in the Northern European region (England, the Netherlands and Scandinavia), deep-sea fishing grew as a critical activity in the local economies, whereas Mediterranean fishing remained subordinate or, when central, its relevance originated

³⁰ A. Carassale and L. Lo Basso, *Sanremo, giardino di limoni*.

³¹ See in this case the tables proposed in A. Zanini, “Un difficile equilibrio. Stato, pescatori e comunità in Liguria tra Sei e Settecento”, in S. Cavaciocchi, *Ricchezza del mare, ricchezza dal mare. Sec. XIII-XVIII. Atti della “Trentasettesima settimana di studi” 11-15 aprile 2005* (Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica “F. Datini”, Prato. Serie 2, Atti delle settimane di studio e altri convegni 37), Firenze: Le Monnier, 2006, pp. 1101-1102. For instance, see the cases of the Levant communities of Quinto, Nervi, Bogliasco and Monterosso, Vernazza and Corniglia, whose figure of fishermen out of the total of the maritime workers range between 51,5 % and 90,2 %.

more by the absence of alternatives than due to actual profitability. The importance of fishing in the northern countries led, for instance, to gradual modernisation and the introduction of technological (ships) and organisational (labour division and in the forms of food preservation) improvements that could have hardly occurred the Mediterranean marines³². In the light of the organisational models to structure a fishing enterprise, those of «company ownership» and «family ownership³³» – marked by a fundamental distinction about the existing relationship between capital and labour (divided in the former, combined in the latter) – Mediterranean fishing fell under the second category. The ownership was usually collective, according to family relationships and, on a broader perspective, with the participation of the entire community. Then, this collective form of ownership – adopted also in long-range cabotage and deep-sea navigation³⁴ – overlapped with collective forms of remuneration of the single maritime enterprise. Sailors were recruited for single voyages, and the revenues were divided among the participants, according to the “share” system. Fishing, short-range cabotage, collective endeavours and “share” system are the features that shaped the economic evolution of most maritime communities lying eastward Genoa. Still, in the

³² The comparative evolution of Mediterranean and Northern European fishing had recently attracted and stimulated international literature. The abovementioned conference papers of the 37th conference of Datini Institute of Prato represent a pivotal work to deal with this subject: S. Cavaciocchi, *Ricchezza del mare, ricchezza dal mare. Sec. XIII-XVIII. Atti della “Trentasettesima settimana di studi” 11-15 aprile 2005* (Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica “F. Datini”, Prato. Serie 2, Atti delle settimane di studio e altri convegni 37), Firenze: Le Monnier, 2006. A authoritative review and critical contextualisation of the conference proceedings and activities can be found in A. Clemente, “La ricchezza del mare in margine alla XXXVII settimana di studi dell’Istituto Datini”, *Storia economica*, No. 8, 2005, pp. 215-235. The Mediterranean fishing practices and communities are also at the center of M.L. De Nicolò, *Microcosmi mediterranei. Le comunità dei pescatori nell’età moderna*, Bologna: CLUEB, 2004.

³³ This distinction is clearly outlined in A. Clemente, “La ricchezza del mare”, pp. 217-218. Such distinction roots into the North-Atlantic historical debate, where fishing constituted a much more significant activity in terms of finance and business. A comparative analysis can be found in: D. Vickers, “Comparing fisheries”, *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 1, 1995, pp. 198-224.

³⁴ Since the Middle Age, several credit and insuring tools have been created to sustain the collective endeavour to carry out shipping business. Some of them, as the *cambio marittimo* or *colonna* survived up to the end of the 19th century. See: G. Salvioli, *L’assicurazione e il cambio marittimo nella storia del diritto italiano*, Bologna: Zanichelli, 1884.

eighteenth century, as we will deepen in the next chapter, Camogli reflects and seems to possess all of those characteristics.

1.3. The Ligurian maritime region in the 19th century

Notwithstanding the persistence of various debatable aspects underlying the status of maritime communities, for the purpose to outline a model for functional-based maritime systems, we opted for a relatively wide-ranging and straightforward definition. According to Karel Davids, a maritime community can be defined as «a village, town or a neighbourhood where a substantial part of the population earns its livelihood wholly, or partly, by work at sea or is directly dependent on seafaring»³⁵. Davids' words put at the centre seafaring and other maritime-related professions and, most importantly, emphasise the communities' dependency on seafaring for their sustenance. In other words, the common ground of maritime communities consists in the concentration of shipping business in a spatially limited environment, where the majority of the inhabitants engaged in maritime activities of any sort.

However, adopting the expression “maritime activities” may result in a vague representation of the multi-faceted world of the shipping economic sector and its industries. Therefore, the analysis that follows explores the set of activities related directly to shipping in the attempt to construct a more definite model. To this purpose, it is possible to focus on the followings: seaborne trade, shipowning, shipbuilding and maritime labour. The shipping business is, indeed, built upon the combination of these factors.

Approaching the argument from a geographical and structural-oriented approach emerges that these elements can be either concentrated in a unique place or be distributed in units. In the latter case, these units compose a network, and the set of interdependent relationships formed between each unit produce maritime systems. Compared with port systems, which enjoyed vast scholarly

³⁵ Karel Davids, “Local and Global: Seafaring Communities in the North-Sea area, c. 1600-2000”, *International Journal of Maritime History*, 2015, No. 27: 4, pp. 629-646.

literature³⁶, maritime systems have rarely attracted the deserved attention. The root causes of the divergent success in the historiography of two similar concepts may lie in the relatively vague object of studies presented by the latter with respect to the former: whereas port systems have in ports their conceptual and physical centre and in port movement the measurable economic activity, maritime systems cannot be grasped as much straightforwardly. Thus, the literature of port-systems has grown around ports, their definition, the spatial and functional relationship with the surrounding urban environment (port-cities)³⁷ and the establishment of interdependent connections with broader geographical entities (hinterlands)³⁸, simply «areas which the ports serve»³⁹. However, the adoption of port movement (the exchange of commodities) as the primary measure to assess the role of ports and their positioning in relation to hinterlands, forelands and concurring ports led to the underestimation of those maritime centres which do not hold remarkable port traffics, the so-called «unimportant ports» by borrowing Jackson's well-known definition⁴⁰. In reality, despite being inferior or nearly irrelevant from a commercial perspective,

³⁶ To port-systems have been frequently dedicated theoretical efforts, by both historians and geographers: a classical summary of the existing literature and the state of art is presented in A.H. Kidwai, "Conceptual and methodological issues: ports, port-cities and port-hinterlands", in I. Banga (ed.), *Ports and their hinterlands in India 1700-1950*, New Delhi: Manohar, 1992, pp. 7-43. For the development of the theoretical groundwork, it is fundamental the contribution of the major British port historian, Gordon Jackson: see, for instance, G. Jackson, "Early modern European seaport studies: highlights & guidelines", in *European Seaport Systems in the Early Modern Age – A comparative approach*, Porto: IHM UP, 2007, pp. 8-27. Equally important are the contributions of Frank Broeze, for example: F. Broeze, "The ports and port system of the Asian seas: an overview with historical perspective from c. 1750", *The Great Circle*, 1996, No. 18:2, pp. 73-96.

³⁷ A.H. Kidwai, "Conceptual and methodological issues: ports, port-cities and port-hinterlands", pp. 27-28; F. Broeze, "Port cities. The search for an identity", *Journal of Urban History*, 1985, No. 11:2, pp. 209-225.

³⁸ T.Y. Tan, "Port cities and hinterlands: a comparative study of Singapore and Calcutta", *Political Geography*, 2007, No. 26, pp. 851-865; G.G. Weigend, "The problem of hinterland and foreland as illustrated by the port of Hamburg", *Economic Geography*, 1956, No. 32:1, pp. 1-16; R. Robinson, "The hinterland-foreland continuum: concept and methodology", *The Professional Geographer*, 1970, No. 22:6, pp. 307-310.

³⁹ A.H. Kidwai, "Conceptual and methodological issues: ports, port-cities and port-hinterlands", p. 19.

⁴⁰ G. Jackson, "The significance of unimportant ports", *International Journal of Maritime History*, 2001, No. 13:2, pp. 1-17. The same argument is discussed, with regard to respectively France and Italy, in the collective volume edited by Gilbert

several secondary ports played crucial roles in animating the main ports' maritime activities, either by shipowning, shipbuilding or other collateral activities. In other words, minor maritime centres can establish functional relationships with primary ports, according to a complementarity scheme, like the one delineated by Amelia Polonia in her studies about the Portuguese early modern maritime space⁴¹. Already Frank Broeze, in his review on port history, had addressed the «functional linkages that emanate from the port»,⁴² among which he comprehends shipowning and shipbuilding, which do not necessarily lie in the very same place that hosts harbour infrastructures. Consequently, having individuated four primary functions relevant to the development of shipping (seaborne trade, shipowning, shipbuilding and maritime labour), it is possible to distinguish different places according to the respective functions performed. Thus, we may be able to develop a new model of analysis to study maritime systems and their configuration as maritime regions to unfold the structure of regional maritime networks and investigate specialisations.

The first action consists in the identification of functional-based typologies of maritime-related settlements: port-cities, which are hubs for national and international seaborne trade and usually provide collateral services, like insurance and credit; seafaring communities, which are commonly identified in small-scale towns with a large concentration of shipownership or, more broadly, are associated with the practice of seafaring activities (merchant shipping and fishing); shipbuilding centres, whose maritime population is primarily committed to shipbuilding. Although such tripartition might seem rigid at first glance, the aim here is to develop a relatively elastic model, a tool to approach most of the case studies, and liable to alterations and adjustments. As a result, by the mid-nineteenth century, the mechanisation of shipbuilding and the conversion from wooden to iron constructions called for increasing centralisation and, therefore, shipyards drew closer to port-cities which, consequently, ended up incorporating them. Being urban spaces, and for the

Buti and Gérard Le Bouëdec in *Rives méditerranéennes*, 2010, No. 35, and by Giovanni Assereto in his chapter: G. Assereto, "Porti e scali minori della Repubblica di Genova in età moderna", in S. Cavaciocchi (ed.), *I porti come impresa economica (sec. XIII-XVIII). Atti della "Diciannovesima Settimana di Studi dell'Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica F. Datini"* 2-6 maggio 1987, Firenze: Le Monnier, 1988, pp. 271-306.

⁴¹ A. Polonia, "European Seaports in the Early Modern Age: concepts, methodologies and models of analysis", *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 2010, No. 80, pp. 17-39.

⁴² F. Broeze, "Port cities. The search for an identity", pp. 13-14.

subsequent high concentration of capital and manpower, port-cities were usually the most important shipowning centres of their respective areas. Beyond that, in some instances, shipping and shipbuilding could also intertwine in the same small-scale communities, with no neat specialisations.

Upon these premises, looking at the historical conditions of Italian shipping in the nineteenth century, Liguria seems to possess all the required characteristics to be addressed as a maritime region: in this period, indeed, the majority of the Italian shipping business, shipbuilding and seaborne trade was based there. Indeed, Liguria's maritimisation reached its peak in the second half of the nineteenth century – right after the conclusion of the Italian unification process (1861) – and retained its leading position well into the twentieth century. Therefore, the following pages tackle the mid-nineteenth century configuration of Ligurian shipping and its position within the national context, drawing on a large corpus of data developed by the Italian Merchant Marine's administrative direction for statistical purposes. These publications cover the 1861-1914 period, but they are available to serial collections only from 1881 onwards⁴³. Thus, most of the tables, figures, and maps employed to analyse Liguria as a maritime region dates to the early 1880s, acknowledging potential bias and being aware of the substantial continuity observed in the Ligurian shipping business from the mid-century to the 1880s.

1.3.1. PORT MOVEMENT

The first feature under consideration is port movement, with the purpose to identify Ligurian port-cities for the crucial role which they covered within their regional maritime system. Substantially, port-cities put in place seaborne trade: they provided the material harbour infrastructures to handle the exchange of commodities.

⁴³ *Sulle condizioni della Marina Mercantile Italiana al 31 dicembre. Relazioni del Direttore generale della Marina Mercantile a S. E. il Ministro della Marina*, Roma, 1881-1914.

Table 1.1. Ship arrivals (% Italian) to the ten major Italian port-cities (1866; 1876; 1886).

<i>Port-cities</i>	<i>1866</i>	<i>1876</i>	<i>1886</i>
<i>Genova</i>	14,22%	11,56%	14,07%
<i>Napoli</i>	8,14%	10,85%	9,59%
<i>Livorno</i>	9,62%	8,90%	7,61%
<i>Messina</i>	9,05%	8,46%	7,39%
<i>Palermo</i>	4,80%	6,73%	6,43%
<i>Catania</i>	3,33%	1,94%	4,18%
<i>Venezia</i>	4,01%	3,93%	4,02%
<i>Brindisi</i>	1,86%	1,92%	2,25%
<i>Ancona</i>	2,24%	2,78%	2,04%
<i>Cagliari</i>	2,10%	1,92%	2,04%
<i>Other (minor ports)</i>	40,63%	41,00%	40,38%
<i>Liguria (except Genoa)</i>	6,51%	2,85%	2,14%* ⁴⁴

Source: Appendix 1.1.

In Table 1.1, Genoa emerges as the leading port city in Italy between 1866 and 1886. Since the Italian reunification, Genoa was of prime importance to national and international overseas traffics, which the Ligurian city retained in the second half of the nineteenth century. Then, about the port movement, Genoa's dominance over the territory of Liguria was undeniable; the capital city exerted its uncontested control over maritime trade, both inbound and outbound, being comparable to what geographers label as «primate city»⁴⁵. Every commodity commercialised by the sea passed necessarily through Genoa's port; consequently, every ship belonging to the local merchant marine had in Genoa its natural point of reference. Beyond Genoa, Ligurian sailing vessels and steamers


⁴⁴ In 1886, sources provide data concerning Savona only.

⁴⁵ M. Jefferson, "The Law of the Primate City", *Geographical Review*, No. 29:2, 1939, pp. 226-232.

engaging in international trade could anchor only in Savona, whose port movement increased from the 1870s onwards in concomitance with the incipient industrialisation of the city.

This mid-nineteenth-century framework was not born out of nothing. Since the Middle Ages and for the early modern era, Genoa detained a predominant position in the Ligurian region. Then, between the end of the Napoleonic domination and the closing decades of the nineteenth century, Genoa's port underwent radical structural transformations, which seriously impacted the main Ligurian port-city and brought its traffics to even higher levels.

Map 1.1. The port of Genoa in 1830.



Source: E. Artaria and P. Artaria, *Nouveau guide du voyageur en Italie orné de cartes itinéraires et du plan des villes principales*, Milano: Francesco Sonzogno, 1829.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the structural configuration of the port did not differ considerably from the previous situation: two piers, on the eastern and western (on the west, *molo vecchio*, then renamed *nuovissimo* after an 1835 reconstruction; on the east, *molo nuovo*) sections of

the port, guided the entrance of the incoming vessels to the central basin⁴⁶. However, the inner part of the harbour lacked anchoring points with the sole exception of the *Darsena*: the apparent result was forcing many vessels to anchor in the roadstead to be loaded and unloaded by wooden lightens⁴⁷. Between 1815 and the Italian unification (1861), the most relevant issues affecting the port concerned the harbour's protection from climate hazards (through various ameliorations of piers and breakwaters) and the excavation of the seabed in order to improve the maximum depth of the central basin⁴⁸. Meanwhile, port communications and infrastructures underwent qualitative changes: in 1852, the telegraphic cable was laid out (which connected Genoa with Turin and, in a couple of years, with France and Sardinia); in 1853, railways were constructed between Genoa and Turin and the coastal line toward the French border was initiated (in 1856, it arrived at the town of Voltri)⁴⁹. Nevertheless, at the moment of the Italian unification, in 1861, the essential characteristics of the harbour were not remarkably different from the 1815 configuration: in particular, the water basin area was substantially the same, and Genoa's port still lacked safe and wide anchoring points⁵⁰. The absence of profound improvements damaged the city's economy, whose traffic volume was one-third of that of its eternal rival within the Mediterranean, Marseille⁵¹.

After the unification, Genoa's weak position to withstand international competition was constantly addressed to the State by public opinion and shipping operators: nevertheless, it required the intervention of a private citizen, Raffaele Deferrari, Duke of Galliera, to solve the long-standing

⁴⁶ On the structural aspects concerning the port of Genoa in the nineteenth century, see: U. Marchese, "Il porto di Genova dal 1815 al 1891", *Archivio economico dell'Unificazione Italiana*, No. 9:2, 1959, pp. 3-109; M.E. Tonizzi, *Merci, strutture e lavoro nel porto di Genova tra '800 e '900*, FrancoAngeli, 2000, pp. 61-96.

⁴⁷ M.E. Tonizzi, *Merci, strutture e lavoro nel porto di Genova*, p. 15.

⁴⁸ U. Marchese, "Il porto di Genova", pp. 18-22.

⁴⁹ *Idem*, pp. 21-22.

⁵⁰ *Idem*, p. 23.

⁵¹ M.E. Tonizzi, *Merci, strutture e lavoro*, p. 65.

issue. In 1876, Deferrari donated 20 million Italian Lira to the government to fund a massive structural intervention on the Ligurian harbour⁵².

Map 1.2. The port of Genoa before the First World War.



From 1877 to 1888, Genoa's port was reconfigured. The most evident changes were: 1) the prolongation of the *molo nuovo* toward south and south east (*molo Duca di Galliera* – length 1.410 m) opened up a total new basin (*nuovo porto*), which almost doubled the surface area of the old port; 2) the construction of a new pier on the east (*molo di Giano* – length 595 m) created another area (*avamposto*); 3) the old port was refurbished with the construction of several piers along the western area, from the *Darsena* to the *molo nuovo*⁵³. Naturally, these radical transformations exerted

⁵² A detailed account on Deferrari's donation and the works which followed can be found in: U. Marchese, "Il porto di Genova", pp. 25-28.

⁵³ Idem.

a profound impact on the volume of commodities exchanged in Genoa: in the early 1880s, the port handled 1,3 million tons of merchandises annually, as opposed to the 2,9 million tons of the end of the decade⁵⁴. The volume rose threefold in less than ten years.

However, while Genoa's port did hold a leading position in the Italian maritime panorama throughout the whole nineteenth century, the secondary port of the region, Savona, attained national relevance only in the closing decades. Although, still at mid-century, Savona represented a centre of attraction for ships in need of repairs and carenage (in 1853, the harbour hosted 269 ships for these purposes⁵⁵), the evolution of Savona as a port-city came primarily with the establishment of local industrial activities and with the opening of a railway line with Turin (its natural hinterland). The connections with the Savoy capital were of pivotal importance for the fate of Savona: in this regard, throughout the first half of the century, the second Ligurian city greatly suffered from the competition represented by Nice (relinquished to France in 1860, in the process of the Italian state unification)⁵⁶. From this event onwards, Savona's history turned favourably: in 1862, Tardy and Benech founded the first metallurgic plant. Then, 1874 represented the year when two strategic railway lines were brought to an end: one connected Savona with Torino, the other run along the coast, with the noticeable result of wiping out short-ranged redistribution cabotage in the western part of Liguria⁵⁷. Railways' takeover of cabotage represents a crucial feature for the evolution of nineteenth-century port systems: the advent of railways overhauled the pre-existent communication means, mainly based on coastal navigation⁵⁸. In fact, in the period from the 1880s to the outbreak of the First World War, the traffic volume directed to the port of Savona enormously

⁵⁴ U. Marchese, "Il porto di Genova", p. 99.

⁵⁵ P. Calcagno, *Savona, porto di Piemonte: l'economia della città e del suo territorio, dal Quattrocento alla Grande Guerra*, Novi Ligure: Città del Silenzio, 2013, p. 437.

⁵⁶ Idem, p. 454.

⁵⁷ Idem, pp. 464-480.

⁵⁸ The emergence of a cabotage-railways competition is lucidly delineated in S.P. Ville, *Transport and the Development of the European Economy, 1750-1918*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1990, pp. 114-172.

increased, at the point, in 1913, to render the Ligurian city the fourth Italian port after Genoa, Naples and Venice⁵⁹.

1.3.2. MERCHANT FLEET

Then, to address the Ligurian maritime region, shipowning is addressed. Accordingly, the analysis object will be the Italian merchant fleet, with specific regard to its distribution in the Italian and Ligurian territories and with a keen eye on the divergent characteristics emerging from port-cities and seafaring communities.

Table 1.2. Total tonnage registered in Liguria and Italy (1865; 1885; 1914).

<i>Year</i>	<i>Liguria</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>%</i>
1865	327.191	656.845	49,81%
1885	495.890	945.677	52,44%
1914	837.311	1.282.115	65,31%

Source: Data processed from *Statistica del Regno d'Italia. Movimento della navigazione nei porti del Regno. Anno 1867*, Firenze: Stabilimento G. Civelli, 1868; *Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile al 31 dicembre 1885. Relazione del direttore generale della marina mercantile a S.E. il Ministro della Marina*, Roma: Tipografia Ditta Ludovico Cecchini, 1886; *Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana al 31 Dicembre 1914. Relazione del Direttore generale della marina mercantile a S.E. il Ministro per i Trasporti Marittimi e Ferroviari*, Roma: Officina Poligrafica Italiana, 1916.

To contextualise Liguria within its national environment, Table 1.2 shows how in 1865, few years after the state unification, almost half of the Italian merchant fleet (49,84% of the tonnage) was owned in Liguria⁶⁰. The leading role of Ligurian shipowners was partially the result of belonging to the Kingdom of Sardinia (the political agent of the Italian peninsula reunification) since the Congress of Vienna (1814) when the centuries-old Republic of Genoa was finally erased from the European political maps. Throughout the following chapters, the pivotal contribution of the 1830s-1860s decades to improving Ligurian shipping will be outlined extensively. However,

⁵⁹ P. Calcagno, *Savona, porto di Piemonte*, p. 492.

⁶⁰ Data processed from *Statistica del Regno d'Italia. Movimento della navigazione nei porti del Regno. Anno 1867*, Firenze: Stabilimento G. Civelli, 1868.

notwithstanding the causes that turned Liguria into Italy's main maritime region, data evidence confirms that few years after the unification, the majority of the merchant fleet was detained there. Twenty years later, in 1885, the Ligurian share had increased to 52,44% of the whole Italian figure⁶¹. Finally, in 1914, at the eve of the First World War, 65,30% of the tonnage was registered in Liguria. For a more accurate perspective, to shed light on the effective distribution of the merchant fleet throughout the Italian peninsula, Table 1.3 relates to the tonnage owned in each maritime area, limitedly to the steamers and sailing ships registered for the Mediterranean cabotage and oceanic navigation. Therefore, the exclusion of coastal navigation and fishing responds to the necessity to impose a size limit to the vessels taken into consideration since their widespread dissemination across the Italian coastlines would have unnecessarily complicated the framework⁶².

Table 1.3. Percentage by area of the Italian merchant fleet for oceanic shipping and Mediterranean cabotage (1885).

<i>Region/city</i>	<i>% steam tonnage</i>	<i>% sailing tonnage</i>
<i>Liguria</i>	57,74%	69,77%
<i>Genoa</i>	54,79%	18,77%
<i>Camogli</i>	-	26,12%
<i>Savona</i>	1,85%	-
<i>Campania</i>	-	21,90%
<i>Sicily</i>	33,71%	3,61%
<i>Palermo</i>	33,08%	1,15%
<i>Veneto</i>	-	2,30%
<i>Tuscany</i>	2,78%	1,72%
<i>Livorno</i>	2,78%	1,32%
<i>Puglia</i>	4,99%	0,34%

⁶¹ Data processed from *Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile al 31 dicembre 1885. Relazione del direttore generale della marina mercantile a S.E. il Ministro della Marina*, Roma: Tipografia Ditta Ludovico Cecchini, 1886.

⁶² See, Appendix I.1.

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<i>Bari</i>	4,99%	-
<i>Sardinia</i>	-	0,20%
<i>Lazio</i>	0,78%	0,15%
<i>Marche</i>	-	0,01%

Source: Data processed from Appendix 1.1.


Table 1.3 describes the major Italian regional areas for sail and steam shipowning: data evidence underlines Ligurian shipping's pivotal position within this framework. The conspicuous concentration of steamships in port-cities (the shipowners living in Genoa, Palermo, Bari, Livorno and Savona held 97,49% of the Italian steam tonnage) offers illuminating insights on the divergent characteristics between sail and steam shipping. Firstly, steamships were primarily found in Genoa and Palermo (respectively 54,79% and 33,08%) since Rubattino and Florio's headquarters were placed there. Up to 1881, Rubattino and Florio had represented the two major Italian shipping companies; then, they joined into a partnership under the Navigazione Generale Italiana (NGI) name⁶³. In Genoa were also registered the ships belonging to the shipping companies La Veloce (8.838 net tons), Carlo Raggio (4.017 net tons) and Schiaffino & Solari (3.068 net tons). Then, there was the shipping company Puglia (5.650 net tons), based in Bari, who competed on Adriatic cabotage with the Austrian Lloyd. Finally, in Livorno and Savona could be found respectively 7 and 3 steamers operated through single-ship enterprises⁶⁴.

On the other hand, as depicted more clearly in Map 1.1, sailing tonnage was dispersed along the coastline in several small-scale seafaring communities.

⁶³ See, Appendix 1.1.

⁶⁴ *Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile al 31 dicembre 1885*, pp. 65-66.

Map 1.3. Major Italian places by region for owned sailing tonnage in 1885 (> 1000 tons).




Source: Data processed from Appendix 1.1.

Map 1.3 visualises the concentration of sailing tonnage in two main regional areas, Liguria – where Genoa’s and Camogli’s overwhelming leadership obscures the sizeable figures of the nearby maritime communities (see Map 1.4) – and Campania, which mainly revolved around the Sorrento peninsula and the island of Procida (see detail in Map 1.1)⁶⁵. Then, Sicily could also count on small-scale communities whose fleets were not at the same levels as those of Liguria’s and Campania’s seafaring towns (see APPENDIX 1.1.). Then, aiming to focus on the Ligurian maritime region to frame Camogli’s position and function within its organisation, Map 1.4 represents a necessary tool of analysis.

⁶⁵ See, Appendix 1.1.

Map 1.4. Ligurian cities and towns by tonnage owned (1885).



Source: Data processed from Appendix 1.1.

Map 1.4 highlights how sailing tonnage was distributed along the coasts of Liguria. For this study, the region has been divided into six sub-regional areas (from west to east): the Porto Maurizio-Western Riviera (Italian for coastline), at the French borderline, comprehending the communities of Sanremo, Oneglia and Porto Maurizio; the Savona-Western Riviera, nearby the second port-city of the region (Loano, Pietra Ligure, Spotorno, Savona and Varazze); the Genoa-Western Riviera (Prà, Pegli and Sampierdarena); the port city of Genoa; the Genoa-Eastern Riviera, stretching between the capital and the Portofino promontory (Quinto, Nervi, Bogliasco, Sori, Recco, Camogli, Portofino, Santa Margherita⁶⁶, Rapallo); the Spezia-Eastern Riviera, going up to Tuscany (Zoagli, Chiavari, Lavagna, Sestri Levante, Deiva Marina, Bonassola, Lerici, La Spezia and Portovenere).

Map 1.4 shows how the Ligurian fleet was concentrated in two leading centres, Genoa and Camogli, which retained 64,34% of the Ligurian merchant fleet altogether⁶⁷. Then, shipownership lay in several seafaring communities scattered along the eastern and western shores of the region: in

⁶⁶ For a few details about the maritime history of this seafaring community, see: P. Berti, “Appunti per la storia della marineria margheritina”, *Microstorie*, No. 1, 2004, pp. 94-102.


⁶⁷ See, Appendix 1.1.

particular, within the area between Genoa and the promontory of Portofino (Genoa-Eastern Riviera) can be found some major places, such as Nervi, Bogliasco and Recco which, together with Chiavari – a few kilometres beyond this sub-regional division – held 17,37% of the tonnage⁶⁸. On the west, Savona's port city was rivalled by Pietra Ligure and Loano, small-scale communities grown in fishing and later specialised in high-seas shipping (they owned respectively 12 and 11 vessels suitable to oceanic transports)⁶⁹.

1.3.3. SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY

The concentration of shipping property in the hands of the Ligurian shipowners was echoed in the development of the national shipbuilding industry, which was centred mainly in Liguria (at least from the moment of the Italian reunification until the 1880s, when the transition from sail to steam and the global shipping crisis hit this economic sector severely).

Figure 1.1. Construction of Italian merchant tonnage between 1862 and 1888 (by region).



Source: Data processed from Appendix 1.2.

⁶⁸ Data processed from APPENDIX 1.1.

⁶⁹ Idem.

Figure 1.1 takes into account the merchant tonnage discharged from Italian shipyards between 1862 and 1888; 72,99% of it was built in Liguria, followed at a great distance by Campania (18,71%)⁷⁰. The causes underpinning the rising trend observed from 1862 and culminated in 1869 rooted in the expansion of the Italian shipping business and led into a phase of generous investments toward new constructions destined to the handling of the grain trade from the Black Sea and, in the latest years of the period, to the establishment in transatlantic routes, in particular in the connections with Latin America⁷¹. Then, as the present thesis will outline with specific regard to Camogli, from the mid-1870s, the whole Italian maritime sector entered into a profound crisis, which, as a by-product, ruinously affected shipbuilding.


Unfortunately, the aggregate Italian statistics about shipbuilding do not provide an all-embracing account which may take into consideration all the maritime places of Liguria; instead, they focus on the most productive shipbuilding centres which, in the Ligurian region, were identified in Sestri Ponente, Varazze, Savona, Chiavari, Lavagna, Loano and Lerici (ordered by importance). Indeed, 79,28% of the Ligurian-built tonnage came from shipyards located in these places⁷².

⁷⁰ See Appendix 1.2.

⁷¹ See, Chapter 4.

⁷² See Appendix 1.2.

Map 1.5. Leading shipbuilding centres in Liguria (1862-1885).



Source: Data processed from Appendix 1.2.

The examination of Map 1.5 allows us to further step forward in the analysis of the Ligurian maritime system and the specialisation of different centres into specific business sectors.

The three leading shipbuilding centres were based in the Western Riviera (Sestri Ponente, Varazze and Savona), lying between Genoa and Savona. To the figure of their constructions must also be added the production of Loano and of those which, in the aggregate statistics, are labelled as “other shipyards in the Ligurian Western Riviera”: from the total result (83,03% of the Ligurian-built tonnage), data evidence highlights how the shipbuilding industry was centred in the Western Riviera, as opposed to shipownership which, instead, was mainly found in the seafaring communities belonging to the Eastern Riviera (see Map 1.2). The outcomes underline a neat discrepancy in the geographical distribution of shipbuilding and shipownership along the Ligurian territory, thus confirming the high degree of specialisation and functional interdependence between two different sub-regional areas.

However, a deeper level of analysis may take into account the specific courses run by some of these shipbuilding centres. Almost everywhere in Liguria, the shipbuilding industry lied deeply in the long-standing tradition of wooden constructions: the majority of shipyards did not consist in permanent sites, but, on the contrary, they were disposed on the beach on a seasonal basis depending on the needs. Another relevant characteristic of Ligurian shipbuilding was the

segmentation of the activities: each shipbuilding centre could host several concurrent shipyards, with rare cases of centralisation or even collaboration between different shipbuilders. A partial exception to this framework was constituted by the *Cantieri Reali della Foce*, located at the mouth of the torrent Bisagno, lying eastward to Genoa's walls. Founded by Napoleon during his domination over Liguria, this public shipyard occupied a long-standing construction site from which several ships were launched in the late middle ages. From 1815 onwards, after the establishment of Savoy's rule on Liguria, this shipyard became the primary construction site for the navy, though it is not rare to find merchant vessels built there⁷³.

Moreover, up to the advent of iron and steel ship constructions, the Ligurian shipbuilding sector was almost self-sufficient for what concerned raw materials: timber was found locally or otherwise was taken from Sardinia and Piedmont; ironware was produced in the inner valleys of Liguria (Sassello, Rossiglione, Masone); cordage and canvas handcrafting represented a traditionally feminine activity in most maritime towns. The lack of copper represented the primary deficiency for the Ligurian shipyards, a shortcoming to which the State remedied through custom exemptions⁷⁴.

Lying in the western Riviera, a few kilometres far from Savona, Varazze represents the most remarkable sample for delineating Ligurian shipbuilding's trajectory⁷⁵. Since the early modern period, in Varazze was concentrated a significant share of the Republic ship-constructions: the activities were in the hands of a select group of families which formed authentic shipbuilding dynasties throughout the centuries. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, about seventy shipwrights and thirty-six caulkers were active there: according to some calculations, the whole

⁷³ U. Marchese, "L'Industria Ligure delle Costruzioni Navali dal 1816 al 1859", *Archivio Economico dell'Unificazione Italiana*, No. 7:1, 1957, p. 1-5.

⁷⁴ U. Marchese, "L'Industria Ligure", p. 5; M. Quaini, *I boschi della Liguria e la loro utilizzazione per i cantieri navali: note di geografia storica*, Firenze: Tipografia R. Coppini & Co., 1968, pp. 1-32.

⁷⁵ For the early modern period, see: L. Gatti, *Navi e cantieri della Repubblica di Genova. Secoli XVI-XVIII*, Genoa: Brigatti, 1999; L. Gatti and F. Ciciliot, *Costruttori e navi. Maestri d'ascia e navi di Varazze al tempo della Repubblica di Genova (secoli XVI-XVIII)*, Savona: Ferraris, 2004.

industry employed more than three hundred people in the sole Varazze⁷⁶. Between 1816 and 1855, from Varazze were released more than 3.000 tons annually, for a number of constructions oscillating between 10 and 30 ships per year. The production boomed in the next two decades (1856-1865 and 1866-1875), reaching respectively 5.203 and 10.634 tons/year. Nevertheless, from the 1850s, the productivity of Varazze's shipyards was surpassed by that of Sestri Ponente where, in the same period, were built respectively 9.182 and 21.498 tons per year⁷⁷ (see Table 1.4).

Table 1.4. Comparative production of Varazze and Sestri Ponente between 1816 and 1885 (in ton/year)

<i>Years</i>	<i>Varazze</i>	<i>Sestri Ponente</i>
<i>1816-1825</i>	2.998	37
<i>1826-1835</i>	3.625	42
<i>1836-1845</i>	2.769	223
<i>1846-1855</i>	3.804	1.421
<i>1856-1865</i>	5.203	9.182
<i>1866-1875</i>	10.634	21.498
<i>1876-1885</i>	3.162	4.621

Source: Data processed from U. Marchese, "L'Industria Ligure", p. 11, Prospetto F

1.3.4. MARITIME LABOUR

For the development of the shipping business, manpower represents another indispensable constituent. Therefore, its availability, the balance ruling the encounter between demands and supplies and the territorial distribution of labourers will be tackled in the present sub-section, with the twofold purpose to verify the role of Liguria in the national context and to investigate the

⁷⁶ L. Gatti, "Un raggio di convenienza", pp. 100-101.

⁷⁷ U. Marchese, "L'Industria Ligure", p. 11, Prospetto F.

creation of market dialectics between port-cities and different seafaring communities lying in the region.


Before addressing the presence of maritime labour pools throughout the Ligurian territory, it is worth advancing some preliminary considerations about the institutional framework ruling seafaring professions and their distribution along the Italian peninsula. According to the 1865 Italian Code for the Merchant Marine, maritime labourers were divided into two distinct categories⁷⁸: the seagoing personnel was enlisted in the first category; shipbuilders and the related professions were comprehended in the second one. Although such classification corresponds to the organisation of seafaring labour after the Italian reunification, its basic structure and characteristics were inherited by the 1827 Sardinian Code, which, in turn, was rooted into the French model, developed in the late eighteenth century with the *Ordonnances de la marine* (1689) and broadly imitated by the institutions of the Republic of Genoa and, later, by the Kingdom of Sardinia⁷⁹.

Within the statistic publications produced by the Italian merchant marine's direction, it is possible to reconstruct the comparative evolution of these categories in a chronological perspective, also concerning their geographical segmentation.

⁷⁸ *Codice per la marina mercantile del Regno d'Italia*, Milano: Fratelli Burali, 1866, art. 18, pp. 11-12.

⁷⁹ J. Captier, *Étude historique et économique sur l'inscription maritime*, Paris: V. Giard & E. Brière, 1907; P. Villiers and P. Currelier, "Du système des Classes à l'Inscription Maritime", *Revue Historique des Armées*, 147/2, (1982), 44-53.


Figure 1.2. Italian maritime labourers enrolled in the first and second categories of sea workers (1866-1914)



Source: *Statistica del Regno d'Italia. Movimento della navigazione nei porti del Regno. Anno 1867*, Firenze: Stabilimento G. Civelli, 1868; *Sulle condizioni della Marina Mercantile Italiana al 31 dicembre. Relazioni del Direttore generale della Marina Mercantile a S. E. il Ministro della Marina*, Roma, 1881-1914.

Figure 1.2 charts the progression of Italian maritime labourers between 1866 and 1914; as shown, data evidence suggest how, after a contraction occurred in the 1880s, in the long run, both the categories grew steadily until the outbreak of the First World War. Notwithstanding the trend of maritime labourers in general, taking into account a specific year (1886) might serve better to the purpose of our geographical and regional-based analysis.

Map 1.6. Maritime labourers in Italy (1881).



Source: *Sulle condizioni della Marina Mercantile Italiana al 31 dicembre. Relazioni del Direttore generale della Marina Mercantile a S. E. il Ministro della Marina, Roma, 1881.*

Map 1.6, indeed, displays how maritime labour supply mainly depended on three regions (Sicily, Liguria and Campania). Whereas Sicily and Campania were highly populated and, there, maritime business combined with more relevant economic sectors, the relatively limited dimensions of the Ligurian territory and its small population lead us to reconsider and contextualise the figures of absolute numbers. Although, in 1881, Liguria provided 22,18% of the Italian maritime manpower, its share over the total population covered only 3,2% of the national statistics⁸⁰. Therefore, to the objective to underline Ligurian maritimisation, Table 1.5 presents the share of maritime labourers over the total population in Liguria, Campania and Sicily.

⁸⁰ L. Lo Basso, *Dal vento al carbone. La metamorfosi del lavoro marittimo in Italia nell'età della transizione (1880-1920)*, Novi Ligure: Città del Silenzio, 2020, p. 36.

Table 1.5. Maritime labourers over the total population in Liguria, Campania and Sicily (1881).

<i>Region</i>	<i>Maritime labourers</i>	<i>Total population</i>	<i>% of maritime labourers over the total population</i>
<i>Liguria</i>	39113	935476	4,18%
<i>Campania</i>	41098	2659688	1,55%
<i>Sicily</i>	43737	2933154	1,49%

Source: *Sulle condizioni della Marina Mercantile Italiana al 31 dicembre. Relazioni del Direttore generale della Marina Mercantile a S. E. il Ministro della Marina*, Roma, 1881.

The results emerging from Table 1.5 outline the neater dependency of the Ligurian economy upon shipping business compared to that of Campania and Sicily. Furthermore, a closer gaze to the specific Ligurian situation, as developed in Table 1.6, can confirm the sub-regional interdependence between different parts of the region and the substantial division of Liguria in different areas.

Table 1.6. Maritime labourers in Liguria by categories (1881).

<i>Maritime districts</i>	<i>1st category</i>	<i>2nd category</i>
<i>Porto Maurizio</i>	9,58%	4,03%
<i>Savona</i>	10,13%	26,60%
<i>Genoa</i>	55,88%	59,84%
<i>Spezia</i>	24,41%	9,53%

Source: *Sulle condizioni della Marina Mercantile Italiana al 31 dicembre. Relazioni del Direttore generale della Marina Mercantile a S. E. il Ministro della Marina*, Roma, 1881.

In particular: the sub-regional district corresponding to Savona (Western Liguria) covered a much greater share of the Ligurian maritime labourers enlisted to the second category (shipbuilders) than those of the first one (seagoing personnel). These data are in line with the shipbuilding industry's extraordinary development in the same area, especially in the shipyards of Savona and Varazze, as outlined in Map 1.3. Conversely, the opposite disproportion is observed in La Spezia's case (Eastern

Riviera), where seafarers outnumbered shipbuilders, artisans and craftsmen. Apart from that, most of the population engaging in maritime professions resided in the district of Genoa, which was very wide in extension and included – not mentioning the leading Italian port-city – prominent seafaring communities such as Camogli and hosted remarkable shipbuilding centres, such as Sestri Ponente.

1.4. Camogli: the port, the town, the people

Map 1.7. Camogli and its surroundings



Located ca. 30 kilometres far from Genoa, Camogli is stretched along a small coastal line delimited by Punta Gaiassa on the west and Punta Chiappa on the east; at the back, it is pressed by mountains. Few and sparse information are available about the early development of Camogli until the late eighteenth century. Its first mention dates back to the 11th century about Saint Giovanni Bono's origins, who was said to come from the "*Vila Camuli*". Then, respectively in 1145 and 1158, appear two different documents: the first one recognises Genoa Archbishop's rights to levy taxes from Camogli; the second one witnesses, for the very first time, a local shipping contract between Primo

de' Camogli and a certain Bertolotto⁸¹. From that moment onwards, various documents attest to the earlier maritime activities of the community's people, who handled traffics with Provence, Spain and even Flanders⁸².

1.4.1. PORT AND THE INFRASTRUCTURES

Until the early seventeenth century, despite the clear maritime vocation of the community, the port of Camogli was limited to a mere anchoring point, with no infrastructural elements which would serve as a repair for the incoming vessels. Then, after a series of interventions in the first decades, a small area was delimited between the Castle and the residential part.

Figure 1.3. Camogli in the 17th century (1624).



Source: *Pianta del luogo di Camogli* (15 luglio 1624) from the geographical collection *Topographia* kept at the State Archives of Genoa.

⁸¹ All these documents are mentioned in G.B.R. Figari and S. Bagnato Bonuccelli, *La marina mercantile camogliese dalla guerra di Crimea all'Inchiesta Parlamentare Boselli: 1855-1882*, Genova: Tolozzi, 1983, p. 1.

⁸² Idem, pp. 2-3.

Notwithstanding these preliminary measures, for the whole early modern period, the port of Camogli must present limited capacity if, still in 1836, it was said to contain no more than 20 vessels between 50 and 200 tons⁸³. The port had already been interested by remarkable interventions during the Napoleonic era, when the structural improvement of Camogli's harbour was considered a priority within the grand campaign of public works in Liguria designed by the French administration⁸⁴.


Indeed, Napoleon's interest in Camogli and its port were framed within a broader design of reorganisation of the Ligurian port system, including Genoa itself. Camogli was labelled as a «commercial scale of public interest»⁸⁵ and, therefore, occupied a remarkable role within the French projects for the Ligurian maritime trade. The administrators' primary concerns were: a) the reparation and prolongation of the dock; b) the drainage of the seabed from stones and other materials; c) the reinforcement of the breakwater.

⁸³ G. Casalis, *Dizionario geografico storico statistico commerciale degli stati di S. M. il Re di Sardegna*, vol. VIII, Torino: 1836, p. 362.

⁸⁴ See, in general: D. Presotto, *Aspetti dell'economia ligure in età napoleonica: i lavori pubblici*, Genova: Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 1967. More specifically on Camogli, see: A. Pellegrini, "Napoleone e il porto di Camogli", in G.B.R. Figari (ed.), *Camogli da borgo a città*, pp. 133-174.

⁸⁵ *Idem*, p. 139.

Figure 1.4. The port of Camogli (1858).



Source: A. Manzini, "Camogli città "moderna". Da approdo a porto – da borgata a città", p. 152.

Nevertheless, already in 1847, the port was undersized to satisfy the needs of local shipowners: according to the contemporary geographer De Bartolomeis, «one hundred and thirty big ships belonged to this port [of Camogli], which could hardly host ten of them»⁸⁶. The activities, including repair and naval maintenance, were transferred to Genoa, and Camogli was downgraded to anchoring for smaller vessels. Nonetheless, the project of Gaetano Mortola, son of Biagio, can still be dated in the early 1880s. In 1881, he wrote to the Parliamentary Commission for the Inquiry about the conditions of the merchant marine:

Since we lack a safe harbour where to repair our vessels, and because the port of Genoa is not suitable to allocate a specific area to these operations without incurring various issues, and because there is no safe harbour along the coast between Genoa and Spezia for those ships which may need refuge under difficult

⁸⁶ L. De Bartolomeis, *Notizie topografiche e statistiche sugli stati sardi dedicate a A.S.S.R.M. Carlo Alberto*, Torino: Tipografia Chirio e Mina, 1847, p. 1491.

weather conditions, I have done the technical studies for the construction of a breakwater in the place called *Giazze* [...].⁸⁷

Then, Gaetano Mortola admitted that, despite having already obtained the authorisation to form a society for the construction, the incoming crisis of the Italian merchant marine had discouraged him from embarking on such a costly enterprise (calculated in about 400.000 lire)⁸⁸. According to G.B. Ferrari, Mortola's project was markedly ambitious: the breakwater was designed to close the whole town from the easternmost neighbourhood (San Rocco) to obtain a port that could even rival Genoa⁸⁹.

Then, local administrators carried out various projects to increase the town's total building area and improve land connections with the nearby communities. These efforts concerned the construction of vehicular roads at the back of the residential area, mainly: this strip of land was seldom populated, but the terrains were usually cultivated with fruit trees or olives. Thus, it is possible to observe various expropriation of lands and pre-existing buildings for infrastructural purposes. The intricate negotiations between the town council and various shipowners (including Erasmo Schiaffino, founder of the *Mutua*) for the makeover of the «road at the back of Camogli», which was widened and straightened, might offer an example⁹⁰.

However, notwithstanding the efforts toward road transports, the actual improvement of Camogli's communication network with the rest of the region passed necessarily through the railway's construction⁹¹. When the first projects to build a railway line to connect Genoa with the Eastern Riviera towns were designed, the town council of Camogli struggled to obtain its passage through the town. The conformation of the area was not very attractive in terms of cost-effectiveness. Hills

⁸⁷ ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Commissione parlamentare per l'Inchiesta sulle condizioni della marina mercantile, b. 4, f. 36, b. 2.

⁸⁸ *Ibidem*.


⁸⁹ G.B. Ferrari, *La città dei mille bianchi velieri*, pp. 420-421.

⁹⁰ ASGe, *Notai II sezione*, b. 176, n. 42.

⁹¹ About the construction of the railway in Camogli, see the monumental and well-documented essay of Vittorio Bagnasco: V. Bagnasco, "La ferrovia a Camogli: la locomotiva a vapore dopo la vela", in G.B.R. Figari (ed.), *Camogli da borgo a città*, pp. 21-86.

and heights closed the town both eastward and westward, which complicated the construction and raised the costs. Since 1856, the mayors of Camogli and the neighbouring town of Santa Margherita concerted actions against the idea to bypass the two towns by connecting Recco and Rapallo directly⁹². Indeed, these towns opposed the realisation of this project, which would have hampered their growth and favoured Recco and Rapallo's old-dominating centres.

Map 1.8. Railway track between Recco and Rapallo and the alternative project.



Indeed, the two alternatives' expected costs differed consistently: the inland track between Recco and Rapallo was almost flat and required few investments while comprehending Camogli and Santa Margherita would have raised the costs for excavating numerous tunnels. In 1861, the town council committed itself to contributing to the fixed capital with 110.000 lire to satisfy the construction company's requests, which would have opted for the flatland track. Finally, the line was completed in 1868.

⁹² Idem, p. 22.

Notwithstanding the contributions to the construction, the town commitment to this enterprise can also be evaluated from the data of expropriations, whose costs reached more than 200.000 lire. The analysis of the nature of the expropriated land and their owners provided the following results: 64,81% of the land was cultivated with olive oils, 16,67% with vineyards, and 10,18% chestnut grove⁹³. Besides, the landowners belonging to the shipowning class covered almost 65%⁹⁴. Finally, few words should be spent on the utilisation of the railway by the community itself: due to the nature of Camogli's shipping business, already in the early 1870s, railway connections took little or no part in the development of the local maritime activities. As said for the harbour, Camogli's shipping business was no more tied with the community's original environment. The voyages departed from Genoa, and the practice of cross-trade kept the ships outside the Mediterranean for extended periods. Nevertheless, the daily railway connections with Genoa were instrumental to transforming traditional practices: already in the early 1870s, passenger traffic reached outstanding levels. It has been calculated that more than one hundred and fifty commuters moved every day to Genoa for work. People's overwhelming inflow forced the railway administration to enlarge the station just three years after the inauguration (1871)⁹⁵. In this period, many shipowners settled their activities in Genoa, where they opened their own shipping offices; there, with the vital support of cable telegraph, the most various shipping operations were held.

1.4.2. THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT

There is one town, Camoglia, with its little harbour on the sea, hundreds of feet below the road; where families of mariners live, who, time out of mind, have owned coasting vessels in that place, and have traded to Spain and elsewhere. Seen from the road above, it is like a tiny model on the margin of the dimpled water, shining in the sun. Descended into, by the winding mule tracks, it is a perfect miniature of a primitive seafaring town; the saltiest, roughest, most

⁹³ Idem, p. 32.

⁹⁴ Idem, p. 36.

⁹⁵ Idem, p. 46.

piratical little place that ever was seen. Great rusty iron rings and mooring chains, capstans, and fragments of old masts and spars, choke up the way; hardy rough weather boats, and seamen's clothing, flutter in the little harbour or are drawn out on the sunny stones to dry; on the parapet of the rude pier, a few amphibious looking fellows lie asleep, with their legs dangling over the wall, as though earth or water were all one to them, and if they slipped in, they would float away, dozing comfortably among the fishes; the church is bright with trophies of the sea, and votive offerings, in commemoration of escape from storm and shipwreck. The dwellings not immediately abutting on the harbour are approached by blind low archways, and by crooked steps, as if in darkness and in difficulty of access they should be like holds of ships, or inconvenient cabins under water; and everywhere, there is a smell of fish, and seaweed, and old rope.⁹⁶

Inspired by his visit to Camogli in 1844, these words of Charles Dickens portrayed the Ligurian town before the shipping boom. Indeed, the vast urbanisation of Camogli took place from the 1850s onwards⁹⁷. At that time, the positive results of maritime activities were directed to the improvement of the town infrastructures, both to the sea (the harbour) and to the countryside (vehicular roads and railway), the latter one described by an Italian traveller through «the immense number of fruit trees of any kind, which adorn the upper hills of Camogli»⁹⁸.

As partially illustrated in Figure 1.3, in the early modern period, most of the urban agglomerate was concentrated in the area prospicient to the Castle. However, it is only from the mid-eighteenth century that it is possible to obtain a clearer picture of the town structure. In her pivotal study about


⁹⁶ C. Dickens, *Pictures from Italy*, London: Bradbury and Evans, 1846, pp. 144-145.

⁹⁷ See: A. Manzini, "Camogli città "moderna". Da approdo a porto – da borgata a città", *Bollettino Ligustico*, No. 22, 1970, pp. 137-157; C. Campodonico and S. Ferrari, "Camogli. Le vicende urbanistiche", in C. Campodonico and M. Doria (eds.), *Camogli: persistenza e trasformazioni di un borgo di mare*, Milano: Motta Cultura s.r.l., 2009, pp. 10-19.

⁹⁸ D. Bertolotti, *Viaggio nella Liguria marittima*, Torino: Tip. Eredi Botta, 1834, p. 42.

Camogli's urban environment, Anna Manzini drew a fundamental map about the town configuration in 1773, which comprehended the original toponyms.

Figure 1.5. Camogli's urban structure in 1773.



As shown in Figure 1.5, still in the late eighteenth century, most of the community was based along a narrow coastline nearby the Castle. Therefore, the proper town development occurred throughout the nineteenth century due to the economic rise of the community and the concomitant demographic growth, which interested Camogli in the “golden age”. Between the 1850s and 1860s, the internal road network was revolutionised by constructing two parallel passages on the eastern side of the town, which rapidly became the main roads of Camogli, as they are today⁹⁹. This impressed an east-northeast vector to Camogli's urban development, whose area was gradually enriched by new rows of buildings and, later on, the railway station, city hall, and theatre¹⁰⁰.

⁹⁹ These passages and other transformations which directly interested the development of Camogli's road networks are lucidly outlined in C. Campodonico, “Il borgo di Camogli nei decenni centrali dell'Ottocento attraverso la classificazione delle strade”, *Microstorie*, No. 4, 2010, pp. 173-198.

¹⁰⁰ C. Campodonico and S. Ferrari, “Camogli. Le vicende urbanistiche”, pp. 10-12.

Figure 1.6. Camogli's urban structure in 1890.



Apart from the nuclear centre of Camogli, to the community economic and social life participated also the inhabitants of two peripheral fractions, Ruta and San Rocco, lying beyond the eastern extremes of Camogli's original settlement, which were built around two sanctuaries (respectively the *Chiesa del Sacro Cuore di Gesù*, founded in the 13th century, and the *Chiesa di San Rocco*, built in the 19th century upon an ancient chapel dated to the 15th century). From an administrative point of view, these places were englobed into Camogli's territory after its upgrade to a city's status in 1871¹⁰¹.

1.4.3. THE PEOPLE

In 1805, French governors surveyed the world under the Imperial administration, thus laying the groundwork for modern demographic statistics. In that year, the town of Camogli counted 4031 inhabitants, to whom must be added 900 people living in Ruta, still separated from the centre. Before this date, very little data are available: the only information provided by Carla Campodonico in her seminal article about Camogli's demography speak about the existence of a sixteenth-century count, based on households, on whose estimation the author implies that in Camogli resided

¹⁰¹ C. Campodonico, *Sviluppo demografico e statistiche della Camogli ottocentesca*, in G.B.R Figari and R. Buelli, *Camogli paese modello... : 1815-1915: uomini e storie del Risorgimento: catalogo [della mostra]: Camogli, Castello della Dragonara, 30 luglio - 30 ottobre 2005*, Genova: Corigraf, 2005, pp. 29-43.

slightly less than one thousand people¹⁰². After the Napoleonic census, then, plenty of details about Camogli's demographic evolution in the first half of the century are provided by the Savoy statistical inquiries over the territory, the first of which, for Camogli, took place in 1822-1823. From a diachronic perspective, the population slightly decreased from 1805, as Camogli and Ruta hosted 4840 people altogether. However, most valuable are the professional categorisation that emerges from this first survey: in 1822, the portion of Camogli's population engaging in seafaring activities was already very remarkable, as it accounted for 31,12% of the total inhabitants (1506 seafarers divided into categories, see Table 1.7)¹⁰³. Still, in 1828, the number of seafarers was paralleled by another professional category, farmers, who covered 27,95 % of the population; fewer were merchants (2,47%) and craftsmen (1,59%).

Table 1.7. Maritime population of Camogli (1822-1828).

	<i>Masters</i>	<i>Cabotage-masters</i>	<i>Sailors</i>	<i>Ship-boys</i>
1822	78	73	1028	327
1828	75	56	1146	508

Source: C. Campodonico, "Un borgo marinaro in epoca preunitaria", p. 13; Idem, *Sviluppo demografico*, p. 31.


Table 1.7 shows the people employed into different categories of maritime professions in 1822 and 1828. Within this six-year timespan, noticeable is the considerable increase in the number of ship-boys, which well-represent the Ligurian town's coeval demographic characteristics: indeed, Camogli's population was markedly young and, therefore, it was expanding. On the same matter, it is relevant how throughout a decade (1828-1837), births outnumbered deaths by far (2068 to 1414): the results were displayed in the constant growth of the overall population that, already in 1838, reached 5809 inhabitants and that was liable to further increases. From a broader sub-regional

¹⁰² The author refers to the data provided in the chronicles of Agostino Giustiniani, published in 1537: A. Giustiniani, *Castigatissimi Annali, con la loro copiosa Tavola della Eccelsa et Illustrissima Repubblica di Genova, da fideli et approvati scriptori per el Reverendo Monsignor Giustiniani Genovese Vescovo di Nebio accuratamente raccolti*, Genova: Antonio Bellono, 1537.

¹⁰³ On 1822-1823 Savoy statistics, see: C. Campodonico, "Un borgo marinaro in epoca preunitaria: Camogli nelle statistiche del 1822-1823", *Microstorie*, No. 2, 2006, pp. 9-27.

perspective, Camogli occupied a respectable position in terms of population: although from an administrative point of view, it was subordinated to Recco, Camogli outnumbered its inhabitants (5809 as opposed to 4557)¹⁰⁴. The situation was slightly different beyond the Portofino promontory, since Santa Margherita, Rapallo, Chiavari and Sestri Levante all were more populated than Camogli¹⁰⁵. However, the economic boom which the town underwent at mid-century, as we will see, substantially contributed to an exponential demographic rise, which, recorded by the first national census of the Italian Kingdom (7380 in 1861), reached its apex in the early 1880s (10851 inhabitants in 1881)¹⁰⁶.

Figure 1.7. The population of Camogli (1805-1911).



Source: C. Campodonico, *Sviluppo demografico*, pp. 29-43; Istituto Centrale di Statistica (ISTAT), *Comuni e loro popolazione ai censimenti dal 1861 al 1951*, Roma: Azienda Beneventana Tipografica Editoriale, 1960, pp. 53-54.

¹⁰⁴ C. Campodonico, *Sviluppo demografico*, p. 32.

¹⁰⁵ *Idem*.

¹⁰⁶

Figure 1.7 illustrates the demographic evolution of Camogli throughout the nineteenth century (1805-1911). As shown, the Ligurian community reached its apex in 1881, when the resident population exceeded ten thousand people. Afterwards, and it will be fundamental to compare with Camogli's economic performances as they will be outlined in the next chapter, the population began to decrease: the human drainage, as we will see, was channelled into two primary directions, Genoa and Latin America.

1.5. Conclusions

Although conceiving the Ligurian maritime region without Genoa would be impossible, it is important to outline how there was life outside the main city, at least in terms of maritime activities. Beyond being the main port on the regional and, then, national scale, Genoa did manifest a vibrant shipping community, engaged in shipownership and shipbuilding; however, it was rivalled and complemented in the management of these activities by the industriousness of smaller places. Already in the age of the Republic, these minor communities were able to carve out a remarkable role for themselves either in fishing, seaborne trade or shipbuilding; then, when, in the nineteenth century, Liguria ascended to new economic horizons, they retained their role for long until, only on the eve of the First World War, they gave way to the greater scale.

In its extraordinary evolution, Camogli tells us an exemplar story of this kind.

2. Camogli's seafaring activities in the late 18th century

2.1. Introduction

The integration of Camogli in the international shipping business took place in the 1830s when its ships and seafarers got involved in the Black Sea grain trade. Nonetheless, before directly addressing its evolution in that phase, this chapter aims to contextualise the first steps of Camogli as a maritime community in the geo-historical framework to which it belonged, the multifaceted scenario of the two Ligurian rivieras. The history of Liguria in the late eighteenth century is addressed to illustrate the socio-economic environment in which Camogli asserted itself as a leading shipping centre. In order to do so, the chapter highlights the local maritime activities, from fishing to long-cabotage to identify the distinguishing traits which concurred to the future success of the community.

The first section will analyse the size of the fleet (number of ships and tonnage) and the types of ships. This analysis will illustrate the character of shipping activity of Camogli and the market orientation (trade routes, commodities) along with the perspectives and the structural limits.

Then, the maritime activities of Camogli are directly taken into account, under the distinction between fishing and cabotage. Specific attention is paid to the transport of charcoal from Maremma (in Tuscany), which engaged the seafaring population of Camogli in a long-standing trade lasting up to the end of the nineteenth century.

2.2. The Camogli merchant fleet

The data are drawn from the records of the arrivals at the port of Genoa, which the Maritime Health Authority of the Republic collected¹⁰⁷: these records provide information about ships, captains, routes and cargoes. Nonetheless, the elements to identify the vessels are limited to the name and type, with no reference to the tonnage or serial numbers. Therefore, absolute certainty about the identity of the ship is not obtainable. The data are related to the arrivals in port, or ships' voyages, without enabling to distinguish one ship from another. Name and type are the sole details provided, but they are of little help to the identification because, still in this period, most of the ships carried identical religious names, deeply connected with local devotion¹⁰⁸.

Nevertheless, the scarcity of details and information does not inhibit from illustrating in the most veritable way the main features of the fleet of Camogli, as well as its presumable relevance in the Ligurian maritime framework¹⁰⁹.

¹⁰⁷ ASGe, *Ufficio di sanità*, 433-434; 468-469; 1687-1688-1689.

¹⁰⁸ A valuable analysis concerning the evolution of the names of Ligurian ships between the 18th and the 19th centuries can be found in L. Gatti, *Un raggio di convenienza: navi mercantili, costruttori e proprietari in Liguria nella prima metà dell'Ottocento*, Genova: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 2008, pp. 86-92.

¹⁰⁹ A statistical comparison between Camogli and its broader regional area is hindered by some methodological issues detected in the previous literature. Most of the studies about the late 18th century port movement of Genoa had been built on a specific source, the «*Avvisi*», a periodical publication providing general information about maritime business, including the list of the ships entering the port of Genoa. On these premises, Luigi Bulferetti and Claudio Costantini, in their pivotal work about the economic history of Genoa between the 18th and 19th centuries, adopted the «*Avvisi*» as their main statistical source to display the port movement. However, if compared to the sources of the *Ufficio di sanità*, which was the deputed institution to record all the information about in and out port movements, these data seem to be incomplete or, at least, rather deficient. For example, in the year 1785, the health records list 179 *navicello* entering in the port of Genoa (all of them carrying the Genoese flag and manned by Camogli captains). In the data collected in the «*Avvisi*», on the contrary, among the records of all the arrivals in the port of Genoa, only 54 *navicello* are found (with a broader statistical sample). Likewise, the last data recorded in the «*Avvisi*» (1793) display a total of 1229 arrivals of ships carrying the Genoese flag. In a different source, drawn up in 1804, at the end of a protracted period of crisis, distinguished by the consistent loss of ships experienced by the Genoese fleet, the total number of the Genoese ships (not the arrivals in port) amounted to 1443. These and other incongruences imposed the choice not to rely on «*Avvisi*»

Therefore, with the purpose to reconstruct the fleet of Camogli to the most verisimilar figure, we had to develop an estimation approach based on the number of voyages which a single ship carried out in a year. In doing so, we made a distinction according to the vessel type (*navicello*, *pinco*, *tartana*, etc.) and counted the occurrences in which ship name and captains coincided. Lacking further data, we assumed that, if a captain conducted a ship with the same name throughout a year, also the ship was the same. Then, we collected all the voyages referring to the same ship and, in order to obtain the yearly average, we divided the result by the number of captain-ship couples. Finally, we took the number of voyages, and we rounded it for the yearly average in order to have the estimated number of ships¹¹⁰.

Table 2.1. Estimated number of Camogli-owned ships by type.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Bombarda</i> ^m	<i>Brick</i>	<i>Feluca</i>	<i>Leudo</i>	<i>Navicello</i>	<i>Pinco</i>	<i>Polacca</i>	<i>Sciabecco</i>	<i>Tartana</i>
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statistics and on the related literature in order to make comparisons between the situation of Camogli (drawn up by the health records) and the broader region. See: L. Bulferetti and C. Costantini, *Industria e commercio in Liguria*, pp. 176-177.

¹¹⁰ A sample of the estimate procedure adopted. In the year 1795, among the type of ship *navicello* we found the following results: Giuseppe Ansaldo – *N.S. del Carmine* (7); Giuseppe Avegno – *N.S. della Mercede* (7); Giuseppe Croce – *N.S. del Rosario* (3); Niccolò Denegri – *N.S. del Rosario* (4), etc. All the couple collected, we made the average (4,08 voyages each year) which was finally the divisor of the total voyages recorded for the *navicello* in the 1795 (193), in order to obtain the final result of 47.

¹¹¹ The nautical terminology turned out to be one of the most challenging issues in the writing of the present chapter. Indeed, whereas in the following period most of the ship typologies tend to converge towards international standards, in the late eighteenth century the difference between Mediterranean and Atlantic ship-building is still as sharp as for the course of the entire early modern age. Therefore, several terms lack of an appropriate translation in English: in all of the cases where an English correspondence cannot be found, the decision was to keep the original term. This, therefore, is the case of most of the typologies displayed in table, apart from the sole *brigantino* which, for its northern origin (since it is not to be confused with its Mediterranean early-modern counterpart), has been translated in “brick”. Most of the following information provided for Mediterranean traditional ship-typologies are drawn from S. Bellabarba and E. Guerreri, *Vele italiane della costa occidentale dal Medioevo al Novecento*, Milano: Hoepli, 2002. Further information, more from a maritime than a purely nautical perspective, and enriched with reference to archival sources, can be found in L. Gatti, *Un raggio di convenienza*, pp. 38-86.

	E*	%	E*	%	E*	%	E*	%	E*	%	E*	%	E*	%	E*	%	Total		
																	E*		
1785					16	19%	53	65%	13	16%							82		
1795	1	1%	5	4%			22	19%	47	43%	28	25%	2	2%			7	6%	113
1805					5	17%	4	14%	15	52%	2	7%			1	3%	2	7%	29

Source: ASGe, *Ufficio di sanità*, 433-434; 468-469; 1687-1688-1689.

Notwithstanding all the possible statistical inaccuracies, which might derive from the proposed estimate, from the table emerges a neat predominance of the *navicello*, followed by *pinco* and *leudo*. The origins of *navicello* are rooted in a different maritime tradition than the Ligurian one: in its first days, this type of vessel was employed in the fluvial navigation along the course of the river Arno, in Tuscany¹¹². It was destined to the transport of marble from the mining regions towards the sea or Florence (via Arno river). The presence of *navicello* in the Tyrrhenian waters is documented from the first decades of the 17th century¹¹³. Besides marbles, this vessel was rapidly associated with additional local commodities, such as timber and charcoal, which initially complemented marble cargoes but then became bulk cargoes on their own¹¹⁴. The transport of timber and charcoal, indeed, corresponded to the use of *navicello* by the shipowners of Camogli¹¹⁵. From a technical point of view, whereas the sophisticated system of sails and rigging is well-known¹¹⁶, there is no explicit reference concerning the dimensions and the tonnage of this type of ship. The average tonnage varied from 30 to 70 tons, but in some cases can be found *navicelli* of more than 100 tons¹¹⁷. The progressive

¹¹² S. Bellabarba and E. Guerreri, *Vele italiane*, pp. 158-163.

¹¹³ Idem, p. 158. The author mentions an episode of 1603, when some *navicelli* were warned by the authorities not to take the sea-route, but to sail instead along the canals linking Pisa with Livorno.

¹¹⁴ L. Gatti, *Un raggio di convenienza*, p. 67.

¹¹⁵ See the sub-section "A long-lasting route: the trade of Tuscan charcoal".

¹¹⁶ S. Bellabarba and E. Guerreri, *Vele italiane*, pp. 158-163.

¹¹⁷ Idem, p. 158; L. Gatti, *Un raggio di convenienza*, pp. 123-176. Most of the *navicello* found recorded by the author range from 30 to 70 tons. There are, however, some exceptions, as in the case of the *navicello* "Il Magnanimo", measuring 130,08 tons, which was built in 1827 in Varazze for the Camogli ship-owner Gaetano Schiaffino. Another case is the "N.S. del Carmine" (101,40 tons) built in 1830 for the Camogli ship-owner Michele Bertolotto. These and other cases can be

specialisation of Camogli into the charcoal trade with Maremma led to the widespread diffusion of this ship type.

Instead, the successful establishment of *pinco* in the merchant fleet of Genoa is related to a different history. The Mediterranean *pinco* is a type of vessel with Spanish origins¹¹⁸. It is established as one of the most efficient vessels in the Tyrrhenian trade during the second half of the eighteenth century when its diffusion displays an impressive growth. Before the late 1770s its presence is almost negligible; then, between 1778 and 1793, the *pinco* covers up to 18% of the total ships registered at the port of Genoa¹¹⁹. The *pinco* constituted the core of the long-distance Genoese fleet owing to its relatively big tonnage: the dimensions varied from 50 to 200 tons, even though the vast majority of them averaged between 100 and 150 tons¹²⁰. It was a flat bottomed vessel with a narrow stern; it had three masts, and its main technical distinguishing trait was the double rigging since it usually had both the square and the lateen rigs installed on the main-mast¹²¹.

The *leudo* or *liuto* has a longer tradition and historical continuity than *pinco*, since this nomenclature dates back to the Middle Ages, in the Catalan area (1209)¹²². Over the centuries, it passed through several transformations and found a stable and recognisable structure only in the nineteenth century. Mainly employed in the Tyrrhenian cabotage, especially in the connections between Sardinia and Genoa, the *leudo* was commonly used to transport foodstuffs, such as wine,

also found in: P. Berti, *Il traffico camogliese del carbone vegetale: un contributo alla storia marittima di Camogli*, in Figari G.B.R. (ed.), *Camogli da borgo a città. Notizie storiche e spunti di ricerca*, pp. 315-328.

¹¹⁸ S. Bellabarba and E. Guerreri, *Vele italiane*, pp. 172-176.

¹¹⁹ Idem, p. 175. The statistics is found in L. Bulferetti and C. Costantini, *Industria e commercio in Liguria*, pp. 162-163, and it is drawn by the authors from the *Avvisi*.

¹²⁰ Idem.

¹²¹ Idem, pp. 173-174.

¹²² Idem, p. 136.

oil, carobs, tuna and wheat¹²³. Their average tonnage was around 30 tons, and it had one mast with lateen rigs and the bowsprit¹²⁴.

Finally, of secondary importance to describe the main features of Camogli's merchant fleet, we find: a) the *bombarda*, a two-masted large coaster, ketch-rigged, of 60-80 tons in average, which experienced a discrete fortune in the first half of the nineteenth century¹²⁵; b) the brick, a two-mast ship of more considerable dimensions, which later became the central unit of the fleet of Camogli, and especially its evolutions of brick-schooner and barque¹²⁶; c) the *feluca*, a two-masted boat with lateen sails, usually employed in cabotage¹²⁷; d) the *tartana*, a three-masted vessel whose capacity stretched between 75 and 130 tons, employed in different context according to its dimensions¹²⁸.

2.3. Camogli: a fishing centre

In the analysis of the maritime activities sustaining the economy of Camogli up to the mid-19th century, a clear pattern of continuity is found between this sailor town and other similar realities scattered along the Ligurian riviera. In this phase, preliminary to the outstanding achievements of the following period, the history of Camogli does not seem to possess any extraordinary trait. The framework of activities proposed concerning the eastern communities of the region fits perfectly in the specific experience of Camogli, as fishing and Tyrrhenian cabotage played the most remarkable part. First, due to its deep-rooted fishing tradition, both coastal and deep-sea. Secondly, in the wake

¹²³ Among the arrivals of Camogli-owned ships, the *leudo* accounts for 65 cases: although half of them reflects the outstanding importance of charcoal and timber trade, on the other hand the cargo list shows a great diversification, including lobsters, roe, carobs, wheat, oil, tobacco, tuna and wine. ASGe, *Ufficio di sanità*, 433-434; 468-469; 1687-1688-1689.

¹²⁴ S. Bellabarba and E. Guerreri, *Vele italiane*, p. 137.

¹²⁵ *Idem*, pp. 54-55.

¹²⁶ For its fundamental role in the following periods of the history of Camogli, this ship type will be more extensively described in the following chapters.

¹²⁷ S. Bellabarba and E. Guerreri, *Vele italiane*, pp. 92-97; C. De Negri, *Le feluche dei liguri*, Genova: Tip. A. Porcile, 1966.

¹²⁸ S. Bellabarba and E. Guerreri, *Vele italiane*, pp. 222-229; L. Gatti, *Un raggio di convenienza*, pp. 64-65.

of its active participation to the Tyrrhenian maritime system: the people of Camogli disregarded long-range cabotage but, at the same time, developed some long-lasting connections with regional areas targeting specific merchandise, charcoal, whose transport constituted an extraordinary long-lasting activity up to the First World War.

The first documented sector of activity pertained coastal fishing, in close contact with the village settlement due to the positioning of a tuna fishery located in the waters of Punta Chiappa, in the nearby area of the Portofino Promontory. The sources attested its effectiveness in 1603¹²⁹: however, its actual instalment might be even dated back to the sixteenth century. Far from being as productive as the most renowned tuna fisheries of Sicilia and Sardinia, the Camogli's one was labelled as *tonnarella*, a trap designed to capture fishes of smaller dimensions (than tuna). The limited range of action of the *tonnarella* found reasons in the lack of fishing resources which is characteristic of the Ligurian and Tyrrhenian seas¹³⁰. Despite the long period of activity, from April to September, this kind of fishing was not very demanding in terms of labour, both for the limited size of the whole structure and because it engaged no more than three small boats altogether. Part of the fish was distributed among the population and the rest was commercialised. Then, to underline the collective effort, some of the income was in the end consigned to the municipality to sustain communal expenses. Indeed, since Camogli lacked industrial facilities to process the tuna for external consumption, most of the catch was delivered to the Genoa fishing market. Meanwhile, the production and the periodical maintenance and repairing of nets employed part of the residing population, especially the sailors' wives who could participate somehow to the economic activities of the village¹³¹.

Due to its nature, this kind of fishing was not very demanding as daily commitment and continuous work; as a result, it was usually complemented by a more varied range of deep-sea fishing. For

¹²⁹ R. Cattaneo Vietti and S. Bava, *La tonnarella e la pesca tradizionale a Camogli*, Recco: Le Mani, 2009; B. Minoletti, *Della pesca a Portofino e della tonnarella di Camogli alla fine del secolo XIX ed oggi*, Genova: La Marina Italiana, 1941; A. Mariotti, "La tonnarella di Camogli e la pesca nel Golfo Paradiso tra ottocento e novecento", in G. Doneddu and A. Fiori (ed.), *La pesca in Italia tra età moderna e contemporanea. Produzione, mercato, consumo*, Sassari: EDES, 2003, pp. 63-76.

¹³⁰ A. Mariotti, "La tonnarella di Camogli", pp. 65-71; A. Clemente, "La ricchezza del mare in margine alla XXXVII settimana di studi dell'Istituto Datini", pp. 217-229.

¹³¹ A. Mariotti, "La tonnarella di Camogli", pp. 67-68.

instance, the case of the *Cooperativa degli zeri*, which Gio. Bono Ferrari accounted to be one of the first experiences of a fishing cooperative¹³², seems to have involved a more considerable amount of ships and people of Camogli (the number of nearly one hundred provided by local historiography might be questionable and it is not verified elsewhere) from the 1780s up to 1810. Its foundation and development are tightly connected with the occasional but abundant presence of *zeri*, a species of small anchovies, in the waters surrounding Camogli. The massive output collected in these circumstances pushed the community to commercialise the catch. This feature led to the creation of a cooperative intended to handle the entire productive chain – through salting and frying processes – from the nets to the market. According to Ferrari, most of the output was sold on account of the personal entrepreneurship of the consul (the ruling authority of the cooperative) “Zanebum” Cichero, who was able to place its product on several markets of the Tyrrhenian (Civitavecchia, Gaeta, Messina and Palermo), where he had established substantial networks overtime¹³³. From 1810 onwards, this species of anchovies almost vanished, putting an end to the profits of the cooperative. Soon, the local fishermen found new employment in the more renowned – and celebrated – fishing for anchovies in the waters of the Gorgona Island.

This experience is remarkable for its volume and for the continuity recorded over time¹³⁴. Despite Ferrari positions its beginning in the aftermath of the *Cooperativa degli zeri*'s affair, and indeed it is undoubtedly attested through the course of the nineteenth century, other authors, relying on archival sources, can date it back to a preceding period¹³⁵. The fishing in Gorgona was practised on a seasonal basis, starting in May and lasting up until the first days of September. On a yearly average of 150-200 ships, the community experienced this endeavour collectively, with massive

¹³² G. B. Ferrari, *La città dei mille bianchi velieri*, pp. 74-76. As usual in the local literature about Camogli, Gio. Bono Ferrari represents the unique authority to account for the history of this *Cooperativa degli zeri*, which is further mentioned by other authors with the mere reference to Ferrari.

¹³³ *Idem*, p. 75.

¹³⁴ The fishing for anchovies at Gorgona Island is central in the local historiography of Camogli. Exhaustive accounts can be found in: G.B. Ferrari, *Camogli: la città dei mille bianchi velieri*, pp. 76-80; A. Mariotti, “La tonnellata di Camogli”, pp. 71-73.

¹³⁵ A. Mariotti, “La tonnellata di Camogli”, p. 72.

participation of youngsters (aged 9 and 10) who had the opportunity to spend in a relatively safe environment their first period at sea. As the expedition to Gorgona was a collaborative practice, it held a deep significance for the life of the community. For instance, it was thoroughly correlated to mass ceremonies which were celebrated both at the beginning and the end of the fishing period, in religious festivals like the one of San Prospero, in September. The impression of a communal rite is masterfully sketched in Gio. Bono Ferrari's account. He records:

The departure of the ships of Camogli to Gorgona followed a specific event, every year. In May every captain, master and sailor used to go to the Mass, named the "Mass of Gorgona". [...] When all the ships were gathered in the harbour, the bells rang in celebration and the Priest, escorted by the praying crowd, brought the Case of Saint Prospero to the Castle. From the highest point, in order to let the people see, he raised the case and slowly blessed the crowd, spelling three words: oh San Prospero preserve the men, the boats and the nets!¹³⁶

During the season the ships went to Livorno to sell the fish and, in the end, only a small proportion of the catch was destined to Camogli – for San Prospero's celebrations – once the fishing was over. The adventure to Gorgona was carried out on small boats, *batelli* and *gondole* in the sources, weighing no more than 4-5 tons¹³⁷. The fleet was relatively recent since the ships recorded aged averagely 6-7 years. These boats were manned by a master (*patrone*) with three, maximum four

¹³⁶ G.B. Ferrari, *Camogli: la città dei mille bianchi velieri*, p. 77. Personal translation of the Italian original: «La partenza della flottiglia camogliese per la Gorgona seguiva ogni anno un avvenimento. Un buon giorno di maggio tutti i Padroni, i Capi barca ed i marinai si recavano in chiesa alla Messa chiamata della Gorgona. [...] Quando tutta la interminabile flottiglia era ben schierata sul golfo, dalla Bardiciocca alle case di Rissuolo, le campane suonavano a festa e il Prete accompagnato dalla folla orante portava la teca di San Prospero in Castello. Dal punto più alto, acciocché i partenti ben vedessero, egli alzava solennemente la teca del Santo e con gesto lento benediceva, pronunciando le tre parole sempre tramandate: San Prospero proteggi gli uomini, le barche e le reti».

¹³⁷ The data are extracted from the records of 17 ships involved in this activity in 1831. They are found in ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1831, n. 2436-2463.

people, without considering the occasional presence of an equal number of men as “reinforcement personnel” (*uomini di rinforzo*)¹³⁸.

Although the Gorgona has been usually conceived as a training opportunity for the youngest members of the community, the average age shows partially different results. Masters were usually in their late thirties (average 38), while the crew members aged in average 36,8 years, with extremes of 9 and 69. On the one hand, masters' figure can find an explanation in the requirements of experience and skills to handle ships in the open sea; on the other hand, it is possible to observe a dichotomy in the composition of the crews, crowded of elders and youngsters and with limited participation of men in their most productive working age¹³⁹. This polarisation is not uncommon in late eighteenth century seafaring communities¹⁴⁰: the coexistence of older and younger elements onboard responded to both social and educational purposes. The presence of seasoned seamen reflects the inner characteristics of short-distance voyages which allowed more mature personnel to continue their maritime careers in a less demanding working environment. On the other hand, the combination of elders and youngster fits totally with the conception of seafaring as a traditional activity within which knowledge and expertise were handed down through the generations. Given the scarcity of sources to examine this specific activity, the interesting data representing the age distribution of the crew members might lead to arguing the relatively decreasing importance for Camogli of its fishing sector, at least for the year 1831 when, as we will discuss in the next paragraphs, the attention of Camogli begins to direct towards most profitable activities.

2.4. Camogli in the Tyrrhenian shipping system

¹³⁸ This is, for instance, the case of the *batello* “San Fortunato”, which in a first phase hosts two men of reinforcement, whereas in a second phase it has three. ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1831, n. 2442. This occurs in other two instances, in the voyages of two *gondole*: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1831, n. 2447 and 2448.

¹³⁹ In percentage, out of the total members of the crews (51), 45% were in the age interval of 9-29, 43% were 40-69 while only the remaining 12% were in the group of 30-39 years old.

¹⁴⁰ See the case-study of Scarborough, in C.R. Foy, “Sewing a Safety Net: Scarborough’s Maritime Community, 1747-1765”, *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 24, 2012, pp. 1-28.

Indeed, leaving aside fishing, an activity that, despite its role in the evolution of the community, is out of the intended borders of the research, we might argue a durable coexistence of fishing with coastal shipping and short-range cabotage, as the activities of the merchant fleet, albeit still composed by rather small vessels, seem to demonstrate.

However, before tackling the involvement of Camogli in the Tyrrhenian shipping system, we must briefly deal with the political context, which between the late eighteenth century and the beginning of the next century is too dense of transforming events. Liguria passed through various political transformations, from being an independent oligarchic Republic until 1797 up to be subjected under the Savoy dynasty after the Vienna Congress, without mentioning the countless administrative resettlements occurred under Napoleon's rule. The outbreak of war disrupted the international scenario, involving the whole continent and affecting the shipping activities in the Mediterranean, which were severely damaged by the Anglo-French rivalry at sea. The merchant trajectories of the Camogli-owned ships, therefore, cannot be addressed without taking into account the political dimension and the war events impacting on the Mediterranean maritime framework. On the other hand, whilst admitting the centrality of political mutations in determining trade routes, this paragraph embraces politics only to a marginal extent, to frame Camogli into a broader system where the critical focus is posed on *long durée* elements (economic and social) rather than on conjunctures (political). Whenever politics is taken into consideration, the reference is made in the light of the explicit key of interpretation to address the community structural limits and potentialities to profit from troubled contexts – a trademark of the Camogli historical evolution also throughout the nineteenth century.


The data are drawn from the archival collection of the maritime health authority of Genoa¹⁴¹. To exploit sanitary registrations in dealing with shipping movement in ports is relatively common and

¹⁴¹ The "Ufficio di Sanità" of the port of Genoa has produced an extensive documentation from the 16th century up to its dismissal as a result of the Italian unification (1861). For the purposes of our analysis, we mainly used the records of the arriving vessels at Genoa which, with regard the two period under our interest (the latest decade of the Republic of Genoa and the period under the Savoy sovereignty), is divided in three different collections: with regard to the period 1785-1795, the arrival records can be found in ASGe, *Ufficio di Sanità*, Manuali e Notulari, 208-483; for the 1805, they have been kept in ASGe, *Ufficio di Sanità*, Arrivi di capitani e padroni, 1682-1694; for the latest phase, under Savoy administration, they are found in ASGe, *Ufficio di Sanità*, Arrivi di bastimenti dall'estero, 553-615.

widespread in the literature. In the absence of records collecting the arrivals and departures in ports with statistical purposes (more common in the following period), the political authorities main interests to keep an eye on the port movements were sanitary and fiscal concerns. Whereas the taxation controls were aimed at the goods either entering or being temporarily deposited into the port warehouses, on the other hand, the maritime healthcare was concerned with the cargo and vessel material conditions (nautical data), the medical status of the captain and the crew (seagoing personnel data) and the route and the specific ports of call visited by the ship (shipping and trade data). This enormous mass of information is extremely precious to maritime historians, as it allows to collect vast datasets and to carry out quantitative approaches. In the impossibility of delineating in details the overall evolution of Camogli's shipping from the late eighteenth century to the Congress of Vienna, due to the overwhelming amount of vessels recorded, we decided to select three different periods, starting from 1785 with a time interval of ten years. The results obtained seem to fulfil the initial requirements, as, throughout the period under analysis, structural trends emerge along with conjunctural processes, the latter occasionally determining the establishment of new routes or in other cases affecting the final figure in a much more decisive way.

For methodological purposes, the ports were grouped on a geographical basis and concerning port systems and traffic flows, notwithstanding the political borders. The port of Livorno deserves a different treatment: despite its location within the Tuscan area, it was considered as a distinct unit to underline its different role within Camogli's shipping system. Indeed, the traffics linking Livorno, and the Tuscan area with Liguria differed under several regards, particularly when concerning merchandises.

Figure 2.1. Camogli-owned ships arriving at Genoa distinguished by regional area. 1785; 1795; 1805.



Source: ASGe, *Ufficio di sanità*, 433-434; 468-469; 1687-1688-1689.

The figure reflects rather clearly the trend of cabotage routes and traffics handled by the fleet of Camogli. The records show the existence of a stable connection with the nearby Tuscan area and particularly with the region of Maremma, whose relative geographical proximity with the Ligurian eastern communities contributed to the establishment of long-lasting relationships. From the eighteenth century onwards, Maremma continuously supplied with charcoal and timber the Republic of Genoa and, in the aftermath of the Vienna Congress, to the Kingdom of Sardinia. The relevance of the statistical measure of charcoal trade within the whole shipping of Camogli – and within the strategies of its captains and shipowners – leads to devoting more space to this subject in order to carry out proper analyses. Meanwhile, the other routes might be taken into account, especially as these activities are keen to provide an insight about the ability of Camogli maritime actors to enter into, and to benefit from, different typologies of trade. In this regard, the distribution of the ports of departure, among which it is worth outlining the recurrent presence of Livorno and Marseille, the sporadic records concerning the Iberic coast and the intermittent participation in the

traffics with the southern Italian area might outline a more composite scenario, where short and long-distance hauls overlapped and coexisted according to convenience and trade opportunities¹⁴². The first remark involves the rate of arrivals to the port of Genoa from Livorno in 1795 (13%), which strikes against the figures of 1785 and 1805, when Livorno is negligible in terms of relative frequency (respectively 1,3% and 5,5%). The reasons for such contrast lie into exogenous factors. The conflicts waged by Napoleon against the British fleet in the Mediterranean granted a comparative advantage to Livorno, which established itself as one of the main *entrepôts* for grain trade. Livorno absorbed a high percentage of the seaborne trade of Marseille, becoming the principal port of transit (and deposit) of the Mediterranean, especially for what concerned wheat and cereals¹⁴³. From the data drawn from the number of Camogli-owned ships to Livorno in this specific year, the favourable conjuncture of the Tuscan city constituted an extremely profitable opportunity for the Genoese fleet. Among the cargo typologies registered emerges a neat preference for cereals and leguminous plants, which constituted the 95,3% of the total. Wheat was loaded as the main cargo in 48,8% of the instances¹⁴⁴. Colonial genres, usually transported over British vessels from the Atlantic and the Levant, are absent, despite they have been a crucial export from the port of Livorno throughout the

¹⁴² The ports of departures were grouped as such: Western Mediterranean (Agde, Barcelona, Ceuta, Ibiza, Marseille, Nice, Toulon, Villefranche-sur-Mer); Southern Italy (Castellammare, Girgenti, Licata, Majori, Mazzara, Mazzarelli, Modica, Napoli, Palermo, Pozzallo, Termini and Terracina).

¹⁴³ The most authoritative reference concerning the evolution of the port of Livorno in the early modern period until the Restauration is: J.P. Filippini, *Il porto di Livorno e la Toscana (1676-1814)*, Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1998. For the importance acquired by the Tuscan port in the Napoleonic period, see also: S. Marzagalli, *“Le boulevards de la fraude”. Le négoce maritime et le Blocus continental, 1806-1813. Bordeaux, Hambourg, Livourne, Villeneuve d’Ascq*: Presses Universitaire du Septentrion, 1999; Id., *I negozianti delle città portuali in età napoleonica: Amburgo, Bordeaux e Livorno di fronte al blocco continentale, 1806-1813*, PhD dissertation, European University Institute, 1993. Also, see the chapter about the British presence in Livorno during the Napoleonic wars in K. Galani, *British shipping in the Mediterranean*, pp. 89-116.

¹⁴⁴ This is the table listing the cargoes loaded at Livorno in 1795 by Camogli-owned ships:

fodder	canvas	chick peas	fava beans	wheat	corn	olive oil	barley
3	1	2	6	21	3	1	6

eighteenth century,. There are a few exceptions when high-value commodities are combined as a complement of the leading merchandise (usually wheat). In this regard, we can find cotton in eight instances and spices like pepper and saffron in four cases¹⁴⁵.

The absence of records concerning the arrival of colonial genres – which instead were common in the overall trade linking Livorno with Genoa – in the other years surveyed, together with the restrict number of ships departing from the Tuscan city in 1785 and 1805, poses the question about the exceptionality of the results found in correspondence to the year 1795. Arguably, Camogli-owned ships simply met Livorno's conjunctural high demands for maritime transport. In 1797, the first French occupation of the city disrupted the trade, which revived at the edge of the century to last only a few years before the imposition of the continental blockade. The absence of vessels recorded in 1805 holds a more profound significance to the general trend of the Tuscan port, especially concerning the British arrivals, whose presence was instrumental to the redistribution trade in which the Camogli-owned ships engaged¹⁴⁶. Nevertheless, the picture plotted for 1795 is still valuable about the conditions and the potentialities of Camogli's fleet, which might have accounted for more or less 31-33 ships – at least a pair of identifications are uncertain¹⁴⁷ – to this route. It implied, also, the presence of a mature merchant awareness of trade conjunctures and international flows of goods, a fundamental skill for the future sake of the community. Finally, this fortuitous occurrence might represent the first involvement of Camogli in the international wheat trade, an activity which later – under similar circumstances – played a critical role in the maritime community success within the international shipping business.

Apart from the particular case of Livorno in 1795, and the already mentioned trade of Tuscan charcoal which will be the subject of the next paragraph, the general trend of Camogli-owned ships in the late eighteenth century displays some occasional relationships with western Mediterranean

¹⁴⁵ See, for instance, the case of the *pinco* "Nostra Signora del Carmine" (*patrone* Prospero Schiaffino), which arrives at Genoa on 6th March 1795 with a cargo of wheat, soap, cotton and saffron: ASGe, *Ufficio di Sanità*, 468.

¹⁴⁶ The decline of British shipping in the port of Livorno is clearly observable in the analysis of Katerina Galani: K. Galani, *British shippin in the Mediterranean*, p. 103 (figure 4.2b).

¹⁴⁷ In two cases, the Marine Health Authority official does not provide any name for the ship, one of the two main distinguishing information to identify a ship together with the family name of its master.

ports, like Barcelona, Ceuta, Agde, Toulon and especially Marseille, together with sporadic arrivals from southern Italy, in particular Sicily.

As far as the western Mediterranean is concerned, almost one-third of the ships (18 of 55) arrived at Genoa on ballast, presumably in their return haul. Although the archival sources lack of further insights about the traffics to this vast area, presumably the transport of Tuscan charcoal touched Marseille as well. This hypothesis leads to the idea that some ships from Marseille were just returning to resume the trade from Genoa. Besides, the existing literature suggests the involvement of a few families from Camogli in alum trade between Naples and Palermo and the Iberian and French coasts¹⁴⁸. Within this area, the data bear witness of a large predominance of Marseille, detaining the 76,3% of the total arrivals from the Western Mediterranean: from the French port, the vessels of Camogli imported to Genoa a various spectrum of commodities, ranging from colonial genres such as coffee, tobacco, sugar, cotton and indigo to local production like hats, draperies, soap and wine.

In analogy with the abovementioned trade axis linking the Republic of Genoa with the Kingdom of Naples, the ships which were directed to Southern Italy usually returned with general cargoes in foodstuff. The relatively modest number of vessels pursuing this route (15 percent of the total movement, leaving out the southernmost charcoal loading ports) sets the role of Camogli in the commercial relationships with Southern Italy in a liminal position if compared to that of other communities. Nevertheless, it might be worth noting the existence in this period of a quite recurrent route to trade carobs – almost one-third of the general merchandises arriving from this region. Indeed, the trade in carobs is, to a lesser extent than Tuscan charcoal, a durable activity in which Camogli-owned ships engaged. Interestingly, the comparison with the sources collected concerning the late 1850s period illustrates a shift in the geographical distribution of this kind of traffic: the role of Sicily gradually decreased, and the routes extended to the Eastern Mediterranean, where captains were able to contract more profitable freights in Crete and Cyprus. Indeed, out of 45 ships with a

¹⁴⁸ G.B. Figari and S. Bagnato Bonucelli, *La marina mercantile camogliese dalla guerra di Crimea all'Inchiesta Parlamentare Boselli: 1855-1882*, Genova: Tolozzi, 1983, p. 5.

carobs cargo between 1858-1862, 19 were loaded in Crete and other 4 in Cyprus¹⁴⁹. The continuity of the traffic is remarkable and, perhaps, deserving of further analysis. The fact that a limited group of ships travelled more than once along the same route might suggest the existence of a certain degree of specialisation and leads to posing questions about whether existed or not further interests throughout the supply chain of this particular commodity. The late eighteenth century sources do not provide this kind of information: on the other hand, the mid-nineteenth century ones might give us more insights. The same merchant, Giuseppe Denegri, purchased most of the carob cargoes¹⁵⁰. Although this family name is attested amongst the historical households of Camogli, he was born elsewhere, in Sampierdarena: nevertheless, Denegri maintained firm and continuous contacts with the leading figures of Camogli's shipping. For instance, in 1854, he purchased in society with Angelo Olivari 18 shares (in a 24 share system) of the brick "Annibale" (149 tons.) from different owners¹⁵¹. Two years later, he was found as commercial correspondent of the Rocca family, merchants of Ligurian origin dealing with long-ranged international trade with North Africa and the Levant, and that in the late 18th century had established the leading unit of their company in Marseille¹⁵². His commercial activities and his wide-ranging networks might have probably facilitated and stimulated Camogli's persistence in this traffic, even when, from the 1850s onwards, the Camogli maritime elites had already abandoned most of their traditional habits, and redirected their investments to the construction of bigger ships with to insert into more lucrative traffics.

¹⁴⁹ ASGe, *Ufficio di Sanità*, Arrivi di bastimenti dall'estero, 590-613. Among the Cretan ports is observed a quite consistent preference for Rethymno (12) and Heraklion (7). In Cyprus, carobs were loaded in Larnaca. Then, among the remaining arrivals it is worth noting the persistence of the market of Pozzallo (Sicily), which appears in other 11 instances.

¹⁵⁰ ASGe, *Ufficio di Sanità*, Arrivi di bastimenti dall'estero, 590-613. Giuseppe Denegri is the main buyer in 27 instances out of 45.

¹⁵¹ ASGe, Notai II Sezione, Notaio Gio. Batta Degregori, 172, n. 41. In this purchasing contract he is recognized by the notary as «Denegri Giuseppe fu Bartolomeo, mediatore in noleggi e sicurtà, native del Comune di San Pier d'Arena mandamento di Rivarolo, Provincia di Genova, ed in Genova domiciliato e dimorante».

¹⁵² About the Rocca family there is the recent work of Annastella Carrino: A. Carrino, *Passioni e interessi di una famiglia-impresa. I Rocca di Marsiglia nel Mediterraneo dell'Ottocento*, Roma: Viella, 2018. The commercial correspondence of the Rocca family is kept in the archives of the Chamber of Commerce of Marseille. The letter of Giuseppe De Negri can be found in: ACCIMP, *Fonds Rocca*, Maison Rocca-Correspondance passive, L 19/14/101, Giuseppe De Negri 1856-1856.

2.5. A long-lasting route: the trade of Tuscan charcoal

Since the late eighteenth century, the most relevant trade practised by the ships of Camogli seems to be the transport of charcoal and timber from the Maremma Tuscan region to Genoa (and elsewhere in the Mediterranean, e.g. Marseille). The first mention of this kind of traffic ascends to Gio. Bono Ferrari's works, who pointed out the remarkable rate of arrivals to Genoa from Maremma and provided some necessary information about the maritime actors and the ships involved, as well as a few details about the typology of merchandises which were traded along this route¹⁵³. Lacking more exhaustive news, Ferrari erroneously dated the first occurrences of this activity to the mid-nineteenth century when, in effect, the people of Camogli still sailed along the route as much as they began to frequent the Black Sea to transport the Russian wheat to the Mediterranean and England. However, as the thoroughly conducted archival research of Pietro Berti has pointed out, the presence of ships from Camogli in this trade is more long-dated and effectively might be ascended at least to the preceding century, at some stage between the 1730s and the 1770s¹⁵⁴.

Nevertheless, the purpose of Berti's work was to outline a trend in order to stimulate further research on this subject: indeed, rather than attempting to reconstruct the entire statistical figure of Camogli's involvement in the Tuscan charcoal trade, the author chose to focus on a few familiar nucleuses to show the effective continuity observed in this trade overtime. Despite the significant number of ships recorded in the article, the data bear witness of a much more consistent presence – from a quantitative perspective – than what is shown in Berti's study. For instance, whereas he reports respectively 3, 2 and 7 ships dealing with charcoal in the years 1785, 1795 and 1805, the registrations of the Marine Health Authority of Genoa provide us with a much more remarkable picture, with 134, 161 and 46 Camogli-owned ships recorded for having transported charcoal from Maremma to Genoa. Furthermore, charcoal was not the unique kind of good with which the people

¹⁵³ G.B. Ferrari, *Capitani di mare e bastimenti di Liguria del secolo XIX*, Rapallo: Arti Grafiche Tigullio, 1939, pp. 471-473.

¹⁵⁴ P. Berti, *Il traffico camogliese del carbone vegetale: un contributo alla storia marittima di Camogli*, in Figari G.B.R. (ed.), *Camogli da borgo a città. Notizie storiche e spunti di ricerca*, pp. 315-328.

of Camogli dealt in the same area, due to the conspicuous numbers of timber cargoes, which made the total figure increase to 174, 188 and 47 respectively.

During the late-eighteenth century period, in the measured intervals, the share of this traffic on the whole amount of Camogli-owned ships sailing along other routes is impressive:

Table 2.2 - Relative number of ships coming from Camogli out of the total arrivals.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total arrivals registered</i>	<i>Charcoal and timber trade</i>	<i>%</i>
1785	219	174	79,5%
1795	330	188	56,9%
1805	55	47	85,5%

Source: ASGe, *Ufficio di sanità*, 433-434; 468-469; 1687-1688-1689.

First, it is possible to point out the similar figure observed in 1785 and 1795 concerning the number of ships doing the route of Maremma. This trend might suggest the substantial inelasticity of Ligurian demands for charcoal and timber within a decade, despite the relative percentages. Likewise, in 1795 the trade with Livorno absorbed another 13% of the traffics, thus resulting in a total picture of almost 70%.

The relevance of coastal coal transport in the history of Camogli might resemble those of the multitude of British maritime communities which specialised in collier trade before committing to deep-sea shipping¹⁵⁵. The opportunity to rely on a stable and unrelenting trade might have played a role in the evolution from occasional to professional sailors, engaged steadily throughout the year in the shipping business. Meanwhile, steadiness could have nurtured the expansion of the merchant fleet, as the statistical relevance of *navicelli* among the ships of Camogli seems to indicate.

Following the inner features of the Mediterranean cabotage, the short-distance route covered by the vessels linking Genoa with the Maremma allowed captains and masters to sail throughout the

¹⁵⁵ See R. Davis, *The rise of the English shipping industry in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries*, Research in Maritime History series (No. 48), Newfoundland: International Maritime Economic History Association, 2012. An interesting comparison can be sketched with the maritime community of Scarborough: C.R. Foy, "Sewing a Safety Net: Scarborough's Maritime Community", pp. 1-11.

whole year, even in winter, despite the seasonal interruptions which were needed in long-distance hauls which would necessarily involve deep-sea navigation stretches. This advantage, however, was not statistically relevant, since of 188 ships engaging in the trade during the whole 1795, as few as 22 challenged the odds of adverse weather over the winter months¹⁵⁶.

The figure for 1805, instead, demonstrates a rather remarkable resilience of the route within the economic depression, when all the trade were limited by the international crisis owing mainly to the continental blockade and, therefore, marked by the absence of the British commerce which was vital to the Mediterranean maritime activities. The conditions of the Ligurian trade were even worse: in 1804, the inclusion into the Imperial administration had deteriorated the already precarious position of Genoa within the international stage. Bulferetti and Costantini, in their pivotal work, have already underlined how the concomitant actions of the continental blockade and the inclusion in the Empire had inflicted a decisive blow to the Ligurian city¹⁵⁷. After the steady growth observed until 1797, the volume of traffics had remained stable up to 1803; then, beginning with the following year, Genoa was rapidly cut off from the international trade, as the minimal participation of big ships in the total movement seems to confirm¹⁵⁸. Genoa became a destination of short-distance voyages, and its fleet strictly restrained to cabotage. In the same regard, it is worth noting the fact that the Genoese fleet had been unceasingly diminished since Napoleon's Egypt expedition in 1798, in the context which the newly acquired territories of Liguria offered a consistent participation¹⁵⁹. The campaign of Egypt directly concerned the fleet of Camogli, since

¹⁵⁶ ASGe, *Ufficio di sanità*, Manuali e notulari, 468-469. In particular the arrivals of Camogli-owned vessel from Maremma to Genoa in the months of January and February and from October to December are as follows: January (1), February (3), October (7), November (3), December (7).

¹⁵⁷ L. Bulferetti and C. Costantini, *Industria e commercio in Liguria nell'età del Risorgimento: 1700-1861*, Milano: Giuffrè, 1967.

¹⁵⁸ See the two tables in L. Bulferetti and C. Costantini, *Industria e commercio in Liguria*, pp. 268-269. These tables clearly express the decrease of the percentage of big ships (over 150 t.) arriving at Genoa between 1797 (27,9%) and 1804 (3,3%).

¹⁵⁹ The exploitation of the Ligurian marine for the Egypt expedition is mentioned in most of the general literature about the late 18th century history of Genoa: L. Bulferetti and C. Costantini, *Industria e commercio in Liguria*, pp. 272-273. A more detailed focus on the naval involvement is found in: V. Ilari and P. Crociani, *Le marine italiane di Napoleone: le marine ligure, toscana e romana, 1797-1814*, Milano: Società Italiana di Storia Militare, 2014.

several ships (26) joined Napoleon's expedition, and only a few of them (3 out of 26) returned safely¹⁶⁰.

The interests of Ligurian ship-owners had been damaged by British privateering in the Mediterranean waters, which disrupted the maritime activities of the region. As a result of all these factors, the total number of Camogli-owned ships engaging in business in 1805 might not be a surprise. Nonetheless, the increased importance of charcoal trade in the broader perspective find reasons in the relative proximity of Maremma, and therefore in the limited length of the route. The short distance coastal navigation and the deployment of small ships allowed the Camogli-owned vessels to continue in their trade to a certain extent, despite the presence of British privateers in the Tyrrhenian waters. Through the year, out of 47 voyages, only three captains reported some dealings with privateers, and all of them were involved in a single attack¹⁶¹. In order to prevent privateers' aggressions and to conduct safer navigation, most of the vessels probably sailed in convoys. In several cases, the sources display concomitant arrivals from the same place of departure. On the 9th March 1805, three Camogli-owned ships arrived at Genoa and two of them – captained respectively by Biagio and Gio. Batta Mortola – came from Castagneto (the latter one coming from the nearby area of Portiglione)¹⁶². The same individuals arrived together on 22nd September, from Follonica¹⁶³.

¹⁶⁰ The number of ships of Camogli within the total amount is questionable. In Ferrari's books the ships are 26, but, as usual for the local historian, there is no mention of his sources: G.B. Ferrari, *Capitani di mare*, p. 333. In the papers of the French administration of Genoa there are mentions of bureaucratic procedures to refund the shipowners who had lost their ships in the campaign, but through these sources is impossible to reconstruct the whole figure: see, A. Pellegrini, "Napoleone e il porto di Camogli", in G.B.R. Figari (ed.), *Camogli da borgo a città*, p. 136 and ASGe, *Prefettura francese*, b. 573.

¹⁶¹ This is the case of the *navicello* "Gesù, Giuseppe e Maria" (*patrone* Bartolomeo Mortola) and of the *filuca* "La Misericordia", (*patrone* Filippo Bertolotto), who reported to having been attacked in the waters of Castagneto (one of the main places of loading of charcoal) by English corsairs on the 17th September 1805. In the first case, the sight of the privateers approaching led the sailors to abandon the ship, leaving only the captain to deal with the corsairs. Both of the ships were not attacked for the cargoes which they were transporting, but only to take foodstuff and water («diverse bagatelle e alcune provviste»). Then, the second vessel attacked had to share its own sailor with Bartolomeo Mortola who was evidently in need of people to man the ship to Genoa. ASGe, *Ufficio di Sanità*, Arrivi di capitani e padroni, 1688.

¹⁶² ASGe, Idem, 1687.

¹⁶³ ASGe, Idem, 1689.

Family ties might have also connected Lorenzo and Andrea Senno who, on the 19th July, arrived at Genoa from Portiglione¹⁶⁴. Nevertheless, convoys were not restricted to the members of the same family: for instance, on the abovementioned 22nd September, six ships are recorded, coming respectively from Castiglione della Pescaia (Geronimo Mortola and Biagio Schiaffino), Follonica (Biagio e Gio. Batta Mortola), Portiglione (Antonio Boggiano) and Torre Civette (Bartolomeo Mortola)¹⁶⁵.

Map 2.1 – The ports of Tuscan charcoal.



The presentation of a singular example of ship engaging in this trade might lead to valuable results, especially with the purpose to reconstruct the rate of productivity to engage in the charcoal route,

¹⁶⁴ ASGe, Idem, 1688.

¹⁶⁵ ASGe, Idem, 1689.

under the lens of both owners and sailors. For instance, taking into account the navigation of the *navicello* “N.S. del Rosario” led by the *patrone* Andrea Simonetti through the course of the year 1795, it is possible to observe that seven out of eight arrivals of this vessel at Genoa are related to the trade of Tuscan charcoal, evidence suggesting the rate of specialisation of the ships involved in this traffic. Furthermore, the occurrence of seven hauls in a single year might lead to arguing a similar rate of sailings between Maremma and Genoa, thus allowing to propose some hypothesis about the real dimensions of the fleet of Camogli (at least of the part which engaged in charcoal trade)¹⁶⁶.

Table 2.3 – The voyages of the *navicello* “N.S. del Rosario”, *patrone* Andrea Simonetti, during the year 1795 – January to December.

<i>Day of arrival</i>	<i>11/02</i>	<i>16/03</i>	<i>01/05</i>	<i>22/05</i>	<i>27/06</i>	<i>12/08</i>	<i>05/09</i>	<i>28/12</i>
<i>Provenience</i>	Nice	Torre delle Civette	Torre delle Civette	Torre delle Civette	Porto Ercole	San Vincenzo	San Vincenzo	Follonica
<i>Cargo</i>	ballast	charcoal	charcoal	charcoal	charcoal	charcoal	charcoal	charcoal

Source: ASGe, *Ufficio di Sanità*, Manuali e notulari, 468-469.

The analysis of the trade geography might lead to interesting results, at least concerning the practical procedures to load the cargo, and to obtain few indications about the ships types and the numbers of the tonnage deployed. The location and identification of the 24 places of charging recorded in the sources led to the detection of three sites which were, already in the late eighteenth century, somehow inhabited and only two of them (Castiglione della Pescaia and Civitavecchia) had actual ports (being the third the village of San Vincenzo)¹⁶⁷. On the contrary, the majority of these sites was placed in depopulated areas: the loading occurred next to military outposts located before the beach – with long stretches of marshlands at the back. Charcoal, which was locally

¹⁶⁶ See paragraph 2.1 “The Camogli merchant fleet”.

¹⁶⁷ See D. Barsanti, *Castiglione della Pescaia. Storia di una comunità dal XVI al XIX secolo*, Firenze: Sansoni, 1984.

produced through the burning of timber according to traditional procedures, was then transported to the sea by the members of the agricultural communities populating the hinterland. In the absence of ports, and due to the peculiar hydrographical characteristics of the area, dominated by shallow waters, charcoal and timber had to be loaded on small lighters and then, finally, on the ship which was anchored offshore.

In the late 1850s, the geographical distribution of the place of loading frames a somewhat different picture, with only 6 locations registered and the overwhelming role of Talamone, covering the 64% of the departures¹⁶⁸. Also, the number of ships changed significantly, from the averagely 170 figure for the late eighteenth century to the 42,6 yearly average in the last decade before the Italian unification (and the subsequent loss of information about this trade). However, as a result of the improvements in Camogli's shipping business, leading to new and more significant constructions, the tonnage devoted to this traffic every year might not have decreased too much, despite the relevant fall in the number of vessels. The sources fail in providing reliable information about the average tonnages of the vessels employed by Camogli in this trade.

Finally, a further interesting feature to observe in the charcoal trade in opposition to the other routes sailed by Camogli-owned ships comes out from the analysis of the average age of the captains involved. These data are available only to what concerns the 1850s phase, but this kind of analysis provides nonetheless fruitful results. In the case of charcoal, the age of captains is much higher than the average for the same period: indeed, whereas the average age of the Camogli captains was 36,5, those going back and forth to Maremma were 47,2 years old. This remarkable difference might imply the relatively traditional nature of the traffic, as well as its declining position within the broader commercial framework, much more focused on longer and more challenging routes, those of the Black Sea grain trade.

2.6. Conclusions

¹⁶⁸ The locations reported in the documents are Castiglione della Pescaia, Follonica, Longone, Pozzallo, San Vincenzo e Talamone. ASGe, *Ufficio di sanità*, Arrivi di bastimenti dall'estero, 590-613.

In the course of the late eighteenth century, the evolution of Camogli's maritime activities seems to be in line with the paradigm of the Ligurian communities, especially of those lying east of Genoa. From the coasts to the deep-sea, fishing remained a key source of economic subsistence to the community. In parallel, the community developed its merchant fleet to profit from both some long-lasting routes as well as conjunctural shipping opportunities. The coexistence of the two aspects represented respectively by the massive involvement in the Tuscan charcoal and the critical readjustment of the routes to exploit the advantageous status of Livorno in the Revolutionary period, reveals a discrete capability to shift from one type of navigation to another. The range of activities remained restricted to the local level, as the outliers from the Northern Tyrrhenian area seems to be somewhat sporadic and exceptional, and seldom substantial to the general framework of Camogli's shipping.

The coexistence of fishing, coal trade and the capability to exploit the opportunities deriving from trade conjunctures (a sort of tramp shipping), constitute the distinguishing traits of the first phase of activities of Camogli. Despite the later outstanding success of the community to insert into the international shipping business might not be directly connected to these premises, since the late 18th century Camogli demonstrates to possess a solid maritime tradition, based on vast supplies of skilled sea labourers and a discrete availability of tonnage. Indeed, only a minimum portion of the pre-existing fleet survived to the following phase, due to the different purposes it served. Nonetheless, the strength of the maritime tradition and the expertise of local sea workers might have played a role in future accomplishments.

3. Seafaring activities in the extended Mediterranean (1830-1870)

3.1. Introduction

The decades between 1830 and 1870 represent a phase of profound changes in the economic and social conditions of the maritime community of Camogli, transformed by the outstanding growth of its shipping industry. Such evolution led a traditional seafaring community to achieve a dominant position within Italian and world shipping in less than forty years. In the heart of this momentous evolution lies the direct participation in the leading maritime business of the period, the Black Sea grain trade, which consisted of hundreds thousands tons of cereals transported yearly from the Southern Russian and Danube port-cities to the Mediterranean and Western Europe. The geographical range of Camogli's shipping extended to new horizons, passing from the local to the international dimension, thus preparing the ground for further oceanic expansion in the second half of the century. In the history of Camogli, the Black Sea phase is the cornerstone for its subsequent development, as the consistent revenues collected through this traffic were continuously reinvested in shipping, especially to the enlargement of the fleet.

To provide an adequate contextualisation to the rise of Camogli's shipping, this chapter considers the Black Sea trade since the latter's features and peculiarities played a crucial role in shaping the former's evolution. From a quantitative and qualitative perspective, the introductory section analyses the fleet of Camogli, the community's primary economic asset.

Then, the second and third sections will provide a geo-historical contextualization of the Black Sea trade, its formation, the earlier developments, with a particular focus on the geographical framework, divided into three main areas: the region of Odessa, the ports of the Azov Sea and the ports of Danube.

The fourth section is dedicated to commercial networks, in particular on Greek and Italian trade houses, due to the relative importance of their business to the maritime activities of Camogli. This analysis aims to investigate and determine the role of each of the two groups in shaping the characteristics of the maritime community's business model.

Then, the fifth section targets Camogli's involvement in the Black Sea trade. Apart from the quantitative assessment of Camogli's presence and participation in the area's economic activities, one of the primary purposes is to contextualize Camogli within the broader framework of the Italian shipping business in the region by determining trade patterns and primary loading ports.

The sixth section opens a parenthesis about the reconversion of Camogli's shipping during the Crimean War (1854-1856). This interlude is fundamental to depict, on one side, the dependency of Camogli from the Black Sea framework and the difficulties to readjust into other markets. On the other side, the adjustment to warfare economy indicates the capability of Camogli's ship-owners to develop rapid and reliable responses to conjunctural crisis, a crucial quality to endure in the shipping business.

Finally, the seventh section addresses the other side of the Black Sea grain trade, namely Camogli's presence in the ports of discharge. In this case, the gradual geographical transfer from the Mediterranean to the British Isles acquired greater significance by developing a complementary trade, that of British coal to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. This trade altered Camogli's maritime activities by reducing their dependency on grain and introducing the captains to new markets, which gradually opened the way to Camogli's subsequent establishment on Atlantic and oceanic routes.

3.2. The Camogli merchant fleet


Compared with the previous period, extensive data about Camogli's fleet are available. In the mid-nineteenth century, voyage and arrival records can be finally combined with crew lists, data about ship constructions and, from 1853 onwards, the lists of the ships enrolled to the local mutual

insurance company (*Mutua Assicurazione Marittima La Camogliese*)¹⁶⁹. Taken altogether, the sources provide us with information about tonnage, ship types, and places and dates of construction, not mentioning data about ownership, the object of more extensive analysis in the fourth chapter.

Notwithstanding the sheer volume of documents, reconstructing the fleet of Camogli in its entirety was still a challenging task owing to the sources' discontinuity. The primary source to delineate the fleet numbers and characteristics is represented by the 1853 list, comprehending the ships enrolled to the local mutual insurance institution, which gathered every vessel owned by shipowners living in Camogli. The foundation of the *Mutua* in 1853 represents, within our research, a conceptual and methodological turning point. From 1853 onwards, the sources allow us to assess, with little or no doubt, the numbers and characteristics of the Camogli fleet because, differently from other types of sources, the 1853 *Mutua* list embodies a trustworthy representation of it (see, Appendix 2.1). Indeed, this list is not based on estimations or data withdrawn from discontinuous archival collections: instead, it represents a veritable all-embracing picture of the fleet conditions in a specific year, a stepping stone from which it would be just possible to progress further. Afterwards, the following lists available date to 1883 and 1902, which will be presented and discussed in the third chapter.

¹⁶⁹ The following sources constitute the archival corpus in the analysis of the evolution of the fleet of Camogli: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, from 1829 to 1865; ASGe, *Ufficio di sanità*, Arrivi di bastimenti dall'estero, 590-613; Civico Museo Marinaro "Gio. Bono Ferrari" (CMMC from now on), *Assicurazioni varie*; L. Gatti, *Un raggio di convenienza*, Appendice 1 – Le navi costruite (1826-30 e 1838-1852), pp. 123-176. For a comparative perspective, see: A. Delis, "Mediterranean Wooden Shipbuilding in the nineteenth century: Production, Productivity and Ship Types in Comparative Perspective", *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, No. 84, 2012, pp. 349-366.

Figure 3.1 – The fleet of Camogli by tonnage range in 1853.



Source: Appendix 4.1.


Figure 3.1 describes the fleet of Camogli in 1853, divided into six tonnage categories. The number of vessels registered amounted to 142 ships, most of them averaging between 100 and 250 tons. The 1853 list was the first of its kind and, therefore, portrays less information than its future counterparts: in the document, structured into four different columns, each ship was recorded according to registration number, name, tonnage and shipowner, to which must be added the rare instances when even the year of construction was mentioned. Therefore, the range of information that the 1853 list can attain is limited to the overall number and the ship's basic structural features, such as tonnage.

Substantially, the 1853 list represents a convenient starting point to examine Camogli's fleet under several regards, through an investigation conducted on different sets of sources, including crew lists, port arrivals, and already-existing datasets. Using the crew lists available (with some discontinuities) until 1865 can yield some valuable insights in terms of chronology, as they enable estimations about the transformation of Camogli's fleet between 1853 and 1865.

Indeed, the crew lists kept in the Genoa State Archives allowed us to draw a fairly extensive survey of Camogli's operating fleet in the Black Sea from the late 1820s to 1865. The source gathering was restricted to the 1853-1865 period for archival homogeneity and concomitance with the first *Mutua* list. Besides, a few occasional incursions to the preceding period have been conducted, for the years 1830 and 1840, to gain a minimum insight into the conditions of Camogli's fleet before 1853. From a methodological perspective, crew lists represented an official four-page document delivered by the port authorities located in the port of registry of a ship (all the Camogli-owned ships were registered in Genoa) and recorded valuable data. They were issued at the departure of a ship from the port of Genoa, at the moment of the crew's enrolment, and covered periods of variable entity (usually no more than two years) of continuous navigation. Inside, it is possible to withdraw information about the ship, shipowners and crew members, including personal and professional details; on the last page, there was usually a list of the ports of call, which can be reconstructed through consular stamps and the declarations that each captain needed before leaving a port, notwithstanding whether it stopped there forcefully (sanitary and custom checks) or for commercial operations. For this section, the analysis was based on the ship identity data: name, tonnage, type and, finally, place and construction date. In this regard, the primary objectives consisted of evaluating the changes in tonnage and vessel types; secondarily, together with other sources more directly related to shipbuilding, place and construction date were concerned.

The first level of analysis addresses the growth of the average tonnage over time. Together with the progressive specialisation into standardised high-seas ship-types, such as brigantines, brigs and barks, these data offer a clear picture of the Camogli's fleet upgrade from coastal trade vessels to long-distance navigation ones.

Figure 3.2 – Average tonnage of Camogli merchant fleet (1853-1865).



Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, from 1853 to 1865; ASGe, Ufficio di sanità, *Arrivi di bastimenti dall'estero*, 590-613¹⁷⁰.

Table 3.1 – Percentage of ship types of Camogli's fleet active in commerce (1828-1865)¹⁷¹.

<i>Years</i>	<i>Bark</i>	<i>Brigantine</i>	<i>Brig</i>	<i>Other</i>
<i>1830-1840</i>	0%	5%	61%	34%
<i>1853-1857</i>	4%	5%	88%	4%
<i>1858-1862</i>	8%	3%	88%	1%
<i>1863-1865</i>	27%	0%	72%	1%

Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, from 1853 to 1865.

¹⁷⁰ The health records of Genoa's port authorities have been paired to the crew lists information only for the years between 1858 and 1862.

¹⁷¹ To translate the nautical terminology, in particular for what concerned the ship types, we chose the official translation proposed by the *Registro Navale Italiano*. Brigantines and brigs are found also in all the numbers of the *Lloyd's register* to identify the respective kind of ships. Barks, instead, are also commonly found as barques.

Figure 3.2 and Table 3.1 address tonnage and ship-types: the former illustrates the steady growth of the fleet's average tonnage; the latter shows the gradual convergence toward three main types of vessels, barks, brigantines and brigs, a contrasting result to the high diversification noted in the last decades of the eighteenth century and still present during the 1830-1840 period.

As shown, the average tonnage increased exponentially between 1830 (120,9 tons) and 1865 (297 tons.). The increment is even more evident by restricting the observation to the timespan between 1853 and 1865 (from 158 to almost 300): it is indicative of the profound correlation between Camogli's participation in the Black Sea trade and the expansion of its merchant fleet.

According to Table 3.1, the high rate of diversification of ship types (see chapter 1.2) left the place to specialization into three different typologies: brigantines, brigs and barks, suitable to long-distance navigation. In 1830 and 1840, the *sciabecco* (1,89%), *navicello* (5,66%) and *pinco* (6,60%) are still found¹⁷²; the frequent recurrence of ketches (18,87%) can be interpreted as the first transition from coastal to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea trade. Some of them sailed along these routes in the early stages of Camogli's presence. Then, the disappearance of traditional types of vessels coincided with the boom of brigantines, brigs and barks¹⁷³. These ships shared some technical features, in particular concerning the hull. However, they were distinguished by rigging and masts: brigantines (brick goletta or brick schooners in the sources) had two masts. The foremast square-rigged, while the second mast was equipped with fore-and-aft sails¹⁷⁴. Brigs (brigantino in Italian) had two masts, both square-rigged, although usually, the mainmast carried a small fore-and-aft sail to improve manoeuvrability¹⁷⁵. Barques (brigantino a palo) were bigger and had three masts: the first two were armed with square sails and the aftermost with fore-and-aft sails. Furthermore, these three ship

¹⁷² All of these ship types are grouped in the class "Other" in the Graphic 3. For a description of these ship types see, Chapter 1.2.

¹⁷³ A comparable transition is shown by A. Delis in the Greek-owned merchant fleet: A. Delis, "From Lateen to Square Rig: The Evolution of the Greek-Owned merchant fleet and its ships in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries", *The Mariner's Mirror*, No. 100:1, 2014, pp. 44-58.


¹⁷⁴ S. Bellabarba and E. Guerreri, *Vele italiane*, pp. 72-77.

¹⁷⁵ *Idem*, pp. 64-71.

types, all employed in the Black Sea trade, presented some considerable differences in tonnage. Brigantines were the smallest, measuring around 111,2 tons (Gatti¹⁷⁶) or 127,6 (crew lists of Camogli¹⁷⁷). Brigs spanned between 178,2 (Gatti) and 204,7 tons (crew lists). Finally, barks (or barques) averaged 365,1 tons (crew list)¹⁷⁸.

The same features – average tonnage and types – can be analysed from a complementary perspective, which observes the shipbuilding strategies taken by Camogli shipowners in more or less the same period (1826-1865). Here, data originate from both crew lists (by sorting the ships depending on the year of construction) and the Ligurian construction lists compiled by Luciana Gatti in her book.

Figure 3.3. Average tonnage of Camogli-built ships between 1826-1865.



Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*; L. Gatti, *Un raggio di convenienza*, Appendice 1 – Le navi costruite (1826-30 e 1838-1852), pp. 123-176.

¹⁷⁶ L. Gatti, *Un raggio di convenienza*, Appendice 1 – Le navi costruite (1826-30 e 1838-1852), pp. 123-176.

¹⁷⁷ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, from 1828 to 1865.

¹⁷⁸ The statistics are drawn from the crew lists of Camogli ships (ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, from 1828 to 1865) and from L. Gatti, *Un raggio di convenienza*, Appendice 1 – Le navi costruite (1826-30 e 1838-1852), pp. 123-176. Barks lack in Gatti's statistics is due to the absence of barks among the ship-buildings reported. Indeed, also the crew lists show that no barks of Camogli was built in Liguria before 1856, thus confirming the data of Gatti.


Table 3.2 – Types of Camogli-built ships between 1826-1865.

<i>Years</i>	<i>Brig</i>	<i>Barque</i>	<i>Brigantine</i>	<i>Other</i>
<i>1826-1835</i>	61%	0%	4%	34%
<i>1836-1845</i>	83%	2%	6%	9%
<i>1846-1852</i>	80%	3%	6%	10%
<i>1853-1857</i>	91%	6%	1%	1%
<i>1858-1862</i>	61%	37%	0%	2%
<i>1863-1865</i>	47%	53%	0%	0%

Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*; L. Gatti, *Un raggio di convenienza*, Appendice 1 – Le navi costruite (1826-30 e 1838-1852), pp. 123-176.

Differently from the previous graphs, Figure 3.3 and Table 3.2 focus on shipbuilding data, emphasising the ongoing transition from coastal to long-distance navigation ships. Still, in the 1830s, some shipowners opted to construct small-sized vessels suitable for cabotage. The incidence of these ship types within the operating fleet of Camogli (Table 3.1), therefore, was not outdated; instead, small cabotage still represented a reliable and profitable market niche to the point of encouraging new constructions. Notwithstanding the impressive reduction of ship-buildings within this category, some shipowners invested in coastal vessels until the early 1850s. Then, as Camogli's fleet had strengthened its position in the Black Sea trade, the community's maritime activities specialized even more, leaving few, if any space at all, to investments in other sectors.

Looking at Camogli's crew lists, the last pieces of information suitable to analysis were place and date of construction that shed a unique perspective on the historical formation of the fleet (date of construction) as well as Camogli's rate of integration within the Ligurian maritime system and the shipbuilding industry.

Figure 3.4 – Estimation of total tonnage built by Camogli ship-owners.

Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, from 1829 to 1865; L. Gatti, *Un raggio di convenienza*, Appendice 1 – Le navi costruite (1826-30 e 1838-1852), pp. 123-176; CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*.

Figure 3.4 expresses an estimation, made upon crew lists and the data collected by Luciana Gatti¹⁷⁹, of the total tonnage built in five-year intervals from 1820 to 1865.

After opening the Black Sea waters to the Sardinian flag (1825), Camogli's shipowners made their first efforts to renew the fleet to respond to the increasing demands of sea transport generated by the booming Russian grain trade. Gradually, ship constructions specialized in medium-sized brigs (see, Table 3.2) that represented the most typical and recurrent ship type until the late 1850s. Hence, after the Crimean War, the shipping capital in the hands of local ship-owners rose to new levels: more ships were commissioned, and their tonnage grew. The average tonnage of the new construction had increased from 189 tons to around 270 tons; most of them were barques, suited for both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, in line with the geographical expansion of Camogli's shipping activities.

¹⁷⁹ L. Gatti, *Un raggio di convenienza*, Appendice 1 – Le navi costruite (1826-30 e 1838-1852), pp. 123-176.

Finally, a few words can be spent on construction places to highlight the profound dependency of Camogli's shipping from Ligurian shipbuilding – a functional and systemic linkage that will be wiped out in the last decades of the nineteenth century.

Map 3.1. Places of construction of Camogli's fleet (1853-1865).



Source: Data processed from ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1853-1865. See: Appendix 3.1.

As shown in Map 3.1, most Camogli-owned ships were built in Varazze (58,4%), the leading shipyard of Liguria, until Sestri Ponente surpassed it in the early 1860s (see Chapter 1). Furthermore, Varazze represented the region's most traditional shipbuilding centre, as confirmed by the crucial role played in merchant shipbuilding since the early modern period¹⁸⁰.

Then, at a very long distance, followed Prà, Sestri Ponente, Savona, Recco and Chiavari; Prà and Sestri Ponente were located at the western outskirts of the regional capital (Genoa); Savona represented the second port-city of the region; Recco and Chiavari belonged to the area adjacent to Camogli. Most of them upheld a long tradition in seasonal shipbuilding, a role which they gradually lost due to the startling transformation of this industry in the second half of the century. As seen in

¹⁸⁰ L. Gatti, *Navi e cantieri della Repubblica di Genova, sec. 16-18*, Genova: Brigati, 1999; Idem, *Un raggio di convenienza*, pp. 93-109 and Appendice 3 – Repertorio di costruttori.

the previous chapter, Sestri Ponente and Savona were exceptions, as their construction sites were gradually modernised and provided with infrastructures suitable to industrial shipbuilding¹⁸¹.

3.3. Geography and navigation in the Black Sea

Between the 1830s and the late 1860s, the fleet of Camogli was radically transformed by Camogli's successful penetration within the Black Sea trade, which coincided with the dramatic increase of Russian grain exports to Western Europe. The Black Sea region constituted the geographic stage of this trade.

In the last decade, the Black Sea region has been at the centre of increasing historiographic attention, which culminated in the "History of the Black Sea, 18th-20th century" project, run by the Centre of Maritime History (IMS-FORTH, Rethymno, Crete), as the prosecution of previous international projects, coordinated by Gelina Harlaftis¹⁸². In particular, it was Greek historiography to revive the discourse about the Black Sea as an area of economic, social and political developments, started in the late eighteenth century and then fully unfolded during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Among the many themes treated and perspectives adopted, these recent studies focused mainly on the Black Sea maritime economy, analysed by the adoption of four geographical subdivisions of this vast regional area, each of them forming a port-system on its own: 1) the western coast, divided in south-western (Varna and Burgas) and north-western (Danube ports and Constanta); 2) the northern coast, whose primary ports were identified in Odessa, Nikolayev, Eupatoria, Sevastopol and Theodosia; 3) the eastern coast, further divided into the Azov Sea region and the south-eastern ports (Novorossiysk and Batum); 4) the southern coast, which included the ports of Northern Anatolia, such as Trabzon and Samsun¹⁸³.

¹⁸¹ G. Doria, *Investimenti e sviluppo economico a Genova alla vigilia della Prima Guerra Mondiale*, pp. 273-303.

¹⁸² Some of the material collected and processed is available online at: <https://blacksea.gr/>. At the time of the writing of the present dissertation, however, I received the whole data corpus by Gelina Harlaftis, to whom I am immensely indebted for her courtesy.

¹⁸³ See, G. Harlaftis, *As an introduction: Black Sea History and the Black Sea Project*, in G. Harlaftis, V. Konstantinova, I. Lyman, A. Sydorenko and E. Tchkoizde (eds.), *Between Grain and Oil from the Azov to the Caucasus: the Port-cities of the*

However, within this multifaceted region, since the beginning, the grain trade concentrated in the first three areas: the ports of the Danube (Galatz and Braila), on the west; the port of Odessa (on the northern shores); the ports of the Azov Sea (Berdyansk, Mariupol, Taganrog and more lately Rostov-on-Don), in the eastern area.

From the period of its foundation – at least up until the end of the Crimean War –, Odessa represented the main port for both export and import trade in Southern Russia. Odessa's city benefitted from unique benefits to facilitate and support its commercial activities through fiscal facilitation (the free port status between 1819 and 1857) and infrastructural investments. Built in the Ottoman fortress of Hadji-Bey's original site, Odessa was ideally located near the mouths of the rivers Dnepr, Dniester and Bug. Soon after its foundation, the city was rapidly provided with a spacious harbour (with quays), a customs house and a large quarantine station. The inland waterways system was fundamental to Odessa's growth: the three rivers granted direct connections with the grain-producing regions of Podolia and Volynia, from which the cereals were delivered through the utilisation of barges floating downstream to the coast.

Moreover, fluvial navigation was paralleled by land transports operating through wheeled wagons. Water and land communications coexisted and, more accurately, were complementary according to the area's unique geographical features¹⁸⁴. Therefore, Odessa was the leading destination of cereals from the most productive areas of Ukraine and Southern Russia (except the Don region, whose products were delivered to the Azov Sea ports). Then, favourable fiscal conditions, modern and spacious ports infrastructures, and foreign merchant communities' growth led it to prosper and dominate the Black Sea trade for a long time.

Eastern Coast of the Black Sea, late 18th – early 20th century, Rethymnon: Centre of Maritime History IMS-FORTH, 2020, pp. xi-xxxii.

¹⁸⁴ P. Herlihy, *Odessa recollected*, pp. 232-233; V. Kardasis, *Diaspora merchants in the Black Sea*, pp. 63-78. Both the authors underline the existence of an integrated system of transport for grain from the interior to the coast. Up until the construction of railroads (from late 1860s), riverine barges coexisted with the *chumaky*, carts or wagons pulled by oxen. The usage of one or the other was dictated by geographical reasons: in the northernmost regions, where rivers presented the most impeding obstacles to navigation (Podolia), land transport was usually preferred over barges which, instead, were more profitable along the southernmost course of the rivers (Bessarabia). Also, E. Sifneos, *Imperial Odessa*, Appendixes, Table 10 *Number of carts carrying grain to Odessa, 1830*, p. 247.

The Azov Sea ports, instead, were very different, especially on what concerns their geographical environment. The Azov Sea navigation was dominated by unpredictable currents, fog, harsh weather conditions, and shallow waters¹⁸⁵. The access to the main ports, positioned on the sea's northern shores, constituted a tough challenge for captains and vessels. The opening of the port of Kerch, located at the entrance of the Azov, in 1821¹⁸⁶, was fundamental to guarantee a safe harbour and to provide some essential services. The port was furnished with a quarantine station, where all the vessels aiming to enter into the Azov must stop, denounce their cargo and deliver all the needed information to Russian officials. Furthermore, due to the straits' shallowness, several ships resorted to the enlightening practice: to sail through safely, the captains had to discharge part of the cargo at the entrance and then receive it back at the opposite end passage. However, these expensive and time-wasting manoeuvres represented one of the main economic activities of the local population¹⁸⁷.

The obstacles to sailing in the Azov Sea were not limited to the Straits passage: for an average of 126 days in a year (more than four months), icing impeded navigation¹⁸⁸. Free navigation was usually inaugurated in the late March/beginning of April and lasted until late November: nevertheless,

¹⁸⁵ See, in particular, the recent publication of Apostolos Delis: A. Delis, "Navigating perilous waters: routes and hazards of the voyages to Black Sea in the 19th century", in M.C. Chatziioannou and A. Delis (eds), *Linkages of the Black Sea with the West. Navigation, Trade and Immigration*, Rethymnon: Black Sea History Working Papers, 2020, pp. 1-33. See, also: V. Kardasis, *Diaspora merchants in the Black Sea*, pp. 4-7.

¹⁸⁶ Interestingly, in his correspondence, the Genoese merchant Domenico Scassi entitles to his personal entrepreneurship the opening of the port of Kerch (of which the Scassi was appointed as first port-governor). He was also responsible for the earlier investments to provide the port with the needed infrastructures. See: V. Vitale, *Onofrio Scassi e la vita genovese del suo tempo (1768-18369)*, pp. 360-361, Letter XII, 5th May 1822.

¹⁸⁷ *Sulla città di Kertch. Cenni di G.B. Giovannetti ex vice-console toscano (1848 e 1849) in Orano*, in *Bollettino consolare*, Torino: Paravia, 1869, pp. 457-459.

¹⁸⁸ These data have been calculated on the basis of the information about the yearly opening and the closure of navigation in the Azov sea in the 1860-69 decade. See, V. Kardasis, *Diaspora merchants in the Black Sea*, p. 7.

sudden icing was a possible risk, and consular or private correspondence is filled with cases of ships being entrapped within the Azov or, otherwise, stuck in the harbours for the whole winter¹⁸⁹.

Finally, shallow waters impeded the vessels' entrance to the ports: the short water depth in the coast's proximity prevented most ships from getting ashore. In this regard, apart from the environmental constraints, the captains bore their guilt: to clear as fast as possible, they used to throw their ballast out of the ship, directly into the sea. Thus, they worsened the already troublesome conditions of the seabed¹⁹⁰. However, not all the ports were affected by shallowness to the same extent: in more than one circumstance, Berdyansk was praised for presenting fewer hindrances (the ships were able to moor at 3 miles maximum from the quay), whereas in Taganrog and Mariupol vessels might have to stop up to 15-20 miles¹⁹¹.

The grain deposits of the three cities were supplied from the fertile hinterlands. In this regard, Taganrog held a comparative advantage due to its relative proximity to the River Don's mouth, which provided a fundamental waterway connection with the internal regions where a network of canals connected the Don and Volga regions with Rostov-on-Don and Taganrog. Berdyansk and Mariupol, on the other hand, mainly relied on their respective countryside, despite some railway projects to improve the connections with the Dnepr river are repeatedly mentioned in the sources¹⁹².

¹⁸⁹ See, for instance the data about the vessels which were forced to spend the winter in Mariupol and Taganrog: *Stato della navigazione nei porti di Taganrog e Marianopoli. Rapporto del Regio console cav. Avv. G. Rossi*, in *Bollettino consolare*, Torino: Paravia, 1869, pp. 464-468.

¹⁹⁰ In order to prevent this behavior and to punish the perpetrators, the Empire issued some laws requiring double inspections to the ballast quantities both in Kerch and in the ports of arrival. The lawbreakers might incur in fees from 100 to 300 roubles or even the confiscation of the ship and up to 6 months of detention. See, AMAE, *Affari esteri*, 895, Odessa, Giuseppe Rossi – Regio Delegato Consolare d'Italia a Taganrog, Gennaio 1862.

¹⁹¹ AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Odessa, 6, 26 Novembre 1852.

¹⁹² In this regard, the Italian consul in Berdyansk emphasizes the potential commercial growth of the city if put in direct connection with Alexandrovsk (nowadays Zaporizzja) on the eastern shore of the river Dnestr. AMAE, *Affari esteri*, 895, Odessa, Cenni Statistici sul commercio di Berdianska ordinati a questa Regia Delegazione Consolare, Novembre 1861.

Furthermore, the Danube port system presents some similar characteristics to the Azov Sea. Located along the western shores of the Black Sea, the Danube embodied the third main area of grain deposit and exports to Western Europe. In this regard, the Wallachian and Moldavian cities of Braila and Galatz represented the most important ports for trade volume. Both of them, however, were in the interior, along the course of the Danube River: instead, the access to the river itself, through the three mouths of Kilia, Sulina and St. George, was controlled by the Russian Empire from the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) onwards. According to the existing literature, in order to limit the economic growth of the principalities – which was challenging the prosperity of Odessa – in 1853, the Russian authorities decided to build a quarantine station at the mouth of Sulina, where the ships entering and clearing the Danube were obliged to stop and denounce cargoes and navigation details to local officials¹⁹³. However, the environmental conditions of the Danube were slightly different from those of the Azov Sea; therefore, soon in Sulina, lighters and tugboats companies were developed to assist or even substitute the ships arriving at the mouths heading to either Galatz or Braila. River cabotage became highly profitable, and even some Sardinians and Italians tried to invest in this activity¹⁹⁴.

Besides the Danube system, however, throughout the mid-19th century, Galatz and Braila entered in competition with Constanta and the Bulgarian ports of Burgas and Varna, southward to the Danube entrance. Whereas Constanta developed later (from the early 1880s)¹⁹⁵, Burgas and Varna's ports¹⁹⁶

¹⁹³ See, A. Emilciuc, "The Trade of Galati and Braila in the Reports of Russian Officials from Sulina Quarantine Station (1836-1853)", in C. Ardeleanu and A. Lyberatos (eds.), *Port cities of the Western Black sea coast and the Danube*, pp. 63-94.

¹⁹⁴ The Italian consul in Galatz reports about the existence of the lighters company Fratelli Corsanego, in 1868. See: *Agricoltura, industria e commercio della Moldavia; rapporto del nobile avv. Bernardo Lambertenghi Regio vice console a Galatz*, in *Bollettino consolare*, Torino: Paravia, 1868, pp. 127-128.

¹⁹⁵ D. Kontogeorgis, "«International» and «National» Ports. The Competition between the Ports of Braila / Galati and Constanta during the Period 1878-1914", in C. Ardeleanu and A. Lyberatos (eds.), *Port cities of the Western Black sea coast and the Danube*, pp. 95-129.

¹⁹⁶ I. Roussev, "The Black Sea Port-City in the Road of Modernization. The First Modern Attempts in Varna during the 1840s-1870s", in C. Ardeleanu and A. Lyberatos (eds.), *Port cities of the Western Black sea coast and the Danube*, pp. 214-223.

competed with the Principalities in our analysis period. They experienced exceptional growth in concomitance with the Crimean War outbreak and the related warfare economy.

3.4. Historical background

The process of integration of the Black Sea into the international scene represents a long-told narrative in which foreign politics, military struggles and the increase of the provisioning demands of Western Europe form a composite scenario.

During the early modern period, the Black Sea's access was firmly detained by the Ottoman Empire, and its navigation was subordinated to the obtainment of special privileges granted by the Porte. The Ottomans' commercial policies responded to provisioning criteria, and the Black Sea represented the foremost productive region of strategic goods, such as grain, cattle, and slaves. Some merchants were allowed to carry out trade in the area; accordingly, they were provided with specific permission to be admitted in the Straits' customhouses. After the cargo's loading in the Black Sea, the ships were mandatorily destined to Constantinople, as the needs of the Porte hold the priority over international trade. Such trade connected the Ottoman capital with the commercial emporia scattered either along the northern coasts of Anatolia or the Bulgarian shores. Merchants and seafarers were usually settled in either one of the traffic's three extremes (Constantinople, northern Anatolia or Bulgaria). Therefore, the picture of a closed sea sailed by Greek and Ottoman subjects under the Ottoman flag is the most veritable to describe the Black Sea's 18th-century trade conditions¹⁹⁷. This situation lasted until 1774, when the Treaty of Kuçuk Kainargé forced the Ottoman authorities to accept Russian-flagged ships to navigate the Straits and participate in the Black Sea economy. The end of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774 and the accomplishment of the free entrance of Russian vessels into the Black Sea represented an astounding breakthrough in the history of the region because it led the way to further

¹⁹⁷ C. Ardeleanu, "The discovery of the Black Sea by the Western World: The Opening of the Euxine to International Trade and Shipping (1774-1792)", *New Europe College, Stefan Odobleja Program Yearbook 2012-2013*, 2014, pp. 21-46; Idem, "The opening and development of the Black sea for international trade and shipping (1774-1853)", *Euxeinos*, No. 14, 2014, pp. 30-52.

transformations, being acknowledged as the first step of integration of the area into the world economy¹⁹⁸. From this moment onward, to pursue the long-desired economic exploitation of the Black Sea's northern shores, the Russian Empire launched a massive colonisation campaign through the foundation of commercial emporia in the region's most strategic places. After Taganrog (1769), positioned at the mouth of the River Don, in the Azov Sea, soon followed Kerch (1774) and Mariupol' (1778). Then, in the aftermath of the 1783 Russian annexation of Crimea, Theodosia was built in the historical site of medieval Caffa, followed by the port of Sevastopol, designed to become the basis of the naval fleet. However, it is the foundation of Odessa in 1794 to represent the Russian authorities' most remarkable action to enhance its commercial activities. Odessa was provided with countless privileges and fiscal concessions, which stimulated its rapid demographic and economic growth¹⁹⁹. In particular, most of the efforts aimed at facilitating commercial and maritime operators – mostly of Greek origin – to settle there to compensate for the absence of merchants and seafarers of Russian descents²⁰⁰. The establishment of Greek merchant houses along the Black Sea northern shores turned out to be crucial to the commercial growth of the area; along with seafaring expertise and shipownership, the Greeks contributed to increase and expand regional and international trade through long-standing commercial networks, well-rooted in the major European port-cities²⁰¹.

¹⁹⁸ A. Papadopoulou, "Foreign merchant business and the integration of the Black and Azov Seas of the Russian Empire into the First global economy", *Business history*, 2019, pp. 1-27.

¹⁹⁹ The most recent historiography about Odessa is embodied by the following works: E. Sifneos, *Imperial Odessa: people, spaces and identities*, Leiden: Brill, 2018; P. Herlihy, *Odessa recollected: the Port and the People*, Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2018.

²⁰⁰ R.P. Bartlett, *Human Capital. The settlement of foreigners in Russia 1762-1804*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

²⁰¹ The historiographical production about the role of the Greeks in the Black sea area is vast and dense. See: G. Harlaftis, *The role of the Greeks in the Black sea trade, 1830-1900*, in L.R. Fischer and H.W. Nordvik (eds.), *Shipping and trade, 1750-1950: Essays in International Maritime Economic History*, Pontefract: Lofthouse, 1990, pp. 63-96; Id, *A History of Greek-owned Shipping: the making of an international tramp fleet, 1830 to present day*, London: Routledge, 1996; E. Sifneos and G. Harlaftis, *Entrepreneurship at the Russian frontier of international trade. The Greek merchant community of Taganrog in the Sea of Azov, 1780s-1830s*, in V.N. Zakharov, G. Harlaftis and O. Katsiardi-Hering (eds.), *Merchant colonies in the early modern period*, London: Pickering & Chatto, 2012, pp. 157-179; V. Kardasis, *Diaspora merchants in the Black Sea. The Greeks in Southern Russia, 1775-1861*, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001; G. Harlaftis, "From diaspora traders to

Meanwhile, the opening to international trade attracted the interest of the Mediterranean and Western countries, which rapidly sought to sign agreements with the Russian Empire to participate in the regional economy. Austria stipulated a commercial agreement in 1784, in compliance with its direct interest toward the Black Sea area; in 1787, both France and the Kingdom of the Naples signed commercial treaties to gain all the advantages and customs exceptions granted by Russia to friendly nations²⁰². As a result, a Neapolitan consul was appointed in Kherson, where some French merchants had established their commercial houses since the early 1780s²⁰³. Through the revolutionary period and the Napoleonic Wars, the conflict between Ottomans and French led to new concession to their allies, Russia and the United Kingdom, which in 1803 achieved for the first time the right to cross the Straits for its merchant marine²⁰⁴. In the same year, 815 ships loaded with Russian wheat delivered their cargoes to European ports: in historiographical accounts, 1803 represents the first occurrence of massive grain arrivals from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean²⁰⁵.

shipping tycoons: the Vagliano Bros”, *The Business History Review*, No. 81, 2007, pp. 237-268; P. Herlihy, “Greek Merchants in Odessa in the Nineteenth Century”, *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, No. 3, 1979, pp. 399-420; E. Sifneos, “Greek Family Firms in the Azov Sea Region, 1850-1917”, *The Business History Review*, No. 87, 2013, pp. 279-308; J. A. Mazis, *The Greeks of Odessa: diaspora leadership in late Imperial Russia*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004; O. Shliakhov, “Greeks in the Russian Empire and their role in the development of trade and shipping in the Black and Azov Seas”, *The Historical Review/La revue historique*, No. 10, 2013, pp. 255-264.

²⁰² The first diplomatic and commercial encounters between Neapolitan subjects and Russia have stimulated various studies: M. Mafri, *Le relazioni diplomatiche e commerciali tra il Regno di Napoli e l'Impero Russo*, in R. Sabbatini and P. Volpini, *Annali di storia militare. Sulla diplomazia in età moderna. Politica, economia, religione*, Milano: Franco Angeli, 2011, pp. 219-239; M. D'Angelo, *Tra Messina e “li mari neri”*, in L.M. Migliorini and M. Mafri, *Mediterraneo e/è Mar Nero. Due mari tra età moderna e contemporanea*, Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2012, pp. 91-138; O. Fedenko, “The activity of the Italian merchants in Odessa during the nineteenth century”, *Danubius*, No. 34, 2016, pp. 31-42; H.R. Gomez, “Migrazioni italiane in Crimea e Nuova Russia: tracce, fonti e contesti”, *Eurasiatica*, No. 8, 2017, pp. 117-144.

²⁰³ C. Ardeleanu, “The opening and development of the Black sea for international trade and shipping (1774-1853)”, p. 35.

²⁰⁴ *Idem*, p. 37.

²⁰⁵ A. de Saint-Joseph, *Essai historique sur le commerce et la navigation de la Mer-Noire*, Paris: H. Agasse, 1805, pp. 204-207; T. Dandolo, *Sulle cause dell'avvilimento delle nostre granaglie e sulle industrie agrarie riparatrici dei danni che ne derivano*, Milano: Giambattista Sonzogno, 1820, pp. 5-7. Most of the ships (552) departed from Odessa, followed by Taganrog (210); among the ships, the Austrian (421) and Russian (329) flags outnumbered all the others. With regard to

After Vienna's Congress, the situation slowly changed and witnessed a gradual increase in the Black Sea's European trade. In 1819, to enhance its advantageous position in grain exports, Odessa was granted the free port status. A few years later, the Greek Independence War outbreak and the resumption of the hostilities between Russia and the Ottomans in 1828-1829 led to a new phase of closure of the Black Sea navigation, lasting until the sign of the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829. In the aftermath, foreign arrivals at the Black Sea ports increased exponentially, which finally enacted the Black Sea's inclusion into the global economy²⁰⁶.

Limitedly to the presence of Sardinian, and later Italian, subjects in the region, it is possible to observe a relatively late establishment. In its latest years (1797), the Republic of Genoa never sought to stipulate agreements with the Russian Empire; at that moment, Ligurian primary commercial interests looked elsewhere, to Tyrrhenian cabotage and the redistribution of Atlantic commodities. Nonetheless, some private entrepreneurs and merchants settled either in the newly founded Odessa or in the first commercial emporia of Crimea and Azov. For instance, scattered information is found about the activities of individuals, such as Raffaele Scassi²⁰⁷, or about proper merchant families, such as the Garibaldi, Lagorio and Durante²⁰⁸, who constitute, altogether, the first Ligurian settlers of the region. Meanwhile, the number of Italians enrolled in Odessa's first guild ascended from 1 to 8

the port of destination, the scheme is more various, with the pre-eminence of Trieste (186), Messina (144), Cephalonia (103), Genoa (72) and Livorno (57).

²⁰⁶ A. Papadopoulou, "Foreign merchant business and the integration of the Black and Azov Seas of the Russian Empire into the First global economy", *Business history*, 2019, pp. 1-27.

²⁰⁷ H.R. Gomez, "Migrazioni italiane in Crimea e Nuova Russia: tracce, fonti e contesti", pp. 134-136. Raffaele Scassi settled in Theodosia some time before the 1813, when he already hold some influence in the city. Then, in the early 1820s, he moved to Kerch, where he was appointed Port Governor and had strong connections with other Sardinian merchant families. Some of his correspondence (13 letters) with his brother living in Genoa has been published in V. Vitale, *Onofrio Scassi e la vita genovese del suo tempo (1768-18369). Con appendice su Raffaele Scassi*, Genova: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 1932, pp. 335-365.

²⁰⁸ H.R. Gomez, "Migrazioni italiane in Crimea e Nuova Russia: tracce, fonti e contesti", pp. 134-138. Members of both the Garibaldi and Lagorio families covered the role of consular representatives of pre-unitarian Italian states (the Kingdom of Sardinia and the Kingdom of Two Sicilies) in Kerch and Theodosia.

members between 1800 and 1813²⁰⁹. Despite a promising onset, before the Congress of Vienna and Liguria's annexation to the Kingdom of Sardinia (1814), the number of ships of 'Genoese' origin incoming to the Black Sea is hardly relevant. On the other side, from 1816 onwards, Genoa's port witnessed a constant increase of Ligurian ships arriving with cargoes of cereals from Odessa and the other ports of the region.

On the political ground, despite few preliminary contacts – of diplomatic purpose – had taken place in the last decades of the eighteenth century, the Kingdom of Sardinia, lacking a systematic maritime policy up until 1815, never developed commercial relationships with Russia before that date²¹⁰. The annexation of Liguria, however, altered the overall economic policies of the Savoy State: despite the initial imposition of a customs barrier between Liguria and Piedmont (lasting until 1818) – detrimental to the Genoese shipowners – the introduction of flag privileges (1824) and the sign of the Treaty with the Porte (1825) paved the way for Ligurian shipping to participating to the Black Sea trade²¹¹. Flag privileges damaged Genoa's transit trade, whose bulk volume moved to Livorno. On the contrary, shipowners highly appreciated this measure: due to their introduction, the Sardinian share on wheat arrivals to Genoa passed from 30% in 1824 to 92,5% in 1830²¹². The second

²⁰⁹ O. Fedenko, "The activity of the Italian merchants in Odessa during the nineteenth century", p. 11. Among the names reported by the author, only Giacomo Tassara can be surely recognized for his Ligurian origins.

²¹⁰ See, F. Bacino (ed.), *La legazione e i consolati del regno di Sardegna in Russia (1783-1861)*, Roma: Tipografia riservata del Ministero Affari Esteri, 1952, pp. 9-20.

²¹¹ The entry customs of cereals were 1/3 less if the cargo was carried on board of national ships. Es. in 1825, the custom was L. 9/quintal under foreign flag and L. 6/quintal under national flag. Source: E. Maragliano, *La politica economica e il commercio marittimo sardo dal 1815 al 1835*, Genova: Quaderni dell'Associazione Ligure di Archeologia e Storia Navale, 1957, p. 12; M. Cevasco, *Statistique de la ville de Genes. Tome II*, Genova: Ferrando, 1840, pp. 374-375.

²¹² E. Maragliano, *La politica economica e il commercio marittimo sardo dal 1815 al 1835*, p. 13. Flag privileges and differential duties were harshly opposed by the Genoese merchant elites, together with the progressive dependence from wheat imports over the total movement of the port of Genoa. To frame the protectionist economic policies of the Kingdom of Sardinia within the general context of the pre-unitarian Italian states, see: V.D. Flore, *L'industria dei trasporti marittimi in Italia. Dagli inizi del XVI secolo al 1860*, Roma: Bollettino Informazioni Marittime, 1966, pp. 155-305; A. La Macchia, "Aspetti dell'economia marittima genovese nei primi decenni della Restaurazione", in R. Battaglia, S. Bottari and A. La Macchia, *Porti e traffici nel Mediterraneo. Tre saggi di storia economica marittima (1695-1861)*, Milano: Franco Angeli, 2018, pp. 9-48.

institutional factor to play a significant role in facilitating Ligurian access to the Black Sea was the stipulation of a commercial treaty with the Ottoman authorities. The negotiations began in 1823 and lasted until 1825: at the end, the Sardinian authorities obtained free entrance to the Black Sea and various fiscal advantages for their vessels²¹³. The treaty accomplished immediate results: in a couple of years, the number of Sardinian ships in Odessa increased from 57 (1825) to 116 (1826) and 237 (1827)²¹⁴. Afterwards, apart from a two year stop of the traffics owing to the Russo-Turkish War of 1828–1829, the figure resumed to pre-war levels again in 1830 (225)²¹⁵.

In sum, since the early 1830s, Sardinian maritime actors were well-established in the Black Sea trade. Within this economic and political framework, Camogli seafarers, captains, and ship-owners found profitable terrain to flourish and rise through world shipping ranks.

3.5. Merchant communities and commercial networks

The absence of a Russian mercantile tradition in the area, and the early settlement of foreign merchant communities, attracted by imperial policies, were crucial factors to shaping the Black Sea trade. These ethnic and national groups carried out the overwhelming majority of imports and exports and, through their networks, contributed to include the Black Sea into a broader interregional economy – including the Mediterranean and Northern Europe – up to the global scale. Each group's influence and the business models implemented changed over time, depending on conjunctural and structural transformations, which impacted on various scales. In different periods and different ways, Greeks, Jews, Italians, British, Germans and French played their role in the

²¹³ Idem, pp. 20-21; E. Guglielmino, *Genova dal 1814 al 1849. Gli sviluppi economici e l'opinione pubblica*, Genova: Regia Deputazione di Storia Patria per la Liguria, 1938, p. 45. The integral version of the Treaty can be found in *Raccolta dei regi editti, manifesti ed altre provvidenze de' magistrati ed uffizi*, No. 23, Torino: Davico e Picco, 1825, pp. 31-38. The sign of the Treaty constituted an international concern, as we might infer by the decisive role played by the British plenipotentiary Lord Strangford, who had the duty to enforce the principle of free passage through the Straits in order to appease the relationships between the Porte and the Russian Empire.

²¹⁴ E. Maragliano, *La politica economica e il commercio marittimo sardo dal 1815 al 1835*, p. 24.

²¹⁵ Idem.

history of the Black Sea trade. On a long-term perspective, the Greeks and the Jews exercised the most substantial influence²¹⁶. Firstly, both groups were already circulating in the area during the Ottoman period, before the Russian conquest: then, they demonstrated comparable capacity to capitalize their long-lasting presence instead of second-comers merchants. Their radication had tangible effects on establishing stable relationships and networks with the hinterland's agricultural regions²¹⁷. Another common feature is found in the geographical width of their commercial linkages: both Greeks and Jews disposed of centuries-old networks in the Mediterranean and Northern Europe, which were vital to trade along far-reaching routes and to optimise information flows. On the other side, the western communities – a cluster comprehending English, French, Austrians, Sardinians and Neapolitans – established their presence upon different premises. Specifically, it is the relationship with their native countries that must be regarded as the primary distinguishing trait. Unlike Greeks and Jews, who settled in the region through private entrepreneurship, westerners sought assistance in their home political institutions before starting any business. Therefore, most westerners retained stable and pervasive affiliation to their home countries, both from political and commercial perspectives, a development which was precluded to Greeks and Jews. These features led to some implications in terms of the business pattern adopted: dependency from national business implied some restrictions, such as developing more limited commercial networks, which seldom went beyond the respective national markets.

The present analysis will address two specific groups, Ligurians and Greeks. This selection is motivated by their relevance to Camogli's shipping.

3.5.1. THE GREEK NETWORKS

²¹⁶ A. Papadopoulou, "Foreign merchant business", pp. 1-27. With regard to the Jewish community of Odessa: P. Herlihy, *Odessa recollected*, pp. 196-208; E. Sifneos, "The Dark Side of the Moon: rivalry and riots for shelter and occupation between the Greek and the Jewish populations in multi-ethnic nineteenth-century Odessa", *Historical Review/La revue historique*, No. 3, 2006, pp. 189-204.

²¹⁷ Some historians also address the mistrust of Western merchants towards the producers in order to add further explanations of Greek and Jewish superiority against Europeans in the hinterland. See. V. Kardassis, *Diaspora merchants in the Black sea*, p. 82.

In the mid-19th century, the Greeks handled a significant part of the Black Sea trade. To analyse the Greek influence in Southern Russia throughout the nineteenth century, scholarly literature distinguishes between Chiot and Ionian phases, according to the predominance of different ethnic commercial networks, the adoption of dissimilar business models and alternative geographical areas within the Black Sea region²¹⁸.

The Chiot phase (1830s-1860s) corresponds to the leadership of merchant families from the island of Chios or somehow related to them. The Ralli represented the most influential family, followed by Rodocanachis, Schilizzi, Scaramanga, Negroponte and Sevastopulo²¹⁹. The operational base was usually Odessa, where the head branches of their firms were founded. These networks were based on ethnicity and kinship and were ruled by severe reputation mechanisms; their companies outreached the Black Sea, up to the English financial and maritime centres, including various intermediate ports in between, such as Marseille, Livorno and Trieste²²⁰. Rather than strictly specialize in cereal trade, the Chiot network opted for high diversification degrees, engaging in different trade commodities, though still maintaining consistent shipping investments. Their commercial strategy was based on controlling the production and consumption markets, being the Russian countryside and England the system's extremes²²¹. Then, some families engaged directly in shipping, under Greek or foreign flags, depending on the conjuncture: indeed, whereas most trades between the Black Sea and Marseille was carried out on Greek vessels, the grain destined to the English ports was usually loaded on Greek-owned ships flying the British flag.

In the 1860s, the Chiot predominance over the Black sea economy was gradually replaced by another Greek network based on Ionian families. The causes underpinning this transition lay in multiple factors, including the closure of the Crimean War and the modernization of the Russian economy and society (for instance, the abolition of serfdom in 1861). The reforming schemes pursued by the Russian authorities affected the economic and social structure of Southern Russia

²¹⁸ G. Harlaftis, *A history of Greek-owned shipping*, pp. 38-106.

²¹⁹ *Ibidem*; about Ralli and Radocanachi see also, P. Herlihy, "Greek Merchants in Odessa in the Nineteenth Century", pp. 407-416.

²²⁰ G. Harlaftis, *A history of Greek-owned shipping*, pp. 39-40.

²²¹ *Idem*, pp. 57-70.

dramatically: the large estates based on serf labour were replaced by small landownership; within this framework, the Jews turned out to be more able than the Greeks to adapt to the new conditions²²². Furthermore, modern transport communications, as railways, were built in concomitance with the modernization of Azov and Caucasus ports infrastructures; finally, Odessa lost its free port status in 1857²²³. These transformations contributed to the redirection of the grain trade to the Azov Sea. There, in Taganrog, was based perhaps the most influential Ionian commercial and shipping company, the Vagliano Bros firm²²⁴.

The Ionian phase (1870s-1900s) is due to the role of numerous Greek families, most of them coming from Cephalonia or Ithaca, based primarily on the Danube and Azov areas. The reorientation of trade must have undoubtedly contributed to the success of these cities: Braila, Galatz on one side and Taganrog, Berdyansk and Mariupol on the other rapidly substituted Odessa in its leading role for grain exports. In the organisational structure, many features of the Ionian network were inherited by the Chiot predecessor, such as kinship and community-based relationships; however, the most distinguishing trait concerned the balance between shipping and trade. If, in the Chiot network, shipping was instrumental in trading, in the Ionian phase instead, the opposite seems to be true. Many influent businessmen belonging to the Ionian networks were of maritime origins: the case of Vagliano is emblematic, since the first member of the family left Cephalonia as a seaman and then, once settled in Taganrog, started a career as sailing fleet shipowner. Later, while involved in the grain trade shortly after the Crimean War, the Vagliano Bros firm raised the largest Greek-owned fleet, developing interests in maritime credit, banking, and insurances.

²²² P. Herlihy, *Odessa recollected*, pp. 149-150; E. Sifneos, *Imperial Odessa*, pp. 120-121; A. Papadopoulou, "Foreign merchant business", pp. 18-20. Among the main features of the Jewish business organization, most of the authors mention their capability to operate on a smaller scale than Greeks. Indeed, several Jews were members of the second guild (see *infra*).

²²³ E. Sifneos, *Imperial Odessa*, p. 26 and Appendixes, Figure 2-5. Relying on the analysis of imports and exports of the port of Odessa overtime, the author shows how the end of the freeport status in 1857 had minimal impact over the trade movement of the Russian port-city. On the contrary, the effects of the Crimean War (1854) and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 are emphasized, due to the fact that in those periods more drastic variations of trade are observed.

²²⁴ G. Harlaftis, "From Diaspora Traders to Shipping Tycoons: The Vagliano Bros", *The Business History Review*, No. 81, 2007, pp. 237-268.

3.5.2. THE LIGURIAN NETWORKS

Differently from the Greeks, the Ligurian commercial networks in the Black Sea have seldom attracted specific studies²²⁵. Current literature, indeed, rarely targeted the patterns of business or singled out the distinguishing features of the Ligurian presence in Southern Russia. Moreover, it failed even to reconstruct individual or “firm” histories. Therefore, although an extensive presentation might exceed this chapter's specific objectives, this paragraph will delineate the main features and outline few specific paths to draw a rather veritable picture of Ligurian business in the Black Sea.

Lacking bibliographical references to navigate the massive amount of archival sources, we borrowed the models developed for other communities, especially the Greeks, to verify their validity to the Ligurian case. For instance, to describe the formation of commercial groups in Odessa and the Azov port cities, historians highlighted the importance of the interconnections between merchants and consular representatives²²⁶. In the Greek case, the individual path of John Ralli might represent an emblematic term of comparison²²⁷; in the Ligurian case, the connubium between diplomacy and trade might even be more pervasive and systematic, especially to penetrate in the Azov region.

Table 3.4 – List of consular representatives of Genoese origins in the Black Sea.

<i>Name</i>	<i>City</i>	<i>Consular Function</i>	<i>Merchant Activity</i>
<i>Rezoagli</i>	Berdyansk	Vice-consul Sardinia	Merchant
<i>Federico</i>			

²²⁵ In order to reconstruct the Italian presence in the Black sea area, some work has already been done on Russian sources: O. Fedenko, “The activity of the Italian merchants in Odessa during the nineteenth century”, pp. 31-42; H.R. Gomez, “Migrazioni italiane in Crimea e Nuova Russia: tracce, fonti e contesti”, pp. 117-144.

²²⁶ E. Sifneos, *Imperial Odessa*, pp. 72-75. In particular, Sifneos includes diplomacy among the three patterns of successful business employed by merchants to establish in the Black sea, following the example of Henry Yeames.

²²⁷ P. Herlihy, “Greek Merchants in Odessa in the Nineteenth Century”, pp. 407-410.

Leonardo Scavino

<i>Tubino</i>	Berdyansk	Vice-consul Sardinia	Tubino firm
<i>Giuseppe</i>			
<i>Tubino Lorenzo</i>	Berdyansk	Vice-consul Sardinia	Tubino firm
<i>Chichizola</i>	Kertch	Vice-consul Sardinia and	Merchant
<i>Pietro</i>		Papal State	
<i>Chiozza</i> Gio.	Mariupol	Aspiring vice-consul	Merchant
<i>Batta</i>		Sardinia	
<i>Lanfranco</i>	Mariupol	Vice-consul Sardinia	Merchant
<i>Sebastiano</i>			
<i>Filippo</i>			
<i>Pignone</i>	Mariupol	Regent vice-consul Two	Rocca firm (Odessa)
<i>Giuseppe</i>		Sicilies	correspondent
<i>Schiaffino Pietro</i>	Mariupol	Vice-consul Sardinia and	Rossi firm (Taganrog)
		Two Sicilies	correspondent
<i>Gerbolini</i>	Odessa	Aspiring consul Sardinia	Gerbolini & Simoni
<i>Gustavo</i>			firm
<i>Rocca Fratelli</i>	Odessa	Merchant	Rocca firm
<i>Rossi L.</i>	Odessa	Merchant	Rossi firm
<i>Tubino</i>	Odessa	Merchant	Tubino firm
<i>Domenico</i>			
<i>Rocca Pellegro</i>	Taganrog	Aspiring vice-consul	Rocca firm (Odessa)
		Sardinia	
<i>Rossi Antonio</i>	Taganrog	Vice-consul Sardinia	Rossi firm
<i>Rossi Domenico</i>	Taganrog	Vice-consul Sardinia	Rossi firm
<i>Rossi Giuseppe</i>	Taganrog	Vice-consul Sardinia	Rossi firm

Source: AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Odessa, 6; AMAE, *Politica*, 80, Odessa; ASN, *Segreteria e ministero di stato degli affari esteri*, 2916-2918 and Id., 7138-7142; ACCM, Rocca frères.

Apart from Odessa, where, for its political relevance²²⁸, only professional diplomats were appointed, the other Sardinian consular representatives in the area were always involved first-hand in trade. As a result of their service, merchants benefitted from various economic privileges, such as tax exemptions and the possibility to collect consular fees from incoming national vessels. Also, they increased their prestige by access to confidential information related to ongoing commercial agreements and by representing the merchants' community before the local authorities. Specifically in the Azov Sea, this merchant-consul model resisted for an extended period to bureaucratic modernization, which prescribed to appoint professional diplomats, state-salaried and trained to hold official positions²²⁹. Indeed, notwithstanding the Crimean War period (1853-56)²³⁰, the consular profession was highly appreciated and most sought by resident merchants. This is evident in the sources at the moment of resignations, when several merchants petitioned the central consul in Odessa to advance their candidacies²³¹. In these conjunctures, the aspiring vice-consuls needed to demonstrate their trade expertise and document the local community's support. The availability of bureaucratic papers concerning Pietro Schiaffino's appointment (whose story is even more relevant to our research, since he was from Camogli), as Neapolitan vice-consul in Mariupol, let us understand the procedure in its entirety. Schiaffino's appointment to this post started in 1843, when his predecessor, Luigi Accame, a Ligurian merchant, decided to move to Taganrog, leaving his seat vacant. Soon, Pietro Schiaffino, not a Neapolitan subject too, advanced his candidacy, strong of the

²²⁸ In Odessa, the Sardinian government put a 1st rank consul, under whose control were positioned all the vice-consulate seats of the Black sea and Azov. The consul of Odessa was always a professional diplomat and he did not have a direct connection with the local society. He was not permanently resident in Odessa: instead, he usually stayed for a period between 5 to 10 years. See: F. Bacino (ed.), *La legazione e i consolati del regno di Sardegna in Russia (1783-1861)*, Roma: Tipografia riservata del Ministero Affari Esteri, 1952.

²²⁹ F. De Goey, *Consuls and the institution of Global Capitalism, 1783-1814*, New York: Routledge, 2016.

²³⁰ The effects of the Crimean War, such as the cease of the grain exports and the stagnation of trade led the local vice-consuls to abandon their posts to develop further trade in other regions. See, for instance, the case of both Pietro Schiaffino or Domenico Rossi who, in 1855, asked for a leave of absence due to the «actual cessation of navigation in those ports, and the disappearance of any kind of business there». AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Odessa, 6.

²³¹ See the contrast between Sebastiano Lanfranco and Gio. Batta Chiozza for the seat of Mariupol, or between Pellegro Rocca and Giuseppe Rossi in Taganrog. AMAE, *Politica*, 80, Odessa.

local support. Although the reference letter praised Schiaffino's «perfect integrity», «fair-minded qualities» and «Christian conduct»²³², the Neapolitan consul of Odessa put the accent on Schiaffino's trade expertise: he was «the local director of the famous trade house Enrico Rossi & Co.»²³³. Furthermore, the list of subscribers reveals a composite scenario where various Italian native speakers, notwithstanding their origins, were deeply interrelated²³⁴.

Pietro Schiaffino's career is worth more attention due to its uniqueness within the paradigm of Camogli's pattern of business. Pietro Schiaffino was born in Gibraltar in 1811²³⁵: his father, born in Camogli, had moved to the British protectorate in 1802 to install a commercial presence along the route towards the Atlantic. Pietro had a brother, Giuseppe, a maritime captain, and two sisters. Since the early 1840s, Pietro Schiaffino settled in Mariupol as director of the Rossi firm's local branch. In 1844, he was appointed vice-consul of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies; in 1850, he reached the same position for the Kingdom of Sardinia. His unique origins and the commercial background of his father might have determined his professional career: thus, Pietro was among the few subjects from Camogli to engage in trade rather than shipping. Despite the absence of private sources, Schiaffino's strategic presence in the port city of Mariupol must have constituted a fundamental contact for Camogli's subjects, especially if considering the importance of reputation, trust and kinship in the formation of long-standing businesses.

To single out the most influential and wealthiest Ligurian firms, the research targeted consular correspondence and Russian sources, crucial to frame Genoese companies' activities within a broader context. According to the Imperial regulations, merchants had to subscribe to a guild to engage in trade. The Russian guild system was structured in three categories, scaled depending on

²³² ASN, *Segreteria e ministero di stato agli affari esteri*, Odessa, 2916, 31st December 1843.

²³³ Idem, 14th May 1844.

²³⁴ Among the subscribers we find Gustavo Gerbolini, of Ligurian descent; Giovanni and Luca Mimbelli, perhaps merchants of Venetian origins, whose relative Stefano, in 1860, figures as Tuscan consul in Mariupol; finally, G. Drascovich, Austrian consul in Mariupol, and repeatedly appointed as regent of the Neapolitan seat in the frequent leaves of Schiaffino. AMAE, *Politica*, 80, Odessa; ASN, *Segreteria e ministero di stato agli affari esteri*, Odessa, 2916. For Gustavo Gerbolini, see *infra*.

²³⁵ The data about his origins and his family are available in the 1834 *Gibraltar census of inhabitants*, online and free searchable at: <http://www.nationalarchives.gi/gna/1834.aspx>.

declared capitals. The first guild hosted merchants dealing with wholesale and international trade with no limits on annual transactions; the members of the second guild, instead, practised both domestic and international trade, but with income limits; in the third category, the merchants could engage only in retail within the Russian Empire²³⁶. The enlist requirements were also related to citizenship: apart from the first rank, accessible to foreigners, the lower guilds' membership was gradually restricted to Russian citizens²³⁷.

Table 3.5 lists the top Ligurian merchants in Odessa in 1859: data are drawn from Sifneos' reconstruction of the first-guild merchants published in the 1859 Odessa Vestnik newspaper²³⁸. The higher positions were occupied by Greek and Jews merchants, as Efrussi, Ralli, Raffalovich, Radocanachi or Scaramanga. Then, five Sardinian firms were enlisted, three in the first fifteen.

Table 3.5 – List of the top Genoese merchants in the first guild of Odessa in 1859.

<i>Position</i>	<i>Merchant</i>	<i>Imports (roubles)</i>	<i>Exports (roubles)</i>	<i>Total (roubles)</i>
12	Rocca Carlo*	55.811	1.279.594	1.335.405
13	Dall'Orso	48.684	1.134.027	1.182.711
	Cesare Augusto			
14	Rossi Luigi	3.245	1.147.010	1.150.255
22	Tubino	93.339	688.899	782.238
	Domenico			

²³⁶ E. Sifneos and G. Harlaftis, "Entrepreneurship at the Russian frontier of international trade", p. 168.

²³⁷ The correspondence of the Sardinian consul reports that the closing of the third guild (retailers and artisans) to foreigners was announced by the end of the 1854, or more probably in the 1855. The law may have not been effective in the following years, since Herlihy date this decree to 1858: P. Herlihy, *Odessa recollected*, pp. 140-141. In both of these circumstances, however, the closure of the third guild to foreigners arouse complaints and demonstrations among the local European communities. Herlihy reports the case of French merchants; the Sardinian consul mentioned all the Sardinian subject who protested: 5 jewelries, 1 hotel, a pasta factory and 2 retailers. AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Odessa, 6, 10th December 1854.

²³⁸ E. Sifneos, *Imperial Odessa*, Appendixes. Table 12.

28	Porro Giacomo	41.285	471.215	512.500
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Source: E. Sifneos, *Imperial Odessa*, Appendix. Table 12. *Of Genoese origin, based in Marseille

To present in details all the characteristics of the Ligurian presence in the Black Sea is well beyond this research's objectives. Unable to unravel their history in all its facets, priority was given to the relationship between shipping and commerce. This choice facilitates an analysis of the evolution of some specific firms.

The organizational structure of the Ligurian firms entangled a few similarities with their Greek counterparts. Since the early modern period, the Genoese merchant elites were forged through commercial networks based on kinship ties²³⁹; it was a natural consequence for them to create family firms when accessing the Black Sea area²⁴⁰. The first group to settle in the region founded commercial houses in Odessa, for instance, Rocca and Gerbolini. Later, when the Azov Sea ports entered into competition with Odessa, these companies expanded to this region; meanwhile, other merchants turned directly to the Azov to maintain close control over local operations (Tubino in Berdyansk and Rossi in Taganrog).

The most striking difference between Greeks and Ligurians lied in the variety of business. The Greeks retained outstanding shares of exports and imports altogether; on the other hand, the Genoese firms engaged little or none in import trade. Such discrepancy was caused by the structure of the Ligurian economy in its entirety. Genoa's port offered little to Russia in terms of export: the hinterland was poorly industrialized and produced few commodities for exports, with the noteworthy exception of silk, highly demanded in the United Kingdom²⁴¹. The primary connections

²³⁹ In this regard, we must mention the pioneering work of Giorgio Doria: G. Doria, *Conoscenza del mercato e sistema informativo: il know-how dei mercanti-finanzieri genovesi nel secolo 16. e 17.*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1986. More recently: C. Marsilio, C.A. Nogal and L. Lo Basso, "La rete finanziaria della famiglia Spinola: Spagna, Genova e le fiere di cambio (1610-1656)", *Quaderni storici*, No. 124, 2007, pp. 97-110; L. Lo Basso, "Diaspora e armamento nelle strategie economiche dei genovesi nella seconda metà del XVII secolo: una storia globale", *Studi storici*, No. 1, 2015, pp. 137-156.

²⁴⁰ E. Sifneos, "Greek Family Firms in the Azov Sea Region, 1850-1917", *Business history review*, No. 87, 2013, pp. 279-308.

²⁴¹ E. Guglielmino, *Genova dal 1814 al 1849. Gli sviluppi economici e l'opinione pubblica*, pp. 122-123; M. Cevasco, *Statistique de la ville de Genes. Tome II*, pp. 12-13; V.D. Flore, *L'industria dei trasporti marittimi in Italia. Dagli inizi del XVI secolo al 1860*, pp. 217-221.

detained by Genoese merchants were in Sicily, where they retrieved the bulk of their imports to Russia²⁴². Thus, Ligurian seaborne trade with the Black Sea area was not reciprocal but unbalanced between exports and imports. This influenced the shipping business's organisation since the unidirectionality of trade complicated the profitable integration between commerce and shipping. On the one hand, the Ligurian merchants chartered most national vessels from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, relying on high exports. On the other hand, they could hardly provide return (from Genoa to the Black Sea) cargoes to the captains for not engaging in Russian imports, forcing them to sail half-route on ballast.

From the Ligurian merchant companies' perspective, chartering national vessel on the market could seem more convenient than owning a fleet, as all the operational costs concerning the inbound route (Genoa-Black Sea) were delegated to independent shipowners. In sum, the system foresaw a sort of externalisation of transports to outsource the management of entrepreneurial risks to shipowners. Nevertheless, the merchants and firms operating in the Black Sea port-cities adopted a wide array of solutions. This analysis is intended to develop different models to balance shipping and trade as observed in Ligurian merchants' activities in the Black Sea.

The first model can be labelled as 'high investment': trade and shipping coexisted and complemented each other. In the earliest phases, this model represented the prevalent organizational structure of the Ligurian business in the area. Its success lay in various factors: mainly because it provided high investment diversification and low specialization, characterizing the Genoese business for centuries. In 1852, to describe the Ligurian commercial activities in Odessa, the local Sardinian consul wrote:

The Sardinian merchants in Odessa have twelve firms. They work both on commission and their own. Since most of them own ships (or possess interests in ships), they trade on heavy loads and send them to Genoa unless Livorno and Marseille offer better opportunities. It is rare for the ships owned or co-owned

²⁴² Nonetheless, even long after the Italian unification (and the inclusion of Southern Italy) the trade balance between Italy and Russia did not change its trend. In 1877, for instance, the Italian consul in Odessa denounces losses for more than 1 million roubles annually deriving from the unfair distribution between imports and exports. See, S. Castiglia, *Rapporto quadrimestrale. I° Quadrimestre 1877*, in *Bollettino consolare*, Torino: Paravia, 1877, p. 623.

by the merchants to be chartered by others, since, on favourable circumstances, with high freight rates, they prefer to load them for their profit; with low freight rates, apart from the difficulties to find freights to foreign ports, they prefer to load them anyway, hoping to meet favourable selling conditions in Genoa or the abovementioned ports.²⁴³

Among various entrepreneurs, the Dall'Orso firm offers a precise sample of this model. Besides, for its modalities, the establishment of Dall'Orso shared some characteristics with the Ionian network, such as in Vagliano. Firstly, they possessed a maritime background: their hometown, Chiavari, was a small-sized community lying in the eastern riviera of Liguria (with a similar history and economic features to Camogli). Therefore, this community's long-standing tradition within the Mediterranean cabotage might have played a central part in the firm's formation. Nevertheless, no literature addressed Dall'Orso's venture into the Black Sea trade, apart from few sparse notions. The company was named Dall'Orso Fratelli (Bros.), but it comprehended many individuals. Francesco appeared in Genoa in 1855: there, he chartered a ship of Camogli directed to the Azov Sea to load wheat²⁴⁴. Some decades later, in 1880, Giacomo and Gio. Batta were enlisted into the Italian Society for Mutual Aid in Odessa, a piece of information that demonstrates their business's longevity²⁴⁵. The most influential family members were Giacomo, Cesare and Giuseppe, merchants and ship-owners. Giacomo was the first to enrol in a Russian guild (first guild – Odessa): in 1852, he

²⁴³ AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Odessa, Lettera del console di Odessa a Torino, 7 aprile 1853. Translation from the original Italian: «I negozianti sardi stabiliti in Odessa vi hanno dodici case di commercio. Essi lavorano in commissione e fanno anche molto per conto proprio. Essendo i sardi per la maggior parte possessori di bastimenti o esclusivamente o per interesse parziale, speculano per proprio conto sui carichi gravi e ciò che inviano per lo più a Genova, salvo che gli scali di Livorno e Marsiglia presentino maggiore vantaggio. Raramente avviene che i bastimenti di proprietà d'armatori o cointeressati negozianti siano ceduti a nolo, giacché in favorevoli circostanze granarie, e per conseguenza con noli alti, preferiscono di speculare caricandoli; ed in epoca di calma degli affari, e perciò di bassi noli, oltreché allora rari sono gli impieghi per i porti esteri, preferiscono anche fare il carico sulla speranza di favorevole sfogo sia a Genova che negli scali sovracitati».

²⁴⁴ AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Costantinopoli, 32.

²⁴⁵ AMAE, *Politica*, 80, Odessa.

handled import and export trade for over 70.000 roubles²⁴⁶. Afterwards, he strengthened his business until he ascended to an important position among Odessa's export merchants²⁴⁷. Presumably, Cesare was his successor: his activities are recorded in Odessa, Berdyansk and Galatz, where he was a resident first-guild merchant and a local representative of various Ligurian maritime insurance companies (including Camogli's Mutua)²⁴⁸. On the other hand, Giuseppe Dall'Orso engaged mainly in shipping: in the 1860s, around 6-7 vessels were registered to him. Moreover, he was co-interested in another dozen ships, all of them sailing in and out the Black Sea²⁴⁹. Such deep interdependence between shipping and trade finds a partial confirmation in the database, constructed by Apostolos Delis, of the Semaphore de Marseille. The firm's economic fortunes peaked between the late 1860s and the 1870s: in 1870, the Dall'Orso chartered 47 vessels from the Black Sea to Marseille²⁵⁰; Giuseppe Dall'Orso and his relatives owned 36% of them²⁵¹.

Massive investments in shipping comparable to those of the Dall'Orso family can be found in other instances. The Rocca house, for example, owned a small fleet²⁵²; however, their approach was

²⁴⁶ See the data processed from *Obzor vneshnii torgovlii Rossii*, 1852. In 1852, Cesare Dall'Orso ranked 100th out of the first guild merchants of the Southern ports of Russia; his business amounted to 14.785 roubles in imports and 59.886 in exports. This database was kindly made available to me by Alexandra Papadopoulou, to whom I am grateful.

²⁴⁷ Idem, 1853-1856. In 1853-54, Cesare increased rapidly his affairs volume, reaching the impressive amount of 361.775 roubles (matching imports and exports). Then, in 1856, despite an evident setback because of the Crimean conflict, he still moved more than 200.000 roubles.

²⁴⁸ CMCC, Assicurazioni varie.

²⁴⁹ P. Schiaffino, *Le «carrette» degli armatori genovesi*, Genova: Nuova editrice genovese, 1996, pp. 90-93.

²⁵⁰ Data processed from *Semaphore de Marseille*, 1835-1875.

²⁵¹ Lacking of any information concerning ship-ownership in the *Semaphore* data, we confronted name and tonnage with the list of ships owned by the Dall'Orso firm in the same period, found in P. Schiaffino, *Le «carrette» degli armatori genovesi*, pp. 90-91.

²⁵² Most of the archival material concerning the correspondence between the Rocca firm and their captains can be found in ACCM, *Maison Rocca frères-correspondance passive*, Lettres des capitaines de navires marchandes, L-19/14/066-069. Furthermore, it is possible to consult the commercial correspondence between the different branches of the firm, where the different systems are vividly outlined. In their correspondence the difference between owned-ships and the others is made clear through the usage of the possessive adjective «nostra» (ours).

relatively diversified²⁵³. Their correspondence reveals that they owned at least a few vessels, including the ships Francesco²⁵⁴ (cap. Graffione) and Moderazione²⁵⁵ (captain Giuseppe Craviotto). For instance, the latter was anchored in Odessa for weeks in the expectation of cargoes; the long delay may trigger a discourse about this business system's efficiency. Nevertheless, despite their intense involvement in the Black sea trade, Rocca's ships rarely navigated in the Black Sea; instead, they were more likely employed in regular connections with Algeria to honour the firm's commercial agreements and relationships with the French merchant elites in Marseille²⁵⁶. This implies that ships owned by others transported a high percentage of their trade volume from the Black Sea.

In reality, reading Rocca's correspondence might suggest the existence of an intermediate model based on privileged relationships between captains and merchants. This system resembles what Sifneos have theorized to describe Greek and Western entrepreneurship in the Black Sea, i.e. the existence of merchant-captain partnerships²⁵⁷. These connections were established on trust and reputation mechanisms. For language familiarity, the Rocca usually selected Ligurian captains²⁵⁸. At the end of every voyage, the Black Sea and Marseille branches exchanged comments on the captain's behaviour and trustworthiness. When incidents occurred and ended up in the cargo's loss

²⁵³ About the renowned Rocca merchant firm, their business and their family history, there is a recently published monograph, based on archival material kept in Marseille. See: A. Carrino, *Passioni e interessi di una famiglia-impresa. I Rocca di Marsiglia nel mediterraneo dell'Ottocento*, Roma: Viella, 2018.

²⁵⁴ ACCM, *Maison Rocca frères-correspondance passive*, Correspondance de Fratelli Rocca (Odessa) à Rocca Frères (Marseille), L-19/14/024.

²⁵⁵ *Idem*, L-19/14/023.

²⁵⁶ *Idem*, L-19/14/022 and Algiers, L-19/14/113. Most of the traffics with North Africa were still concerning the grain trade, especially from Algiers and Oran.

²⁵⁷ E. Sifneos, *Imperial Odessa*, pp. 73-74.

²⁵⁸ Part of the correspondence kept in the ACCM, *Maison Rocca frères*, *Lettres des capitaines de navires marchandes*, is related to this category as well.

or deterioration, the Rocca firm usually closed the professional relationship unilaterally²⁵⁹. Instead, once gained the company trust, the captains employed regularly for their firm could put to profit such privileged relationships by extending them to relatives and friendly captains: this is what happened, for instance, to the captain of *Stella del Mare*, Giacomo Razeto from Camogli, who recommended to the Rocca firm his brother, captain on Annetta, unable – at that moment – to find cargoes in Odessa, due to weather hazards²⁶⁰. The partnerships' practical economic advantages were not clear: most likely, merchant and carriers split the profits of both the cargo selling and the freights. However, the unavailability of commercial correspondence related to other Ligurian firms prevented us from further analysing this issue. Arguably, there were other cases, as studied in the case of the Greek ethnic networks.

Finally, the primary alternative to engaging in ship-ownership was a “low investment” model in which merchants limitedly involved themselves in shipping. The cargo was loaded on “tramp ships” available in the loading ports. The profits on the cargo – substantially, the earnings deriving from price differentials in the purchasing and selling markets – fell into the traders' hands, whereas shipowners' income relied exclusively on freights. The dimensions of the traffic volume and the high profitability of each voyage made supply and demand for maritime transport meet in the Black Sea ports: their fluctuations animated the freight rates market. Although it contrasted with the consul's assumptions on the Ligurian business model, some leading Ligurian firms (Rossi and Tubino) opted for low investments into shipping. In reality, these companies owned a few shares on some vessels; nonetheless, there is no evidence of high investments in shipping to a comparable extent of Dall'Orso, for which the link between trade and shipping was inherently structural. Instead, Rossi

²⁵⁹ A few of these incidents involved some captains from Camogli. The first is the case of captain Diego Schiaffino, ship *Chiara*, which was chartered in Messina, in 1848, with a cargo of citruses to Odessa. In the Russian city, however, the cargo arrived completely deteriorated; an incident for which, after long inquiries, the responsible was not clearly individuated and, therefore, the economic loss went all on the Rocca's side. Another experience is that of captain Ferrari, of the ship *Margherita*, who, on the contrary was held responsible for the rotting of a cargo of hides loaded in Taganrog and carried to Marseille in 1852. ACCM, *Maison Rocca frères-correspondance passive*, Odessa, L-19/14/022 and L-19/14/023.

²⁶⁰ ACCM, *Maison Rocca frères-correspondance passive*, Lettres des capitaines de navires marchandes, L-19/14/069.

and Tubino can be found among the most recurrent charterers of Camogli's ships, a perfect example of a "tramp fleet" among the Ligurian merchant marine.

Besides, even Dall'Orso or Rocca, when they found themselves in extreme need or, on the contrary, had a wheat surplus in their warehouses, decided to charter captains who did not belong to their close networks. Again, Rocca's correspondence provides us with a fascinating insight into these practices: for instance, in case of emergency, priority was given to Ligurians, followed by the other "Italian" flags; then, it was the turn of the northerners and, only as of the last resource, the Greeks. This classification is very intriguing, for it raises cultural issues and opens our perception to contemporary stereotypes: it is reported that Greek captains were disposed to accept lower freights. Nevertheless, they were the object of prejudices as, in Rocca's words, they were deemed to be «unaccountable» and «less known in the Mediterranean ports»²⁶¹.

3.5.3. CAMOGLI AND THE BLACK SEA COMMERCIAL NETWORKS

Based on these preliminary arguments about the Black Sea commercial networks, the present section aims to reconstruct the relationships established by Camogli's captains and these merchants. The analysis is drawn upon the data collected from Genoa's maritime health records (1858-1862) and the Semaphore de Marseille (1850-1870)²⁶².

Table 3.6 - Merchants chartering Camogli ships to Genoa and Marseille divided by nationality in Odessa, the Azov Sea and the Danube.

	<i>Italian</i>	<i>Greek</i>	<i>Other</i>
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²⁶¹ ACCM, *Maison Rocca frères-correspondance passive*, Odessa, L-19/14/022. «Preferiamo la bandiera bremese o svedese o altra neutrale alla greca, essendo quest'ultima nazione di poca fede e capace di rubare l'intero carico nelle attuali circostanze e poi tutti i capitani greci in nessun porto non sono affatto conosciuti, per cui non vogliamo aver da fare con simile gente»

²⁶² For the records drawn from the *Semaphore de Marseille* I am indebted to Apostolos Delis, who allowed me to see the database that he personally built upon this source.

<i>Odessa</i>	61,50%	12,35%	26,15%
<i>Berdyansk</i>	56,70%	32,04%	11,25%
<i>Mariupol</i>	60,30%	28,20%	11,50%
<i>Taganrog</i>	57,70%	30,77%	11,54%
<i>Galatz</i>	55,17%	31,03%	13,80%
<i>Braila</i>	58,82%	35,30%	5,88%

Source: ASGe, *Ufficio di sanità*, Arrivi di bastimenti dall'estero, registers from 590 to 613; Semaphore de Marseille, 1835-1875.

In comparison with Azov and Danube ports, Odessa's traffics present unique features: in the Russian city, a more significant part of Camogli ships was chartered by Ligurian (to Genoa) or French (to Marseille) subjects. More specifically, it was the houses Casareto, Rocca and Dall'Orso to handle most Ligurian trade to those destinations, whereas Savine et fils managed the bulk of the expeditions to Marseille. Concerning the Greeks, their share of Camogli's trade from Odessa is of secondary importance, with just a modest involvement of Rodocanachi and Spartalis. Given the Greek predominance within Odessa's export trade, these data illustrate an opposite trend: in Odessa, their presence was indeed determinant and, in the period 1833-1860, counted for almost half of the exports value²⁶³. Furthermore, although Odessa represented a fundamental market to the Mediterranean, it was rare that Camogli's vessels departed from Odessa to the United Kingdom – a route where Greek connections were determinant, whereas Sardinians run little or no business²⁶⁴. Upon these premises, the commercial trend in Berdyansk, Mariupol and Taganrog was different. Firstly, Camogli's captains concentrated on Italian and Greek commissioners, as their average percentage increased to ca. 88% (as opposed to the ca. 73% of Odessa). Secondly, partner merchants changed. In Berdyansk, the firms Tubino and Porro&Pertica were praised both in

²⁶³ V. Kardassis, *Diaspora merchants in the Black sea*, pp. 147-155. Tables from 7.1 to 7.4.1. According to these tables, 43% of the export trade value was handled by Greeks. Moreover, from his evidences the author illustrates how 51% of the total (export and import) business of Odessa (1833-1860) was detained by the three greater houses Rodocanachi, Ralli and Pappoudov (62% if adding Zarifi and Mavros).

²⁶⁴ See, paragraph 1.8 'Destination ports'.

consular reports and in Rocca's correspondence in additional sources²⁶⁵. Among the Greeks, instead, Camogli's main charterers were Ambanopoulo, Cuppa and Vagliano²⁶⁶. In Mariupol, the majority of the traffics were in the hands of the Ligurian houses Rossi (whose local agent was Pietro Schiaffino, until 1858) Gerbolini and Rocca (who conducted their trades through a trustworthy agent, Giuseppe Pignone²⁶⁷); speaking of the Greeks, Scaramanga and Spartalis were the most relevant to Camogli's activities²⁶⁸.

The commercial firm of Gustavo Gerbolini, later Gerbolini&Simoni, presents recurrent contacts with the people of Camogli. Established in Mariupol in 1836, the founder began his activities by operating on commission²⁶⁹. Afterwards, Gerbolini became one of the most influential merchants of the Ligurian community of the Russian city; throughout his activities, he became a personal acquaintance of Pietro Schiaffino, the resident vice-consul for the Kingdom of Sardinia (and later of the Kingdom of Naples)²⁷⁰. In 1850, Gerbolini&Simoni grew into the wealthiest Sardinian firm in the Black Sea, as confirmed by the fact that they handled commercial operations for more than 600.000 roubles²⁷¹. Furthermore, the firm's economic condition was even strengthened when Gerbolini obtained a long-term provisioning contract with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, which

²⁶⁵ See: AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Odessa, 6; ACCM, *Maison Rocca frères – correspondance passive*, Correspondance de Fratelli Rocca (Odessa) à Rocca Frères (Marseille), L-19/14/024.

²⁶⁶ *Semaphore de Marseille*, 1835-1875.

²⁶⁷ ACCM, *Maison Rocca frères – correspondance passive*, Correspondance de Fratelli Rocca (Odessa) à Rocca Frères (Marseille), L-19/14/022.

²⁶⁸ *Semaphore de Marseille*, 1835-1875.

²⁶⁹ See, ACCM, *Maison Rocca frères – correspondance passive*, Gustave Gerbolini (Marianopoli), L-19/14/102. At the moment of my archival research, the passive correspondence from Mariupol was erroneously kept within the correspondence from the Italian states (perhaps due to the existence of a Marianopoli in Sicily).

²⁷⁰ See the support provided by Gustavo Gerbolini to Pietro Schiaffino in the moment of his election to vice-consul for the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies: ASN, *Segreteria e ministero di stato agli affari esteri*, Odessa, 2916.

²⁷¹ *Obzor vneshnii torgovlii Rossii*, 1850.

represented a trustworthy and regular source of revenues, fundamental to the firm economic growth²⁷².

Finally, Taganrog emerges as the port where Camogli's captains and Greek merchants interwove the most solid relationships. For instance, Rocca's report about the ships leaving Taganrog in June 1859 reports some essential information about Ligurians and Greeks' interactions. This table lists 18 ships hoisting the Sardinian flag: half of them can be identified as Camogli's vessels.

Table 3.7 - List of the Sardinian ships leaving Taganrog in June 1859.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Destination</i>	<i>Cvt</i>	<i>Goods</i>	<i>Place of loading</i>	<i>Merchant</i>
<i>Adelfide</i> *	British ports	2379	rye	Taganrog	Scaramanga
<i>Cara</i>	British ports	1781	rye	Taganrog	Rodocanachi
<i>Francesco</i> *	British ports	2907	wheat	Taganrog	Ralli
<i>Leone</i>	British ports	3154	oat	Taganrog	Several
<i>Luigi</i> *	British ports	3859	oat	Taganrog	Rodocanachi
<i>Maria</i>	British ports	3345	wheat	Taganrog	Ralli
<i>Moderazione</i> *	British ports	2457	linseed	Taganrog	Rodocanachi
<i>Oriente</i> *	British ports	3389	oat	Taganrog	Several
<i>Regina</i>	British ports	2500	wheat	Taganrog	Micrulacchi
<i>Rimbalto</i>	British ports	3405	wheat	Taganrog	Ralli
<i>Siccino</i>	British ports	2823	rye	Taganrog	Scaramanga
<i>Solone</i> *	British ports	1372	oat	Taganrog	Ralli
<i>Teresa</i>	British ports	2398	linseed	Taganrog	Rodocanachi
<i>Thalia</i>	British ports	3755	barley	Taganrog	Ralli
<i>Tigre</i> *	British ports	1600	wheat	Taganrog	Ralli

²⁷² ASN, *Segreteria e ministero di stato agli affari esteri*, Odessa, 7140.

<i>Arbace</i> *	Mediterranean	2615	oat	Taganrog	Micrulacchi
<i>Aurora</i>	Mediterranean	2540	wheat	Taganrog	Lauder
<i>Idea</i> *	Mediterranean ²⁷³	3412	oat	Taganrog	Lauder

*presumable Camogli-owned ships. Source: ACCM, *Maison Rocca frères-correspondance passive*, Correspondance de Fratelli Rocca (Odessa) à Rocca Frères (Marseille), L-19/14/024.

The situation portrayed in Table 3.7 explicates how the overwhelming majority of Ligurian commissioners from Taganrog were Greeks. The Ralli chartered 6 Ligurian ships (3 of Camogli); then, followed Rodocanachi with 4 (2); finally, Scaramanga and Micrulacchi, with 2 (1) vessels each. Most of these ships were sent to the British ports, 15 (7) out of 18.

Finally, to describe the Danube commercial networks and their relationships with the Ligurian merchant marine, it was not possible to find similar sources; therefore, their scarce availability limits our capacity to deal with the context of Galatz and Braila. Looking at Genoa and Marseille data on port arrivals, the Greek houses Argenti&Sechiari, Melas, Spartalis and Zariffi seem to participate considerably in Camogli's traffics from the Danube. Among the Ligurians, most of the cargoes were purchased through the mediation of Andrea Danovaro from Genoa²⁷⁴. Nevertheless, scholarly literature highlighted how the leading Sardinian commercial house settled in the Danube region was the Pedemonte Brothers²⁷⁵. Founded in 1831 by Filippo, Antonio and Francesco, in the 1840s, the company was very active. From 1847 onwards, it slipped into a deep crisis, from which it

²⁷³ Although the brig *Idea* was chartered to the Mediterranean, from its crew list it emerged that this vessel delivered its cargo in Newcastle. ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 2107.

²⁷⁴ The identity of Andrea Danovaro is rather neglected by the sources: in Russia and in the Danube area, he is never mentioned neither in consular correspondence nor in the guild lists. Nevertheless, Danovaro emerges as one of the greatest commissioners of grain cargoes from the Black sea. His absence from local sources lead us to assume that he played an intermediate role between the Black sea and Genoa. Perhaps, he corresponds to the cav. ("knight", an honorific title) Andrea Danovaro who, in 1867, is granted by the Savoy Kingdom of the noble title of Count in 1867.

²⁷⁵ R. Tomi, "L'histoire de la Maison de commerce Pedemonte et Fils", *Historical Yearbook*, No. 3, 2006, pp. 111-122; C. Ardeleanu, "La comunità italiana nella città portuale di Galati nel periodo del Risorgimento (1830-1856)", in G. Nemeth and A. Papo (eds.), *Unità italiana e mondo adriatico-balcanico*, Trieste: Luglio, 2012, pp. 65-78.

never recovered. Throughout the 1850s, Pedemonte's troubled business passed through bankruptcies, unpaid debts, company restructuring; notably, Francesco Pedemonte contracted massive debts with Ligurians and local inhabitants (an Italian banker, Marco Thal and even the Moldavian prince Gregori Stourdza²⁷⁶). However, in the late 1850s and 1860s, when Camogli's presence in the Danube ports grew significant, their company seems to be wholly disappeared, apart from the latest court proceedings between Francesco and his creditors.

Concerning the Genoese presence in Galatz and Braila, an interesting phenomenon is represented by some merchants' decision to settle there at the outbreak of the Crimean War. Among many others, it was the case of Gustavo Gerbolini, previously settled in Mariupol, as he declared his establishment in Galatz in April 1854 in his dense correspondence with the Rocca family. According to his words, Gerbolini had moved to Galatz at the beginning of the Crimean War, after it had suspended the Azov ports trade²⁷⁷. Indeed, transferring the business to the Danube area was behaviour in line with other Black Sea trade houses (see the analogy with George Rodocanachi²⁷⁸), which, for the export shutdown from the Russian territories, had sought for alternative markets in Galatz and Braila.

3.6. Camogli and the Black Sea trade


The Sardinian, and later Italian, participation in the Black Sea trade primarily targeted grain exports from this area to the Mediterranean and the United Kingdom. On the other side, the low demands for Italian merchandises in the Russian ports limited arrivals with cargo. Such characteristics affected both shipowners and merchants, the former being forced to sail on ballast for half leg, the latter being unable to handle equivalent exchanges from and to the Black Sea.

²⁷⁶ AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Galatz,

²⁷⁷ See, for instance, the several complaints about the stop of commercial transactions delivered by the Sardinian consuls in Mariupol, Berdyansk and Taganrog. AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Odessa, 6.

²⁷⁸ P. Herlihy, "Greek merchants in Odessa in the nineteenth century", p. 416.

Figure 3.5. Import and export trade between Italy and the Black Sea Russian ports (1827-1880).



Source: Data processed from S. Petmezas, A. Papadopoulou et al., *Black Sea historical statistics, 1812–1914*, Research Project “The Black Sea and its port-cities, 1774–1914. Development, convergence and linkages with the global economy”, 2012–2015, www.blacksea.gr.

Figure 3.5 illustrates the comparative evolution of import and export trade between the Black Sea Russian ports and Italy from 1827 to 1880. As shown, until the Crimean War, Black Sea exports toward Italy outnumbered the traffics in the opposite direction: afterwards, Italian imports to the Black Sea increased until they balanced exports, with an impressive rise observed in the early 1870s. Genoa stood in a relatively weak position within this framework: despite the incipient industrialisation, its hinterland – Piedmont – produced mainly foodstuff products of little or no interest to the Russian markets. As a result, Genoa was even less connected with the Black Sea economic area than other peninsular ports, such as Livorno or Messina: the former benefitted from its traditional partnership with British and Greek merchants and, therefore, played a role in redistributing colonial genres towards Eastern Europe; the latter represented the leading exporting port of Sicily, the main European production site of a relatively highly demanded agricultural product, citruses. Despite the scarcity of serial data to measure Italian ports export trade to Russia

(and the Danube area), the statistics provided for 1865 seems to be solid enough to sustain this framework (see Table 3.10).

Table 3.10. Percentage of commercial movement from the main Italian ports to the Black Sea region (1865).

<i>Ports of origin</i>	<i>Black Sea and Azov Sea</i>	<i>Danube</i>
<i>Genoa</i>	4%	45%
<i>Livorno</i>	60%	60%
<i>Messina</i>	93%	–

Table 3.10 underlines the negligible commercial interests linking Genoa to the Russian ports (6 ships, 4% of the movement); in Livorno and Messina, instead, the percentages increase to 60% and 93%, and also the total numbers grow consistently, to 12 and 26 ships cleared with cargo. Therefore, despite its leading role in both ship-ownership and maritime movement, Genoa has little or no direct commercial relationships with Russia about local exports. The figure slightly changes when taking the Danube Principalities into account, though the relatively low numbers may suggest caution: it represented an additional indication of the limited competitiveness, in Russia, of the products from the pre-unitarian Savoy state, of which Genoa was the natural port of export.

The causes of the low level of commercial movement from the port of Genoa to the Black Sea region lay in various factors: the principal reason consisted in the incompatibility between Piedmont products – the primary productive hinterland of Genoa – and Russian demands. From Western Europe, Russia imported mostly intermediary products and manufactures, whereas Greek imports from Eastern Europe provided the bulk of the agricultural provisions. Already in 1853, Greek competitiveness in handling imports to Russia was lucidly stigmatised by the Sardinian consul residing in Odessa:

The import trade to this port [Odessa] on board of Sardinian vessels is narrow due to the fact the most easily sold goods are not profitable [...] and because the several bankruptcies occurring every year among the retailing shopkeepers, from which the Sardinian firms had been repeatedly damaged, has disgusted them

about importing trade at the point that, apart from the goods sold quickly in exchange of cash, they are increasingly disregarding this branch of trade. On the contrary, the Greek firms, enjoying broader relationships, have attracted to them the monopoly over imports, and they fill the market to such an extent to keep away any competitor. Nevertheless, thanks to the sole exports, some Sardinian firms play a remarkable role in the local business. In 1852, the Porro firm moved 3 million francs. The Rossi firm [moved] 2 million and 700 thousand francs and the Rocca firm two million.²⁷⁹

Nevertheless, whereas direct commercial transactions between Genoa and the Black Sea were scarce, it was not unlikely that Ligurian vessels would call at Messina to load local products to be transported to Odessa or the Azov Sea ports. For instance, despite the Western Ligurian Riviera's long-standing tradition to produce citruses for the international market²⁸⁰, citruses were usually loaded in Sicily. From a commercial perspective, the trade of citruses and olive oil from Italy to the Black Sea present similar features. Liguria produced and sold both of these articles: however, only southern Italian citruses found profitable markets in Russia, whereas olive oil was mainly managed by Greek merchants and carried out onboard Greek ships. Olive oil was indeed highly demanded in Russia, mainly for religious purposes, because it was needed to light the lamps illuminating the

²⁷⁹ AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Odessa, 6, Lettera del console di Odessa a Torino, 7 aprile 1853. Translation from the original Italian: «L'importazione in questo porto sui legni sardi è assai ristretta, perché quei generi che qui sarebbero di facile sfogo non presentano conveniente utile [...] ed oltre della molteplicità dei fallimenti, che ogni anno più accadono fra i bottegai di piazza, nei quali più e più volte le case sarde restarono compromesse, le ha talmente disgustati dell'importazione che, eccettuati gli articoli di facile vendita a contanti, vanno poco alla volta trascurando questo ramo di commercio. Le case greche, invece, che hanno relazioni più estese, hanno attirato a sé il monopolio dell'importazione ed inondano talmente la piazza di ogni genere di qualità di merci di consumo, ed in sì gran quantità da svogliare qualunque altro speculatore. Malgrado ciò, quasi colla sola esportazione alcune dette case sarde ricoprono un posto non indifferente nel giro commerciale di questa piazza. La casa Porro figura nel 1852 per un giro di 3 milioni di franchi. La casa L. Rossi per 2 milioni e 700 mila franchi e la casa Rocca per 2 milioni».

²⁸⁰ See, A. Carassale and L. Lo Basso, *Sanremo, giardino di limoni: produzione e commercio degli agrumi all'estremo Ponente ligure (secoli XII-XIX)*.

sacred icons²⁸¹. Nevertheless, neither Ligurian nor southern Italian olive oil could compete with the Greek counterpart in terms of transport costs and market price, despite numerous attempts to introduce such a product in Russia²⁸². Instead, another strategic Italian product, rice, followed a slightly different path: indeed, rice merchants succeeded in penetrating the Black Sea market as a high-quality alternative to local products. In particular, Piedmont rice was first introduced in Russia in 1859, in concomitance with a lousy harvest in the province of Astrakhan. Afterwards, Italian rice maintained its relatively good position, as it was appreciated for its flavour and superior cooking qualities²⁸³.

As far as imports were concerned, Camogli's shipping followed more or less the exact trajectory of the whole Sardinian maritime world. Their absolute majority travelled on ballast along a straight route from Genoa to Constantinople, without intermediate stops. However, to not sail on ballast for the whole first leg, some vessels called at Messina – with no orders – seeking some cargo to sell in the Southern Russian ports. The traces of this trade have been transmitted through the Neapolitan consuls' reports, as they were requested to compile tables and statistics of the commercial relationships between Russia and their country, including the foreign ships arriving in Odessa from national ports. From January to July 1851, eight Sardinian vessels arrived at Odessa from the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (out of 17 foreign ships, the remaining being Russian and Austrians)²⁸⁴. All of them had been loaded at Messina, seven with citruses and one with pumice stones. In this list, it is possible to identify three Camogli ships, all brigs: *Il Pegaso*, captain Giuseppe Schiaffino, *La Tigre*, captain Paolo Borzone and *Guardia*, captain Gio. Batta Razeto²⁸⁵. In January 1853, a

²⁸¹ AMAE, *Affari esteri*, Odessa, 895.

²⁸² *Memoria sul commercio di Berdiansk, di Giov. Batt. Giovannetti ex vice-console toscano (1848 e 1849) in Orano*, pp. 65-66.

²⁸³ *Idem*, p. 65.

²⁸⁴ ASN, *Segreteria e ministero di stato agli affari esteri*, Odessa, 5256.

²⁸⁵ The brig *Il Pegaso* (197 t.), constructed in Varazze in 1843, was owned by Bernardo Schiaffino; the brig *La Tigre* (176 t.), built in the same place and date, and the brig *Guardia* (372 t.), built in Varazze in 1848, were owned by Prospero Lavarello. ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 13, No. 4018 (*Il Pegaso*); *Idem*, serie 14, No. 8659 (*La Tigre*); *Idem*, serie 14, No. 6754.

comparable list enumerated three Camogli ships that arrived at Odessa from Messina, again with citrus and wine²⁸⁶. Here, the vessels were *Grimaldo*, *Arpia* and *San Carlo*, captained respectively by Gio. Batta Repetto, Giuseppe Bertolotto and Gio. Bono Ferrari²⁸⁷. More data are available about Kerch port movement, as shown in the following list:

Table 3.11 - Camogli ships arrived with cargo in Kerch (1846; 1847; 1851*).

<i>Year</i>	<i>Port of loading</i>	<i>of Ship</i>	<i>Captain</i>	<i>Cargo</i>	<i>Tonnage</i>
1846	Genova	Concezione	G. Razeto	coffee	146
1846	Genova	La Purità	P. Senno	olive oil / furniture	133
1846	Malta	Chiara	D. Schiaffino	citrus	168
1846	Messina	La Sacra Famiglia	L. Brigneti	citrus	162
1846	Messina	Unione	B. D'Aste	fresh fruits	187
1846	Nizza	Concezione	F. Stagno	citrus and oil	101
1846	Other 21			Ballast	3724
1847	Messina	Costante	P. Mortola	citrus	190
1847	Genova	Amore	F. Lavarello	furniture	145
1847	Other 37			Ballast	6083
1851*	Messina	Elia	G.B. Mortola	citrus	210

²⁸⁶ ASN, *Segreteria e ministero di stato agli affari esteri*, Odessa, 5256.

²⁸⁷ The brig *Grimaldo* is enrolled in the list of the *Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese* in 1853, owner Antonio Schiaffino: CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*. The brig *Arpia* was captained by the owner, Giuseppe Bertolotto; ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 13, No. 4245. The brig *San Carlo* (188 tons), built in Varazze in 1835, instead, was owned by Erasmo Schiaffino, one of the leading ship-owner of the first generation of Camogli's ship-owners. He was one of the founders of the local mutual insurance company. The captain, Gio. Bono Ferrari, was his son-in-law. ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 13, No. 4251.

1851	Messina	Costante	P. Mortola	citruses	190
1851	Messina	San Carlo	G.B. Ferrari	citruses	188
1851	Messina	Rosario	G. Mortola	citruses	158
1851	Messina	Almeria	Lavarello	citruses	254

*from Neapolitan ports only. Source: ASN, Segreteria e ministero di stato agli affari esteri, Odessa, 5256.

As appears from Table 3.11, already in the late 1840s, almost 50 Camogli-owned vessels called at the ports of Azov. Only 12% of the ships arrived laden at Kerch, whereas most travelled on ballast from Genoa.

More generally, the glaring discrepancy between the massive influx of Ligurian vessels at the Black Sea ports and the meagre arrivals of Ligurian commodities to the same places finds a further confirmation in some statistic tables comparing the Sardinian maritime movement and its import trade to the ports of Taganrog and Mariupol in 1867-1868, available in the Italian consular reports. According to these data, illustrated in Table 3.12, the Italian flag accounted for 25-30% of the tonnage, whereas the import value settled down to 3-5%.

Table 3.12 - Italian imports to Mariupol and Taganrog (together) compared to tonnage in 1867-1868.

	<i>Ships</i>		<i>Import</i>	
	Tons	%	Value	%
1867	115.402	29,57%	757.900	3,80%
1868	153.696	27,75%	1.040.947	5,09%


Source: *Della navigazione e del commercio nei porti di Taganrog e di Marianopoli nel 1868 rapporto del Cav. Avv. Rossi Console a Taganrog*, in *Bollettino consolare*, Torino: Paravia, 1869, p. 201.

Although it was not possible to reconstruct the arrival of full-laden Sardinian ships to the Black Sea systematically, more data are available concerning their presence in these ports: however, provided that most vessels arrived on ballast, it is evident that they did not leave the region unless with cargo.

Therefore, it is clear that mapping the Ligurian presence in the Black Sea would tell us more about export activities rather than imports.

From a methodological point of view, in order to analyse the characteristics of Ligurian participation in the grain trade, the Black Sea region must be considered according to geographic criteria: for this purpose, the area can be divided into three subregions, Odessa and its hinterland, the Azov Sea ports and the Danube ports.

Figure 3.6 - Export trade from Odessa, the Danube region and the Azov ports (1831-1883).



Source: S. Petmezas, A. Papadopoulou et al., *Black Sea historical statistics, 1812–1914*, Research Project “The Black Sea and its port-cities, 1774–1914. Development, convergence and linkages with the global economy”, 2012–2015, www.blacksea.gr.

The competition between each other varied throughout the nineteenth century: in general, the loss of the leading position of Odessa observed after the Crimean War (1853-1856) was due to significant structural changes in which Russian infrastructural investments on railways in the Azov region, the abolition of serfdom (1861) and the loss of Odessa’s free port status (1857) merged. The data of Odessa’s exports within the total figure of the southern Russian ports reflects the declining

importance of the city: its share over exports falls from 40% average in the 1840s to 25% average in the 1870s. The main categories of products exported were cereals of different kinds, mainly wheat and, then, corn, rye and linseed. There was also some trade in woollen clothes (especially of “merinos” quality) and salt.

Data about the Ligurian share over the whole trade movement are available with some discontinuities from the early 1850s to 1878: the availability of these data made it possible to partially reconstruct the tonnage percentage covered by Ligurian ships over the whole export trade movement.

Table 3.13 - Tonnage percentage out of Sardinian and Italian flags' total movement in Odessa, the Azov ports and the Danube.

	<i>Odessa</i>	<i>Azov</i>	<i>Danube</i>
<i>1850</i>	16%	15%	
<i>1857</i>	18%	16%	
<i>1858</i>	17%	18%	
<i>1859</i>	23%	15%	
<i>1860</i>	19%	33%	
<i>1861</i>		32%	10%
<i>1862</i>		22%	13%
<i>1866</i>		26%	3%
<i>1867</i>		27%	
<i>1868</i>		30%	
<i>1869</i>	31%	30%	
<i>1870</i>	14%	21%	
<i>1871</i>	16%	19%	
<i>1872</i>	17%	19%	9%
<i>1873</i>	15%	24%	5%
<i>1874</i>		21%	3%

Leonardo Scavino

1875	47%	5%
1877	24%	1%
1878	12%	2%

Source: *Commercial reports received at the Foreign Office from Her Majesty's consuls (CRFO)*, from 1862 to 1879; *Della navigazione e del commercio nei porti di Taganrog e di Marianopoli nel 1868 rapporto del Cav. Avv. Rossi Console a Taganrog*, in *Bollettino consolare*, Torino: Paravia, 1869, pp.199-206; *Stato della navigazione nei porti di Taganrog e Marianopoli. Rapporto del Regio console cav. Avv. G. Rossi*, in *Idem*, pp. 464-468; *Memoria sul commercio di Berdiansk, di Giov. Batt. Giovannetti ex vice-console toscano (1848 e 1849) in Orano*, in *Bollettino consolare*, Torino: Paravia, 1868, pp. 45-104; *Agricoltura, industria e commercio della Moldavia; rapporto del nobile avv. Bernardo Lambertenghi Regio vice console a Galatz*, in *Idem*, pp. 107-128.

Table 3.13 delineates an unbalanced concentration of Ligurian tonnage between the three different Black Sea areas: their presence was more regular and had a more consistent weight in Odessa and the Azov, whereas in Galatz and Braila, they seldom reached 10%. In the Azov Sea ports, the Italian participation averaged 22,60%; in Odessa to 17,60%. Indeed, the Italian shipping system turned out to be one of the most successful in the Azov ports compared to the other regions; in the aftermath of the Crimean War, Sardinian vessels directed much more decisively to these ports, establishing durable supremacy in the Azov export trade. In Taganrog, the Italian ships' tonnage increased from 21.728 tons (9% of the total) in 1857 to 134.036 (29% of the total) in 1871²⁸⁸. Even more impressive is the figure of Berdyansk, where Italian shipping outnumbered all the other flags: in the same period, the proportion of the Italian tonnage out of the total available in the Russian port passed from 40% to 57%.

According to the British consuls, the Italian success in these ports lied in various factors. First, Italian captains' high appreciation, whose «intelligence, activity and exemplary conduct» were

²⁸⁸ *Report by Mr. Consul Carruthers on the Trade of Taganrog for the year 1861*, in *CRFO*, London: Harrison and Sons, 1862, pp. 248-254; *Report by Consul Carruthers*, in *Idem*, 1872, pp. 431-442. The peak of the Italian share over Taganrog shipping movement was in 1863 when it reached the 31%. In parallel with the tonnage, the ships' number grew almost accordingly: in 1857 there were 104 Sardinian ships, whereas in 1871 there were 348. Since Italian ship-owners had invested in newer and bigger ships, also the average tonnage witnessed an impressive growth, from 208 tons in 1857 to 385 tons in 1871.

praised and valued over «the shipmasters of any other nation»²⁸⁹. Instead, the second factor was market competitiveness: due to their lower operational costs, Italian captains could accept lower freights. More specifically, British consuls underlined all the factors determining the Italian comparative advantage in terms of costs. Maritime labour in Italy was cheaper than in other merchant marines, especially compared to the British one; then, due to the Italian relative delay in unionism and class movements, several aspects of sailors' working activities were not strictly regulated as much as in the case of the British. For instance, the food supplies distributed on board could have been of lower quality, and there was no evident limit to their working hours (whereas British sailors did not work on Sunday, and their working hours were from six to six)²⁹⁰. Therefore, the discrepancies in terms of seafaring labourers' rights directly impacted operational costs, both in terms of money and time. However, apart from this brief reference to maritime labour, all of these aspects will be more extensively outlined in the fifth chapter. Then, Italians were also advantaged for the lower costs of wooden ship-building; despite the alleged more safety and endurance of British vessels, merchants were unwilling to charge the freight differentials on their accounts, reversing the risk, instead, on insurance companies²⁹¹.

These more significant numbers about the Azov ports might be partially explained through a combination of technological advances in navigation and the peculiar environment of the area.

²⁸⁹ *Report by Mr. Consul Carruthers on the trade of Taganrog for the year 1861*, in *CRFO*, 1862, pp. 248-249. Also in Berdyansk, in 1864, Italian captains were «preferred by the majority of the exporters to any other except British. This might be attributed to the energetic character of their commanders, and the great care taken by them in the preservation of cargoes». *Report by Mr. Acting Consul Wagstaff on the trade of Berdyansk for the year 1864*, in *CRFO*, 1865, p. 13.

²⁹⁰ Report by Consul Zohrab on the Commerce and Navigation of Berdyansk for the Year 1870, in I. Lyman and V. Konstantinova (eds.), *The Ukrainian South as viewed by consuls of the British Empire (nineteenth-early twentieth centuries, Vol. 1: British Consuls in the port of Berdyansk*, Kiev: Institute of Ukrainian Archeography and Primary Sources Studying of M.S. Hrushevskyyi, 2018, p. 415.

²⁹¹ In this regard the British consul is clear: «the advantages of British vessels, being safer and more ably navigated, are lost in the difference of cost, for merchants do not, after all, place so much importance on superiorities which benefit insurance companies rather than themselves». *Report by Mr. Consul Zohrab on the Trade and Navigation of the Port of Berdyansk for the Year 1866*, in I. Lyman and V. Konstantinova (eds.), *The Ukrainian South as viewed by consuls of the British Empire*, p. 397.

Indeed, whereas in Odessa and the Danube ports, steamers established their rule in the grain trade between the 1860s and early 1870s, in the Azov Sea, the transition from sail to steam in navigation was not even close to its conclusion a decade later. For instance, in 1867, 37% of the value of the goods exchanged in Galatz had been transported on steamships²⁹². In 1872, 421 steamships (of which 310 hoisting the British flag) cleared Odessa's port (only partially balanced by 621 sailing vessels)²⁹³. In the same year, only 69 steamers called at Taganrog, out of 874 ships, counting for no more than 18% of the tonnage. In Berdyansk, competition among steamers was even less effective: in 1874, the tonnage of steamships cleared from the port counted for 8% of the total since there were only 11 steamers out of 323 ships²⁹⁴.

Moreover, Berdyansk was the most resilient to steamships' success: only in 1883 and 1884, steam navigation was established on proportions similar to those of Odessa and Danube ports during the previous decade²⁹⁵. The evolution of technological transition in the Black Sea trade had inherent connections with one or another merchant marine's success in different ports. For a wide array of reasons, among which ship-building costs, coal availability and prices were mentioned, it is to be taken into account also the organisational structure of shipping business²⁹⁶; indeed, the British controlled a significant part of the world steamship fleet, whereas Italy continued to a large extent to employ sailing vessels on these routes²⁹⁷.

²⁹² *Agricoltura, industria e commercio della Moldavia*, pp. 121-125. The overall data, in Italian lira, show that the total movement on steamships counted for 18,4 millions, whereas sailing ships transported goods for 31,9 millions. The Italian participation to this movement was of the 12% of the total (only on sailing ships).

²⁹³ *Report by Consul-General Abbott on the trade of Odessa in 1872*, in CRFO, 1873, pp. 1020-1021.

²⁹⁴ *Report by Vice-Consul Wagstaff on the Trade and Commerce of Berdyansk for the year 1874*, in I. Lyman and V. Konstantinova (eds.), *The Ukrainian South as viewed by consuls of the British Empire*, p. 471.


²⁹⁵ *Report by Vice-Consul Lowe on the Trade and Commerce of Berdyansk for the Year 1883*, in I. Lyman and V. Konstantinova (eds.), *The Ukrainian South as viewed by consuls of the British Empire*, pp. 520-525.

²⁹⁶ All of these factors will be the object of a more extensive presentation in the third chapter.

²⁹⁷ According to the statistics tables elaborated by the Norwegian Office for Statistics, in 1879, the British steamship fleet represented the 66% of the world steamship tonnage; Italy counted for 1,7% of the total. See: A.N. Kjaer (ed.), *Navigation maritime. Les marines marchands*, Christiania: Ahschehoug, 1881, Table No. 3, *Nombre et tonnage des navires marchands des different pays dans chaucune des annes 1871-1880*, pp. 18-25.

Thus, it was natural that Camogli shipowners, being among the foremost representatives of Italian sailing shipping, favoured the Azov destinations over Odessa and the Danube. However, although this assumption finds a confirmation on the overall perspective, the time limits of the sources available and the drastic oscillations observed from year to year prevent us from giving the Azov ports top priority.

Figure 3.7 - Camogli ships loading in the Black Sea ports by region.



Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*.

According to Figure 3.7, the numeric consistency of Camogli's shipping in the Black Sea increased in parallel with the fleet's structural growth – analysed in paragraph 1.2 of the present chapter. The rise of Camogli's vessels from 63 in 1854 to almost 180 in 1865 is even more evident if associated with the average tonnages' boost, passed from 163 to 297 tons (Figure 3.1).

The absolute majority of the Camogli fleet was employed in the Black Sea trade; apart from the persistence of coastal cabotage (dealing with Tuscan charcoal, see chapter 1), all the ships able to long-distance navigation engaged in this business. However, the presence of Camogli vessels within the broader framework of the national participation in the Black Sea trade was not an easy task due to the dispersion of most consular correspondence (particularly concerning statistics and tables)

between the archives of Turin and Rome²⁹⁸. This fact was explicitly actual for Odessa and the Danube ports, whereas more information is available for the Azov Sea ports.

Table 3.14 - Camogli's share over the Sardinian presence in Odessa, the Black Sea ports and the Danube²⁹⁹.

	<i>Odessa</i>	<i>Berdyansk</i>	<i>Mariupol</i>	<i>Taganrog</i>	<i>Danube</i>
	%	%	%	%	%
<i>1857</i>	15%	22%		27%	
<i>1858</i>	7%	28%			
<i>1859</i>	10%	20%		40%	
<i>1860</i>					
<i>1861</i>	11%	9%	15%	17%	18%
<i>1862</i>		10%	14%	16%	
<i>1863</i>		13%	18%	12%	16%
<i>1864</i>		17%	11%	20%	
<i>1865</i>				20%	

Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*; AMAE, *Affari Politici*, 80, Odessa; ASN, *Segreteria e ministero di stato degli affari esteri*, 5256; *Commercial reports received at the Foreign Office from Her Majesty's consuls*, from 1862 to 1879.

The slight amount of data concerning Odessa restricted the analysis to a few specific years. On average, the results show 10,75% of the ships in the leading Russian Black Sea port. Hence, further

²⁹⁸ The correspondence of the Sardinian consuls of the 1850s and 1860s have a peculiar archival history: first collected in Turin, the capital of the Kingdom of Sardinia, after the Italian unification some of it was transferred to Rome (1871) among the documents of the “Archivio del Ministero degli Affari Esteri d'Italia”. Then, some parts returned to Turin after the Second World War, whereas other remained in Rome. See, F. Bacino (ed.), *La legazione e i consolati del regno di Sardegna in Russia (1783-1861)*, pp. 9-20.

²⁹⁹ In order to elaborate this table we chose to show only the years in which we possessed data for both of the categories (Camogli ships and Sardinian flag) and, therefore, able to the percentage calculations and to draw comparisons.

comparisons can be advanced for Odessa and the Azov ports. Notwithstanding the total amount of ships going toward either the two destinations, the participation of Camogli increases to a 14,50% yearly average in Mariupol, 17% in Berdyansk and, finally, to 21,70% in Taganrog.

Through crew lists information, we were also able to reconstruct the general route patterns followed by Camogli ships to and from the Black Sea. In this regard, we might propose three different samples corresponding to each destination area among Odessa, the Azov and the Danube. The first example might be found in the brig *Principe di Moldavia* (169 t.), built in Varazze in 1851, owned by Gio. Batta Grimaldo Ansaldo and captained by Gerolamo Lavarello³⁰⁰. On the 24th May 1861, the vessel left Genoa to Constantinople, an obligated stop to enter and leave the Black Sea, due to the presence of passage duties demanded by the Ottoman authorities. However, far from representing merely a customs house, Constantinople was a leading financial and commercial centre, where several trade houses, banking and any kind of shipping operators possessed some branches or even the headquarters³⁰¹. In 1872, for instance, captain Nicola Schiaffino from Camogli contracted a 7.389 francs bottomry loan from the Greek businessman Antonio Inglesis to repair his ship *Dittatore Garibaldi* which had suffered some damages along his route from Taganrog³⁰².

³⁰⁰ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 8054. This is not the first time we found this ship. Other voyages (always along Black sea routes) are found in Idem, serie 13, n. 4250 and Idem, serie 14, n. 1221.

³⁰¹ The intermediate role for shipping and banking of the city of Istanbul has been underlined by recent works, especially for what concerned the presence of Greeks operators. See, E. Eldem, S. Laiou and V. Kechriotis (eds.), *The economic and social development of the port-cities of the southern Black sea coast and hinterland. Late 18th-beginning of the 19th century*, Black Sea Project Working Papers vol. V, Corfu: 2017. In particular, see K. Galani, "The Galata bankers and the international banking of the Greek business group in the 19th century", pp. 45-79. See also, G. Harlaftis and V. Kardassis, *International shipping in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea: Istanbul as a maritime centre, 1870-1910*, in S. Pamuk and J.G. Williamson (eds.), *The Mediterranean Response to Globalization Before 1950*, London: Routledge, 2000, pp. 233-265.

³⁰² MCMC, *Noli*, Contratto di cambio marittimo tra Nicola Schiaffino e Antonio Inglesis – 5 marzo 1872. The bottomry loan (*cambio marittimo* in Italian) has been a fundamental financial and risk-sharing tool since the Middle Age and throughout the whole early modern period. It was based on a loan connected to the ship, where all the risks were pending on the borrower in exchange of high interests. In period when loans with high interests were forbidden or opposed for religious reasons, the bottomry loan was allowed due to the as much high risks on the borrower connected with the unpredictability of navigation. Several merchants and businessmen, still in the 18th century, practiced the

In the Ottoman capital, the captain either received (from a local commissioner) or established his following destination, Odessa, the port from which he would have taken a grain cargo to go back into the Mediterranean. The ship left Constantinople on the 8th July 1861. From the Russian port, since the cargo's stowage into the hold could take up to 10-14 days, the *Principe di Moldavia* departed at the end of July. Finally, after a due stop in Constantinople again, it sailed to Marseille, where it arrived at the beginning of September (10th). Following a two-week stop in the French port, for discharging the cargo and recruiting a new crew, the ship left Marseille towards Constantinople on the 28th of September. Then, it sailed along the Odessa-Marseille route another time, and in the following year, it went to a Danube port (Galatz) to carry its cargo to England. After a two year service and three voyages to the Black sea, in the end, it went back to Genoa for some reparations, a few months stops during winter, in order to resume navigation in the following spring.

However, for those ships heading to the Azov and the Danube, the route's first leg did not differ from those going to Odessa. The brig *Mentore* (274 t.), for instance, departed from Genoa to Constantinople on 11th March 1862³⁰³. Almost a month later, it left the Ottoman capital destined to the Azov (no more details were provided); after the obligatory stop at Kerch quarantine station, however, it headed directly to Taganrog, from where departed only in late May. As we will analyse more closely in the next paragraph, the *Mentore* was chartered directly to Falmouth, one of the most trafficked ports for orders of the British Isles, to receive the communication about its final direction (Amsterdam) on 6th August. To illustrate a sample route to the Danube, instead, we might choose the voyage of *Sincero* (172 t.). The vessel left Genoa in late November 1861; by the time that

bottomry loan as a proper financial investment, due to the high returns of sea-borne trade. In the case under analysis, Antonio Inglesis contracted an interest rate of 12% (total 8.275 francs) to be returned within three days from the arrival of the ship to its final destination. For a broader introduction to marine insurances and the institution of bottomry loans, see: A.B. Leonard (ed.), *Marine insurance. Origins and institutions, 1300-1850*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016; G. Salvioli, *L'assicurazione e il cambio marittimo nella storia del diritto italiano*, Bologna: Zanichelli, 1884. See also: A. Delis, "Shipping Finance and Risks in Sea Trade during the French Wars: Maritime Loan Operations in the Republic of Ragusa", *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 24: 1, 2012, pp. 229-242.

³⁰³ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 15, n. 2504. The brig was constructed in 1852 in Varazze and was owned by the Mortola Bros of Gio. Batta. Active in the Black sea trade at least since the 1856, it was led for six years by the experienced captain Prospero Castagnola of Camogli (ASGe, *Matricole*, register 2, n. 2127). In 1862, however, the ship changed its captain in favour of Gio. Batta Olivari.

the ship would have been in the Black Sea (1 and ½- 2 months maximum), the entrance to the Azov would have been closed due to the icing (in 1862, its navigation opened on 7th April³⁰⁴). Therefore, it stopped first in Messina to load some cargo to sell in the Danube and set sails to Constantinople. Afterwards, the ship was checked in the quarantine station of Sulina (where the captain denounced to have the hold full of citruses) and went to Galatz to discharge. In a few days, perhaps unable to find freight in the port, the ship left for Braila, where it finally loaded its wheat cargo and left in late March to Falmouth³⁰⁵.

Within this composite framework, it is worth noting how between 1854 and 1856, the Black Sea grain trade was interrupted by the Crimean War outbreak, which reduced the traffic to its lowest numbers since the Russo-Turkish war of 1827-28. However, this brief historical phase allows examining the behaviour of maritime operators involved in merchant shipping in front of the suspension of most seaborne trade. In 1853, the economic fate of Camogli was strictly dependent on the grain trade: converting to other traffics or sailing elsewhere was not an easy accomplishment. The suspension of the Black Sea trade could have impacted the community at every socio-economic level, from the top (shipowners) to the bottom (maritime workers). Instead, many shipowners were able to find an alternative market where to employ their ship and exploit their experience in the Black Sea area³⁰⁶: they put the vessels at the service of the belligerent powers (the United Kingdom and France at the beginning) to transport troops and supplies to the Crimean warfront.

This traffic is curiously documented in the consular correspondence carried out by the Sardinian consul in Malta, representing a key port-station where the British and French navies stopped before

³⁰⁴ V. Kardasis, *Diaspora merchants in the Black sea*, p.7, Table 1.1, *Duration of Freezing up of the Sea of Azov*. For the average routes length and directions, see: A. Delis, "Navigating perilous waters: routes and hazards of the voyages to Black Sea in the 19th century", pp. 1-33.

³⁰⁵ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 15, n. 6251. The ship was built in Varazze's shipyards in 1855 for the ship-owner Rocco Schiaffino. In the first years of navigation the ship captain was Ferdinando Peragallo. Then in 1862 he was substituted by Filippo Boggiano, who lasted a couple of years and then was destined to command Rocco Schiaffino's newly built ship (*Giano*, 430 t., built in 1862) whereas Emanuele Mortola was employed on *Sincero*.

³⁰⁶ *Ibidem*. Among the most important ship-owners there were Bernardo Degregori (3 ships), Biagio Olivari (3), Erasmo Schiaffino (3) and Gerolamo Schiaffino (3). In this period, however, concentrated ship-ownership was not a distinguishing trait of the community as it will be in the late 19th century. See the fourth chapter.

moving troops and provisions to the war theatre. From the port movement emerges how the British army relied almost exclusively on its navy and merchant marine; on the contrary, the French army chartered numerous commercial vessels, many of them hoisting the Sardinian flag.

Table 3.15 illustrate the charging places where to load French troops and supplies, from April 1854 to March 1855: in total, 141 Ligurian ships participated in these traffics.

Table 3.15 - Number of Sardinian ships chartered by the French government divided by place of charging.

<i>Place of charging</i>	<i>N* Sardinian ships</i>
<i>Algiers</i>	10
<i>Arzew</i>	3
<i>Bona</i>	13
<i>Gibraltar</i>	1
<i>Marseille</i>	93
<i>Sète</i>	1
<i>Skikda</i>	1
<i>Toulon</i>	19

Source: AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Malta.

Table 3.16 - Passengers and cargoes carried on board Sardinian ships.

<i>Officers</i>	<i>Soldiers</i>	<i>Horses</i>	<i>Oxen</i>	<i>Donkeys</i>	<i>Flour sacks</i>	<i>Supplies</i>	<i>Fodder</i>
13	1963	2016	415	58	1500	6	2

Source: AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Malta.

Table 3.16 shows the various cargoes carried along this route: the most significant part of the Ligurian ships carried soldiers and horses from Marseille or Algerian ports to the Black Sea. Then, with the partial exception of cattle, all the other categories did not reach considerable amounts

(1500 sacks of flour were carried on four ships only). On average, each ship transported up to 20 soldiers and an equivalent number of horses.

Although the sources are relatively scarce, it is also possible to reconstruct these vessels' ports of destination: substantially, the ships went to Varna and Kamiesch, both of strategic concern within the French military organization. In Bulgaria, Varna's port, slightly remarkable for the grain trade, from June 1854 onwards became a crucial point for French and British military operations to retake control over the Danube region³⁰⁷. Instead, the small harbour of Kamiesch – a natural bay nearby Sevastopol – constituted the logistic base of the French activities in the Crimean Peninsula.

3.7. Destination ports

After presenting the main features of the Russian grain trade and Camogli's presence in the Black Sea, the present paragraph, on the other hand, deals with the opposite side of the trade, the destination ports. In the Black Sea, Camogli's vessels were chartered to either the Mediterranean or the British Isles. When destined to a Mediterranean port (mainly Genoa and Marseille), the exact destination was communicated to the captain directly in the ports of charging; instead, in the case the cargo was to be shipped to British and Northern European ports, the captain received a first informal destination to a port for order – Malta in the Mediterranean and Falmouth and Cork in the Atlantic – before reaching its final consignee. Therefore, to analyse the terminal phase of the trade, the choice consisted of dividing the destinations into two distinct geographical categories: within the first group were comprised the leading Mediterranean ports, Genoa, Marseille and Livorno; in the second group were clustered the British and Northern European ports, which animated a proper maritime system, where ports for orders, grain import ports and coal export ports coexisted in functional integration.

From reconstructing the routes, the diachronic and comparative analysis of the destinations produced the following results:

³⁰⁷ I. Roussev, *The Black Sea Port-City in the Road of Modernization*, pp. 214-223. For a general framework of the Crimean War events, see: A. Ramm, "The Crimean War", in J. Bury (ed.), *The New Cambridge Modern History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960, pp. 468-492.

Table 3.17 - Cargo destinations from the Black Sea by year (1853-1865).

	<i>Marseille</i>	<i>Genoa</i>	<i>Livorno</i>	<i>British ports</i>
1853	40%	47%	9%	4%
1854	30%	45%	6%	18%
1857	52%	37%	0%	10%
1858	52%	25%	4%	19%
1859	30%	48%	0%	23%
1860	43%	28%	0%	30%
1861	35%	19%	7%	39%
1862	15%	22%	3%	60%
1863	24%	33%	6%	37%
1864	16%	33%	6%	45%
1865	28%	19%	0%	53%

Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, from 1853 to 1865.

Table 3.17 represents an outstanding tool to visualise the transformation of Camogli's involvement in the Black Sea trade throughout the 1850s and 1860s. Until 1860-1861, the Mediterranean ports were crucial to the development of their maritime activities. Afterwards, the impressive increase of cargoes directed to the Atlantic transformed Camogli's trade and impacted its development. In the 1850s, Marseille and Genoa received 41% each (on average) of Camogli's grain cargoes; by adding Livorno, the average in the 1853-1859 period ascended to 86% in favour of Mediterranean ports. Meanwhile, on the overall perspective, the transport of cereals to the United Kingdom had begun in 1847, right after abolishing the protectionist Corn Laws, a formal act that marked the beginning of Russian grain export to the British market³⁰⁸. The ground-breaking consequences of this even

³⁰⁸ On the Corn Laws, their abolition and their impact on the growth of the Black Sea trade, see: C. Schonhardt-Bailey, *From the corn laws to free trade: interests, ideas, and institutions in historical perspective*, Cambridge: MIT press, 2006; S. Fairlie, *The Anglo-Russian grain trade 1815-1861*, Thesis: University of London, 1959; Idem, "The Nineteenth-Century

were so evident that was repeatedly mentioned by contemporary observers (e.g. the Sardinian consul in Odessa, in 1853):

The extraordinary increase of grain imports to the United Kingdom dates back to the abolition of the Corn Laws. Until 1845, Great Britain figured for 8% of Odessa's grain exports, whereas now it counts for 43%, without even considering 1849-50 when the United Kingdom purchased the 50% and 62% of the exports this port, respectively. Conversely, the exports to the Mediterranean were affected by this transformation and, whereas in 1845 it counted for 83%, now it is reduced to 41%. Such diminution is caused by the fact that before Livorno, Genoa and Trieste covered the role of intermediate grain deposits, keen to supply the British demands; instead, since a few years, these demands are directly satisfied in Odessa.³⁰⁹

In the beginning, Ligurian ships' participation in the Black Sea-Britain routes was undermined by their smaller average tonnage vis á vis the northern European ships³¹⁰. Until early 1860, casting a glance at the Ligurian average tonnage compared to the other flags seems to confirm the consul assertions. For instance, Table 3.18 illustrates these data about the port of Taganrog between 1847 and 1867.

Corn Law Reconsidered", *The Economic History Review*, No. 18: 3, 1965, pp. 562-575; Idem, "The Corn Laws and British Wheat Production. 1829-1876", *The Economic History Review*, No. 22: 1, 1969, pp. 88-116.

³⁰⁹ AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Odessa, 6, Lettera del console di Odessa a Torino, 7 aprile 1853. Translation from the original Italian: «Lo straordinario aumento nell'importazione dei cereali nel Regno Unito, data dalla abolizione della legge eccezionale sui grani. Difatti si vede che sino all'anno 1845 la Gran Bretagna non figurava nell'esportazione dei cereali da Odessa che per l'8%, mentrache attualmente figura già per il 43%, non contando gli anni 1849 e 50, nel primo dei quali il Regno Unito ritirò il 50% e sul secondo il 62% delle esportazioni di questo porto. L'esportazione invece per il mediterraneo risentiva di questa modificazione, e mentre che si vede questo figurare nel 1845 per l'83%, riducesi presentemente al solo 41%. Tale riduzione nasce da che in prima gli scali di Livorno, Genova e Trieste figuravano come depositi granarii intermedi, pronti sempre a soddisfare ad ogni minima domanda del Regno Unito, mentre che da qualche anno questa domanda viene direttamente soddisfatta da questa piazza».

³¹⁰ Idem.

Table 3.18 - Average tonnage in the port of Taganrog in 1847, 1857 and 1867.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Ligurian-Italian</i>	<i>Other flags</i>
1847	179	244
1857	208	271
1867	322	290

Source: *Commercial reports received at the Foreign Office from Her Majesty's consuls, Taganrog, 1847-1857-1867.*

Given the rapid growth of Camogli's fleet, as observed previously, there is no wonder that the availability of newly built and bigger ships played a decisive role in allowing its ship-owners to establish also in this profitable branch of trade.

From a commercial perspective, another factor that might have played against Ligurian participation in this new route lay in the Ligurian commercial networks' irrelevance in the ports and markets of the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, Camogli's maritime operators' unusual openness to serve foreign merchants obliterated this obstacle since they were increasingly employed by Greek subjects with deep-rooted linkages in the British economic environment.

Therefore, it was natural that in the 1860-65 period, British destinations constantly grew, passing from a yearly average of 14% to 44%, with a 60% peak in correspondence to 1862³¹¹. Table 3.19, then, represents an even more accurate analysis, stemming from the matching between ports of loading and destination.

Table 3.19 - Cargo destinations from Odessa, the Azov Sea and the Danube region (1853-1865).

	<i>Marseille</i>	<i>Genoa</i>	<i>Livorno</i>	<i>British ports</i>
<i>Odessa</i>	38%	32%	6%	25%
<i>Azov Sea</i>	33%	30%	3%	34%
<i>Danube</i>	24%	29%	3%	45%

Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, from 1853 to 1865.

³¹¹ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, from 1853 to 1865.

The results shown in Table 3.19 underline the uneven distribution of cargoes between Odessa, the Azov Sea ports and the Danube area. From Odessa (throughout the same chronological period), most cargoes were sent to the Mediterranean ports, with an overwhelming majority, up to 75%; the same measure fell to 66% in Azov's case and 56% Galatz and Braila. The lower intensity of the Ligurian commercial activities in the Danube area must have played a role in curtailing the Mediterranean shipments (limitedly to Ligurian and Italian shipping, since the bulk of the Danubian grain arriving at Genoa and Marseille was transported by foreign vessels). Instead, Camogli's captains were able to insert in the shipments to the United Kingdom, arguably profiting from the significant readjustment of several Greek businessmen who, during the Crimean War, moved their headquarters to Galatz and Braila.

The gradual redirection of the grain trade from the Mediterranean to the British Isles greatly impacted Camogli's maritime history. Rather than representing a mere geographical transfer, the opening of the British shipping market and the establishment of commercial relationships with British and Greek subjects operating on a more extensive business scale were crucial to the rise of Camogli's maritime activities in the following decades.

3.7.1. BRITISH PORTS: THE FORMATION OF A WHEAT-COAL INTEGRATED ROUTE

The first modification determined by the access to the British markets consisted of improving the Black Sea route economic effectiveness.

To illustrate this crucial transformation, it is worth analysing a sample of the routes followed by Camogli ships from the Black Sea to the British Isles. To this purpose, it is possible to take as an example the course of the bark *Verità* (362 t.), built in 1858 in Sestri Ponente, which was one of the finest and biggest ships, built in the booming period of 1855-59. His owner was Fortunato Bertolotto, son of Michele, one of the most influential shipowners of the community (at that time, he also owned the ship *Giovanni*, 377 t.). In February 1862³¹², it sailed for its third voyage to the Black

³¹² ASGE, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 9560.

Sea to get a grain cargo in Galatz or Braila to the United Kingdom (the local Italian consul recorded her first voyage to Newcastle in 1860³³³). Having loaded in Braila, on May 20, 1862, the *Verità* sailed straight to Cork-Queenstown (after Sulina and Constantinople); there, the captain (Fortunato Cuneo, employed for a long time on the ship) received his final orders to go to Waterford for the discharge (July-August 1862). The ship was directed to Newport, Wales, to load coal to Genoa on its haul back to the Mediterranean, where it arrived on the 24th of September. Some months afterwards, instead, the *Verità* was one of the first ships of Camogli going to New York and to remain actively employed for a couple of years on oceanic routes on British commissions³¹⁴.

Compared to the routes of the previous period (such as those sailed by the *Principe di Moldavia*, *Mentore* and *Sincero*), the example of *Verità* witnesses the introduction of a new commodity – coal – whose handling generated a radical transformation of Camogli's routes within the Black Sea trade, in particular for what concerned their cost-effectiveness. As said, the traditional Mediterranean – Black Sea route forced the Italian merchant marine to travel on ballast for the first leg (apart from occasional shipments of commodities from Sicily); accordingly, once grain cargoes were delivered to the port of destination, the navigation resumed likewise. The inefficiencies of this route were covered by the high profitability of Black Sea freights. On the contrary, accessing the British markets implied the formation of a composite route; the grain trade was complemented by coal transports to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, an integration that determined a more efficient economic management and higher profits per voyage. Indeed, according to the Italian consular representative in Berdyansk, in 1868, «the value of a ship, employed between the Levant and the ports of the United Kingdom, with the auxilium of the coal as return cargo, could be repaid in 5 to 6 years»³¹⁵.

The exchange between grain and coal cargoes, however, rarely took place in the same port. Instead, before leaving the British Isles with coal, a ship could reach up to three different ports, each of them

³³³ AMAE, *Affari Esteri*, b. 895, Newcastle.

³³⁴ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, register 19, n. 15028, Bertolotto Michele Mentore. Throughout the career of one of the ship-owner sons, embarked as ship-boy on board of the *Verità* from its first voyage in 1858 to 1865, we were able to reconstruct part of the vessel's activities after the crew list registration of 1862.

³³⁵ Bollettino consolare italiano, pp. 81-82. Translation from the Italian original: «Si stima che il valore di un bastimento, tenendo la carriera tra il Levante e i porti del Regno Unito britannico, e col rincalzo del carico di ritorno di carbon fossile, venga riscattato dopo 5 o 6 anni».

covering a specific function: a port for orders, a port to discharge the wheat cargo and a port to load coal. Along the British shores, the main ports for orders were Falmouth and Queenstown: captains called at these ports to receive updated instructions about the voyage's final leg. Thus, more than 80% of the incoming vessels anchored either at Falmouth or Queenstown³¹⁶. Then, the cargo was delivered to the prescribed port of discharge; from ports for orders, ships could be sent anywhere, even on the continent.

Table 3.20 - List of the most frequent British ports for Camogli ships divided by region and primary function.

	<i>Port for orders</i>	<i>Discharging ports</i>	<i>Coal ports</i>
<i>Ireland</i>	Queenstown	Limerick	
		Waterford	
<i>Western England</i>	Falmouth	Gloucester	
		Bristol	
		Plymouth	
<i>Wales</i>			Cardiff
			Swansea
			Newport
<i>Eastern England</i>		Hull	Newcastle-upon-Tyne
		London	Hartlepool
			Liverpool
<i>Scotland</i>		Edinburgh	Glasgow
			Troon
<i>Continental</i>		Antwerp	
<i>Europe</i>		Amsterdam	
		Rotterdam	
		Hamburg	

³¹⁶ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, from 1853 to 1865.

Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, from 1853 to 1865.

For instance, Falmouth collected all the ships destined to continental Europe, with the Dutch and Belgian ports of Amsterdam and Antwerp in the first line (approximately 8% of the cargoes). Then, being in front of England's eastern shores, most ships coming from the continent sailed to the Tyneside region, more specifically to Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Hartlepool to load cargoes to the Mediterranean or directly to the Black Sea. In 1860, the Italian consul in Newcastle mentioned 12 Camogli-owned ships anchored in Hartlepool (out of 29 Italian vessels, 41,3%) and 11 in Newcastle (out of 41 Italians, 26,83%).

Table 3.21 - List of provenience and destination of Camogli ships in Hartlepool and Newcastle ports in 1860.

<i>Port</i>	<i>Provenience</i>	<i>Destination</i>	
<i>Hartlepool</i>	London	8	Genoa 13
	Wisbech	2	Odessa 1
	Dunkerque	1	
<i>Newcastle</i>	Antwerp	4	Genoa 7
	Hull	3	Constantinople 2
	Leith	2	Odessa 2
	London	2	

Source: AMAE, *Affari Esteri*, 895, Newcastle.

Camogli's participation in the British coal trade to the Mediterranean remained a distinguishing feature of the community's maritime activities for an extended period. Although in the decades that followed, up to the 1900s, the presence of Camogli-owned ships along the Black Sea routes and in the Mediterranean cabotage gradually diminished down to its nearly complete disappearance, coal trade remained a profitable opportunity to end oceanic voyages and sail back to Genoa, to

disembark the crew or for ship repairing. Furthermore, the Italian state alimanted this trade through shipping subsidies over coal cargoes, which increased the profitability of their transport³¹⁷.

3.8. Conclusions

In less than twenty years, the nature of Camogli's shipping and, therefore, the economic structure of the community were transformed dramatically. If, before the 1830s, Camogli epitomised the standard Ligurian seafaring community, divided between cabotage, fishing and occasional long haul traffics, at the end of the 1860s, it operated on an entirely new level. Camogli's ships engaged to oceanic routes, having British ports as a destination rather than those of the Mediterranean; meanwhile, the fleet's dimensions and quality increased to compete on the global scale. The road to success was represented by Camogli's participation in the Black Sea trade: in that conjuncture, captains and shipowners were able to achieve uttermost results. By accessing the trade in the 1830s, they were able to occupy a market niche; thus, they guaranteed constant and substantial revenues to build a top-class fleet (175 Camogli-owned ships in the Black Sea ports in 1865, 297 average tons), which is impressive for a seafaring community of ca. 7.000 inhabitants.

In slightly more than a decade (1850-1865), the most successful shipowners of Camogli reinvested all the shipping incomes in new constructions, an operation that led the way to the aggregation of an enormous fleet which, at its peak – in 1879 –, counted 368 ships of 497 tons on average, an outstanding result that ranked Camogli at the 8th place in the world for sailing vessels (15th counting also steamships)³¹⁸. The causes of this success were rooted in the Black Sea trade and can be summarised into two crucial factors: firstly, Camogli's strict specialisation in shipping; second, the width of commercial partners, beyond the Ligurian networks. The means to penetrate the market

³¹⁷ The introduction of direct subsidies over a limited list of 'strategic cargoes' represented one of the most durable accomplishments of the Parliamentary Inquiry about the Italian Merchant Marine of 1882, aimed to provide long-term solutions to this industry which was entered in a downward phase. Some captains of Camogli benefitted from this subsidies for what concerned coal cargoes from British ports to Genoa. This is the case, for instance, of the brig bark *Giuseppe Aste*, in 1888: ASGe, *Notai III Sezione*, 689, n. 104.

³¹⁸ A.N. Kjaer (ed.), *Navigation maritime. Les marines marchands*, p. 12, Table n. 2.

diverged from most Ligurian competitors; rather than establishing direct associations with specific trade houses, Camogli's captains operated to a great extent on the freight market; their revenues were invested to fleet's upgrade and the reduction of the operative costs. Finally, the consolidation in the British markets – which was complemented by the arrival of numerous members of the community, who settled in the most strategic ports, as representatives of the communitarian insuring institution – facilitated Camogli's readjustment to the transformation of the Mediterranean and Black Sea shipping markets, from which they were gradually pushed away by steamers' increased competitiveness.

4. Seafaring activities on a global scale (1870s-1900s)

4.1. Introduction

This chapter addresses the transition from sail to steam to contextualize Camogli's shipping transformation throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century. The first section introduces this theme under a broad perspective – not necessarily declined into Camogli's case study. The primary elements of the transition from sail to steam are, thus, analyzed: firstly, the transformations which concerned nautical technology will be treated; secondly, few words will be spent on the improvements which unfolded in the field of communications and which contributed to the birth of contemporary shipping as much as the formers.

Afterwards, the second section will outline the development and transformation of Camogli's fleet, from the end of the Black Sea phase to the immediate pre-war years (1870s-1914). Notwithstanding the late manifesting of actual transition from sail to steam – culminated into the formation of a small fleet of tramp steamers – the section will illustrate the trajectory of local shipping, from the peak moment to its gradual decline.

Finally, the third section will extensively concern how the ongoing transition affected Camogli indirectly through market pressure. Rapidly, as soon as the first steamers established themselves in the Black Sea ports, Camogli shipowners reacted by transferring their activities onto the global scenario. Accordingly, the last part will tackle the subtle line between expansion and marginalization by outlining the evolution into a proper tramp fleet: this dialectic, perceivable also as a contrast between evolution and resilience, will be delineated according to the division of this history into two sub-phases, an expanding one (1870s-1880s) and a declining one (1890s-1914).

4.2. The introduction of new technologies in shipping

Rivers of ink have been poured into narrating and analyzing the role that the Industrial Revolution played in shaping humankind's fate. Therefore, summing them up would result in a pointless exercise that could not add any value to our narrative. Even to outline the Industrial Revolution's manifold implications toward the transport sector would represent a too extensive endeavour³¹⁹. Undoubtedly, technological innovation stimulated dramatic changes into the transport industry, as the utilization and optimization of both land and water means of communications escalated to unprecedented degrees, paving the way to increases in speed and reliability, to several changes in the methods of distribution, to the rise in market size and by providing more accessible raw materials³²⁰. The transition from sail to steam is just a portion of the broader scale of transformations in the framework of the transport revolution³²¹. Furthermore, international shipping is only one of the fields of application of the new technologies, and among the latest being the introduction of

³¹⁹ A significant work on the topic is R. Szostak, *The role of transportation in the Industrial Revolution. A comparison of England and France*, Montreal: MacGill-Queen's University Press, 1991. The author emphasises the role of technological innovation in transport as an agent of change in the productive organisation rather than as a result of it. The same approach with a more explicit reference to navigation is found in: J. Armstrong and D.M. Williams, *The impact of technological change. The early steamship in Britain*, St. John's Newfoundland: International Maritime Economic History Association, 2011. Other studies, to mention only the most relevant, are: D.R. Headrick, *The Tentacles of Progress. Technology transfer in the age of Imperialism*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990; D.S. Landes, *The Unbound Prometheus. Technological change and industrial development in Western Europe from 1750 to the present*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969; S.P. Ville, *Transport and the development of the European Economy, 1750-1918*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990; A. Jarvis, "The Nineteenth-Century roots of Globalization: Some Technological Considerations", in D.J. Starkey and G. Harlaftis (eds.), *Global markets: the internationalization of the sea transport industries since 1850*, St. John's Newfoundland: IMEHA, 1998, pp. 217-238 (with noteworthy considerations about "technological determinism"). A good attempt to summarise the role of technological advance within the whole context of the global transformations of the 19th century is J. Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World. A Global History of the nineteenth century*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 637-672. See, also: M. Merger, "Una nuova rete di comunicazioni", in V. Castronovo (ed.), *Storia dell'economia mondiale. L'età della rivoluzione industriale*, pp. 472-491.

³²⁰ R. Szostak, *The role of transportation in the Industrial Revolution*, pp. 3-33.

³²¹ P.H. Bagwell, *The transport revolution, 1770-1985*, London: Routledge, 1988.

steam engines onboard high-seas ships preceded by railways, inland navigation and coastal shipping. The combination of multiple varieties of innovative components – as iron hulls, engines and propellers – required more time for their optimization than on land communications, where the absence of reliable competitors led to the rapid establishment of railways. Then, as a result of canals, railways and steamships merging in a deeply renovated system, the transport revolution did occur.

A distinction between endogenous and exogenous factors might be outlined in examining the features embroiled with the transport revolution in shipping. Under the first category lie those improvements strictly entangled with nautical technology: compound steam engines, which emancipated navigation from winds regimes and dramatically diminished coal consumption on longer routes; screw propellers, which substituted side-paddle-wheels, thus improving navigation efficiency; iron hulls which increased longevity and weather resistance³²². Besides, to the growth of the nineteenth-century maritime industry contributed other transformations, not directly involved with nautical technology, which played a pivotal role in rationalizing the flow of merchandises and global transports. Regular communications tied to the development of liner shipping, the deep-sea cable network and the constructions of the canals – Suez, 1869 and Panama, 1902 – dramatically changed traditional routes and trade patterns. Nautical evolutions represent the core topic in the next section; the creation of liner shipping and the improvements in logistics and communication will be outlined in the following one.

4.2.1. THE EVOLUTIONS IN NAUTICAL TECHNOLOGY


4.2.1.1. *Steam engine*

As steamship technology matured over time, the improvements primarily concerned the following factors: speed, reliability, longevity and fuel efficiency. The latter represented the most challenging feature to be improved to meet the economic demands of deep-sea navigation. Before the invention of compound engines, steamers could not compete with the sail on longer routes. Previously, coal

³²² M. Stopford, *Maritime economics. Third edition*, New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 23.

consumption was so demanding that steamships must either dispose of constant supplies or devote a consistent percentage of their cargo capacity to fuel storage. Therefore, deep-sea navigation was barred to steamers, which instead grew competitive on coastal navigation. From the 1850s, with the first application of a compound engine³²³ into a steamer, this trend gradually changed. At the beginning of the 1870s, steamships ruled the Mediterranean waters. Their success within the Mediterranean lay in the specific characteristics of an enclosed sea, which could be filled with easily accessible coal stations.

Figure 4.1. Coal consumption (kg) in IPH (Indicated Horsepower) per hour.




Source: E. Corbino, *Economia dei trasporti marittimi*, Tav. XIV, p. 187³²⁴.

³²³ R. Knauerhase, "The Compound Steam Engine and Productivity Changes in the German Merchant Marine", *The Journal of Economic History*, 28, No. 3 (1968), pp. 390-403.

³²⁴ E. Corbino, *Economia dei trasporti marittimi*, Città di Castello: Società Tipografica Leonardo da Vinci, 1926. Similar data are reported with different unit of measurements (lbs.) in several further studies: D.R. Headrick, *The Tentacles of progress*, p. 25; M. Stopford, *Maritime economics*, pp. 26-27; G.P. Allington, "Sailing rigs and their use on ocean-going merchant ships, 1820-1910", *International Journal of Maritime History*, 16, No. 1 (2004), pp. 135-136; S.P. Ville, *Transport and the development of the European Economy*, p. 51; C. Knick Harley, "Aspects of the Economic of Shipping", in L.R. Fischer and G.E. Panting (eds.), *Change and adaptation in maritime history. The North-Atlantic fleets in the nineteenth century*, St. John's Newfoundland: IMEHA, 1984 p. 176; Y. Kaukiainen, "Coal and Canvas: Aspects of the Competition between Sail and Steam, c. 1870-1914", *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 4: 2, 1992, pp. 175-191.

As shown in Figure 4.1, the average coal consumption fell dramatically in the first decade of steam shipping. Then, as the evolution decelerated at mid-century, it almost halved in the 1870s. The last sharp decrease is universally associated with the invention of triple expansion engines, the definitive instrument for steam shipping to compete on oceanic routes. In the meantime, the Suez Canal opening in 1869 had shortened the way to India, thus granting steamships more advantages in the carriage of high-value cargoes. In the 1850s, steamers could not rival the new generation *clippers in connecting Europe and North America*, both on passenger and cargo transports³²⁵. In the pre-Suez era, steamships were excluded from the Indo-European routes, where *tea clippers* dominated the seaborne trade by providing regular connections between the Far East and Europe. Afterwards, although steamships could challenge sail on longer routes, sailing ships did not disappear but readjusted to new contexts³²⁶.

Figure 4.2. Distribution of world tonnage between sail and steam (1850-1885).



³²⁵ G.S. Graham, "The ascendancy of the sailing ship, 1850-1885", *The Economic History Review*, IX, No.1 (1956), pp. 74-88; R.L. Cohn, "The transition from sail to steam in immigration to the United States", *The Journal of Economic History*, 65, No. 2, 2005, pp. 469-495.

³²⁶ See *infra*.

Source: A.N. Kiaer (ed.), *Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: III. Les marines marchandes*, 1887³²⁷.

From the appraisal of the existing literature tackling the competition between sail and steam and the role of technological improvements in its determination, the ascendance of steamers might be portrayed as a sequence of forwarding leaps and could be metaphorically represented as a succession of concentric circles stemming from the United Kingdom³²⁸. From British coal *colliers* to the Pacific Ocean tramp steamers, passing through the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, the success of steam shipping exacerbated the marginalization of sails and pushed them towards increasingly peripheral markets. According to Knick Harley's calculations³²⁹, sail competitiveness with steam lasted for the whole second half of the nineteenth century. On short routes, steamers rapidly overcame sail; on the longer ones, steam did not establish its rule up until the First World War.

4.2.1.2. Iron hulls

Differently from engines, hull evolution was not limited to steam navigation. In the nineteenth century, hull materials changed significantly, from wood to iron and then from iron to steel. This development affected both sail and steamships, turning out to be a decisive factor for sail resilience in shipbuilding, albeit the dramatic differences observed from country to country. In the first place,


³²⁷ A.N. Kiaer (ed.), *Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: III. Les marines marchandes*, Christiania: Bureau Central de Statistique du Royaume de Norvège, 1887.

³²⁸ See C. Knick Harley, "Ocean Freight Rates and Productivity, 1740-1913: The Primacy of Mechanical Invention Reaffirmed", *The Journal of Economic History*, XLVIII, No. 4, 1988, pp. 851-876; Idem, "Aspects of the Economic of Shipping", in L.R. Fischer and G.E. Panton (eds), *Change and adaptation in maritime history. The North-Atlantic fleets in the nineteenth century*, pp. 167-186; Idem, "The shift from sailing ships to steamships, 1850-1890: a study in technological change and its diffusion", in D.N. McCloskey (ed.), *Essays on a mature economy: Britain after 1840*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 215-234; D.M. Williams and J. Armstrong, "An Appraisal of the Progress of the Steamship in the Nineteenth Century", in G. Harlaftis, S. Tenold and J.M. Valdaliso (eds.), *The World's Key Industry. History and economics of International Shipping*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 43-63.

³²⁹ C. Knick Harley, "Aspects of the Economy of Shipping", pp. 177-178; G.S. Graham, "The ascendancy of the sailing ship, 1850-1885", pp. 74-88.

iron hulls (and later steel) allowed the construction of bigger ships. Also, weather resistance and longevity notably increased, providing a set of transformations paving the way for a revolution of shipbuilding and shipping altogether (consider, for instance, the advantage of longevity for creating a structural sale-purchase market, almost non-existent until then³³⁰).

Figure 4.3. Number of constructions and mean tonnages of iron and wooden sailing ships (the UK, 1877-1879).



Source: A.N. Kiaer (ed.), *Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: II. Les marines marchandes*, 1881³³¹.

Figure 4.3 examines a sample of mean tonnages of iron and wooden ships compared with the yearly number of constructions between 1877 and 1879. Despite the relatively high constructions of wooden vessels, it is clear how it maintained low tonnages devoted to coastal shipping. Meanwhile, iron hulls were favoured in more significant constructions, measuring about 800-900 tons, the minimum requirement for engaging in oceanic bulk trade.

Concerning this nautical discourse, the uneven availability of raw materials and the diffusion of highly specialized know-how to handle iron shipbuilding exacerbated the already existing divergence between the United Kingdom and the other European countries. In this sense, it is between the 1860s and the 1870s that matured the world shipbuilding industry's future

³³⁰ M. Stopford, *Maritime economics*, pp. 198-207.

³³¹ A.N. Kiaer (ed.), *Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: II. Les marines marchandes*, pp. 64-65 (Table n. 8°: Tableau supplémentaire concernant les constructions navales).

configuration: some embraced new developments, substituting sail with steam and wood with iron. Elsewhere, for instance, Italy, notwithstanding the positive performances of the national merchant marine, the shipyards stuck to traditional wooden shipbuilding and, in the long run, lost its productive shares.

Table 4.1. Yearly mean tonnage built in Italy and the United Kingdom (1865-1909).

	<i>Italy</i>	<i>United Kingdom</i>	<i>Ita/UK (UK=100)</i>
<i>1865-69</i>	74574	376821	19,8
<i>1885-89</i>	8826	456082	1,9
<i>1905-09</i>	28083	895166	3,1

Source: *Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana al 31 Dicembre 1914. Relazione del Direttore generale della marina mercantile a S.E. il Ministro per i Trasporti Marittimi e Ferroviari*, Roma: Officina Poligrafica Italiana, 1916, pp. 80-95.

Table 4.1 neatly describes the impaired competition between the Italian and British shipbuilding industries in the wake of the establishment of new technologies. Still, in the late 1860s, the Italian shipyards could fabricate the equivalent of one-fifth of the tonnage released by the world-leading country. After a couple of decades, the same mathematical relationship fell tenfold, to one-fiftieth. Without inclining in energy determinism, part of the reasons underlying such diverging developments lied in Great Britain's natural resources³³². The whole set of raw materials required to construct steamships and iron-hulled sailing ships and their activity – iron and coal – were in short supply in the Italian territory. Conversely, the country abounded of timber and could rely upon a solid tradition for wooden shipbuilding.

Within this framework, to technological determinism were added other factors playing against the transition from sail to steam within the Italian merchant marine. Among them, for instance, there

³³² See J. Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World*, p. 643-645 and 651. The author enumerates what he considers factors of comparative advantages for England against the rest of the world: the creation of a consumption marked of the so-called upmarket products; the disposal of colonial outlets to absorb the growth of production; the normalisation of technological advance.

was the fact that the earliest attempts to transition resulted in dramatic failures, as in the case of the *Transatlantica*³³³. In general, it is possible to observe the increasing regional specialization in the shipbuilding sector in the long run, resulting in the gradual exclusion of traditional centres to the advantage of the most advanced ones, or of those who adapted better to the innovative techniques and the market demands.

Furthermore, technological advance triggered remarkable changes in the international distribution of tonnage. As seen, the Italian shipbuilding sector had experienced its golden period in the 1860s up until the biennium 1872-73³³⁴. It entered a profound crisis of which dependency from foreign-built and second-hand ships represented the most evident results. In the context of high-seas navigation, such development interested both steamships and sailing ships. The crisis was not limited to shipbuilding, but it was widely associated with the ongoing global transformations within shipping as a whole. In this period, competition between sail and steam revealed its downsides, such as the freight rates declining trend³³⁵ and the increasing globalization, which harmed the least developed economies. From the beginning of the introduction of steamers in Italian shipping, foreign production dependency is neatly observable. In 1867, amid a positive cycle for the Italian merchant marine, out of 98 steamships, only five were built entirely in Italian shipyards (eight disposed of Italian hulls, but foreign engines), all wooden-hulled³³⁶. One decade later, in 1873-1879, the purchases on the foreign market outnumbered domestic constructions (61 to 26). Again,

³³³ On Rubattino's activities and particularly on the unsuccessful experience of *Transatlantica* see G. Doria, *Debiti e navi. La compagnia di Rubattino (1839-1881)*, Genova: Marietti, 1991.

³³⁴ See *Statistica del Regno d'Italia. Movimento della navigazione nei porti del Regno. Anno 1867*, Firenze: Stabilimento G. Civelli, 1868 and other data from: G. Giaccherio, *Genova e la Liguria nell'età contemporanea: un secolo e mezzo di vita economica 1815-1969*, Genova: Cassa di risparmio, 1970.

³³⁵ In the third section of this chapter I will present most of the studies on the correlation between transition and the evolution of freight rates.

³³⁶ Data extracted from *Statistica del Regno d'Italia. Movimento della navigazione nei porti del Regno. Anno 1867. Marina mercantile e costruzioni navali*, pp. 109-110 (Table n. 4: Quadro descrittivo dei piroscafi per compartimenti marittimi d'iscrizione).

observing average tonnages underlines an even higher gap, presenting 581,82 tons per unit (foreign) and 185,58 (Italian)³³⁷.

4.2.1.3. *Liners, communications,
logistics and infrastructures*

Although the most tangible factors in determining the transition from sail to steam were inherently connected with the development of nautical technology, they cannot be restrained within such borders. Indeed, the transport revolution taking place in shipping needs to be contextualized and entangled with the transformations occurring in communications and logistics³³⁸. As we will see, during the nineteenth century, the corporate sector of shipping changed as much as shipbuilding³³⁹. The circulation of valuable information has always been an essential factor in the development of seaborne trade. Since nautical developments reduced shipping costs, making sea transports more profitable on longer routes, commercial knowledge transfer assumed more importance. As a result, the traditional ways to gain and transmit information needed improvements to adapt to the globalized market's needs. Both traders and shipowners required a smoother and quicker information flow based on regular and up-to-date communications.

³³⁷ Data extracted from A.N. Kiaer (ed.), *Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: II. Les marines marchandes*, pp. 62-63 (Table n. 8: Détails sur les accroissements et extinctions relatifs à l'effectif des marines marchandes pendant les années 1873-1879).

³³⁸ J. Armstrong and D.M. Williams, "«A new and very modern Business». The traffic and operations of the early steamships", in Id., *The Impact of Technological change*, pp. 183-203.

³³⁹ These developments are outlined in a vast bibliography: M. Stopford, *Maritime economics*, pp. 23-35; G.H. Boyce, *Co-Operative Structures in Global Business: communicating, transferring knowledge and learning across the Corporate frontier*, New York: Routledge, 2002; P.N. Davies, "The impact of improving communications on commercial transactions: nineteenth-century case studies from British West-Africa and Japan", *International Journal of Maritime History*, 14, No. 1 (2002), pp. 225-238. In a broader interpretation connected with Imperialism, see J. Black, *The power of knowledge. How information and technology made the modern world*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014, pp. 276-279.

Maritime historians put the introduction of steam engines at the beginning of this process. Notwithstanding most of the technical aspects, the leading innovation of steam power application to navigation consisted of the emancipation from wind regimes, whose rule had lasted since pre-history. Thus, steamers surmounted weather unpredictability and provided scheduled services between different ports. Soon the routes were organized according to fixed schedules, paving the way for the birth of liner shipping³⁴⁰. However, the revolutionizing character of this transformation impacted well beyond shipping. Regularity and predictability became crucial to private merchants and public governors. Then, the movement volume of news, people and merchandises considerably increased³⁴¹.

In the formation of liner shipping, state intervention represented a key factor: since the earlier stages of development, steamship companies obtained privileged contracts to transport mail in exchange for postal subventions³⁴². Within historiography, subsidized companies had attracted a great deal of attention³⁴³: public aids have been awarded in almost every country with a maritime projection, including the most committed supporter of the free market, the United Kingdom. Indeed, in the history of the development of subsidized lines engaging to postal services, Great Britain is at the forefront³⁴⁴.

When coal consumption was still inefficient to transport bulky cargoes at the onset of steam navigation, the allowance of subventions for mail cargoes granted steamers a crucial advantage.

³⁴⁰ M. Stopford, *Maritime economics*, pp. 25-28; P.N. Davies, "The development of liner trades", in K. Matthews and G. Panting, *Ships and Shipbuilding in the North Atlantic Region*, St. John's Newfoundland: Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1978, pp. 173-206;

³⁴¹ See L.U. Scholl, "The global communications industry and its impact on international shipping before 1914", in D.J. Starkey and G. Harlaftis (eds.), *Global markets: the internationalization of the sea transport industries since 1850*, pp. 195-215.

³⁴² See coeval studies such as: R. Meeker, "History of shipping subsidies", *Publications of the American Economic Association*, 6, No. 3, 1905, pp. 1-229.

³⁴³ The debate between free navigation (and free trade) and protectionism is continuously present in economic discourses through the second half of the century. Flag privileges and public subsidies represented the main tools to protect the national merchant marine: for the Italian case, see: *Inchiesta sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana e sui mezzi più acconci ed efficaci per assicurarne l'avvenire e promuoverne lo svolgimento*, Roma: Tip. Eredi Botta, 1882, voll. 6.

³⁴⁴ R. Meeker, "History of shipping subsidies", pp. 5-42.

Postal communications were critical in the rulers' objectives, particularly for a colonial country as the United Kingdom³⁴⁵. The establishment of regular and steady connections with India engaged the English society for a protracted period. Mail transport represented a means to run political and economic integration, especially in power projection and colonial administration. From direct public management, postal services rapidly passed under private handling, leading the way to the state subsidies policy, which from Britain spread in all the European societies³⁴⁶. The presence of privileged companies in a free market was sharply criticized and opposed by the competitors: hence, shipping became a central field in the broader discourses between the sponsors of protectionism and those of free-trade³⁴⁷.

Furthermore, subsidies facilitated the development of liner shipping and, thus, the rapid seizure from steam companies of crucial markets, such as passengers transport³⁴⁸. From the late 1850s, fuel efficiency improved with the introduction of compound engines: thus, steamships, relying upon the advantages of offering scheduled services, won the competition against sail in migrant transoceanic

³⁴⁵ D.R. Headrick, *The tentacles of progress*, pp. 97-144.

³⁴⁶ A. Giuntini, *Le meraviglie del mondo. Il Sistema internazionale delle comunicazioni nell'Ottocento*, Prato: Istituto di studi storici postali, 2011, pp. 35-98.

³⁴⁷ See the theoretical framework of shipping subsidies developed by Meeker: R. Meeker, "History of shipping subsidies", pp. 172-218.

³⁴⁸ Passengers transport rapidly became one of the main market for international shipping. There is a huge bibliography on the topic, due to its involvement in wider themes of historiography, such as migration and globalisation. From a maritime perspective, the main references on the topic are: T. Fey, L.R. Fischer, S. Hoste and S. Vanfraechem, *Maritime transport and migration. The Connections between Maritime and Migration networks*, St. John's Newfoundland: IMEHA, 2007; T. Fey, *The Battle for the Migrants. Introduction of Steamshipping on the North Atlantic and its impact on the European Exodus*, St. John's Newfoundland: IMEHA, 2017. Despite the clear advantages of steam shipping over time, at the beginning (early 1850s) also sailing ships competed on this transport. For the Italian case, see, for instance, the experience of Gio. Batta Lavarello, a ship-owner from Varazze (Genoa): G. Giacchero, *Genova e Liguria nell'età contemporanea. Un secolo e mezzo di vita economica, 1815-1969*, p. 269; G. Doria, *Investimenti e sviluppo economico a Genova alla vigilia della Prima Guerra Mondiale*, Milano: Giuffrè, 1973. This context offered also some interesting features, like the recurrent presence of mixed-propelled ships. See, G. Gropallo, *Navi a vapore ed armamenti italiani dal 1818 ai giorni nostri*, Genoa: Bertello, 1958, pp. 77-78.

transports³⁴⁹. Previously, steam liners had filled the shipping sector for general cargo: by this locution, we mean «many small consignments, each too small to fill a ship, that had to be packed with other cargo for transports»³⁵⁰ as opposed to bulk cargoes, which consisted of «large homogenous parcels big enough to fill a whole ship»³⁵¹. The two typologies' neatly diverging evolution based on commodities exacerbated the distinction based on shipping types between liners and tramps, as the latter specialized in bulk cargoes³⁵².

Leaving to further discourses the sketching of these two kinds of shipping, an introduction about the rise of liners is suitable to deal with the mentioned evolution in communications. The formula of the «steamship as an agent of modernization³⁵³», coined by Armstrong and Williams, might be suitable to this context: liners offered scheduled services, thus providing regular exchanges of mail, goods and people from one point to another. As a result, they undoubtedly contributed to the escalation of the international flows of information and knowledge transfer. Indeed, as Peter Davies argued³⁵⁴, the transition from sail to steam impacted the history of information and communications directly. In his studies about the commercial activities that British merchants maintained with West Africa and Japan, liner shipping's contribution to commercial expansion emerges vigorously³⁵⁵.

³⁴⁹ R.L. Cohn, "The transition from sail to steam in immigration to the United States", *The Journal of Economic History*, 65, No. 2, 2005, pp. 469-495.

³⁵⁰ M. Stopford, *Maritime economics*, p. 60.

³⁵¹ *Idem*.

³⁵² On the subject of the distinction between liner and tramp shipping, a general reference is: M. Stopford, *Maritime economics*, pp. 25-28. The detailed descriptions of the two are in M. Stopford, *Maritime economics*, pp. 417-427 (tramp) and 505-512 (liner).

³⁵³ J. Armstrong and D.M. Williams, "The Steamship as an agent of modernisation", *International Journal of Maritime History*, 19, No. 1 (June 2007), 145-160.

³⁵⁴ P.N. Davies, "The impact of improving communications on commercial transactions: nineteenth-century case studies from British West-Africa and Japan", pp. 225-238.

³⁵⁵ *Idem*, pp. 227-228. Particularly meaningful is the case of West Africa, where, with the foundation of the *African Steam Ship Company* in 1852, was instituted a weekly connection with London and, later on, Liverpool. This development attracted investors, leading to a commercial escalation of the trade between the area and England.

One further example can be offered by the Italian shipowner Raffaele Rubattino in designing a liner connection between the Italian ports and the Far East immediately before the opening of the Suez Canal³⁵⁶. According to his project, the route was intended to increase Italian exports to the Far East by establishing monthly connections between Genoa, Livorno, Naples and Messina with Bombay, Calcutta, Singapore, Hong-Kong and Yokohama. In the beginning, Rubattino's steamers transported samples of Italian merchandises and manufactures to promote national production abroad. Then, by encouraging commercial results, the liner connection was subsidized by the Italian state³⁵⁷.

After establishing liner steam shipping within mail transport, the invention, in rapid succession, of the deep-sea cable network revolutionized the world information system³⁵⁸. In 1850, the first laying of cables between Dover and Calais commenced a process concluded in a couple of decades (1872) when Singapore, Hong-Kong and Yokohama were finally included in the world network. Hence, most of the maritime world was connected.

By providing regular and faster connections, steamships had qualitatively improved commercial communications; then, submarine telegraphy radically enhanced the globalization and the commercial integration between remote areas. Before cable telegraphy, a London merchant carrying business in India needed several months to perform a single commercial operation;

³⁵⁶ ASGe, *Camera di commercio*, box 39. The first formulation is attributable to a member of the Genoese Chamber of Commerce, Errera.

³⁵⁷ NGI (Navigazione Generale Italiana): it represents the result of the fusion between Rubattino's company and the one of Florio, based in Palermo. See ACS, *Ministero della marina, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Divisioni premi compensi e tasse*, box 61, *Movimento generale della navigazione*, Bombay: in 1891, are found five steamships regularly connecting Genoa and Bombay (Po, Domenico Balduino, Singapore, Raffaele Rubattino and Manilla) and two that covered the section from Bombay to Hong Kong (Bisagno and Bormida).

³⁵⁸ Submarine telegraphy is a well-studied topic in the British and American historiography, due to the preponderant involvement of these two countries in its development. A valuable summary is D.R. Headrick, *The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851-1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. The same author has repeatedly emphasised how telegraphy might be studied from both a political and economic perspective: D.R. Headrick and P. Griset, "Submarine Telegraph Cables: Business and Politics, 1838-1939", *The Business History Review*, LXXV, No. 3, 2001, pp. 543-578. In Italian, a good reference is: A. Giuntini, *Le meraviglie del mondo. Il Sistema internazionale delle comunicazioni nell'Ottocento*.

afterwards, the same person could exchange 25-30 words in a minute³⁵⁹. Naturally, these improvements echoed into the shipping organization: among the various transformations, we might mention the formation of an autonomous managerial structure, distinct from the personnel operating on seas³⁶⁰. In this regard, the evolution of the relationship between shipowners and captains is one of the most discernible effects³⁶¹. In the pre-cable era, shipowners could not handle first-hand all the commercial operations. Instead, they ought to delegate decision-making in the hands of reliable and trustworthy people or, otherwise, to command the ship by filling the captain's position³⁶². Indeed, the mastering of both navigational and commercial skills figured among the professional prerequisites to be possessed by captains. Afterwards, submarine telegraphy suppressed most of the pre-existing intermediate passages and allowed shipowners to manage all the critical operations personally.

Conversely, on the captains' side, cable telegraphy was perceived as «a controlling device that curtailed their freedom as masters of the ship³⁶³». Their capabilities as businessmen were no longer required. The increase of informational speed and business competitiveness created the need to dispose of personnel on the ground, permanently connected with the global network of information through the cable telegraphy. From a broader perspective, it is not dissimilar from the substitution of owner-capitalists with hired managers observable in the industrial sector due to capital

³⁵⁹ A. Giuntini, *Le meraviglie del mondo*, p. 152.

³⁶⁰ P.N. Davies, "The development of liner trades", in K. Matthews and G. Panting, *Ships and Shipbuilding in the North Atlantic Region*, p. 97.

³⁶¹ See also Chapter 5.

³⁶² On the various aspects about the relationships between ship-owners and captains and the role of the captains on board, see: Y. Kaukiainen, "Owners and Masters: management and managerial skills in the Finnish Ocean-Going Merchant Fleet, c. 1840-1880", in L.U. Scholl and M.L. Hikkanen (eds.), *Sail and steam. Selected maritime writings of Yrjö Kaukiainen*, St. John's Newfoundland: IMEHA, 2004, pp. 53-68. Another important contribution about the evolution of the figure of merchant captains: J.M. Witt, "«During the Voyage every Captain is Monarch of the Ship»: The Merchant Captain from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth century", *International Journal of Maritime History*, 13, No. 2, 2001, pp. 165-194.

³⁶³ L.U. Scholl, "The global communications industry and its impact on international shipping before 1914", in D.J. Starkey and G. Harlaftis (eds.), *Global markets*, p. 212.

concentration and cartelization³⁶⁴. Apart from big companies such as NGL, this development occurred on a smaller scale within Italian shipping since owners turned themselves into managers and left maritime operations to trustworthy members of their broader kinship.

Then, to improve shipping logistics, the amelioration of port facilities aimed at shortening the time spent in ports represents another critical factor. As steamships, by increasing speed, reduced the loaded days at sea, the idle time ashore became more significant in terms of income foregone. Thus, the optimization of cargo handling diminished the no-income and costly intervals between subsequent voyages. Where possible, the governments invested in the construction of docks to adapt to the increase of trade volumes, as congested port traffic impacted severely on shipping enterprises. Besides, technological advancements made their crucial contribution even in this field. Since the early nineteenth century, pump machines and mechanical elevators were installed in the most advanced ports to exploit the fundamental principle whereby «all the lifting is done in a single initial stage, after which successive movements are carried out chiefly or wholly by gravity³⁶⁵».

The introduction of mechanical devices to optimize cargo handling in ports constituted a crucial achievement for the seaborne economy's escalation. In the same conceptual direction, were channelled the efforts to curtail the number of total handlings within single transports. Notwithstanding the single improvements developed in each field, the need for numerous transshipments, from ship to ship, from ship to warehouses and railways, impacted severely on the cost-effectiveness of sea transports. Within this framework, the most significant achievements to the benefit of shipping logistics involved the radical transformation of geography. Indeed, the realization of monumental infrastructures, such as canals and railway tunnels, aimed at overcoming geographical constraints and, thus, fulfilling human ambitions to control nature. The most practical accomplishments of such ambitious designs were converted into a massive boost for international trade and the global transport system's optimization. Among the various case studies, such as the Alpine railway tunnels – which redirected a substantial part of the European seaborne trade to the Mediterranean basin – the Suez Canal opening in 1869 is the most emblematic.

³⁶⁴ J. Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World*, p. 649.

³⁶⁵ A. Jarvis, "The Nineteenth-Century roots of Globalization: Some Technological Considerations", in D.J. Starkey and G. Harlaftis (eds.), *Global markets*, p. 223.

The Suez Canal construction can be placed at the culmination of long-standing designs pointed at the development of inland waterways. In competition with railways, the rise of canal systems in certain countries has always been associated with steamships due to the technological implementations in transport logistics³⁶⁶. Indeed, since the earlier phases of the development of steam shipping technology, inland waterways offered a crucial employment source: on short distances and under specific conditions, steamers even withstood the competition with railways³⁶⁷. Then, Suez represented a great leap forward within the deeply rooted tradition for canals by transferring on international shipping what had been widely deployed in inland navigation. Leaving to a different section the representation of a few details about the alterations that the Suez Canal opening aroused in the Italian shipping sector, in this context, we will develop some discourses about the role of the Suez Canal in determining broader transformations³⁶⁸.

First of all, from a technical point of view, navigating into the Canal represented a troublesome challenge for sailing vessels. Since the limited depth and the variable winds and currents hindered the passage of big sailing ships even in the waters of the Red Sea, captains were obliged to hire steam tugboats for the entire course. Indeed, despite advertised as much as one hundred meters large, in width, the Canal measured more realistically around sixty meters and the central section – where the ships were supposed to navigate – stretched for no more than twenty-two meters³⁶⁹. Likewise, common knowledge about depth presented similar discrepancies between the official data and the reports of first-hand witnesses: in several cases, ships with a draught measuring about five meters were incurred in collisions and groundings, despite the alleged eight meters depth³⁷⁰. These

³⁶⁶ See the attention given to canal systems in various works on the subject: S.P. Ville, *Transport and the development of the European Economy, 1750-1918*, pp. 30-48; A. Grubler, *The rise and fall of infrastructures. Dynamics of Evolution and Technological change in Transport*, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1990, pp. 73-81. A comparison between British and French canal networks is in R. Szostak, *The role of transportation in the Industrial Revolution*, pp. 54-60 and 81-84.

³⁶⁷ S.P. Ville, *Transport and the development of the European Economy, 1750-1918*, pp. 30-48.

³⁶⁸ For a general account: M.E. Fletcher., "The Suez Canal and World Shipping (1869-1914)", *Journal of Economic History*, No. 4, 1958, pp. 556-573.

³⁶⁹ G. Boccardo, *Il Bosforo di Suez in relazione con il commercio del mondo e segnatamente con il commercio dell'Italia. Cenni ed osservazioni*, Forlì: Febo Gherardi Editore, 1869, pp. 6-7.

³⁷⁰ Idem.

troubling conditions affected voyage safety and, as a result, could be translated into higher insurance premia (the same went for the Cape circumnavigation, which was listed among the dangerous routes and, therefore, required additional costs).

However, the need for tugboats (mandatory for sailing ships over 50 tons) epitomized one of the most evident comparative disadvantages for sails against steamships which could instead navigate without additional costs. The impact of tugboats rentals and passage fares on voyage costs was indeed substantial. In return, Suez offered just a slight time reduction which, however, in the economy of a sailing ship, determined nothing more than a proportional diminution of labour cost, insufficient to cover the higher expenditure. Instead, the equivalent factor (time saved) retained a much more significant value for the benefit of steam voyages where, together with labour costs, fewer navigation days meant a relevant cut in coal consumptions, a critical item in steamers operational budgets³⁷¹. Summing it up, the Suez Canal provided impair advantages to steam as opposed to sailing vessels, for which, instead, the passage was economically unsustainable.

Thus, the Indo-European traffics, utterly strategic to the English interests, were rapidly monopolized by steam navigation. Although the United Kingdom initially expressed its opposition to the construction of the Canal, tolls registrations illustrate how British steamers soon seized the route. Already in the first year (1870), British ships dominated the traffic: on 489 ships passing (441.890 tons), 314 belonged to British shipowners (291.680 tons). In other words, 64% of the vessels and 66% of the tonnage passed through the Canal could be reconducted to British shipping³⁷². Afterwards, in 1896, such supremacy was even neater, as 70% of the cargo and postal ships hoisted the Union Jack flag³⁷³.

As we will see, however, not every kind of shipping was immediately redirected through the Canal. In virtue of their enormous advantage, steam liners monopolized general cargo transport, which

³⁷¹ For instance, within the proceedings of the ministerial inquiry about the conditions of the merchant marine, we found various calculations and comparisons of sailing vessels and steamers operational costs. According to the Cadenaccio Bros., ship-builders, for instance, coal consumption (together with oil, fat and routine maintenance of the engines) accounted for about 10-15% of the monthly expenditure. See, *Inchiesta parlamentare*, vol. I, pp. 86-87.

³⁷² Data from: G. Giacchero, *Genova e Liguria nell'Età contemporanea*, p. 357.

³⁷³ *Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile al 31 dicembre 1896. Relazione del direttore generale della marina mercantile a S.E. il Ministro della Marina*, Roma: Tipografia Ditta Ludovico Cecchini, 1897, p. 562.

granted high freights to cover toll expenses and related fees. Meanwhile, because the freights for bulky commodities were hardly satisfactory to grant profits to the tramp shipping industry, sail withstood the competition with steam for a more extended period. In particular, in the Far East connections, sailing vessels lasted until the end of the century.

This introductory section was aimed to illustrate the transformations in the global shipping occurring in concomitance with the third phase of the evolution of Camogli's maritime activities. All the mentioned factors – nautical technology (hulls and propulsion), communications (liner shipping and cable telegraphy) and logistics (cargo handling in ports and infrastructures) – contributed to determining the unique trajectory which Camogli underwent throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century and until the First World War. More than ever, the macro-historical processes, operating at the global and structural levels, influenced the micro-historical and local dimension.

4.3. The Camogli merchant fleet on the global scale (1870s-1914)

In continuity with the equivalent section of the previous chapter, these pages will address the development of the fleet of Camogli from the early 1870s to the First World War. The first source used for this purpose is the 1883 list of the ships enrolled on the local mutual insurance association³⁷⁴. Then, to examine the evolution of the fleet in the last decades of the nineteenth century, it was possible to draw information from the 1902 book of the *Registro Navale Italiano*, which recorded the Italian merchant marine's status in its entirety – at the end of December 1901³⁷⁵. Finally, the last source is represented by the 1916 publication of the same book, which enlisted the


³⁷⁴ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese, Genova: Tipografia dell'Istituto Sordo-Muti, 1883.

³⁷⁵ *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902*, Genova: Pietro Pellas, 1902.

Italian ships that existed in late 1915: this source provides the last depiction of Camogli's fleet before the First World War³⁷⁶.

In the wake of the community's economic rise after the Black Sea period, the fleet of Camogli entered into an expanding phase lasting until the early 1880s. Throughout the last third of the century, the bulk of Camogli's merchant marine stemmed from an impressive campaign of constructions at the turn of the 1860s and the 1870s.

Figure 4.4. The number of constructions within the fleet of Camogli (1850s-1883).




Source: CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese, Genova: Tipografia dell'Istituto Sordo-Muti, 1883.

Indeed, as represented in Figure 4.4, 78% of the constructions occurred between 1866 and 1876. More than two hundred-forty ships were built throughout this period: the resulting figure, measured in 1883, consisted of 307 ships enrolled to the *Mutua*. In the 1850s, as we saw in the previous chapter, many shipowners built numerous ships to renew the fleet and adapt it to the needs of the Black Sea trade. However, from the late 1860s, they started a new massive campaign of constructions that completely transformed the fleet's nature. After this period, Camogli's merchant

³⁷⁶ *Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro 1916*, Genova: Pietro Pellas, 1916.

marine achieved its most significant and most competitive (in terms of international shipping) configuration: in particular, mean tonnage rose outstandingly. In 1883, it measured about 595 tons: at the lower extreme, the brigs *Annetta* (185 t.) and *Etra* (197 t.), built in the 1850s. On the other side lay the newly built (right in 1883) full-rigged ships, *Fede e Amore* (1331 t.), *Gio. Batta Repetto* (1244 t.) and *Indus* (1111)³⁷⁷.

Figure 4.5. Ships enlisted in the 1883 *Mutua* divided per tonnage categories.



Source: CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese, Genova: Tipografia dell'Istituto Sordo-Muti, 1883.

Figure 4.5. illustrates the growth of the fleet by tackling the ships according to their tonnage (1883). Whereas in the early 1860s, the presence of vessels bigger than three hundred tons was

³⁷⁷ The respective owners were Giacomo Olivari (*Annetta*), Andrea Cichero (*Etra*), Gio. Batta Bertolotto (*Fede e Amore*), Gio. Batta Repetto, who named his ship under himself, and Gio. Batta Lavarello (*Indus*). See: CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese.

extraordinary, the first shipbuilding campaign of 1866-1876 transformed the fleet of Camogli. These remarkable accomplishments were made possible by various factors: firstly, through the revenues collected during the Black Sea phase; secondly, due to the massive inflow of maritime credit which Camogli underwent in the early 1870s, an economic phenomenon that will be the object of more reasoned analyses in the next chapter³⁷⁸.

From a nautical perspective, apart from few exceptional cases (4,56% of brigs, 1,95 % three-masted schooners and 0,97% full-rigged ships), the fleet was composed for an overwhelming majority of barques (93,16%).

From a broader perspective, these exceptional performances in the shipbuilding sector granted Camogli inclusion among the world's leading shipping centres. In 1881, a study published by the Norwegian Statistical Bureau ranked the small seafaring community as the fifteenth shipping port of the world for owned tonnage³⁷⁹.

Table 4.2. Ranking of world shipping centres (1881).

	Ports	Steamships	Sailing ships	Total
1	Liverpool	523182	1077827	1601009
2	London	570308	619764	1190072
3	New-York	206788	533312	740100
4	Glasgow	379783	353015	732798
5	St. John	5375	266992	272367
6	Boston	16341	239612	255953
7	Sunderland	106586	110934	217520
8	Hamburg	74518	142452	216970
9	Bremen	59655	157284	216939
10	Marseille	156039	57258	213297
11	Greenock	35179	170065	205244

³⁷⁸ See chapter 4.

³⁷⁹ A.N. Kiaer (ed.), *Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: II. Les marines marchandes*, Bureau Central de Statistique du Royaume de Norvège, Christiania: 1881.

12	Newcastle	137672	59847	197519
13	Syros	6968	187652	194620
14	Hull	152369	39367	191736
15	Camogli	0	183026	183026
16	Philadelphia	52473	114892	167365
17	Yarmouth	437	161505	161942
18	San Francisco	52341	105295	157636
19	Arendal	688	154166	154854
20	North-Shields	80158	72385	152543
21	Genoa	34221	115905	150126
22	Barcelona	41706	99567	141273
23	Bath	2123	130658	132781
24	Le Havre	54778	74262	129040
25	Aberdeen	22188	97619	119807

Source: A.N. Kiaer (ed.), *Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: II. Les marines marchandes*, Bureau Central de Statistique du Royaume de Norvège, Christiania: 1881.


According to this study, Camogli ranked above remarkable competitors, such as San Francisco, Philadelphia, Genoa, Barcelona and Le Havre. In the Mediterranean region, Camogli ranked third, after Marseille and Syros only. Moreover, by excluding steam tonnage – since Camogli shipowners were among the few ones to lack steamers completely – the position of Camogli upgraded to the eighth and second position respectively in the world and the Mediterranean. On the national scale, by comparing these data with other statistical sources, it is possible to observe how 18,48% of the Italian tonnage (sail and steam together) belonged to the shipowners of Camogli^{38o}. In other words,

^{38o} *Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana al 31 Dicembre 1914. Relazione del Direttore generale della marina mercantile a S.E. il Ministro per i Trasporti Marittimi e Ferroviari*, Roma: Officina Poligrafica Italiana, 1916, p. 105. In 1882, the total tonnage of the Italian merchant marine was calculated to measure 990.004 tons (sail and steam altogether), of which 885.285 (89,39%) consisted of sailing vessels.

at the beginning of the 1880s, the results of the massive shipbuilding of the previous years granted Camogli a leading role within Italian and European shipping.

However, in the late 1870s, the Ligurian community reached its peak of maritime development. As seen in Figure 4.4, the yearly rate of constructions fell dramatically from 1875 (26) to 1877 (3). Afterwards, it never recovered: amid a global freight crisis, which accelerated the decline of world sail shipping, Camogli shipowners stopped investing in new ships and entered a downward trend.

Figure 4.6. Evolution of the merchant fleet of Camogli by tonnage (1879-1920).



Source: CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese, Genova: Tipografia dell'Istituto Sordo-Muti, 1883; *Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile al 31 dicembre 1896*; *Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile al 31 dicembre 1914*; *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902*; *Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro 1916*; *Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro 1921*.

Figure 4.6 outlines the overall evolution of Camogli's merchant marine's total tonnage from 1879 to 1920. As we can see, from the early 1880s onwards, it followed a downward curve until 1896, before improving once again at the turn of the century up to the First World War. However, this trend inversion requires more in-depth analysis. Although in 1902, mean tonnage began to increase after a protracted declining phase, observing the list of the ships belonging to Camogli shipowners highlights some noteworthy features concerning Camogli's structural conditions merchant marine.

Indeed, although quantitative aspects might indicate a trend inversion, a more accurate qualitative analysis revealed some troublesome aspects.

In 1902, the fleet consisted of 97 ships, measuring 988 tons on average³⁸¹. Compared with those of the preceding periods, a crucial characteristic of the 1902 fleet lay in the average age. For example, in 1883, since most vessels had been built between 1866 and 1876, they were 13 years old on average. In 1902, the same measure rose to almost 27 years old: out of 97 vessels, only thirteen had been built after 1883. Just one ship was less than ten years old, while almost one-third of them were older than thirty years³⁸².

In broader terms, throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century, Camogli's investments toward shipbuilding stopped almost completely. In 1902, the ships were still built during the «golden era» to compose the bulk of the fleet. Instead of constructing new vessels, most shipowners purchased second-hand ships on the foreign market: indeed, in 1902, 56,70% of the fleet was constructed abroad, mainly in British shipyards³⁸³. The reliance of Camogli's shipowners onto the second-hand foreign market responded to the need to renovate the fleet, compete in terms of tonnage and technology on bulky cargoes routes, and, at the same time, it compensated for their lack of resources³⁸⁴.

Starting from the late 1870s, the national shipbuilding industry's conditions were not as prosperous as before: notwithstanding the transition from sail to steam, technological competition pushed for the replacement of wood with iron (and later steel) for hulls. These transformations found the Italian shipbuilders unprepared: a significant share of them still worked on improvised and seasonal

³⁸¹ *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902.*

³⁸² The newest was the wooden-hulled barque *Precursore* (1508 t.), built in Liguria for Prospero Schiaffino; the oldest, apart from the steamer *Filippo Chicca*, built in 1853, were the iron hulled barque *Oriana* (1050 t.), built in the UK in 1864 and purchased second-hand by Stefano Razeto, and the wooden hulled barque *Marion* (542 t.), built in the same year in the UK and purchased second-hand by Giuseppe Schiaffino. See, *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902.*

³⁸³ *Ibidem.*

³⁸⁴ Identical strategies were adopted by Norwegian shipowners: see, B.E. Johnsen, "Cooperation Across the North-Sea: The Strategy behind the Purchase of Second-hand British Iron and Steel Sailing Ships by Norwegian Shipowners, 1875-1925", *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 17: 1, 2005, pp. 151-169.

shipyards along the beach. The Italian shipbuilding industry, in sums, lacked both the natural resources and the professional skills to adapt in a brief time to the market requirements.

The declining trend of Italian shipbuilding showed a similar pattern to that of Camogli: throughout the 1860s, and up to 1875, the yearly construction rate amounted to ca. 70.000 tons³⁸⁵. Afterwards, it entered a severe crisis, culminated with an average built tonnage of 5.000 tons per year in 1887-1888³⁸⁶. Although Italian shipbuilding performances slightly improved during the pre-war period (around 24.000 tons per year), they never returned to the peak level. From 1885, public authorities had embraced protectionist policies aimed at safeguarding the national shipyards from foreign competition³⁸⁷. Nevertheless, at that time, second-hand prices were too attractive for Camogli shipowners, who implemented their fleets' renewal, at least from a technological perspective.

In 1902, 29,89% of the fleet was iron-hulled. Sometimes over-aged second-hand ships were modified – with iron structure and wooden planking – in a second moment to increase their durability³⁸⁸. The fleet's gradual toughening with the substitution of wood with iron offered advantages in many regards, as for insurances. For instance, in 1907, as a sign of the time, the local mutual insurance company "Cristoforo Colombo" accepted iron-hulled ships only³⁸⁹.

Finally, the 1902 list of Camogli's vessels witnesses the shipowners' attempt to transition. Throughout the list, indeed, it is possible to find four steamers: the *Filippo Chicca* (367 t.; 400 ihp) and the *NS del Boschetto* (1401 t.; 1100 ihp), belonging to Stefano Razeto, the *Maria Teresa* (348 t.; 345 ihp), owned by R. Repetto, and the *Luigino* (1321 t.; 700 ihp), ownership of Emanuele Bozzo³⁹⁰. Whereas the *Filippo Chicca* and *Maria Teresa* are small-sized steamers, mostly employable on

³⁸⁵ *Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana al 31 Dicembre 1914*, pp. 81-82.

³⁸⁶ *Idem*.

³⁸⁷ See *infra* and Chapter 4.

³⁸⁸ See, for instance, the case of the barque *Dilbhur* (1281 t.), belonging to Giuseppe Mortola. The hull was originally constructed in wood in 1865, but it was renewed in 1897, with the consolidation of the structure with iron. See, *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902*, p. 246.

³⁸⁹ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie, Statuto dell'Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Cristoforo Colombo*, 1907, art. 1.

³⁹⁰ *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902*.

cabotage routes, the *NS del Boschetto* and *Luigino* were medium-sized. All of them had been purchased second-hand abroad: the oldest was the *Filippo Chicca*, whose hull and engines had been built in 1853; the newest was the *Luigino*, built in 1879.

This embryonal group of steamships, the first testimony of Camogli's attempt to transition, was then enlarged and developed until the First World War. Indeed, in 1915, the steam fleet of Camogli was composed of thirteen elements:

Table 4.3. List of steamers owned by Camogli shipowners in 1915.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Year of construction</i>	<i>Place of construction</i>	<i>Tons</i>	<i>Horsepower (indicated)</i>
<i>Ascaro</i>	1891	Sunderland	3244	1250
<i>Avala</i>	1890	Stockton	3384	1850
<i>Deipara</i>	1886	Hull	2219	1234
<i>Eliofilo</i>	1897	Glasgow	3523	1500
<i>Eliopoli</i>	1897	Glasgow	3344	1500
<i>Espero</i>	1882	Blyth	999	812
<i>Luigino B.</i>	1885	Newcastle	1971	628
<i>Maddalena</i>	1891	Willington	2600	1150
<i>Messicano</i>	1891	Barrow	4202	1825
<i>Oriana</i>	1886	Belfast	3132	1350
<i>Patras</i>	1895	Newcastle	1602	1150
<i>Polynesia</i>	1881	Newcastle	1294	950
<i>Trentino</i>	1876	Hartlepool	1283	720

Source: RINA, 1916.

Before the war outbreak, steam tonnage accounted for almost 40% of Camogli's total. Finally, the shipowners had engaged the path to transition, at least nominally: throughout a slightly positive

shipping cycle, the community retained almost the same tonnage between 1902 and 1915³⁹¹. Nonetheless, from the peak moment (1879-1883), its dimensions halved in absolute terms and performed even worse than national and international competitors. The mean tonnage (2522 t.) and age (more than 26 years old) of Camogli's steamship fleet were no longer competitive within the oceanic tramp shipping market, which, until the 1910s, many shipowners embraced as the primary road to resilience. As we will see in the following pages, Camogli's steamers engaged mainly to Mediterranean cabotage and specialized as tramp carriers of bulk commodities within the European maritime borders.

Then, the First World War stroke the final blow to Camogli's position within the international shipping market. According to local historians, German torpedoes sank several ships³⁹². At the end of the conflict, in 1920, barely twelve ships had survived: among steamers, the *Patras* was the only one to get past the war unscathed³⁹³. The total tonnage owned by the community members (10.309 tons) decreased well beneath the 1853 levels (25.045)³⁹⁴. The «golden age of sail» was finally over and, the same went for the history of what once had been the third shipping centre of the Mediterranean.

4.4. The expansion towards the oceans (1870s-1880s)

In continuity with the representation of Camogli's maritime activities of the previous chapter, these pages tackle local shipping evolution in the aftermath of the Black Sea phase. As seen, from the early 1870s onwards, the ships of Camogli were gradually ousted from the Mediterranean and the Black Sea routes as a result of the advent of steam navigation. According to a definition of the transition from sail to steam as a «succession of forwarding leaps», instead of the interpretations stressing its graduality, it might be possible to argue that, by the late 1870s, steamships had seized

³⁹¹ M. Stopford, *Maritime economics*, p. 110, Figure 3.8.

³⁹² G.B. Ferrari, *La città dei mille bianchi velieri*, pp. 294-296.

³⁹³ *Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro 1921.*

³⁹⁴ *Idem.*

Mediterranean long cabotage. However, the establishment within the British ports and creating the integrated wheat-coal trade granted Camogli's shipping system access to alternative markets, an essential step to readjust to the late nineteenth-century configuration of the global seaborne trade. To achieve a better understanding of the original features and distinguishing traits of Camogli's maritime activities throughout this period, these accomplishments will be outlined and examined in the following sections with a critical distinction. The first section will propose a general framework of the conversion from the European to the global dimension, bearing in mind the absence of systematic and detailed sources as far as the 1870s-1880s decades are concerned. The second section, instead, drawing on vast and plentiful archival material, will tackle the resilience phase: from the 1880s onwards, the vital spark which had animated Camogli's shipping until that moment left the room to an instinct for survival. Instead of conquering new markets, the ships of Camogli retreated to firmer positions until finally returning to Mediterranean cabotage at the turn of the century.

Between 1865 and the late 1880s, the most traditional maritime sources, such as crew lists or logbooks, are utterly silent. From 1865 onwards, crew lists, fundamental to reconstruct the Black Sea phase, completely disappeared from the Italian archival map³⁹⁵. On the other hand, logbooks, which provide an even broader set of data, start from 1881, though most data begin from the 1890s and become systematic in the new century³⁹⁶. Thus, the silence of the mentioned maritime sources forced us to gather parcels of information and discontinuous notions from miscellaneous archival funds, such as those belonging to the Italian merchant marine's administration covering the 1861-1869 period and then reappears for the late 1880s³⁹⁷.

³⁹⁵ After a brief phase of continuity with the Piedmont administration, the state reunification was supposed to reorganise the administration of maritime affairs. De facto, neither the State Archives of Genoa ever received more recent crew lists, nor these documents were transferred to the centre (National Central Archives of Rome).

³⁹⁶ See *infra*.

³⁹⁷ See, ACS, *Ministero della Marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, *Miscellanea Uffici Diveri*, 1861-1869. This archival collection gathers sources of all sorts about the administration of the merchant marine within this period; it consists of hundreds of boxes containing, with no chronological, typological or thematic order, a wide variety of documents, ranging from desertion processes, the papers required for captains' licenses, news about the selling of

Further details were found in the proceedings of the Italian inquiry into the conditions of the merchant marine that took place in 1881-1882. Basically, in Camogli, local shipowners were questioned and discussed the extant potential and the foreseeable future of sailing shipping; in so doing, they provided information about the actual conditions of their traffics by bringing on the floor samples of their activities³⁹⁸.

Given such precarious archival basis, this section is geographically divided into two parts: firstly, it deals with the Latin American subcontinent where, through the establishment of economic interests which intermingled with the formation of Ligurian migrant communities, the ships of Camogli are found with unbroken continuity. Secondly, it analyses the access to the Southeast Asian markets in the aftermath of the Suez Canal opening, which, paradoxically, led to the first inclusion of the Italian merchant marine in the transport of bulk commodities from and to this region through the Cape route.

**4.4.1. MIGRANTS, GUANO, COOLIES AND OTHER TRAFFICS:
CAMOGLI SHIPS IN THE LATIN AMERICAN AREA (LATE
1860S-EARLY 1880S)**

Postponing to a later stage the cardinal discourse about Ligurian migration to Latin American countries, the presence of ships and seafarers from Camogli in this region deserves a general overview nonetheless. From the late 1860s, it is possible to record increasing numbers of Camogli-owned ships in Latin American ports. Although contextualizing their traces into a systematic framework presents countless difficulties, a few key features can be presented. Firstly, these ships converged toward two neatly distinct areas: the Plata basin and the Pacific coast. Secondly – relying on cross-references and secondary literature – their movement is to be reconducted to various traffics: the early waves of migrant transports, the commercialization of the Peruvian guano and the carriage of Chinese *coolies* across the Pacific, from China to Peru.

national ships abroad, ministerial inquiries about various subjects etc. Furthermore, the subsequent archival fund, covering the 1870-1880 period, is not inventoried and, therefore, not available to researchers.

³⁹⁸ *Inchiesta sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana*, vol. 1, pp. 134-165.

The first attempts of Camogli shipowners to penetrate the transport of passengers to America can be dated as early as the 1830s. According to its crew list, the brigantine *L'Indio* (150 t.), belonging to Pellegrino Marciani, seems to represent this traffic's precursor. Departed on 27th September 1836, the brigantine arrived at Montevideo in late December. Surprisingly, it consisted more of a collective emigration than an actual business since every crew member transferred to the Latin American country with the respective families. Finally, the brigantine was sold in Buenos Ayres in February 1837³⁹⁹. Apart from this unusual and rather unique event, starting with the early 1860s, it is possible to find somewhat regular passenger transports. In autumn 1864, for example, the barque *Nina Figari* crossed to Montevideo with 149 passengers on board⁴⁰⁰. Built in 1863 for Prospero Figari – captain and shipowner – and measuring 439 t., at that time, the *Nina Figari* ranked among the heaviest Camogli ships. Similar voyages are recorded for the barques *Nuova Ottavia* (468 t.), *Ascensione* (395 t.) and *Fison* (325 t.) which, between 1861 and 1865, engaged to passenger transports to Montevideo and Buenos Ayres⁴⁰¹. Indeed, before steam technology annihilated sail competitiveness within this specific business, migrant transport was highly profitable: in a single voyage, shipowners could recover a significant part of the initial expenses⁴⁰².

Although a vast literature targeted steam establishment within transoceanic passenger transports and their decisive impulse to mass migration, few studies have highlighted the role of sailing vessels in fueling such movement's earliest manifestations⁴⁰³. As a partial exception, Raymond L. Cohn dealt with mass migration under sail, under the specific regard of the transition from sail to steam within this specific shipping market⁴⁰⁴.

³⁹⁹ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, n. 4719, 1836.

⁴⁰⁰ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 16, n. 9030.

⁴⁰¹ Idem, serie 14, n. 8444; Idem, serie 16, n. 1681 and n. 4426.

⁴⁰² See, ASGe, *Fondo miscellaneo*, 61, Ricevute del passaggio su brigantine sardo *Il Guerriero* per Montevideo, 1842.

⁴⁰³ T. Fey, *The Battle for the Migrants. Introduction of steam shipping on the North Atlantic and its impact on the European Exodus*, St. John's Newfoundland: IMEHA, 2017.

⁴⁰⁴ R.L. Cohn, *Mass Migration Under Sail. European Immigration to the Antebellum United States*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009; Idem, "The transition from sail to steam in immigration to the United States", *The Journal of Economic History*, 65, No. 2, 2005, pp. 469-495.

As a general feature, mass migration in the age of sail was characterized for its minimal organization: multiactivity and irregularity represented distinguishing features of the sail handling of migration transports. There were no substantial differences in structure between cargo and passenger sailing vessels from a nautical angle: in the latter, the hold was provided with temporary intermediate decks where to allocate migrants⁴⁰⁵. Thus, shipowners could engage in cargo and passenger transports without significant differentiation. This implied extreme elasticity in terms of market opportunities and represented a fundamental prerequisite to dedicate to this business: passengers moved only westward, from Europe to America, and, therefore, cargoes were needed on the way back. Later, when steamers seized passenger traffics, the eventual competition between sailing vessels and steamers for American cargoes was resolved by splitting them into general and bulk transports, the former handled by steamers and the latter by sails.

In terms of chronology, although Cohn, who analyzed Atlantic (Ireland and Great Britain) and Central (France and Germany) European migration to the United States, argued that the transition manifested as early as in the 1860s, for the Latin American context, it is worth postponing this timeline a little bit further. Still in 1868, for instance, the Italian consul residing in Montevideo reported news about the shipwreck of the Camogli-owned brig schooner *Due Sorelle*, commanded by Bartolomeo Ferro, in front of the Brazilian coasts. Although only a few details are provided, the consul explicitly refers to the «passengers» conditions, who safely reached their intended destination, Buenos Ayres⁴⁰⁶.

Frequently, most news about Camogli ships' presence in the area come from shipwrecks and related events. Valparaiso and Lima's consuls reported many of these occurrences, most of which concerned Cape Horn, renowned for being a most troublesome passage of world navigation. In

⁴⁰⁵ See, *Regio Decreto 20 novembre 1879 n. 5166* che approva il regolamento per l'esecuzione del testo unico del Codice per la Marina Mercantile. Art. 546. For a broader analysis see, A. Molinari, *Le navi di Lazzaro. Aspetti sanitari dell'emigrazione transoceanica italiana: il viaggio per mare*, Milano: Franco Angeli, 1988; Idem, "Emigration Traffic in the Port of Genoa between the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries: Shipping and Problems of Social Hygiene", *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 13, No. 1, 1993, pp. 102-118.

⁴⁰⁶ ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, *Miscellanea Uffici Diversi 1861-1869*, b. 342, *Corrispondenza Montevideo*, 10 Maggio 1869.

February 1869, for example, the actions of Emanuele Ferro, captain of the barque *Itala*, were praised for having salvaged the crew of the ship *Matteo* «from certain death»⁴⁰⁷.

The news about the Camogli's presence along the Latin American Pacific coast regarded mainly Peru and, to a lesser extent, Chile. Basically, some community members moved to Callao in the early 1830s and started their business there: later, by process of «diffusion» and «feedback»⁴⁰⁸, the Peruvian economic system attracted more people from Camogli. Apart from coastal cabotage, which the Ligurian migrant community rapidly seized and controlled, the Peruvian seaborne trade mainly relied upon guano exports to Europe. For its importance, the «age of guano» represents a milestone within the history of Peru. After its independence (1824), the country entered into severe financial trouble and declared bankruptcy in 1826. Since most of the national debt was detained by foreign (British) investors – who had loaned large sums to the newborn state to fund its military efforts –, the discovery of the fertilizing qualities of guano represented a crucial breakthrough that enabled the country to resuscitate financially⁴⁰⁹. The heyday of guano trade lasted roughly from the early 1840s to the late 1870s: the value of its exportation «routinely exceeded two million pounds sterling per year»⁴¹⁰. A significant part of the exports was destined to improve British agricultural

⁴⁰⁷ Idem, Sul naufragio del Brick Bark “Matteo”, 21 Febbraio 1869.

⁴⁰⁸ See, J.D. Gould, “European Inter-continental Emigration: The Role of «Diffusion» and «Feedback»”, *The Journal of the European Economic History*, 2, 1980, pp. 267-315.

⁴⁰⁹ Concerning the guano age, its exploitation and the importance to Peruvian foreign trade and national finances, see: E.F. Frank, “History of the Guano mining industry”, *Journal of Cave and Karst Studies*, 60, No. 2, 1998, pp. 121–125; W.M. Mathew, “The Imperialism of Free Trade: Peru, 1820-70”, 21, No. 3, 1968, pp. 562–579; Idem, “Foreign contractors and the Peruvian Government at the outset of the Guano Trade”, *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, 52, No. 4, 1972, pp. 598–620; Idem, “Peru and the British Guano Market, 1840-1870”, *The Economic History Review*, 23, No. 1, 1970, pp. 112-128; C. Vizcarra, “Guano, Credible Commitments, and Sovereign Debt Repayment in Nineteenth-Century Peru”, *The Journal of Economic History*, 69, No. 2, 2009, pp. 354-387. See, also: R. Craig, “The African Guano Trade”, *The Mariner’s Mirror*, No. 50:1, 1964, pp. 25-55. More recent is the fascinating monograph of Gregory T. Cushman, who approaches the history of guano from an environmental perspective: G.T. Cushman, *Guano and the Opening of the Pacific World. A Global Ecological History*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

⁴¹⁰ C. Vizcarra, “Guano, Credible Commitments, and Sovereign Debt Repayment”, p. 368.

performances: in 1870, UK imported 280.000 tons of guano⁴⁴¹. Although exploitation rights were in the hands of the Peruvian state, British merchants and companies (i.e. the Anthony Gibbs & Sons) obtained a sort of monopoly over its commercialization abroad. Within this framework, the combination of various factors might lead to assume that Camogli's captains were included in this commodity's overseas transport. Indeed, already in 1865, the Italian consul in Callao invited his government to further stimulate the afflux of national vessels to the Peruvian ports. In doing so, he praised guano cargoes for their profitability, at the point that «many ships travel on ballast from Europe to be satisfied with the sole return freight»⁴⁴². Alternatively, he noted, coal was the primary outbound cargo from the United Kingdom. Upon these premises, the establishment of Camogli's shipping within this back and forth route seems plausible: on the one hand, they were well-introduced in the British coal trade; on the other hand, they were practical of the Peruvian market, owing to their radication in Callao. In the absence of precise data, it was possible to withdraw numerous statements about the exploitation of the guano trade in the proceedings of the 1882 Inquiry into the conditions of the Italian merchant marine⁴⁴³. Interestingly, the guano trade was targeted as one of the most explicit proofs to determine sailing shipping resilience in long-haul trades. In reality, the guano trade followed a different path: after decades-old exploitation of the superficial layers of guano, the extracting costs rose; thus, this natural manure lost its competitive edge against nitrate of soda, which was abundant in nearby Chile⁴⁴⁴. Already in the 1870s, its exportation had sharply declined to negligible levels⁴⁴⁵.

⁴⁴¹ J. Glover, "Tonnage statistics for the decade 1891-1900", *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 65, No. 1, 1902, p. 5, Table I – *Showing the quantities of certain articles exported and imported in 1860, 1870, 1880, 1890 and 1900*.

⁴⁴² AMAE, *Affari Esteri*, b. 817, Lima, 1865.

⁴⁴³ *Inchiesta sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana*, vol. 1, pp. 134-165.

⁴⁴⁴ W. M. Mathew, "Peru and the British Guano Market", pp. 119-128. For the Italian participation to the trade of Chilean nitrates see: J.P. Vallejos, "La presenza italiana nel ciclo del salnitro: Tarapacà, 1860-1900", in *Il contributo allo sviluppo del Cile*, Torino: Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1993, pp. 197-225.

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibidem*; C. Vizcarra, "Guano, Credible Commitments, and Sovereign Debt Repayment", p. 368, Figure 3 – Peruvian Guano Exports.

In Peru was based another profitable trade to which Camogli's shipowners dedicated: the transport of Chinese indentured labourers (*coolies*) from Macao, destined to work either in guano mining or in plantations⁴⁴⁶. This trade was motivated by the Peruvian depressed demography, a situation in contrast with the increasing demands for cheap labour that landowners (plantations) and the state (guano mining) intended to introduce⁴⁴⁷. In 1849, through the publication of the first *ley chinesca*, the first Chinese labourers arrived, and this traffic lasted, with some discontinuities (it stopped between 1856 and 1861), until 1874. In slightly more than a couple of decades, the *coolie* trade moved from Asia to the Latin American Pacific shores, almost ninety thousand human beings⁴⁴⁸.

Despite its enormous impact on Peruvian history, the Italian participation in *coolie* trade did not last long: the outbreak of a regional conflict (the Chincha Islands War of 1865-1866), the intricacies of maritime fiscal and administrative jurisdictions and the passionate activism of the coeval Italian consul of Lima led to the creation of an insightful archival collection about the participation of Italian shipowners and seafarers to this «infamous trade»⁴⁴⁹. Among them figured Giovanni Figari, arguably the leader of Camogli's migrant community in Callao, owner of numerous ships devoted to cabotage and high-seas shipping. Within a list compiled by the consul Pietro Castelli, Giovanni Figari emerged as the shipowner of a full-rigged ship (*Provvidenza*, 564 t.) and a barque (*Lima*, 255

⁴⁴⁶ About coolie trade exists a vast bibliography. The most classical reference is: W. Stewart, *Chinese bondage in Peru: A History of the Chinese Coolie in Peru, 1849-1874*, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1970. More recent are: E. Young, *Alien nation. Chinese migration in the Americas from the coolie era through World War II*, Charlotte: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014; A.J. Meagher, *The Coolie Trade. The Traffic in Chinese Laborers to Latin America 1847-1874*, Philadelphia, Xlibris Corporation, 2008. See also: M. Foster Farley, "The Chinese Coolie Trade 1845-1875", *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 3, No. 4, 1968.

⁴⁴⁷ For the political framework underlying the coolie trade see: M.J. Gonzales, "Planters and Politics in Peru, 1895-1919", *Hispanic American Historical Review Comparative Studies in Society and History J. Lat. Amer. Stud.*, 62, No. 5, 1982, pp. 262-92.

⁴⁴⁸ W. Stewart, *Chinese bondage in Peru*, pp. 74-75.

⁴⁴⁹ ACS, *Ministero della Marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici Diversi 1861-1869, b. 475, Lettera del comandante della Pirocorvetta Racchia, 30 luglio 1869.

t.) which from January 1865 to June 1866 sailed three times along the Macao-Callao route with a total of 908 *coolies*⁴²⁰.

The allegation to Camogli as an Italian seafaring town of the business and activities performed by the migrant communities formed by its inhabitants represents a much more complicated discourse, which we will partially tackle in the last chapter. Indeed, the matter of identifying migrant communities with their native social groups represents a broader discourse with which migration historians deal. Although the general preference has been to treat as different the members of the original community from those who settled permanently abroad, in attaching *coolies* trade to Camogli, with no further documental evidence about the active participation of actual Camogli-owned ships (as opposed to those of migrants of Camogli's origins), the primary purpose is to be clear and transparent on this argument. Indeed, the *coolies* trade has always represented a troublesome matter for the history of the Ligurian seafaring community: local historians, devoid of the mentioned methodological concerns, included *coolies* trade among the various enterprises to which the members of the community engaged with high profits. Nevertheless, in so doing, they transfigured the nature of the traffic, which was considered as standard passenger transport, notwithstanding all the implications deriving from coercion and the characteristics of the nineteenth-century indentured labour.

4.4.2. CAMOGLI'S SHIPPING AND THE ALTERNATIVES TO SUEZ

After the abandonment of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea routes, Southeast Asia constituted another geographical area to which Camogli shipowners turned their attentions for the first time. Surprisingly, the establishment of Ligurian sailing shipping in the area followed the Suez Canal inauguration, which in scholarly literature is deemed to be crucial for granting steam shipping a

⁴²⁰ ACS, Idem, b. 273.

decisive leap forward in the competition with the sail⁴²¹. Instead, the primary consequence of the Canal consisted of the subdivision of Indo-European trade into two categories. On the one side, steamers navigated through the Canal, with general cargoes constituted by high-value commodities; on the other, sailing vessels, mainly belonging to second-comers merchant marines, specialized in transporting bulk merchandises around the Cape⁴²².

Whereas Rubattino (the absolute leader of the Italian steam shipping sector) looked at the construction of the Suez Canal with interest and, through personal investments (the purchase of the Assab Bay), rapidly embarked upon the Canal business⁴²³, the vast majority of the Italian shipowning elites, who persevered in sailing constructions, lacked the structural characteristics to follow his lead along the same path. Therefore, the NGI liners dominated general cargoes: they carried national products to India and withdrew high-value commodities demanded in Italy⁴²⁴.

At the same time, increasing numbers of Italian ships called to the ports of the Far East. Indeed, although Suez had gradually absorbed most of the highly-profitable transports, the Cape route was still active, and numerous sailing vessels carried low nominal value cargoes (cereals, coal, timber) according to the 'old way'. Cape Town retained its status as a crucial hub for Indo-European trade, but it was also part of a broader international framework. Arguably, the roots of Italian shipowners'

⁴²¹ For a general account on the relationships between Italy and the Suez Canal, see: S. Bono, "Il Canale di Suez e l'Italia", *Mediterranea Ricerche Storiche*, No. 8, 2006, pp. 411-422; U. Spadoni, "Il Canale di Suez e l'inizio della crisi della marina mercantile italiana", *Nuova Rivista Storica*, No. 54, 1970, pp. 651-672.

⁴²² Although not specifically on the Italian merchant marine, but as an overall perspective, the delimitation of a market niche for sails after the construction of the Canal is exemplary outlined by Gerald S. Graham. See, G.S. Graham, "The ascendancy of the Sailing Ship: 1850-1885", *The Economic History Review*, 9, No. 1, 1956, pp. 74-88.

⁴²³ On Rubattino and his interests toward the Suez Canal, see: A. Codignola, *Rubattino*, Bologna: Licinio Cappelli, 1938, pp. 238-379. At pp. 280-281, the author reports the contract between Rubattino and the Italian State for the institution of a regular line of steamers connecting the Italian main port cities with Alessandria and Bombay. In 1877, then, the future *Navigazione Generale Italiana* obtained a more profitable contract which extended the line to the Southeast Asian ports and Hong Kong.

⁴²⁴ See, for instance, the 1887 logbook of the steamship *Manilla*: ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, 1158/1. The outbound cargo included: wine, sulphur, almonds, national and foreign liquors, marmalades, marbles, silver bars, cement, coral, mirrors and jewellery. From Bombay, instead, the *Manilla* transported wheat, raw cotton (mainly), spices, china potteries, indigo and coffee to Naples, Barcelona and Genoa

participation (and of those of Camogli in the first line) to this shipping movement stroke into their previous experiences as cross-traders. Once more, it was past experiences to cover a primary role in determining subsequent developments. Data evidence from Cardiff, for instance, witness high demands for sea transports to Cape Town, loaded with coal cargoes, widely satisfied by Italian shipping. Between 1886-1888, approximately ninety Italian vessels left the British ports to the Cape, and more than 60% of them departed from Cardiff⁴²⁵.

Interestingly, this coal movement was inherently motivated by steamers' success in the Indian Ocean: to navigate, steamships needed significant quantities of coal, scarce in these regions. The Suez Canal had increased the presence of steamships in Asia; thus, they stimulated the regional demands for coal, whose transport, paradoxically, was performed on sailing vessels and passed around the Cape instead of through Suez. Thus, steam navigation nurtured its sail counterpart by providing abundant and incessant coal freights. From the opposite perspective, the low operational costs met by sailing vessels constituted made them indispensable for expanding steam navigation into peripheral markets, where its economic sustainability depended on the availability of low-cost coal supplies.

After their arrival to the Cape, these vessels continued to the Far East ports to discharge coal or ballast and reached Rangoon, Singapore, Batavia or Moulmein to load rice or teak cargoes⁴²⁶. In the shipowners' perspectives, the rice trade occupied the same position as guano: indeed, it embodied a crucial transport into which sailing ships would have always succeeded over steam⁴²⁷. Throughout the 1870s, the rice trade became so strategic for Southeastern Asia that, in the coeval common understanding, the export places for this cereal were defined as «rice ports» ("*porti del riso*")⁴²⁸. Once

⁴²⁵ ACS, *Ministero della Marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Divisione premi compensi e tasse, Movimento nazionale nei porti esteri, Capetown, b. 57-61.

⁴²⁶ Idem.

⁴²⁷ *Inchiesta sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana*, vol. 1, pp. 134-165.

⁴²⁸ About the development of the international rice market, in particular from Burma delta, see: M. Adas, *The Burma Delta: Economic Development and Social Change on an Asian Rice Frontier. 1852-1941*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974. See also, P.A. Coclanis, "Distant Thunder: The Creation of a World Market in Rice and the Transformations it Wrought", *The American Historical Review*, No. 98: 4, 1993, pp. 1050-1078; Idem, "Southeast Asia's Incorporation into the World Rice Market: A Revisionist View", *Journal of South-East Asian Studies*, No. 24: 2, 1993, pp. 251-267.

again, most rice cargoes were destined for British consumption: from 1860 to 1880, rice imports to the United Kingdom rose dramatically from 1.535.000 to 7.899.000 cwts⁴²⁹.

As proof of Camogli's presence within the rice trade, the Maritime Museum of Camogli keeps charter party receipts belonging to Emanuele Boggiano, a leading shipowner during the 1870s and 1880s⁴³⁰. This document's survival is fundamental to reconstruct the mechanisms of chartering vessels and, in general, analyzing the evolution of shipping practices. The contract, dated to London, 5th April 1880, documents the chartering of the barque *Quaker City* (872 t.) belonging to Boggiano⁴³¹, by the G.B. Haynes company of London the mediation of the shipbroker company H. Clarkson & Co. The contract prescribed a medium-term arrangement: at the time of the agreement, the ship was said to be «at Rice Ports or left for Europe». Then, «after completion of the present voyage, it shall have the option to load for the East, River Plate or Port on the way». Hence, therefore, the ship «shall sail and proceed as ordered at the port of discharge of the outward cargo of Akyab, or Elephant Point, Rangoon or Diamond Island, Bassein, for orders (to be given within 48 hours)». Finally, it «shall load from the said Charterer or his Agents, a full and complete cargo of Cargo Rice in Bags». On its way back to Europe, «being so loaded, it shall therewith proceed to Queenstown, Scilly, Plymouth or Falmouth for orders, to discharge at a good and safe port in the United Kingdom or on the Continent between Bordeaux or Hamburg»⁴³².

Similar and somehow complementary in terms of geographic proximity was teak trade, which took place in the same broader regional area and followed the same route pattern⁴³³. Unfortunately, the scarcity of available sources impedes us from delimiting the chronological boundaries within which

⁴²⁹ J. Glover, "Tonnage Statistics of the decade 1880-1890", *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 55, No. 2, 1892, p. 207, Table I - *Showing the quantities of certain articles exported and imported in 1860, 1870, 1880 and 1890*.

⁴³⁰ CMMC, *Contratti di noleggio e vari*, Contratto di noleggio "Quaker City" 1880.

⁴³¹ The barque *Quaker City* was registered in the 1883 list of the *Mutua*. See, CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese. In that year, the *Quaker City* composed Emanuele Boggiano's personal fleet together with the *Rocco Schiaffino* (1030 t.) and the *Fedele* (478 t.).

⁴³² CMMC, *Contratti di noleggio e vari*, Contratto di noleggio "Quaker City" 1880.

⁴³³ For a general overview, see: C. Rai, *Control and Prosperity: the teak business in Siam 1880s-1932*, Hamburg: PhD Dissertation, 2016.

Camogli ships devoted to this trade. In the Inquiry proceedings (1882), only the consul of Hamburg mentioned teak transports from the Burma delta. Interestingly, he referred to the teak trade as an unexploited opportunity to complement rice cargoes and enlarge the spectrum of cargoes retrievable in Southeastern Asia⁴³⁴. Thus, although an earlier establishment in the 1870s might be farfetched, inevitably, some ships of Camogli engage in teak trade in the late 1880s. It is the case, for instance, of the barques *Calunnia* (870 t.), *Draguette* (728 t.) and *Stella B.* (860 t.), which, between 1886 and 1890, were recorded in Moulmein and Samarang with teak cargoes to Europe⁴³⁵.

4.5. The resilience at the turn of the century (1890s-1914)

Differently from the previous decades, the archival material is vast and offers a mine of information. The primary sources are composed of the enormous archival collection of logbooks of the Ligurian merchant marine – kept in the State Archives of Genoa –, which covers the period from 1881 to the mid-twentieth century⁴³⁶. Among Italian maritime historians, this source has received few attentions: only Paolo Frascani addressed, in a seminal article, the logbooks' potential to investigate the history of Italian shipping and seafaring during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century⁴³⁷. Eventually, the paucity of studies could be reconducted to the delays of the inventory process within the Italian archival system, an assumption utterly valid for Genoa, where State Archives made available their vast collection of logbooks only in the last years.

⁴³⁴ *Inchiesta sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana*, vol. 1, p. 290.

⁴³⁵ ACS, *Ministero della Marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Divisione premi compensi e tasse, Movimento nazionale nei porti esteri, Capetown, b. 57-61. The three ships were captained respectively by Prospero Schiappacasse, Davide Schiaffino and Antonio Figari.

⁴³⁶ The archival collection of logbooks kept in the State Archives of Genoa kept the logbooks of 2078 different ships, from the 1880s to the 1950s.

⁴³⁷ P. Frascani, "Tra la bussola e il negozio: uomini, rotte e traffici nei giornali di bordo delle navi a vela dell'800", *Società e storia*, 100, 2003, pp. 487-510. Some references can be found also in: Id., "Una comunità in viaggio: dal racconto dei giornali di bordo delle navi napoletane (1861-1900)", in Id., *A vela e a vapore*, pp. 114-115.

The usage of logbooks within the Italian merchant marine was regulated by the 1879 *Regolamento che approva l'esecuzione del testo unico del Codice della Marina Mercantile*⁴³⁸. Despite being mentioned in the 1866 "Code for the merchant marine", logbooks in onboard bureaucratic practices were taken for granted⁴³⁹. In the 1879 version, between articles 345 and 361, it is possible to find all the instructions and regulations concerning logbooks. According to the law, there were three different logbooks: 1) general logbook; 2) navigation logbook; 3) hold logbook. The captain exerted absolute responsibility for the first type, which contained all the relevant information concerning the voyage, including the crew members' list, salaries, eventual accidents encountered in navigation, and, more broadly, every data that the captain deemed useful to annotate⁴⁴⁰. Navigation logbooks, instead, were compiled either by captains or mates: they provided information and data about the route, including atmospheric events and manoeuvres⁴⁴¹. Finally, hold logbooks were routinely updated by mates under the captain's supervision. Structured schematically, they contained valuable information about cargoes, including ports and dates of loading and discharge, nature and quantities of merchandises and personal information about charterers and consigners⁴⁴².

Although each type offers outstanding potential for maritime studies, having in mind investigating the traffics carried out by Camogli's ships from the 1890s to the First World War, hold logbooks represent the most suitable source for this kind of study.

Cross-investigations led to identifying seventeen logbooks attributable to Camogli shipowners: they cover a period from 1881 to 1914, divided into 408 different routes. For «route», we intend each movement from one port to another that involved the loading or discharging of cargoes – therefore, it does not include intermediate ports of call (which whatsoever are seldom recorded in the hold logbooks).

⁴³⁸ Regio decreto 20 novembre 1879 n. 5166.

⁴³⁹ *Codice per la marina mercantile del regno d'Italia*, Milano: Fratelli Borroni, 1865, p. 32, art. 92.

⁴⁴⁰ *Regio decreto 20 novembre 1879 n. 5166*, art. 347-348.

⁴⁴¹ *Idem*, art. 349-350.

⁴⁴² *Idem*, art. 351.

Our analysis of hold logbooks focused on ports of loading, ports of discharge and merchandises. Similarly to a georeferenced Social Network Analysis, where ports are nodes and routes linkages between nodes, we constructed origin-destination flow maps. Flow maps offer the advantage to visualize routes and connections between ports scaled by intensity (the thicker, the more recurrent).


4.5.1. THE GEOGRAPHY OF CAMOGLI'S SAILING CROSS-TRADE

Between 1881 and 1914, Camogli's specialization into oceanic cross-trade of bulky cargoes reached its apex. The null correlation with domestic production considerably affected the first outgoing leg from the Mediterranean to the outer seas. Conversely, returning to the Mediterranean systematically implied the procurement of cargoes destined either to Genoa or Marseille. In tight continuity with the previous phases, beginning with 1885, many captains resorted to subsidized coal shipments to return to Italian ports with cargo⁴⁴³.

In general, although in the 1870s and 1880s, Camogli had expanded its range to the Pacific Ocean's outskirts, in the last period, most of the activities seem to concentrate around a figurative triangle between Europe, North America and Latin America. Map 4.1 represent all the routes with cargo made by Camogli sailing vessels (steamers will be considered and analyzed separately).

⁴⁴³ The issue of subsidised routes and the development of maritime protectionism within the Italian merchant marine, see Chapter 4; see also, S. Palmer, "The British Coal Export Trade, 1850-1913", in D. Alexander and R. Ommer, *Volume not Values: Canadian sailing ships and the world trade*, St. John's Newfoundland: Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1979, pp. 331-354.

Map 4.1. Geography of Camogli's routes with cargo (1886-1914).



Source: ASGe, *Giornali nautici*.

From a first general overview, Map 4.1 neatly highlights the Atlantic area's centrality for Camogli's late-nineteenth-century shipping. The visual pattern of the routes draws a fictional triangle connecting Europe, North America (East Coast) and Latin America (La Plata region). Indeed, these areas, taken altogether, amounted to 86,50% of voyages with cargo. Moreover, according to the origin-destination methodology, beyond simply representing linkages between ports, flow maps visualize oriented routes. As a result, not only Map 4.1 portray port connections but also yield visual data about specific commercial patterns. For instance, at first sight, it is possible to grasp the mainly exporting role of Northern American ports and the predominantly importing function of the ports of Mediterranean Europe⁴⁴⁴.

Table 4.4. Percentage of Camogli's voyages with cargo and on ballast to and from four geographical areas (1886-1914).

⁴⁴⁴ Data processed from ASGe, *Giornali nautici*.

	<i>Incoming</i>		<i>Outgoing</i>	
	ballast	with cargo	ballast	with cargo
<i>North America (East)</i>	62.97%	37.03%	2.41%	97.59%
<i>Latin America (Plata)</i>	9.33%	90.67%	48.53%	51.47%
<i>Mediterranean</i>	1.75%	98.25%	31.95%	68.05%
<i>Europe</i>				
<i>Atlantic Europe</i>	17.02%	82.98%	12.72%	87.28%

Source: Data processed from ASGe, *Giornali nautici*.

Table 4.4 illustrates the percentage of vessels with cargo and on ballast that arrived and departed from the ports of four primary regional areas: the east coast of North America, the area of Plata, the Mediterranean ports, and those belonging to Atlantic Europe. According to Table 4.4, for instance, 62,97% of the incoming vessels to North America arrived on ballast instead of 97,59% of the ships that departed from the same ports with cargo. Quite the contrary, almost every vessel (98,25%) freighted to the Mediterranean transported some kind of cargo. The La Plata ports attracted mostly loaded vessels (90,67%) and released more or less half ships with cargo and half on ballast (respectively 51,47% and 48,53%). Finally, it was relatively rare that on ballast ships called (17,02%) and left (12,72%) the ports of Atlantic Europe, mainly located in the United Kingdom.

This preliminary analysis, conducted on the mere evidence of with cargo / on ballast arrivals and departures, witnesses how Camogli's seafarers sailed with continuity across the Atlantic both in the horizontal and vertical directions, carrying out commercial operations inside a sort of nineteenth-century version of the "Atlantic triangle". Usually, the ships remained outside the Mediterranean for more or less one year and a half to two years. For example, the barque *Edinburgh* (1299 t.), belonging to Biagio Mortola, remained from July 1901 to October 1903 outside the Mediterranean waters, after having carried out commercial operations in Cadiz, Buenos Ayres, Port Elizabeth (South Africa), Pensacola (US.), Hamburg and Pensacola again⁴⁴⁵.

⁴⁴⁵ The logbook of the barque *Edinburgh* is exceptional within our sample even for its typology, being a general logbook (the hold logbook was nowhere to be found). Nevertheless, owing to the outstanding precision and abundance of details

Quite surprisingly, the presence of Camogli in the waters of the Pacific seems to rarefy in this last phase: on the one hand, the growth of the local merchant marines, handled by Ligurian subjects who, nonetheless, hoisted the Latin American flags, might have cut off the Italian vessels from the area. Furthermore, with specific regard to Peru, the depletion of guano resources might have diminished Camogli's economic involvement in the seaborne traffics of the area⁴⁴⁶.

Besides, it seems to be more complicated to explain the absence of Camogli-owned vessels in the Southeast Asian ports: perhaps, although rice and teak transports proved to be resistant to transition for an extended period after 1869, at the turn of the century, such process was accomplished. As proof of that, we may underline that the latest data from this area dated back to 1892. By this indication, contracting the analysis within 1881-1892 would bring more significant results (6,67% of the voyages instead of 0,60% of the following period, 1893-1914)⁴⁴⁷.

After introducing the most relevant features of Camogli's cross-trade at the end of the nineteenth century, the analysis will be developed further through the routes' subdivision according to the most exchanged commodities.

4.5.2. MERCHANDISES

The analysis that follows draws upon an extensive array of commodities transported by Camogli's vessels worldwide. Specifically, specific sections target timber, fossil fuels and foodstuff, whereas the other products (including raw industrial materials, construction material and fertilizers) will be treated further in more general discourse.


For its overwhelming importance within Camogli's late-nineteenth-century tramp shipping, timber represents the first commodity taken into account. Indeed, out of 236 total voyages with cargo, in 35,60% of the instances, Camogli's ships transported timber in various forms.

which the captains deployed in the composition of the general logbook, we were able to reconstruct the routes and cargoes of the ship even in absence of the apposite logbook. See, ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, n. 602/1.

⁴⁴⁶ For a broader analysis, see Chapter 7.

⁴⁴⁷ ASGe, *Giornali nautici*.

Map 4.2. Camogli's timber trade (1886-1914).



Source: ASGe, *Giornali nautici*.

In representing the geography of Camogli's participation in the timber trade, Map 4.2 provides first enlightenment about the reasons behind the predominance of North American ports in the overall figure. Indeed, the absolute majority of shipments from this area concerned pitch-pine timber, which underwent massive commercialization throughout the second half of the nineteenth century⁴⁴⁸. More precisely, most pitch-pine exports were concentrated in the Gulf area, along the coasts of the US states of Florida, Alabama and Mississippi⁴⁴⁹. From data collection, evidence suggests the predominance of the port of Pensacola, followed by Gulfport and Mobile. According to 1913 official statistics of the US timber trade, these three districts exported more than half of the US

⁴⁴⁸ See, E.E. Pratt (ed.), *The export lumber trade of the United States*, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1918.

⁴⁴⁹ J.A. Eisterhold, "Lumber and Trade in Pensacola and West Florida: 1800-1860", *The Florida Historical Quarterly*, 51, No. 3, 1973, pp. 267-280; Idem, "Charleston: Lumber and Trade in a declining Southern Port", *The South Carolina Historical Magazine*, 74, No. 2, 1973, pp. 61-72; Idem, "Lumber and Trade in Lower Mississippi Valley and New Orleans, 1800-1860", *Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association*, 13, No. 1, 1972, pp. 71-91; O. Clubbs, "Pensacola in Retrospect: 1870-1890", *The Florida Historical Quarterly*, 37, No. 3, 1959, pp. 377-396.

yellow pitch-pine *lumber* and two-thirds of sawed pitch-pine *timber*⁴⁵⁰. In the framework of Camogli's traffics, Pensacola constituted the most frequented port for loading cargoes in absolute terms. According to coeval observers, in the early twentieth century, sailing vessels represented a valid alternative to steam for timber shipments. The exporters favoured sails because of the relatively less complex supply chain required to load medium-sized sailing vessels compared to large steamers⁴⁵¹. In particular, dealing with minor cargoes was favoured by single sewing enterprises rather than by large companies.

From Pensacola and, more broadly, the whole Northern American region, timber was transported either to Latin America or Europe. Seldomly going to Europe directly constituted the best option in terms of economic productivity: since most westward crossings of the Atlantic were on ballast, European ships sought more than one freight before returning to Europe. The result was purely tramp shipping. Camogli's vessels rarely sailed along linear routes – back and forth handling a single commodity – but fancied more complicated traffics. Usually, at their first arrival at Pensacola from Europe, the captains opted for freights toward the Plata region, where pitch-pine was widely appreciated for internal constructions⁴⁵².

From Plata, captains were presented with two options: either returning on ballast to Pensacola (or any nearby port) to resume pitch-pine trade or accepting freights bound to Europe. Interestingly, in many instances, pitch-pine deliveries to these ports were followed by transports of different wood quality, the *quebracho*. The commercialization of this specific typology was connected to its unique characteristics, which made it widely appreciated in leather manufacturing as a natural dye. *Quebracho* was mainly shipped to Europe – especially to Genoa: therefore, it represented one of Camogli ships' options to return loaded to the Mediterranean.

⁴⁵⁰ E.E. Pratt (ed.), *The export lumber trade*, pp. 17-18. The distinction between *lumber* and *timber* is related to different processing degrees of the wood. *Timber* identifies cut and sawn wood, which still retains its original form; *lumber* involves more processes and corresponds to the wood exported in form of boards, planks and deals. Nonetheless, for the sake of clarity, our choice was to adopt the term *timber* to identify wood products in general.

⁴⁵¹ *Idem*, pp. 55-57.

⁴⁵² *Idem*, p. 113. Between 1881 and 1914, pitch-pine cargoes arrived to Buenos Ayres (14), Montevideo (5), Rosario (2) and to Rio de Janeiro, Bahia Blanca and Santa Fé (1).

Alternatively, among the goods exported from Buenos Ayres and Montevideo to Europe, on more than one-third of the instances (34,29%), cargoes were composed of animal bones⁴⁵³. This merchandise was employed in agriculture as a natural fertilizer, similarly to Peruvian guano and Chilean nitrates. Camogli's vessels transported animal bones mainly to UK ports (Glasgow and Berwick) and Northern Europe (Rotterdam, Hamburg and Dunkerque). This commodity was brought only once directly to the Mediterranean, to Savona.


Calling to the Atlantic European ports was followed either by returning to the Mediterranean – to change the crew and anchor the ship for maintenance – or by the continuation of tramping. Going back to Genoa was usually associated with coal transports. Starting from 1885, coal shipments from outside the Mediterranean to the Italian ports benefitted from public subventions granted by the Italian state's protectionist policies to support the national merchant marine⁴⁵⁴. However, the premium – calculated in 1 lira per ton of coal – was reserved for the ships constructed in the Italian shipyards (much state efforts targeted the protection and development of national shipbuilding)⁴⁵⁵. Therefore, as Camogli shipowners purchased their iron-hulled barques and full-rigged ships on the second-hand foreign market, this subvention's effectiveness gradually faded. However, even without subsidies, British coal remained a solid option for Camogli's vessels, which – it might be worth reminding – had been sailing along this route since the early 1860s.

⁴⁵³ The cargoes of animal bones from Buenos Ayres, Montevideo and Santa Fé were 11, 7 and 1 respectively. ASGe, *Giornali nautici*.

⁴⁵⁴ See, *Legge 6 dicembre 1885, n. 3547. Sui provvedimenti riguardo alla marina mercantile*. See, also its update: *Legge 23 luglio 1896, n. 318. Riflettente la concessione di compensi di costruzione e premi di navigazione ai piroscafi ed ai velieri nazionali*.

⁴⁵⁵ See Chapter 4 and also: E. Corbino, "Il protezionismo marittimo in Italia: le industrie marittime fino al 1885", *Giornale degli economisti e rivista di statistica*, 61, No. 11, 1921, pp. 370-389; Idem, "Il protezionismo marittimo in Italia", *Giornale degli economisti e rivista di statistica*, 62, No. 2, 1922, pp. 65-81; E. Giretti, "I succhioni della marina mercantile", *Giornale degli economisti*, 30, 1905, pp. 37-59.

Map 4.3. Camogli's trade in fossil fuels (1886-1914).



Source: ASGe, *Giornali nautici*.

British coal was also transported outside the Mediterranean. Being the most demanded merchandise of the globe, coal was shipped everywhere: not surprisingly, Map 4.3 illustrates how most coal shipments (37,5%) were directed to South Africa (Cape Town and Port Elizabeth)⁴⁵⁶. By supplying highly demanding areas with coal cargoes, Camogli ships sailed along one of the most strategic routes for global shipping.

Afterwards, from the late 1880s, the success of a new typology of fossil fuel – petrol – led to the creation of new route patterns until it rose to replace coal wholly, thus favouring the passing of the torch of world leaders from the United Kingdom to the US. Camogli's operators in this trade are not intense and systematic: petrol was loaded only in three ports (New York, Philadelphia and Savannah), all of them located along the US east coast. Commercialized in tins or boxes, petrol was shipped to Latin America (Montevideo), Southeast Asia (Batavia) and the Mediterranean (Palermo, Catania, Alger and Alessandria).

⁴⁵⁶ See, A. Mabin, "The rise and decline of Port Elizabeth, 1850-1900", *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, No. 19: 2, 1986, pp. 275-303.

Remaining on fossil fuels, some ships transported shale oil from Sidney, on account of the Australian Kerosene, Oil and Minerals Company⁴⁵⁷. Shale oil was extracted from shale rocks by applying various thermal and chemical processes: the final product showed qualities comparable to petrol. In general, Australia's inclusion within Camogli's route network began in the 1890s but reached actual continuity in the twentieth century. Camogli's ships travelled to the Australian ports, either on ballast or with general cargoes (an unusual practice, for, by the end of the century, general cargoes were primarily handled by steamers); from there, they retrieved shale, railway sleepers, chrome and timber. For example, in 1900, the barque *Andaman* (919 t.), ownership of Gaetano Olivari, reached Sidney after having discharged in Port Elizabeth (South Africa) a cargo of coal and concrete retrieved in London⁴⁵⁸. There, the captain embarked shale destined to Genoa. After a few years spent between Marseille and the French Caribs (Martinique and Guadalupe), in 1904, the *Andaman* left France with bricks to be discharged in Dunedin (New Zealand). Then, return cargoes were found in Queensland (Australia), where the captain filled the hold with chrome to Baltimore (1905). From there, not surprisingly, the *Andaman* returned to pitch-pine trade from Gulfport to Buenos Ayres and, finally, loaded *quebracho* to Genoa (1906).


Finally, turning back to the cargo options available in the Atlantic area, it is worth mentioning the presence of few profitable freights for covering the passage from Europe to America. Previously, we underlined how most westward voyages to America occurred on ballast: in particular, for sailing vessels, the lack of profitable outbound cargoes from Europe was associated with the absence of bulky merchandises. Indeed, European countries exported to America mainly two cargo typologies: passengers, whose transportation was among the firsts to be absorbed by steamships⁴⁵⁹ and general cargoes, which rapidly followed the same path. Therefore, it was natural that sailing vessels serving on tramping routes would hardly find outbound bulky cargoes to America. Nevertheless, the constant presence of Camogli's vessels in the port of Cadiz unveils a different framework.

⁴⁵⁷ See, ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, n. 119/1.

⁴⁵⁸ Idem.

⁴⁵⁹ R.L. Cohn, "The transition from sail to steam in immigration to the United States", *The Journal of Economic History*, 65, No. 2, 2005, pp. 469-495.

Map 4.5. Camogli's trade in foodstuff (1886-1914).



Source: ASGe, *Giornali nautici*.

As seen in Map 4.5, from 1889 to 1914, before engaging the Atlantic, various Camogli's ships called at Cadiz to load sea salt cargoes toward Latin America. This trade frequency might imply its inclusion within a more systematic route network, where reliable outbound cargoes to Latin America were fundamental to increase cost-efficiency. Among the merchandises included under the "foodstuff" category depicted in Map 4.5, sea salt is the most recurrent (42,62%). Although Cadiz covered the absolute majority of the cases, sea salt was loaded in Ibiza and Trapani as well: then, most shipments were delivered to Montevideo (12) and Buenos Ayres (9). Less systematic seem to be US demands for European sea salt, as there were only two instances, one to Portland and the other one to Halifax.

Another commodity labelled under this category is wheat. Indeed, Camogli had a long history in the wheat trade. However, from the loss of its commercial competition for the Black Sea grain with steam, Camogli's ships were rarely seen engaging in this specific trade. Nevertheless, the international wheat market's transformation and the integration of extra-European producers (United States, Argentina and Australia) provided new opportunities. Camogli's contribution to these flows was never crucial; loads of wheat cargoes in the Americas (Montevideo, Buenos Ayres

but also New York and Philadelphia) were still rare (2,65% of the total voyages)⁴⁶⁰. In this phase, Camogli's wheat trade was completely a-systematic: it was usually transported to Europe (mainly UK and Northern European ports) as an occasional return cargo, according to the poor organization that wholly reflects the tramp shipping model.

4.5.3. THE STEAM FLEET OF CAMOGLI: ROUTES AND SHIPPING PATTERNS

Meanwhile, starting from the early twentieth century, some shipowners living in Camogli attempted a transition from sail to steam and purchased, with the same attitude employed for sail vessels, second-hand steamers in the foreign markets. Despite the relatively lower importance of steamships within Camogli's shipping, the analysis of their routes and the commercial use they were destined for might represent a vital operation to outline Camogli's maritime evolution entirety. On the one hand, it illustrates the sharp differentiation between sail and steam shipping markets; on the other hand, it marks some continuity elements in the approaches deployed by Camogli's shipowners in their regards.

This analysis draws from two steamers hold logbooks, *Deipara* (1402 t.) and *Luigino* (1321 t.)⁴⁶¹: they belonged respectively to Gaetano Maggiolo and Emanuele Bozzo, who, at the same time, owned also sailing vessels⁴⁶². Archival research in Genoa led to identifying a third hold logbook of a Camogli-owned steamer, the *Filippo Chicca* (367 t.), belonging to Stefano Razeto. However, for its limited tonnage, it engaged only to Italian cabotage. Thus, including a ship with strikingly different structural characteristics would have hindered the sample consistency: therefore, the *Filippo Chicca* will remain outside of the present analysis.


⁴⁶⁰ ASGe, *Giornali nautici*.

⁴⁶¹ ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, n. 557/1 and 1133/1.

⁴⁶² According to the 1902 Italian register, Emanuele Bozzo possessed also the barque *Maria Madre B.* (744 t.) and Gaetano Maggiolo owned the barque *Caterina G.* (627 t.). See, *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902*.

The first element to differentiate sail and steam shipping lies in the respective rates of cargo / on ballast voyages. In sailing vessels, the voyages on ballast reached almost one-fourth of the total (24,41%); as far as steamers are concerned, the figure sharply decreases (11,01%). In other words, even in the hands of shipowners that were traditionally bound to sail shipping, steamers productivity was higher.


Map 4.6. Geography of Camogli's routes with cargo – Steamers (1881-1914).



Source: ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, n. 557/1 and 1133/1.

Secondly, Map 4.6 outlines a sharply contrasting scenario in comparison with the pattern of sailing routes. The primary discontinuity with sailing vessels is rooted in the geographical framework: the Atlantic Ocean for sails, Europe for steamships. Indeed, most steamers navigated in a composite region, where Atlantic and Mediterranean Europe and Northern Africa were fully integrated. In particular, the Mediterranean regained centrality: in the case of sail, only 18,14% of the cargoes were retrieved from a Mediterranean port, whereas the same statistics rose to 65,98% for steamers. In broader terms, Camogli's steamships engaged mainly to the Mediterranean cabotage.

Then, a comparative overview of the cargoes handled may provide a clearer insight into steamers' activities.

Figure 4.7. Merchandises transported by *Deipara* and *Luigino*.

Source: ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, n. 557/1 and 1133/1.

Firstly, Camogli's steamers rarely transported general cargoes (10,30% of the total). This feature contrasts with the overall trend of steam navigation, specialized in the handling of general cargoes. The rarest occasions when the *Deipara* and *Luigino* carried general cargoes (mainly composed of various foodstuff articles) either involved a passage to Buenos Ayres (in 1906, the first recorded voyage of *Deipara*, the only one outside the broader European region) or were directed to Odessa and Alessandria. Indeed, Camogli's shipowners lacked the means and the experience to establish liner connections; instead, they opted for using steamers in the same manner as sailing vessels. Thus, these steamships were deployed into the transport of bulky merchandises within the Mediterranean/Atlantic range, within an area where sailing vessels had lost their competitiveness during the previous decades.

Intriguing evidence of Camogli's return to the past may be seen in their new involvement in the Black Sea region after roughly three decades of absence. Between 1900 and 1910, indeed, both *Luigino* and *Deipara* called at the grain ports of Taganrog (5 times), Odessa (2), Braila (2), Berdyansk, Novorossiysk and Theodosia (1 time each). Wheat trade was well-known to Camogli shipowners –

who had built their fortunes on the Black Sea trade before turning to oceanic routes in the 1870s. Cut off from the Black Sea because of steam competitiveness, there is no wonder about the fact that, having finally attempted the transition, Camogli ships would have returned to this region. To reconstruct the whole figure, then, the wheat was discharged in the Mediterranean, mainly in Genoa, and in Marseille, Venice and Southern Italy.

Another trademark, to which Camogli's steamers engaged, was coal. For sailing vessels, British coal transports had remained essential as a resource to contract return cargoes to the Mediterranean. In steamers' case, coal trade from the United Kingdom to Genoa and Savona (with the slightest participation of Alessandria, Syros and Piraeus) became even more critical (16,49% over the total shipments against 3,54% of sailing vessels). Interestingly, Camogli steamers engaged also in petrol transports (2,06% of the total voyages with cargo). Nonetheless, differently from sailing vessels (which handled North American oil), Camogli's steamers retrieved petrol – in boxes – at the port of Batum, on the easternmost shores of the Black Sea⁴⁶³. The *Luigino* called at Batum twice, firstly in 1900 and then five years afterwards. On the first instance, it brought it to Lisbon; on the second to Alessandria⁴⁶⁴.

Finally, Camogli's steamships specialized in three types of transport of bulk merchandises: iron ore, pyrite and phosphate. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that Camogli's steam fleet presented similar characteristics to the coeval British steam tramp shipping⁴⁶⁵. Iron ore was usually loaded in North African (Algiers) and Italian ports (Rio Marina, in the Elba Island). Then, it was sent to Venice (2 times), Ancona (2), Glasgow (2), Newport (2), Rotterdam and Genoa (1 each)⁴⁶⁶. Pyrite, instead,

⁴⁶³ For an overview about the easternmost region of the Black Sea area, see: G. Harlaftis, V. Konstantinova, I. Lyman, A. Sydorenko and E. Tchkoizde (eds.), *Between grain and oil from the Azov to the Caucasus: the port cities of the eastern coast of the Black Sea, late 18th – early 20th century*, Rethymon: Centre of Maritime History IMS-FORTH, 2020. In particular about oil trade, see: E. Tchkoizde, "Oil and soil: the role of Batoum's economic development in shaping of political significance of the Caucasus", in G. Harlaftis et al. (eds.), *Between grain and oil from the Azov to the Caucasus*, pp. 461-522.

⁴⁶⁴ ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, 1133/1.

⁴⁶⁵ R.S. Craig, "Aspects of tramp shipping and ownership", in K. Matthews and G. Panting, *Ships and Shipbuilding in the North Atlantic Region*, St. John's Newfoundland: Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1978, pp. 207-228.

⁴⁶⁶ ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, n. 557/1 and 1133/1.

was mainly retrieved in the port of Huelva (14 times), in Spain, and, secondarily in Stratoní (2), north of Greece: its commercialization was usually associated with the production of sulfuric acid⁴⁶⁷. Finally, Camogli's steamers loaded phosphate in Northern Africa – Sfax (12 voyages) – and transported it to Venice (6 times), Cartagena (2), Genoa, Galatz, Rotterdam and Belfast (1 each). Similarly to several commodities handled by Camogli's sailing vessels, phosphate found intensive utilization in agriculture for its fertilizing qualities.

4.6. Conclusions

This chapter aimed to outline the evolution of Camogli's maritime activities in the age of the transition from sail to steam. During this historical phase, technological improvements to navigation and the advent of steam shipping entangled with broader transformations that revolutionized the previous transport system. At the turn of the century, the international shipping business was dramatically modified: it was divided into two distinct sectors, liner and tramp shipping, being the former specialized to general cargo and passenger transports and the latter to bulk cargo. In light of these global processes, in the same period, the seafaring community of Camogli underwent an extraordinary growth (from the 1860s to the early 1880s) followed by a steady decline (late 1880s-1914) which culminated in the loss of the remaining fleet throughout the First World War. Although the economic roots of the rising phase lay into the successful establishment of Camogli's shipping within the Black Sea trade of the previous decades, the readjustment to the mutated conditions of the international seaborne trade resulted from the onset of steam shipping is still remarkable. Not only Camogli shipowners survived the loss of their principal source of income (the transport of the Black Sea grain), but they also managed to increase shipping profits and by investing them in shipbuilding to enhance the position of their community within the international shipping world. In terms of economic shipping trends, the declining cycle that began in the early 1870s took the shape of a global freight crisis. Then, the contraction of profits paired with Italian shipping difficulties to engage the path of transition pushed the Camogli's maritime activities to increasingly marginal routes. From the 1890s onward, Camogli shipowners

⁴⁶⁷ Idem.

entered into the resilience phase. The high rates of purchases on the second-hand market and the rise of the mean age of the fleet pointed out the qualitative decline of shipping compared to the previous period. Finally, the attempt to transition, marked by the creation of a modest steam tramp fleet, might indicate, in its configuration, the incipient structural collapse of the community.

5. Shipowners and the evolution of maritime business in Camogli

5.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to outline the historical trajectory of Camogli's shipping business from the perspective of the shipowning elites composing the community. It highlights the relationships between the development of maritime activities from Tyrrhenian cabotage to oceanic tramp shipping and the mutations that modified the nature of shipownership. Similarly to what done for maritime activities, the present chapter aims to delineate the efforts of the Camogli shipowning elites to readjust to the transformations that occurred within the shipping business.

In the first section, the chapter reconstructs the most influential shipowners and family groups based in Camogli. Then, in the second section, owing to the great diffusion of shared ownership and familiar and communitarian mechanisms of ownership, the chapter will tackle these features and their role in shaping Camogli's historical experience in shipping. In this regard, a focus is dedicated to the formation of a communitarian maritime credit system. To this purpose, the role of Camogli's mutual maritime insurance association to develop mechanisms of interdependence among the members of the community will be emphasised.

Recovering Camogli's evolution path, the third section focuses on the rising phase of the community (1860s-1870s). Thus, the aim is to correlate its infrastructural, social and cultural development with individual activism and the collective dedication of the shipowning class toward the whole community.

Then, reminding the critical role of the technological transition to alter the dynamics of the nineteenth-century shipping market, the fourth section will outline the shipowners' interests and decision-making in dealing with this issue. In particular, the section will primarily draw from the proceedings of the National Inquiry for the conditions of the merchant marine, to which Camogli's

shipowners actively participated. To provide an insight into the troublesome conditions in which Camogli entered from the 1870s onwards, the chapter attempts to outline the financial difficulties experienced by local shipowners. In particular, the crisis of the community is presented under the light of structural, conjunctural, communitarian and individual events. Indeed, the late-nineteenth-century shipping which Camogli underwent derived from factors which operated on various levels: structural, as the global transformations and the characteristics of small-scale shipping centres influenced the potential evolution of the Ligurian community; conjunctural, as the freight crisis hit Camogli's shipowners in the moment of their greatest weakness (the late 1870s); communitarian, as widespread decisions accelerated or delayed crucial processes; individual, since personal choices, initiatives and business skills still played a decisive role in determining either the resilience or the catastrophe of single shipping enterprises.

5.2. Shipping families of Camogli (1853-1915)

This first section aims to reconstruct the framework of Camogli's shipownership and to evaluate the evolution of the shipowners' business strategies throughout the nineteenth century. To this purpose, the analysis will focus on the primary family groups that animated the community's economic life and detained most of its merchant tonnage. As shown in Table 5.1, the bulk of Camogli shipowners can be reconducted to fourteen family groups: Schiaffino, Razeto, Olivari, Mortola, Degregori, Bertolotto, Repetto, Cichero, Bozzo, Ferrari, Lavarello, Figari, Valle and Casabona⁴⁶⁸.

Table 5.1. Ten greatest shipping families of Camogli (1853; 1883; 1902; 1915).

Year	1853		1883		1902		1915					
	N.	%	N.	%	N.	%	N.	%				
	Schiaffino	40	35%	Schiaffino	63	21%	Mortola	24	25%	Mortola	18	32%
	Olivari	11	10%	Razeto	26	8%	Schiaffino	20	21%	Dapelo	5	9%

⁴⁶⁸ According to the period, to this list could be added Ottone, Ansaldo, Ferro, Oneto, Boggiano, Maggiolo, Chiesa, Aste etc.

Mortola	9	8%	Olivari	19	6%	Razeto	17	18%	Olivari	5	9%
Degregori	8	7%	Degregori	16	5%	Bertolotto	7	7%	Bozzo	4	7%
Bertolotto	7	6%	Mortola	16	5%	Olivari	7	7%	Schiaffino	4	7%
Lavarello	7	6%	Bertolotto	12	4%	Repetto	5	5%	Degregori	3	5%
Razeto	6	5%	Repetto	11	4%	Figari	3	3%	Valle	3	5%
Brigneti	5	4%	Cichero	10	3%	Bozzo	2	2%	Bertolotto	2	4%
Ferrari	5	4%	Bozzo	10	3%	Degregori	2	2%	Figari	2	4%
Cichero	4	4%	Ferrari	8	3%	Casabona	2	2%	Razeto	1	2%

Source: Appendixes 4.1-4.4.

Table 5.1 illustrates the ten wealthiest shipping families of Camogli from 1853 to 1915. The data reported outline the number of ships belonging to each group and, owing to the remarkable oscillations of numbers, their respective percentages over the whole fleet of Camogli. From the Black Sea period until the new century, the general trend delineates a relative predominance of the family Schiaffino. Mortola, Razeto and Olivari followed this large group of shipowners; Bertolotto and Degregori maintained continued participation.

From a methodological point of view, the structural and business nature of these families differ considerably one from another: the Schiaffino gathered from twenty to forty shipowners – divided into many households – depending on the period. At the opposite end, there were families, such as Bertolotto and Degregori, composed of few households, whose success was tied with the initiatives of single individuals and their closer kinship. In between, there were broader family groups, such as Mortola, Razeto and Olivari, whose establishment within local shipping was dependent on family entrepreneurship.

5.2.1. SCHIAFFINO

<i>Year</i>	<i>1853</i>	<i>1883</i>	<i>1902</i>	<i>1915</i>
	Agostino 3	Agostino 2	Filippo fu Prospero 3	Cognati 2
	Antonio 3	Antonio 3	G.B. fu Prospero 2	Others 2

Erasmus	3	Emanuele	2	Giuseppe	2
Francesco	2	Enrico	3	P.	3
Gerolamo	3	Erasmus Eredi	2	Others	10
Gio. Batta	4	Fortunato	3		
Giuseppe	4	Francesco	4		
Lorenzo	2	Gaetano	2		
Niccolò	2	Giovanni	3		
Prospero	7	Pellegro	6		
Others	7	Prospero	3		
		Eredi			
		Rocco	3		
		Others	27		

Until the end of the century, the Schiaffino represented the community's most influencing and wealthy family group. In 1853, 40 ships belonged to various Schiaffino shipowners; in 1883, the amount rose to 63 vessels before decreasing to 20 in 1902 and 4 in 1915⁴⁶⁹. The recurrence of identical first names impedes us from identifying most Schiaffino shipowners, especially in the absence of private sources, which could elucidate further personal details. For instance, it is possible to distinguish three different Prospero Schiaffino: one, son of Francesco, born in 1823, shipowner and captain of the brig *Enoch* (218 t.), built in Varazze in 1852; a second one, son of Giacomo, shipowner of the brig *Industria* (245 t.), built in Varazze in 1853; a last one, son of Giuseppe, who owned the brig *Volontà di Dio* (137 t.), constructed in 1850 in Varazze⁴⁷⁰.

Among the group of 1853, the most renowned and celebrated shipowner was Erasmo Schiaffino (1790-1866), son of Giovanni and cofounder of the local mutual marine insurance association (*Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese*) in 1853 with his cousin Niccolò Schiaffino and

⁴⁶⁹ See, Table 4.1.

⁴⁷⁰ See, Appendix 4.1 and: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 6794-6858-7876.

Giuseppe Degregori⁴⁷¹. At the time of the foundation of the *Mutua*, he owned the brig *San Carlo* (188 t.), commanded by his son-in-law Gio. Bono Ferrari. In 1864, he began constructing the barque *Erasmus* (1200 t.), to whose completion Erasmus could not assist as he died a few weeks before in 1866. As narrated by local historians, Erasmus's path is rather romantic: captured with his father by Algerine corsairs in 1805, he was sold as a slave to a local merchant who moved to Malta, instructed him and, at his death, set him free and donated to Erasmus a part of his wealth⁴⁷². Back to Camogli, Erasmus entered in marriage with Caterina Schiaffino: from their union descended two sons (Giovanni and Lorenzo) – later shipmasters – and four daughters, Geronima, Maria, Rosa and Cecilia, married to local captains, some employed by Erasmus on board of his ships⁴⁷³.

Furthermore, more data are available about Agostino Schiaffino, son of Enrico, born in 1807, and his descendants. In 1853, Agostino owned three brigs, *Licurgo* (148 t.), *Perseverante* (219 t.) and *Salvatore* (136 t.); a few years later, in 1856, he commissioned the brig *Rosa* (300 t.), commanded by one of his sons, Enrico. In 1861, another son, Antonio, was appointed as captain of the *Perseverante*. In 1864, in drawing his last wills, Agostino left the *Rosa* to Antonio and mentioned to have commissioned another ship – still under construction – to be destined to Enrico⁴⁷⁴. Both Antonio and Enrico appear in the 1883 list, where they figured as shipowners of three vessels each: Antonio

⁴⁷¹ About Erasmus Schiaffino, son of Giovanni, see: G.B. Ferrari, *La città dei mille bianchi velieri*, pp. 138-141 and 406-407. For the *Mutua*, see *infra*. He must not be confused with Erasmus Schiaffino, son of Gio. Batta, born in 1802 and owner of the brigs *Idea* (288 t.) and *Stefano* (174 t.). Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 2107 and serie 16, n. 9017.

⁴⁷² *Idem*.

⁴⁷³ Some of these information were drawn from an unpublished manuscript of Gio. Bono Ferrari, *Fasti e nefasti della famiglia Ferrari*. Differently from his other works, this manuscript, composed in form of a memory, was intended for private use to hand down family memories to the new generations. We were able to read it by the kindest concession of Gianni Oneto, one of the descendants of the author. Geronima married with Gio. Bono Ferrari (1824-1918), who commanded for many years the *San Carlo* and then became a shipowner on his own: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 13, n. 4251. Maria married Giuseppe Pace (b. 1827). Rosa married Bartolomeo Chiesa: ASGe, *Notai II sezione*, b. 77, n. 44; Cecilia married Francesco Bisso.

⁴⁷⁴ ASGe, *Notai II sezione*, b. 178, n. 19. In his will, Agostino mentions also his two daughters, Angela and Geronima, to whom he assigned dowries for 2.000 Italian Lira each.

owned the *Maria Schiaffino* (803 t.), *Perseverante*⁴⁷⁵ (474 t.) and *Splendido* (432 t.); Enrico the *Agostino S.* (605 t.), *Angela Schiaffino* (557 t.) and *Enrichino* (949 t.).

Apart from these isolated and scattered data, reconstructing in details the shipping framework of Schiaffino's family group does not represent a feasible objective. Even the loss of the predominance observed from the late nineteenth century is hard to interpret in this light. Indeed, in the second half of the century, there were no Schiaffino shipowners capable of concentrating their resources into shipping enterprises. The theme of capital dispersion (see *infra*) is fundamental to explain both the success and decline of Camogli's shipping. Arguably, the dimension of this family group and the impressive numbers of single-ship shipowners – from the earliest stages – exacerbated its loose composition. Conversely, other family groups were able to flourish even in time of crisis due to the entrepreneurship of individual and more identifiable nuclear families.

5.2.2. OLIVARI

<i>Year</i>	<i>1853</i>	<i>1883</i>	<i>1902</i>	<i>1915</i>
	Biagio 3	Biagio 4	Gaetano Davide di Fortunato 2	G.B. fu A. 2
	Fortunato 2	Fortunato 4	Others 5	Gaetano di A. 2
	Others 6	Prospero 2		Others 1
		Others 9		

Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, to the shipping family of Olivari belonged a relevant share of Camogli's fleet (see Table 5.1). Most of the fortunes of this family were related to two different branches. The first was tied to Biagio Olivari son of Prospero; the second to Fortunato Bartolomeo Olivari, son of Gio Batta (b. 1818). Both of them were active in the Camogli's shipping field since the early 1850s. In 1853, Biagio owned the brig *Lucchina* (272 t.), and the brig schooners *Imparziale* (117 t.) and *Zenobia* (101 t.)⁴⁷⁶. Two years later, he built the brig *Emilia* (215 t.); with these

⁴⁷⁵ It must not be confused with the brig *Perseverante* (219 t.) owned by his father Agostino.

⁴⁷⁶ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 6596-6928-8633.

ships, Biagio participated in the Black Sea trade. Then, in 1867 he commissioned the barque *Lucco* (515 t.); in 1870, followed the construction of the *Gio. Battista O.* (481 t.) and of *Lucchino* (793 t.) in 1876; finally, Biagio built the *Prospero e Davide* (892 t.) in 1881⁴⁷⁷. The latter was named under his sons, Prospero and Davide Olivari, who succeeded to him as shipowners of the same barque and purchased from abroad the iron-hulled full-rigged ships *Pellegrina O.* (1591 t.) and *Biagio O.* (2070 t.)⁴⁷⁸.

The individual trajectory of Fortunato Bartolomeo Olivari (b. 1818) is comparable with that of Biagio. Active in the Black Sea trade since the earliest period, during the 1850s and 1860s, to Fortunato belonged the *Angiolina* (161 t.), *Aurelia* (320 t.), *Colombo* (135 t.) and *Protezione* (170 t.)⁴⁷⁹. After constructing the *Aurelia* in 1863, he commanded the brig in its inaugural voyage to Taganrog and then Belfast⁴⁸⁰. Throughout the late 1860s, Fortunato added to his fleet the barques *Fortunata Camilla* (470 t.), *Giuseppe Revello* (489 t.) and *Teresa Olivari* (826 t.)⁴⁸¹. Still before his death, in 1902, Fortunato had transferred to his son Gaetano Davide Olivari his rights over the *Teresa Olivari*, to which Gaetano Davide added the iron-hulled barque *Andaman* (919 t.), employed in oceanic transports of bulk cargoes⁴⁸².

⁴⁷⁷ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1883).

⁴⁷⁸ *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902; Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro 1916.* The *Prospero e Davide* is still active in 1902; the *Biagio O.* was purchased later, before 1916.

⁴⁷⁹ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1853) and ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 13, n. 9631; serie 14, n. 2263-6891-9597; serie 16, n. 4630.

⁴⁸⁰ *Idem*, serie 16, n. 4630.

⁴⁸¹ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1883).

⁴⁸² *Registro italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902* and see also: ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, 119-1, which is the hold logbook of the *Andaman* and covers from 1900 to 1906.

5.2.3. MORTOLA

<i>Year</i>	<i>1853</i>	<i>1883</i>	<i>1902</i>	<i>1915</i>
	Fratelli 2	Fratelli 2	Biagio 4	Giovanni di Fortunato 2
	Giuseppe 4	Giacomo 3	Fratelli fu Agostino Antonio 3	Giuseppe fu G.B. 4
	Others 3	Gio. Batta 3	Giuseppe 8	Mortola & Bozzo 5
		Others 8	Mortola & Schiappacasse 2	Mortola & Schiappacasse 2
			Others 7	Others 5

The family group of Mortola, instead, presents a more complicated structure. Similarly to the Schiaffino, until the 1890s, their shipping properties were dispersed among numerous people, whose actual identities and relationships between each other are hard to define. In 1853, the Mortola represented the third group for the number of ships owned (9)⁴⁸³; thirty years later – the peak for Camogli’s shipping – they owned 16 ships and occupied the fourth rank, after Schiaffino (63), Razeto (26) and Olivari (19), having the same numbers of Degregori (16)⁴⁸⁴. Few details are available about the Black Sea period. Nevertheless, the intriguing trajectory of Francesco Mortola might be worth noting; indeed, according to local reconstructions, throughout his traffics in the Black Sea, Mortola became friend with «a great wheat merchant of Russian origins»⁴⁸⁵. Besides, the fact that, in 1864, his son Prospero Mortola named his new barque *Scaramanga* (391 t.) seems to

⁴⁸³ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1853).

⁴⁸⁴ Idem, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1883).

⁴⁸⁵ G.B. Ferrari, *Capitani di mare e bastimenti di Liguria*, p. 359.

corroborate such chronicle⁴⁸⁶. Of course, this is a remarkable witness about the relationships tied between the shipowners and captains of Camogli with Greek wheat merchants⁴⁸⁷.

However, the relative success of the Mortola began later, from the 1890s onwards. In 1902, they were the only family group to have improved the number of ships from the preceding period (21). From this moment on and until the First World War, the Mortola became the leading shipowners of Camogli. The most significant part of their fleet belonged to two different branches: on the one side, there were Biagio and Luigi Mortola (*'u liggia*), sons of Antonio Agostino; on the other side, there was Giuseppe Mortola (*sanrocchin*), son of Gio. Batta⁴⁸⁸.

Biagio and Luigi were the founders of the *Fratelli Mortola* (Mortola Bros.) shipping company which, in 1902, counted eight ships⁴⁸⁹. Their fleet was composed of one full-rigged ship – the *Trojan* (1624 t.) –, four iron-hulled barques – the *Edinburgh* (1290 t.), the *Anna M.* (832 t.), the *Aline* (739 t.) and the *Scottish Chief* (706 t.) – and three wooden-hulled barques – the *Due Cugini* (1258 t.), the *Elmstone* (737 t.) and the *Angelo* (689 t.)⁴⁹⁰. Apart from the *Due Cugini* and the *Angelo*, they were all purchased second-hand on the foreign market. In line with Camogli's shipping business in the early twentieth century, the *Fratelli Mortola* company engaged in oceanic tramp shipping (e.g. between 1898 and 1903, the *Edinburgh* was very active in the trade of pitch-pine from Pensacola)⁴⁹¹. In 1915, their properties were reduced to the mentioned *Anna M.* to which the iron-hulled full-rigged ship *Rosa M.* (1360 t.) was added⁴⁹². The latter even survived the First World War⁴⁹³.

Giuseppe Mortola (*sanrocchin*), son of Gio. Batta, was arguably the leading shipowner of Camogli between the 1890s and the First World War. His fortunes were tied to Vittorio Emanuele Bozzo, his

⁴⁸⁶ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 16, n. 8905.

⁴⁸⁷ See Chapter 3.

⁴⁸⁸ In Camogli, nicknames and family names were fundamental to discern one group from another. In this case, both of them refer to the specific neighborhood of their origins.

⁴⁸⁹ *Registro italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902.*

⁴⁹⁰ *Idem.*

⁴⁹¹ ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, 602-1.

⁴⁹² *Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro 1916.*

⁴⁹³ *Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro 1921.*

brother-in-law, with whom he formed a partnership lasting even after the war. In 1902, taken together, Giuseppe Mortola and Vittorio Emanuele Bozzo owned a tramp fleet of thirteen elements, including a steamship – the *Luigino* (1321 t.)⁴⁹⁴. In 1915 only, the two shipowners owned twelve ships.

Table 5.2. Fleet of Giuseppe Mortola and Vittorio Emanuele Bozzo (1901-1915).

<i>Register</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Tons</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Hull</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Year</i>
1902	Luigino	1321	Steamship	Iron	Foreign	1879
1902	Elise	1290	Full-rigged ship		Foreign	1869
1902	Indus	1111	Full-rigged ship	Iron	Sestri	1874
1902	Caldera	1574	Barque		Foreign	1884
1902	Ines Elisa	1495	Barque		Foreign	1879
1902	Dilbhur	1281	Barque		Foreign	1865
1902	Corona	1152	Barque		Foreign	1866
1902	Vermont	978	Barque		Chiavari	1874
1902	Bianchetto	944	Barque	Iron	Lavagna	1875
1902	Giuseppe P.	750	Barque		Sampierdarena	1876
1902	Maria Madre B.	744	Barque		Sestri	/
1902	Riconoscenza	609	Barque		Sestri	1872
1902	Gio. Batta Padre	597	Barque		Sestri	/
1916	Trentino	1283	Steamship	Iron	Foreign	1876
1916	Eurasia	1873	Full-rigged ship	Iron	Foreign	1885
1916	Combermere	1717	Full-rigged ship	Iron	Foreign	1881
1916	Loch Garve	1711	Full-rigged ship		Foreign	1875
1916	Bianchetto	1669	Full-rigged ship	Iron	Foreign	1877
1916	Macdiarmid	1624	Full-rigged ship		Foreign	1883

⁴⁹⁴ See for the *Luigino* the Chapter 3 and ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, 1133-1.

1916	Blanche	1527	Full-rigged ship	Iron	Foreign	1877
1916	Ortrud	1507	Full-rigged ship	Iron	Foreign	1875
1916	Cognati	1505	Full-rigged ship	Iron	Foreign	1880
1916	Merioneth	1395	Barque	Iron	Foreign	1875
1916	Herat	1332	Barque	Iron	Foreign	1877
1916	Roberto G.	587	Barque	Iron	Foreign	1881

Source: *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902*; *Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro 1916*.

The fleet of Mortola and Bozzo was composed of large vessels suitable to engage in oceanic tramp routes. Apart from the smallest barques (still measuring more than 600 tons), most of the fleet was purchased second-hand from the British market. This factor influenced the average age of the ships, mostly built throughout the 1870s and in 1885 at the latest. Besides, most of the full-rigged ships were iron-hulled instead of barques, which mainly presented a wooden structure. From a diachronic perspective, Mortola and Bozzo renovated their fleet entirely from the first to the second decade: this feature may indicate two different things. First, it underlines the short-term usability of the 1901 fleet, composed of vessels more than 28 years old on average. Secondly, the changes might be interpreted as a sign of the relatively good shipping profits collected during the first period, which allowed these shipowners to renovate their fleet with little or no fixed capital in their hands (the value of forty years old vessels must have been proximal to zero). During the war, the submarine attacks of the German navy destroyed almost completely this fleet: already at the end of 1917, Mortola and Bozzo had remained with just four ships (the *Roberto G*, *Blanche*, *Herat* and *Eurasia*)⁴⁹⁵. Finally, at the end of the war, they had lost the *Blanche* too: in 1921, the fleet of Mortola and Bozzo counted three ships (being one of them the forty-one years old barque *Roberto G.*, which weighed only 587 tons)⁴⁹⁶.

⁴⁹⁵ *Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro 1918*.

⁴⁹⁶ *Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro 1921*.

5.2.4. RAZETO

<i>Year</i>	<i>1853</i>	<i>1883</i>	<i>1902</i>	<i>1915</i>				
	Single-ship owners	6	Antonio	3	Emanuele	4	Single-ship owner	1
			Emanuele	2	Stefano fu Martino	6		
			Gaetano	3				
			Giovanni	3				
			Martino	4				
			Stefano	3				
			Others	8				

Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, the family Razeto (the alternative versions Razzeto and Razetto are rarely found) comprises different family groups dedicated to shipping and shipownership. Although various members of this family were already active in the early 1850s, these shipowners obtained the most successful results from the latest years of the Black Sea phase until the end of the first decade of the twentieth century⁴⁹⁷.

Starting from the 1860s, Giovanni Razeto (1823-1896), son of Michele, was one of the most influential shipowners of Camogli. Owner of the barques *Dittatore Garibaldi* (307 t.), *Anita Garibaldi* (597 t.) and *Emilia M.* (678), Giovanni claimed to maintain friendly relationships with Giuseppe Garibaldi. He even donated one share of his first ship (built in 1861) to the «hero of the two worlds». The *Dittatore Garibaldi* mainly sailed from and to the Black Sea, engaging in the transport of the Russian wheat⁴⁹⁸. Instead, the *Anita Garibaldi*, built in 1865, and the *Emilia M.*, in 1873, were both employed in oceanic routes. In 1883, the former was found in Haiti, under the command of Michele

⁴⁹⁷ See Table 5.1.

⁴⁹⁸ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 7933; serie 15, n. 6254; serie 16, n. 4588 and 8789.

Razeto, son of Giovanni⁴⁹⁹. The latter anchored in Saint Helena in 1886, on its way back from Moulmein, where it was loaded with a teak cargo⁵⁰⁰.

Nonetheless, most of the data found in the notarial archives concerned one specific family group, whose first member was Prospero Razeto (ca. 1800-1876), son of Martino. In 1857, he wrote his testament in favour of his wife, Emanuela Mortola, from which Prospero had three sons, Francesco, Gaetano and Martino. In the Black Sea trade period, he owned the brig *Il Prospero* (170 t.), commanded by his son Martino⁵⁰¹. In 1876, at the moment of his death, Prospero left to the heirs (Martino and Francesco's sons, dead before his father) his properties, including the barque *Mio Padre* (442 t.), later named *Prospero Razeto* by Martino⁵⁰². Thus, in 1883, Martino Razeto (b. 1822), son of Prospero, was a prominent shipowner with four vessels: the *Prospero Razeto*, the *Camogli* (466 t.), the *Boschetto* (602 t.) and the *N.S. del Boschetto* (625 t.)⁵⁰³. Meanwhile, his first son Stefano owned three ships, the *Gentili* (800 t.), *Martinin* (714 t.) and *Lorenzino* (906 t.)⁵⁰⁴. Twenty years later, Stefano was Camogli's second greatest shipowner after Giuseppe Mortola⁵⁰⁵. In that circumstance, he owned two steamers, two full-rigged ships and two barques. One of his steamships, the *Filippo Chicca* (367 t.), was employed in regular connections between Genoa and Naples⁵⁰⁶. The rest of the fleet, among which figured the steamer *N.S. del Boschetto* (1401 t.) and the iron-hulled full-rigged

⁴⁹⁹ G.B. Ferrari, *La città dei mille bianchi velieri*, p. 352.

⁵⁰⁰ ACS, *Ministero della Marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Divisione premi compensi e tasse, b. 57.

⁵⁰¹ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 13, n. 5356 and 8207. Later, it was commanded by Fortunato Marciani: see, Idem, serie 14, n. 6815 and 8607.

⁵⁰² ASGe, *Notai III sezione*, r. 679, n. 330.

⁵⁰³ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1883).

⁵⁰⁴ Idem. In his works, Gropallo delineated the trajectory of Stefano Razeto son of Martino; however, more than once the author made confusion between him and Stefano Razeto son of Antonio, owner of the *Monte Tabor* and *Oriana*. See, G. Gropallo, *Il romanzo della vela*, p. 163.

⁵⁰⁵ *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902*.

⁵⁰⁶ ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, n. 763/1.

ships *Annibale* (1582 t.) and *Stefano Razeto* (1909 t.) – the latter one was the biggest of Camogli – engaged to oceanic tramp shipping⁵⁰⁷.

5.2.5. OTHER SHIPOWNERS (REPETTO, BERTOLOTTO AND DEGREGORI)

For absolute numbers and continuity over time, these four family groups were the Camogli's shipping sector leaders. Nevertheless, the history of the community recorded various individual shipowners who, limitedly to specific conditions and historical phases, were able to compete and even surpass them.

One of them was Gio. Batta Gaetano Repetto «Perrucca» (1804-1892), son of Agostino. His career as a shipowner began late, considering that in the Black Sea period Gio. Batta Gaetano still commanded the ship of his father Agostino and then of his brothers Prospero (b. 1809) and Fortunato, the *N.S. del Boschetto* (116 t.)⁵⁰⁸. Then, in 1883, he appears in the list of the *Mutua* as the shipowner of eight vessels: the *Agostino Repetto* (517 t.), *Beppino R.* (615 t.), *Boschetto M.* (428 t.), *Fortunato Repetto* (717 t.), *Gaetano Repetto* (622 t.), *G.B. Repetto* (1244 t.), *Maria Repetto Figlia* (843 t.) and the *Stefano Repetto* (617 t.)⁵⁰⁹. The construction of this fleet began in 1865, with the *Boschetto M.*; then, it intensified between the late 1860s and early 1870s, when it culminated in the *G.B. Repetto*, the biggest ship of Camogli at that time. Some of the ships were named under Gio. Batta Gaetano's sons, Fortunato, Prospero and Stefano, who later became captains and shipowners. After the death of «Perrucca», his three sons fought against each other and their uncles, partners of Gio. Batta Gaetano in his business⁵¹⁰. The litigation was settled only through the intervention of the Civil Court, which divided into four parts the real estates and the shipping properties of Gio. Batta

⁵⁰⁷ See, for instance, the logbook of the barque *Martinin*, active between 1881 and 1906. Idem, n. 1252/1.

⁵⁰⁸ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 13, n. 5360.

⁵⁰⁹ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1883).

⁵¹⁰ ASGe, *Notai III sezione*, r. 1615, n. 454.

Gaetano⁵¹¹. At the end of this troublesome phase, the three sons of «Perrucca» merged their shipping activities and founded the company *Fratelli Repetto* (Repetto Bros.). Arguably in virtue of the complicated inheritance, in 1902, the *Fratelli Repetto* company had lost all of the vessels received ten years before. In exchange, they owned three full-rigged ships, the *Gio. Batta Repetto* (1425 t.), *Prospero Repetto* (1181 t.) and *Beecroft* (1544 t.) all purchased second-hand abroad⁵¹². Neither these nor different ships belonging to any Repetto is found in 1915⁵¹³.

Furthermore, also the family groups of Bertolotto and Degregori gave a decisive contribution to Camogli's shipping, though for limited periods. As seen in Table 5.1, their fortunes concentrated in the central years of Camogli's maritime history, between the 1860s and the 1880s. From the analysis of their evolution, these families present similar characteristics; in particular, both seem to rely on the control of various activities beyond shipping, such as politics, banking and maritime insurances. Emblematic is, in this sense, the personal trajectory of Fortunato Bertolotto (b. 1814), son of Michele, shipowner, banker and mayor of Camogli in 1874. Although his dealings with politics and banking – fundamental to understand some critical features of Camogli's evolution – will be developed in the following pages, his career as shipowner can be delineated in this section. The first news concerning this figure date to 1853, when Fortunato commanded his barque *India* (388 t.), in and out the Mediterranean, along the Black Sea routes⁵¹⁴. The structural characteristics of the ship and its origins were exceptional: in that period, the *India* was the biggest ship of Camogli and the only one built abroad (Hamburg)⁵¹⁵. A few years later (1861-1864), Fortunato owned the barques *Giovanni* (390 t.) and *Verità* (362 t.), commanded respectively by Pellegrino Schiaffino and Fortunato Cuneo⁵¹⁶. These ships made enormous profits along the integrated wheat-coal routes from the Black Sea to

⁵¹¹ *Ibidem*, Allegato A.

⁵¹² *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902.*

⁵¹³ *Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro 1916.*

⁵¹⁴ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 13, n. 4223. During its first voyage, Fortunato Bertolotto brought the ship from London to Theodosia, where he loaded wheat to Genoa.

⁵¹⁵ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1853); see also: G.B.R. Figari, *La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: 1853-1888*, p. 9.

⁵¹⁶ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 7975 and 9560; serie 16, n. 4633 and 6203.

the British islands, back and forth⁵¹⁷. As we will see in the following section, in 1872, he purchased a total of one-hundred and forty *carati* (shares). Thus, he became the major shareholder of ten ships: *Abele*, *Adelfide*, *Antonio*, *Favorito*, *Fortunato*, *Francisca*, *Maria Cichero*, *Nuova Verità* and *Teresa Ester* (average tonnage: 535 t.)⁵¹⁸.

Nevertheless, this massive operation was associated with more complicated affairs: for example, a couple of years later, most of them (all but *Nuova Verità*) were entitled to shipowners enlisted in the mutual insurance association of his foundation, the *Nuova Camogliese* (see *infra* and Table 5.5) – the *Abele* to his brother Diego Lorenzo Bertolotto⁵¹⁹. Afterwards, limitedly to his shipping properties, there is no evident data until 1878, when he is defined as the owner of four barques, namely *Giovanni*, *Ninfa*, *Cassa marittima* and *Nuova Verità* (650 t.). About these ships, except for the already mentioned *Giovanni* and *Nuova Verità*, we possess few notions apart from the fact that they were altogether insufficient to cover a debt of 322.000 lire⁵²⁰.

To the same broad family group also belonged Lazzaro Bertolotto (1818-1906), shipowner and, later, professor of Astronomy and Navigation at Camogli's nautical school. Active in the Black Sea routes until the early 1860s, at the command of his brig *Laura* (185 t.)⁵²¹, Lazzaro abandoned his maritime career quite early⁵²². Instead, Vittorio Bertolotto (1855-1934), his son, resumed the shipping business. In 1887, he had purchased from Giacomo Schiaffino the barque *Gimello* (589 t.), which he renamed *Sirio*⁵²³. Fifteen years later, Vittorio Bertolotto owned the full-rigged ships *Narcissus* (1270

⁵¹⁷ *Idem*.

⁵¹⁸ ASGe, *Notai II sezione*, 1964, n. 28-134.

⁵¹⁹ ASGe, *Tribunale di commercio*, Sentenze, 889-900; 913-924; 937-948.

⁵²⁰ *Idem*, 944, n. 1220.

⁵²¹ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 13, n. 4021 and serie 14, n. 6811.

⁵²² G.B. Ferrari, *La città dei mille bianchi velieri*, pp. 445-446.

⁵²³ See, CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1883); *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1887*.

t.) and *Euphemia* (1338 t.) and the barque *Angela* (872 t.)⁵²⁴. In 1915, then, his fleet was reduced to the full-rigged ship *Andreta* (1755 t.)⁵²⁵.

The family Degregori unfolds similar characteristics: its most influential members were all involved in matters beyond shipping on its own. In particular, some of them covered a role in the local mutual insurance association and banking. For example, Giuseppe Degregori (b. 1796), son of Francesco, appears among the three founders of the *Mutua*, together with Erasmo and Niccolò Schiaffino. In 1836, he sailed to Odessa, at the command of his brig *Il Prudente* (169 t.), to retrieve grain cargoes destined to the Mediterranean ports⁵²⁶. In 1844, Giuseppe built the brig *La Gloria* (178 t.), employed in the same routes⁵²⁷.

However, the most successful household among the Degregori can be reconducted to the activities of Bernardo and Agostino, sons of Gio. Batta, and their descendants. Throughout the 1850s and 1860s, both owned various ships engaged in the Black Sea grain trade. Agostino owned the brig *San Rocco* (173 t.) and the barques *Dante* (278 t.) and *Italico* (369 t.), the last one built in 1863⁵²⁸. Bernardo was the owner of a brig schooner, three brigs and two barques, the biggest one – *Conte Serra* (327 t.) – built in 1857⁵²⁹.

Agostino had six sons: Antonio (b. 1834), Bernardo (b. 1843), Fortunato (b. 1846), Francesco (b. 1845), Gio. Batta (b. 1832) and Luigi (b. 1838). Bernardo had two: Gio. Batta and Giuseppe. The business and professional relationships between the two brothers were deeply rooted and also

⁵²⁴ Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1902. Interestingly, the ship *Narcissus* is the setting at the centre of Conrad novel *The Nigger of the "Narcissus": A Tale of the Forecastle*: the author had embarked on the ship in 1887, many years before Vittorio Bertolotto acquired it in 1899.

⁵²⁵ *Registro Nazionale Italiano per la visita e classificazione delle navi e dei galleggianti. Libro registro 1916.*

⁵²⁶ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 3, n. 4519.

⁵²⁷ *Idem*, serie 14, n. 9571 and serie 15, n. 6242.

⁵²⁸ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 6739 (*San Rocco*); serie 14, n. 9498 (*Dante*); serie 16, n. 8959 (*Italico*).

⁵²⁹ The list of his ships comprehended: the brig schooner *Bayruttino* (105 t.), built in 1830; the brigs *N.S. del Carmine* (110 t.) and *San Bernardo* (143 t.), built respectively in 1854 and 1846; the barques *Conte Serra* (327 t.) and *San Paolo* (297 t.), the last one built in 1854. See: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 13, n. 4170 and 9927; serie 14, n. 2131 and 2213; serie 15, n. 2454; serie 16, n. 1669 and 4530.

involved the respective spawns. Apart from the fact that Agostino employed most of his sons on board his ships (Luigi and Gio. Batta as captains, the other in minor positions⁵³⁰), even Bernardo resorted to his nephews to man his ships: for example, in 1862, Antonio commanded the brig *San Paolo* and embarked his younger brother Francesco as a cabin boy⁵³¹.

Later, the second generation succeeded their parents: despite it is not possible to clearly distinguish between Gio. Batta, son of Agostino, and Gio. Batta, son of Bernardo, in 1883, the eight cousins owned a fleet of thirteen ships of a considerable average tonnage (ca. 760 t.)⁵³².

Table 5.3. Fleet of the sons of Agostino and Bernardo Degregori (1883).

<i>Name</i>	<i>Tons</i>	<i>Year of construction</i>
<i>Baron Podestà</i>	758	1874
<i>Bernardo</i>	748	1876
<i>Biagio</i>	868	1876
<i>Degregori A.</i>	830	1874
<i>Esempio</i>	474	1869
<i>Fratellanza</i>	892	1878
<i>Moderato</i>	544	1870
<i>Prosperina</i>	615	1864
<i>Ricordo</i>	781	1869
<i>Sei Fratelli</i>	577	1870
<i>Speme</i>	527	1867
<i>Unico</i>	663	1872
<i>Zehlima</i>	475	1860

⁵³⁰ See, ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 9498.

⁵³¹ See, Idem, serie 15, n. 2454.

⁵³² CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1883).

Source: CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1883).

Also, some of them occupied influential positions within the local society. Gio. Batta, son of Bernardo, engaged in banking and founded the *Cassa di sconto Camogliese*, active in the maritime credit sector. About this banking institution, there is no existing bibliography. Although G.B.R. Figari dates its foundation after 1880⁵³³, from an overview of the archival sources produced by the Commercial Court of Genoa, the *Cassa di sconto Camogliese* emerges in 1874 earliest⁵³⁴. Instead, his brother Giuseppe is repeatedly mentioned in the notarial sources as his proxy in the handling of various affairs, particularly for purchasing ships at public auctions⁵³⁵.

Similarly, Luigi, son of Agostino, became very close to Fortunato Bertolotto and his own banking institution (the *Banco Camogliese Fortunato Bertolotto*), at the point to be appointed as its liquidator (together with Emanuele Boggiano)⁵³⁶.

Finally, Francesco was the director of the *Mutua* during the 1880s, until its first liquidation in 1888.

5.3. Individual ownership and communitarian shipping

Since the earliest stages, the shipping system of Camogli largely depended on forms of shared ownership and collective entrepreneurial initiative. Such dependence derived from its specific economic and maritime environment: in other words, the nineteenth-century shipowners of Camogli had inherited long-standing traditional practices to share risks and investments, which were typical of fishing communities⁵³⁷. Indeed, shared ownership and the other forms to reduce

⁵³³ See, G.B.R. Figari and S. Bagnato Bonuccelli, *La marina mercantile camogliese dalla guerra di Crimea all'Inchiesta Parlamentare Boselli: 1855-1882*, Genova: Tolozzi, 1983, p. 98.

⁵³⁴ See, ASGe, *Tribunale di commercio*, Sentenze, r. 889, n. 90 and 126.

⁵³⁵ See, ASGe, *Notai III sezione*, r. 681, n. 1156-1212. For instance, in 1878, their partnership involved the acquisition of the barques *Rosa Lavarello* and *Francesco Borzone*.

⁵³⁶ See, *infra*.

⁵³⁷ See chapter 1.5.

individual responsibilities fit the needs of low-capital enterprises suffering from scarce financial resources. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the long-established practices to finance, own and manage small vessels for fishing and coastal cabotage were transferred to high-seas shipping with no relevant discontinuities.

Still in 1853, from the examination of the fleet of Camogli emerges a fragmented framework, in which at least ninety-three people owned 142 ships⁵³⁸.

Table 5.4. Ships and shipowners in Camogli (1853-1907).

	<i>N ships</i>	<i>N shipowners</i>	<i>Ships per man</i>	<i>Average ton.</i>	<i>Ton per man</i>
1853	142	93	1,52	176	269
1883	307	200	1,53	595	913
1907	109	55	1,98	1086	2154

Source: CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*.

The data reported in Table 5.4 analyse the dispersion of the shipping capital among family groups and individuals within the same households. The ratio of 1,52 ships per man (1853) indicates a remarkable fragmentation of shipownership. Few people possessed more than one vessel: for example, the case of Prospero Lavarello, to whom belonged five ships, is exceptional within the framework of the period⁵³⁹. More widespread was, instead, the presence of various relatives: this was

⁵³⁸ See, CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1853). The ratio of ships per man might also be rounded up due to the faulty identification of some shipowners with identical names and surnames. For instance, under the highly common name of Prospero Schiaffino were registered seven ships: researching across different sources led us to identify at least two different Prospero Schiaffino, one son of Giacomo, owner of the brig *Industria* and the barque *Prosperoso*, and the other one son of Giuseppe, surely attested as the owner of the brig *Volontà di Dio*. Same procedure was followed to distinguish between Giuseppe Mortola son of Biagio, to whom belonged the brig *Due Fratelli* and Giuseppe Mortola son of Niccolò, who possessed the brig *Mercurio*. See: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1853-1865.

⁵³⁹ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1853). On this figure, see also: G. Gropallo, *Il romanzo della vela*, p. 124.

the case, for example, of Prospero and Luigi Bertolotto, sons of Filippo and brothers between one another, respectively owners of the brigs *Le Grazie* and *Delia* which were active in the Black Sea trade from the early 1850s onwards⁵⁴⁰.

It was the household to represent the nuclear unit for engaging and sustaining shipping entrepreneurship. Before the definitive establishment of stock companies in most of the productive sectors, the contribution of direct and acquired kinship in developing a business was essential. As seen in the previous section, in most cases, family members split their involvement and responsibilities according to age criteria: the older generation was in charge of ashore responsibilities and assumed the proper functions of shipownership; the younger generation, instead, covered one or more roles within the onboard hierarchy, on the top (captains and mates) or at the bottom (cabin-boys) depending on the age.

The family-based maritime business was not an isolated feature of small-scale places: on the contrary, even some of the most influential British tramp shipping companies shared the same background. However, not surprisingly, in the context of small communities, the households extended well beyond the borders of nuclear families up to overlap, instead, with the community itself. In this regard, the extensive and long-standing habit of using the ancient juridical institution of *carati* might be one of the neatest exemplifications of how communitarian business and private entanglements overcame the restricted boundaries of individual households.

5.3.1. THE "CARATI" SYSTEM

The adoption of *carati* to divide shipownership among different people is in clear continuity with the past of Camogli. Every ship was partitioned in 24 *carati*: at the end of the nineteenth century, however, source evidence reports the existence of various subfractions, like half, one-quarter or one-eighth of *carato*. During the ancient regime, the usage of this instrument to fraction shipownership was widespread all over Europe and still resisted in nineteenth-century sailing shipping.

⁵⁴⁰ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1853); ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 13, n. 4211 and 4300.

Despite the similarities, the utilisation of *carati* must not be confused with the form of payment *alla parte*⁵⁴¹. The former regarded shipownership; the latter was an alternative to salaries and a tool to ascribe labour costs to the profits of single voyages. Therefore, from a juridical and practical point of view, these concepts regarded different spheres of shipping activities, though it was possible for some crew members – particularly in fishing enterprises – to be also shareholders. The use of *carati* limited the impact of the initial and running costs of shipping on single individuals. The splitting of the expected profits counterbalanced this effect.

In the ancient regime, the reasons underlying the success of this form of shipownership lay in the extreme dangerousness of the Mediterranean navigation. By splitting the investments among more coparticipants, the entrepreneurial risk was proportionately reduced. Similarly and differently at the same time, after the European powers annihilated the threat of Northern-African piracy (from the 1830s onwards), the use of *carati* fit the needs for the financial support of small-scale shipowners.

Table 5.5. List of shareholders of the brig *Ulisse*, 1855.

<i>Surname</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Father</i>	<i>Wife/Widow of</i>	<i>N. Carati</i>
<i>Antola</i>	Francesco			0,5
<i>Boggiano</i>	Giuseppe	Prospero		0,5
<i>Denegri</i>	Giuseppe	Bartolomeo		1
<i>Ferrari</i>	Gio. Batta	Giuseppe		7
<i>Ferrari</i>	Niccolò	Giuseppe		1
<i>Figari</i>	Giuseppe			0,5
<i>Figari</i>	Fortunato	Gio. Batta		0,5
<i>Figari</i>	Maria		Schiaffino Diego	1
<i>Mortola</i>	Gio. Batta			1
<i>Olivari</i>	Fortunato	Gaetano		1
<i>Schiaffino</i>	Gio. Batta			0,5

⁵⁴¹ See chapter 1.4 and, for a more detailed analysis, chapter 5.

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<i>Schiaffino</i>	Prospero	Giacomo	0,5
<i>Schiaffino</i>	Giacomo	Prospero	0,5
<i>Schiaffino</i>	Antonio		0,5
<i>Senno</i>	Andrea	Rocco	0,5
<i>Senno</i>	Prospero		0,5
	Costantina	Schiaffino Rocco	0,5
	Antonietta	Brignati Lorenzo	0,5

Source: CMMC, *Carature*, n. 3-19.

Table 5.6. List of shareholders of the barque *Aquila*, 1884.

<i>Surname</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Father</i>	<i>Wife/Widow of</i>	<i>N Carati</i>
<i>Benvenuto</i>	Teresa		Cordiglia Prospero	0,5
<i>Borzone</i>	Caterina		Schiaffino Domenico	0,5
<i>Capurro</i>	Filippo	Paolo		0,5
<i>Chiesa</i>	Maria			0,5
<i>Cichero</i>	Andrea	Niccolò		0,5
<i>Degregori</i>	Gio. Batta	Antonio		0,5
<i>Denegri</i>	Benedetta		Simonetti Niccolò	1
<i>Denegri</i>	Maria			0,5
<i>Gardella</i>	Giuseppe			0,5
<i>Massone</i>	Caterina	Pellegro	Simonetti Gio. Batta	0,5
<i>Mortola</i>	Giacomo Agostino			0,5
<i>Mortola</i>	Erasmus			0,5
<i>Schiaffino</i>	Antonio			0,5
<i>Schiaffino</i>	Fortunato			0,5
<i>Schiaffino</i>	Giovanni	Gio. Batta		2
<i>Schiaffino</i>	Gio. Batta	Giuseppe		0,5

<i>Schiaffino</i>	Felicina	Erasmus	0,5
<i>Schiappacasse</i>	Fortunato	Giovanni	11
<i>Schiappacasse</i>	Maria		1
<i>Simonetti</i>	Andrea	Lorenzo	1
<i>Simonetti</i>	Prospero	Lorenzo	0,5

Source: ASGe, *Notai III sezione*, r. 687, n. 2695.

The examination of Table 5.5 and 5.6 provides us with a glimpse of the extreme atomisation of Camogli's shipownership. The first case addresses the coparticipants in the construction of the brig *Ulisse*, belonging to Gio. Batta Ferrari, son of Giuseppe⁵⁴². The list was reconstructed through the papers which shipowners consigned to shareholders to recognise their legal rights over the ship. Conversely, the second case is withdrawn from a vessel sale agreement registered by a local notary. On 5th October 1884, Fortunato Schiappacasse (the shipowner) and the whole group of shareholders sold the barque *Aquila* (321 t.) to Camillo Reali, a shipmaster from Livorno. The transaction took place for 17.400 lire, 725 per *carato*⁵⁴³.

In both cases, family members and collaterals (as in the case of Niccolò Ferrari and Maria Schiappacasse) were on the list. However, the range of participants extended to a much broader spectrum of members of the community. According to the typical structure, one shareholder (Gio. Batta Ferrari and Fortunato Schiappacasse) possessed the relative or absolute majority of the shares; in the first case, the plenary of shareholders was required to appoint, by notarial deed, a shipowner to be responsible for the ship before the law⁵⁴⁴. The responsibilities and prerogatives of shipowners comprehended to find freights, to ensure the vessel, to contract loans in case of need, to maintain

⁵⁴² CMMC, *Carature*, n. 3-19. He was brother to Gio. Bono Ferrari (grandfather of the homonymous founder of the local maritime museum), which we mentioned in the second chapter as the captain of the brig *San Carlo*, owned by Erasmo Schiaffino. More information about the brig *Ulisse* (203 t.) can be found in ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 1237 and 6800 and serie 15, n. 2526.

⁵⁴³ ASGe, *Notai III sezione*, r. 687, n. 2695. The notary was Angelo Doberti.

⁵⁴⁴ This type of document was called *Atto di dichiarazione di armatore*: some examples can be found in ASGe, *Notai III sezione*, r. 679, n. 289 and 330.

and repair “body and equipment” of the ship, to hire and pay the crew, to appoint the captain, to file lawsuits and show up in judgment, to declare the abandonment of the ship and, finally, to sell it⁵⁴⁵.

By using *carati*, despite their primary aim, consisting of capital and risk-sharing in single enterprises, the people of Camogli had a tool to diversify the investments into different ships. Diversification was essential for mid-nineteenth-century Camogli seafarers and shipowners. To illustrate the role of this economic practice within the shipowning framework of Camogli, the testaments proved to be remarkably useful, mainly when, due to the need to divide the legacy among different inheritors, the notary compiled inventories. A noteworthy example of the source is represented by the following list of the properties of Gaetano Schiaffino, son of Martino:

Table 5.7. List of *carati* belonging to Gaetano Schiaffino of Martino at his death, 16th June 1877.

<i>N Carati</i>	<i>Ship</i>	<i>Value (lira)</i>	<i>N Carati</i>	<i>Ship</i>	<i>Value (lira)</i>
14,5	Martino	98580	0,33	Stella d'Oriente	266
2,75	Prospero	9443	0,33	Pellegro	326
2	Perseveranza	4443	0,33	Pietro	1055
1,25	Lucchina C.	3390	0,33	Meeting	631
1	Semplice	4000	0,33	Ottavia	789
1	Nipote	3000	0,33	Eva	466
1	Lucchino	10000	0,25	Gaetano S.	2640
1	Lucchino (1853)	400	0,25	Camogli	509
1	Maria Casabona	3650	0,25	Giorgina	625
0,5	Pellegra Figari	3000	0,17	Marequita	500
0,5	Monte A.	3500	0,17	Cognato	255
0,5	Zio Battista	4125	0,17	Temo	246
0,5	Maria Schiaffino	4553	0,17	Ascolta	277

⁵⁴⁵ ASGe, *Notai III sezione*, r. 678, n. 12.

0,5	Maria Madre	2068	0,17	David	350
0,5	Mio	2129	0,17	Po	313
0,5	Domenico	3079	0,17	Pellegro	210
0,5	Virginia	1505	0,17	Flora	116
0,5	Buoni Parenti	1088	0,17	Mio Padre	153
0,33	Duilio	2500	0,17	Beppino A.	738
0,33	Tre Fratelli	300	0,17	Michele	312
				Picasso	
0,33	Stefano	100			

Source: ASGe, *Notai III sezione*, r. 680, n. 556.

The impressive amount of *carati* shown in Table 5.7 provides us with an insight into the investment practices of Camogli shipowners. In total, Gaetano Schiaffino owned 35,60 *carati* belonging to forty-one different vessels, whose sum valued 175.630 lire. Contextualised within the assets and real estate transmitted to his underage son Martino, the investments of Gaetano in shipping accounted for 80,22% of the total⁵⁴⁶. Most of the value derived from the activities of the ship *Martino*, of which Gaetano was the shipowner and primary shareholder. Meanwhile, he diversified his investments and purchased more than 20 *carati* from forty other ships. In addition, more accurate examinations suggest that the investments covered a broad chronological arc. For instance, the acquisition of a share over the brig *Lucchino* (272 t.), built in 1853⁵⁴⁷, might have probably occurred a couple of decades before the one over the barque *Lucchino* (793 t.), built in 1876⁵⁴⁸. Furthermore, the variation

⁵⁴⁶ ASGe, *Notai III sezione*, r. 680, n. 556. At the end of the inventory, the notary had calculated an active capital of 218.928,40 lire, of which 175.630 derived from *carati*, 36.300 from real estates and the remaining 6.998 from minor belongings.

⁵⁴⁷ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1853). The brig *Lucchino* belonged to Biagio Olivari. It sailed along the Black Sea routes, at least from 1861 to 1865: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 6928 and serie 16, n. 4604 and 9078.

⁵⁴⁸ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1883). Also the barque *Lucchino* belonged to Biagio Olivari.

between different ship types (as emerges from the unitary values of the *carati*) allowed Gaetano to engage in various shipping markets. Sticking with our previous example, the maritime activities of a 20-years old brig of 272 tons must have been intrinsically dissimilar from those of a newly-built barque weighting 793 tons: such contrast is even more evident from the comparison of their unitary values, respectively 400 and 10.000.

Moreover, the *carati* presented a market value and were subjected to market exchanges as ordinary assets. Not surprisingly, it is possible to observe the creation of speculative operations around *carati* trading. Single *carati* and their subfractions demonstrated the rights of a person over a ship. Therefore, they could be sold both for need (as debt repayments) and for speculative purposes. In this regard, the operations of the already mentioned Fortunato Bertolotto, son of Michele, might represent a borderline case: in 1872, in only two months (from 18th February to 24th April), Fortunato undertook eighteen transactions of *carati* (ten of purchase, eight of selling). Through these movements, he purchased 140 *carati* for 73.000 lire and sold 103 *carati* for 49.000 lire⁵⁴⁹.

Summing it up, in the nineteenth century, the use of *carati* satisfied numerous needs of small-scale maritime communities: firstly, it enabled low-capital entrepreneurs to compete with more structured and foreign maritime actors; secondly, the interchangeability of *carati*, within a vibrant shipping environment, offered the tools for investments diversification and financial speculation. Together with the local mutual maritime insurance institution, the *carati* facilitated the development of the local shipping business and contributed to its success within the international shipping market.

5.3.2. THE SOCIETÀ DI MUTUA ASSICURAZIONE MARITTIMA CAMOGLIESE (1851)

Although the adoption of the *carati* system entailed the implementation of risk-spreading strategies, the foundation of a locally-based mutual insurance society represented a step forward and prompted other forms of self-protection and mutual collaboration.

⁵⁴⁹ ASGe, *Notai II sezione*, r. 1964, n. 28-134.

Recently, the history of maritime insurances has attracted the attention of several scholars, both stemming from the Italian and international environments⁵⁵⁰. According to the most extensive and straightforward definition, with maritime insurance, we identify every instrument used «to transfer the risks of navigation to a third party». Marine insurances could cover either cargoes or the ship itself (the modern hull and equipment): both of the applications are attested since the late Middle Ages⁵⁵¹. Historians agree on the asynchronous diffusion between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic and Northern Europe from a geographical perspective⁵⁵². In the latter regions, indeed, the introduction of marine insurances is imputed to the presence of Italian merchants and shipping operators in the Flanders, from which insurances would have spread in the nearby regions⁵⁵³.

Until the nineteenth century, most of the marine insurances were premium-based: the contractor paid a percentage of the insured value to the insurer in exchange for his risks coverage. Instead, mutual maritime insurances spread and established themselves as a reliable and profitable alternative only from the mid-nineteenth century onwards⁵⁵⁴. In particular, both Piergiovanni and Giacchero correlated the development of mutual insurance institutions to the specific historical and economic context of the Ligurian region under the Savoy domination. The depression of

⁵⁵⁰ For the Italian scenario, apart from the more classica references, see: G. Giacchero, *Storia delle assicurazioni marittime. L'esperienza genovese dal Medioevo all'età contemporanea*, Genova: Sagep, 1984; V. Piergiovanni, "Le assicurazioni marittime", in Id, *Norme, scienza e pratica giuridica tra Genova e l'Occidente medievale e moderno*, Genova: Atti della società ligure di storia patria, 2012, pp. 869-882; Idem, "L'Italia e le assicurazioni nel secolo XIX", in Id. *Norme, scienza e pratica giuridica*, pp. 827-868. For a recent comparative perspective, still influenced by several essays of Italian setting, see: A.B. Leonard (ed.), *Marine insurance. Origins and institutions, 1300-1850*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

⁵⁵¹ G. Giacchero, *Storia delle assicurazioni marittime*, pp. 78-79.

⁵⁵² D. De Ruysscher, "Antwerp 1490-1590: Insurance and speculation", in A.B. Leonard (ed.), *Marine insurance*, pp. 79-106; S. Go, "Amsterdam 1585-1790: Emergence, Dominance and Decline", in A.B. Leonard (ed.), *Marine insurance*, pp. 107-130; G. Rossi, "England 1523-1601: The Beginnings of Marine Insurance", in A.B. Leonard (ed.), *Marine insurance*, pp. 131-150.

⁵⁵³ See, . De Ruysscher, "Antwerp 1490-1590", p. 79.

⁵⁵⁴ G. Giacchero, *Storia delle assicurazioni marittime*, pp. 165-200; V. Piergiovanni, "Alle origine delle società mutue", in Id. *Norme, scienza e pratica giuridica*, pp. 1013-1032.

Ligurian shipping in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars was then followed by a new expansive phase that was not driven by the Genoese bourgeois but found its vital spark in the small communities of the Rivas. There, mutual insurance institutions spread from the mid-nineteenth century onwards: mutualism represented the alternative of the small scale to compete with big centres. Moreover, from a historiographic perspective, Giacchero and Piergiovanni reevaluated the mutual insurance institutions, which had previously suffered from prejudices of backwardness⁵⁵⁵. The primacy of the *Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese*, founded in 1851 as the first of its kind in Liguria, aroused most of the attention. Within historical discourses, the *Mutua* of Camogli was so crucial that historians coined the model of the nineteenth-century mutual insurances from this exemplar⁵⁵⁶.

In contrast with this attitude, before proceeding with the analysis of the *Mutua* and its role within the nineteenth-century shipping of Camogli, it is worth mentioning some antecedents of mutualistic forms of maritime insurances drawn from the international scenario, also in the attempt to stimulate the Italian historiography to re-discuss the theme under more comparative approaches. Recently, many attentions targeted the so-called «seamen's boxes» attested in various places from the early decades of the seventeenth century. In particular, the role of these boxes is questioned in most works about the Dutch Republic in the early modern period, mostly when the geographic scale is set on maritime communities⁵⁵⁷. Labelled as «seamen's boxes» or «insurance boxes», scholars have identified their core activity in mutual aid assistance for seamen who were captured at sea (in particular in the Mediterranean⁵⁵⁸) or fell sick during their service⁵⁵⁹. Conversely, Sabine C.P.J. Go

⁵⁵⁵ V. Piergiovanni, «Alle origine delle società mutue», in Id. *Norme, scienza e pratica giuridica*, pp. 1013-1032.

⁵⁵⁶ Both Giacchero and Piergiovanni, in the mentioned works, dealt with marine mutual insurances by the resorting to Camogli's exemplary institution: G. Giacchero, *Storia delle assicurazioni marittime*, pp. 165-200; V. Piergiovanni, «Alle origine delle società mutue», in Id. *Norme, scienza e pratica giuridica*, pp. 1013-1032.

⁵⁵⁷ See: K. Davids, «Seamen's Organizations and Social Protest in Europe, c. 1300-1825», *International Review of Social History*, No. 39, 1994, pp. 145-169; Id., «Local and global: Seafaring communities in the North Sea area, c. 1600-2000», *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 27:4, 2015, pp. 629-646.

⁵⁵⁸ See A. Zappia, *Mercanti di uomini. Reti e intermediari per la redenzione dei captivi nel Mediterraneo*, Novi Ligure: Città del Silenzio, 2018.

⁵⁵⁹ K. Davids, «Seamen's Organizations and Social Protest in Europe», pp. 151-156.

noted that, in the case of Groningen, the «insurance boxes» of one of the leading guilds of the town (gathering «Great Skippers») served precisely for insuring purposes⁵⁶⁰. More specifically, unambiguous references to forms of mutual marine insurances can be found within the regulations of this mutual box. The formal mechanisms differed in various regards from the nineteenth-century counterparts (for instance, refunds were still premium-based); nevertheless, being the primary purpose to share risks among a list of associated shipowners, the case of Groningen still represents an intriguing basis for comparison deserving more accurate studies.

Turning back to Camogli's *Mutua*, the *Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese* was founded in 1851 by the initiative of Giuseppe Degregori, Erasmo Schiaffino and his cousin Niccolò Schiaffino, who became the first president of the association. About the *Mutua* arose various studies of both academicians, such as the already mentioned Giacchero and Piergiovanni, and local historians, like G.B.R. Figari⁵⁶¹. Drawing from the rich archival collection kept in Camogli's maritime museum, Figari delineated the institutional development of the *Mutua*, from its foundation to its liquidation (1888), in proper research published in the series of *Quaderni del Museo*⁵⁶². Figari commented on the original statutes of the association by adding notes and legal considerations; he also provided a general framework of the historical evolution of the *Mutua*, contextualised with local dynamics⁵⁶³. Therefore, the chapter is limited to a general overview and, when possible, it aims at filling some gaps through archival findings.

In its original form – composed of 18 articles – and published in 1853 (a couple of years after the foundation), the first statute of the *Mutua* lacked a clear definition of its associational purposes. Ten

⁵⁶⁰ S. Go, “Mutual Marine Insurance in the Province of Groningen, c. 1605-1770: A case of financial innovation”, *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 17:1, 2005, pp. 123-149.

⁵⁶¹ Apart from the already mentioned works of Giacchero and Piergiovanni, we must mention here the considerable and valuable production of G.B.R. Figari about the *Mutua*: G.B.R. Figari, *La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: 1853-1888*, Quaderni del Museo, No. 4, 1976; G.B.R. Figari, S. Bagnato Bonuccelli, *La marina mercantile camogliese dalla guerra di Crimea all'Inchiesta Parlamentare Boselli: 1855-1882*, Genova: Tolozzi, 1983.

⁵⁶² CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, etc. The archival corpus concerning the *Mutua* is rather remarkable: the Museum possesses the original statute (1853) and its updates (1862 and 1868), plus the lists of the ships (1855, 1862, 1870, 1881) which we used sparsely in the text.

⁵⁶³ G.B.R. Figari, *La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: 1853-1888*, Quaderni del Museo, No. 4, 1976.

years later, these objectives were unambiguously declared in the second article: «the association has as its object the mutual insurance for every maritime risk, in deep-seas as in port, bay or coast, as a result of fires, pirates, robberies or due to the captain's and crew's guilt or incompetence; smuggling, forbidden trade, and war risks are excepted»⁵⁶⁴.

The functioning of the *Mutua* was straightforward: at subscription, each member paid a fee of 1% of the insured value⁵⁶⁵. After that, unless of unfortunate events, he retained his membership for three years (then increased to six). In case of wrecks, the captain or the shipowner would order a professional assessment of the damages. Then, the results were communicated to the *Mutua*. This phase was critical, and in many cases, the *Mutua* contested the first assessment and pretended to appoint trusted assessors for a new evaluation⁵⁶⁶. Once the disputes between the *Mutua* and the injured party were settled, the Director requested that associates pay their respective shares in 15 days. Finally, within a month, the Director forwarded the sum to the damaged insured.

A core rule of the statute prescribed a minimum number of associates (70, then 100): the reasons underlying this article aimed at keeping the average payments within a threshold level, beyond which resorting to the *Mutua* would have been unbearable⁵⁶⁷. Nonetheless, until the mid-1880s, the *Mutua* never suffered from reduced subscriptions; on the contrary, the number of the associates exceeded three hundred at its peak.

In 1860, in a report in which the Genoese Chamber of Commerce examined the phenomenon of mutual insurance institutions, these were praised for being «so useful that, in a short time, [they]

⁵⁶⁴ Personal translation from: Art. 2, Convenzione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese. Oggetto e condizioni della società, 1862, in G.B.R. Figari, *La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: 1853-1888*, pp. 9-18.

⁵⁶⁵ Art. 10, Statuti della Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese, in G.B.R. Figari, *La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: 1853-1888*, p. 2.

⁵⁶⁶ See, for instance, the litigation between the *Mutua*, represented by its director Bernardo Degregori, and Antonio Cichero, owner of the brig *Il Camogliano*, wrecked nearby Liverpool. The captain had proceeded with a first assessment reporting that the damages exceeded the 75% of the value and, as a result, the shipowner declared its formal abandonment. The director of the *Mutua* went to the Genoese Commercial Court to ask a new assessment, which was, in the end, denied. ASGe, *Tribunale di commercio*, Sentenze, 807, 68, 19 gennaio 1864.

⁵⁶⁷ Art. 17, Statuti della Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese, in G.B.R. Figari, *La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: 1853-1888*, p. 11.

obtained the consensus of almost all of the Ligurian shipowners [the reference is to all the Ligurian associations], and the best ships and most skilful captains are inscribed to them»⁵⁶⁸. More specifically, «the total value of the vessels enrolled within the two associations of Genoa and Camogli accounted for 22-23 million francs, over which shipowners saved, from insuring premia, mediations and commissions, more than 600.000 lire per year»⁵⁶⁹.

Notwithstanding the specific mechanisms, the restriction of the membership to shipowners and captains from Camogli represented a defining element of the association⁵⁷⁰. Even more pervasive was the rule according to which when shipowners formed the crews, they ought to prioritise captains born or living in Camogli; otherwise, the appointment of the captain was subordinated to the approval of the *Mutua* assembly⁵⁷¹.

The exclusion of the exogenous elements and the circumscription of all the relationships within a specific community-based pool was, indeed, a key factor for granting success to mutualistic institutions. Local exclusivity was the key to maintain the operations of the *Mutua* quick and effective. Being the members tied either by kin relationships or daily-basis acquaintances, infringing the rules, delaying payments or even refusing could lead to disasters. Negative behaviours could degenerate into the rupture of the business and commercial interactions with the whole community. Thus, the role of trust relationships in developing business, which was crucial in the early modern period, is perpetuated in small-scale and community-based associations. Mutual aid between ships and crews of the associates was mandatory in every situation (in addition to those cases for which consuetudinary laws already prescribed mutual aid, such as shipwrecks and rescues at sea); otherwise, the captain (we remind, forcibly from Camogli) would have been expelled from the association and «dishonoured»⁵⁷².

⁵⁶⁸ Relation discussed in the Genoese Chamber of Commerce (24th January 1860), in G. Giacchero, *Storia delle assicurazioni marittime*, p. 197.

⁵⁶⁹ *Idem*.

⁵⁷⁰ Art. 2, Statuti della Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese, in G.B.R. Figari, *La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: 1853-1888*, p. 2.

⁵⁷¹ Art. 7, *Idem*.

⁵⁷² *Ibidem*.

For its crucial weight within the design of the local shipping, the examination of the historical evolution of the *Mutua*, in terms of numbers of ships, types and values, would represent a mere repetition of the previous chapters. Instead, turning the perspective to shipowners might offer some valuable insights into the distribution of tonnage among the community members and isolate a few noteworthy individuals.

Also, some historians have exploited the list of agents of the *Mutua*. Scattered in the European and world ports, their presence is a strong testimonial of expanding the range within which Camogli's ships might have needed their assistance. Despite refraining from providing the whole lists, some key features must be noted.

In the early 1860s, the Black Sea trade absorbed the most considerable part of the fleet: the *Mutua* had agents in every relevant place, including Constantinople and Odessa, the ports of Azov (Kerch, Taganrog, Berdyansk, Mariupol) and Galatz. In this region, most of the agents were Italian resident merchants, not necessarily of Camogli's origins, but able to provide the required assistance to the captains (there are, among others, Dall' Orso, Tubino, Amoretti and Lanfranco). Moreover, the *Mutua* had its representatives at the opposite end of the trade, in the United Kingdom, since it had agents in London, Cardiff, Falmouth, Newcastle and Queenstown. Even there, except Gio. Bono Avegno, the agent in Cardiff, no people belonged to the community. Finally, the *Mutua* had agents in New York, Buenos Ayres and Lima, with Giovanni Figari (whose personal trajectory will be the object of a more accurate treatise in the last chapter) being the only one from Camogli⁵⁷³.

Conversely, the list of agents dating to 1881 is a clear expression of the dramatic geographical expansion that Camogli's maritime activities underwent in a couple of decades⁵⁷⁴. First of all, the total number of representatives passed from 31 to 65. Then, their spatial distribution was utterly uprooted. First, we observe the gradual withdrawal from the Black Sea region, with the disappearance of Taganrog, Mariupol and of the ports of Danube from the list. Secondly, there is an escalation of the number of agents in the British ports, with Belfast, Glasgow, Leith, Liverpool,

⁵⁷³ See, Agenti della Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese, in G.B.R. Figari, *La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: 1853-1888*, p. 19.

⁵⁷⁴ See, CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Rappresentanti all'estero dell'Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1881).

North-Shields and Great Yarmouth. Such dramatic intensification of representatives in this area is just one more indicator of the increased dependence of Camogli's shipping on British cross-trade. Thirdly, also the American continent witnessed the inclusion of new ports, like Baltimore, the Island of Bermuda, Montevideo (which was previously covered by the agent of Buenos Ayres) and Savannah. Finally, the Far East appeared for the first time with Batavia and Rangoon: evidently, the *Mutua* had recognized the first attempts of Camogli shipowners to enter the Indo-European trade by taking over the bulk trades around the Cape⁵⁷⁵.

In conclusion, not willing to anticipate anything about the crisis of the *Mutua*, since it will be treated in a much more comprehensive analysis targeting the almost total collapse of the local shipping system from the late 1870s, we will conclude with few words concerning the short-lasting competitor of the *Mutua*, the *Assicurazione Marittima "Nuova Camogliese"*.

5.3.3. THE FOUNDATION OF THE NUOVA CAMOGLIESE (1873-1878)

In autumn 1872, thirty-three dissident members of the *Mutua* decided to withdraw and gather in a new concurrent institution, the *Assicurazione Marittima "Nuova Camogliese"*, officially founded on the 5th January 1873⁵⁷⁶. According to local reconstructions, both political and economic factors might have weighed in the determination of the rupture; the rebellious association was composed by the so-called *liberali*, who opposed the conservative party of the *paolotti* that remained in the original *Mutua*⁵⁷⁷. Gio. Bono Ferrari repeatedly wrote about the existence of this political rivalry to outline the ardent political environment of the post-unitarian period. In particular, the conflict involved the figure of Garibaldi: the “Hero of Two Worlds” enjoyed broad support among the younger

⁵⁷⁵ See, Chapter 3.

⁵⁷⁶ To investigate the history of this institution, there are just a few and sparse documents: apart from the statute, reported by G.B.R. Figari, even in the notarial and processual sources there are few references.

⁵⁷⁷ The political rivalry between these two parties is mentioned in G.B. Ferrari, *La città dei mille bianchi velieri*, pp. 418-421; 456-457.

generations of Camogli, also because of his professional maritime background⁵⁷⁸. For example, Simone Schiaffino, of the *liberali*, participated in the "Expedition of the Thousand" and perished in Calatafimi⁵⁷⁹. Giovanni Razeto, as said, named his two ships *Dittatore Garibaldi* and *Anita Garibaldi* and, allegedly, kept a regular correspondence with the "Hero of Two Worlds"⁵⁸⁰. Finally, when the greatest Italian shipowners gathered in Camogli for the First General Conference of Italian Shipowners (1880), they dedicated their assembly to Garibaldi, who even sent his greetings to the participants⁵⁸¹.

Furthermore, in the opinions of G.B.R. Figari, the members of the group gathered in the *Nuova Camogliese* shared a cutting-edge vision of the shipping business, based on single ship properties and the avoidance of *carati*⁵⁸². The absence of institutional sources produced by the association had prevented previous historians even from identifying the associates. Thus, there was no means either to support or to oppose these assumptions. Recently, the overview of the processual documents produced by the Trade Court of Genoa⁵⁸³ allowed us to gather some data and, thus, start with identifying the members.

Table 5.8. List of shipowners enrolled on the *Nuova Camogliese*.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Surname</i>	<i>Ship</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Surname</i>	<i>Ship</i>
<i>Fortunato</i>	Ansaldo	<i>Alfa</i>	Antonio	Marini	<i>Adelfide</i>
<i>Gio. Batta</i>	Ansaldo	<i>Mia Madre</i>			<i>Marini A.</i>
		<i>Occidente</i>	Giovanni	Mortola	<i>Pontida</i>

⁵⁷⁸ See, G.B.R. Figari and R. Buelli (eds.), *Camogli paese modello... : 1815-1915: uomini e storie del Risorgimento : catalogo [della mostra]*: Camogli, Castello della Dragonara, 30 luglio - 30 ottobre 2005, Genova: Corigraf, 2004.

⁵⁷⁹ G.B. Ferrari, *La città dei mille bianchi velieri*, pp. 418-419.

⁵⁸⁰ Idem, pp. 429-430.

⁵⁸¹ See, *infra*.

⁵⁸² G.B.R. Figari and S. Bagnato Bonuccelli, *La marina mercantile camogliese*, pp. 81-82.

⁵⁸³ About this institution, see: G.S. Pene Vidari, "I tribunali di commercio", in Assereto G., Bitossi C. and Merlin P. (eds.), *Genova e Torino. Quattro secoli di incontri e scontri*, Genova: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 2015, pp. 377-398.

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		<i>Venti Settembre</i>	Nicolò	Mortola	<i>Ida</i>
<i>Gio. Batta</i>	Avegno	<i>Armida</i>	Filippo	Olivari	<i>Riconoscente</i>
		<i>Diadema</i>	Prospero	Olivari	<i>Favorita</i>
<i>Fortunato</i>	Bellagamba	<i>Matilde Bellagamba</i>			<i>Teresa Ester</i>
<i>Diego</i>	Bertolotto	<i>Abele</i>	Gio. Batta	Olivari	<i>Affezione</i>
<i>Giuseppe</i>	Bertolotto	<i>Virginia</i>	Luigi	Olivari	<i>Affezione C.</i>
<i>Emanuele</i>	Boggiano	<i>Fedele</i>	Gaetano	Pellerano	<i>Po</i>
<i>Filippo</i>	Boggiano	<i>Sperimento</i>	Giuseppe	Pellerano	<i>Adem</i>
<i>Giuseppe</i>	Bozzo	<i>Luigi</i>	Luigi	Pellerano	<i>Suez</i>
<i>Andrea</i>	Cichero	<i>Manin Cichero</i>	Emanuele	Schiaffino	<i>Ottavina</i>
<i>Antonio</i>	Cichero	<i>Mirra</i>	Filippo	Schiaffino	<i>Armonia</i>
<i>Gio. Bono</i>	Cichero	<i>Nuovo Dovere</i>	Gaetano	Schiaffino	<i>Amalia</i>
<i>Fortunato</i>	Cuneo	<i>Sì</i>			<i>Catterina</i>
<i>Antonio</i>	Degregori	<i>Sei Fratelli</i>			<i>Prospero</i>
<i>Fortunato</i>	Degregori	<i>Giulia</i>	Prospero	Schiaffino	<i>Catterina Doge</i>
<i>Luigi</i>	Degregori	<i>Semplice</i>			<i>Fratelli Doge</i>
<i>Gio. Batta</i>	Figari	<i>Po</i>			<i>Prospero Doge</i>
<i>Maria</i>	Figari	<i>Fortunato</i>	Prospero	Schiaffino	<i>Piccino</i>
<i>Prospero</i>	Figari	<i>Messina</i>	Andrea	Simonetti	<i>Simonetti</i>
<i>Fortunato</i>	Marini	<i>Fortunato</i>	Gaetano	Valle	<i>Memore</i>

Source: ASGe, *Tribunale di commercio*, Sentenze, 889-900; 913-924; 937-948.

From 1874 to 1878, the shipowners listed in Table 5.8 were involved in processual litigations between the original *Mutua* and the *Nuova Camogliese*. The biggest group is composed of thirty-one shipowners who passed directly from the *Mutua* to the new one. They were brought to court by Prospero Schiaffino, Director of the *Mutua*, willing to enforce the payment of the wrecks that

occurred in the past year (1874)⁵⁸⁴. According to G.B.R. Figari, the litigants found an elaborate agreement which involved a third party, the *Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima "La Fiducia Ligure"*. The *Fiducia Ligure* was one of the most successful mutual marine insurance association of Genoa. Apparently, in virtue of private agreements with the direction of the *Nuova Camogliese* (in 1876, Giacomo Schiaffino is the Director⁵⁸⁵) and Fortunato Bertolotto, director of the credit institution *Banco Camogliese Fortunato Bertolotto*, the *Fiducia Ligure* offered to repay the pending debts left by the dissidents.

The involvement of Fortunato Bertolotto arose from the strict correlation between the *Nuova Camogliese* and his interests. The statute expressed in various articles a sort of financial dependency from the *Banco Bertolotto*. Indeed, all the cash operations ought to pass through the *Banco*. More specifically: article 20 prescribed that, at the moment of associating, every member ought to pay to the *Banco F. Bertolotto* an anticipation fee equal to 1% of the insured value; article 25 deputed the *Banco F. Bertolotto* to the collection of fines and financial interests which associates would be required to pay; finally, the article 51 recognised the right of the *Banco F. Bertolotto* to yearly withdraw 0,20% of the total insured values in exchange of the administrative services performed⁵⁸⁶. Nevertheless, the fortunes of the *Nuova Camogliese* did not last long, albeit the involvement of wealthy and skilful shipowners (e.g. in the 1880s, Emanuele Boggiano owned one of the most modern and bigger fleets of Camogli), and the alliance with the most potent Fortunato Bertolotto (even elected mayor in 1874). The commitment to Bertolotto and his bank turned out to be decisive in determining its disaster when it was dragged to the bottom by the sudden collapse of Camogli's shipping finances.

⁵⁸⁴ ASGe, *Tribunale di commercio*, Sentenze, 894, n. 1120-1153.

⁵⁸⁵ *Idem*, 920, n. 1085.

⁵⁸⁶ See, artt. 20-25-51, Statuto Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Nuova Camogliese, in G.B.R. Figari, *La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: 1853-1888*, pp. 31-33.

5.4. The rising phase: the investments toward the community (1850s-1870s)

Notwithstanding shipping business, the period lasting from the frequentation of the Black Sea ports to the first ventures along the oceanic routes played a crucial role in developing the community as a whole.

Although a significant part of the maritime revenues was reinvested into new ship constructions – which led Camogli to gather one of the most important fleets of the Mediterranean – a great wealth remained within the community. It was destined for various projects and was instrumental to the development of the town in several regards. Within these designs, the active role of shipowners in the community's political, social and economic life was essential.

As the most prominent community members, the class of shipowners engaged to local administration with continuity: some served as mayors, many as council members. As noted by Figari and Bagnato Bonuccelli, already in 1848, out of thirteen members of the town council, eleven belonged to the maritime elites, including the mayor, Francesco Schiaffino⁵⁸⁷. Then, various families followed each other at the top of the city administration: Schiaffino, Bellagamba, Ansaldo, Mortola, Bozzo were all surnames of shipowners who were elected mayors during the 1850s and the 1860s. Then, in the mid of an expansive economic phase, the election of Fortunato Bertolotto in 1874 coincided with the most impressive achievements, right before a downward spiral led Camogli to its most profound crisis.

Unable to deal with all the projects, this section focuses on two primary elements: educational institutions (e.g. the nautical school) and recreative places (in particular, the Social Theatre).

⁵⁸⁷ G.B.R. Figari and S. Bagnato Bonuccelli, *La marina mercantile camogliese*, p. 121. The town council was composed as such: Francesco Schiaffino, mayor; Gio. Batta Ansaldo, Antonio Olivari, Bernardo Olivari, Giacomo Brignati e Prospero Costa, regular councilmen; Giuseppe Olivari, Gio. Batta Olivari, Andrea Tassara, Bernardo Queirolo, Fortunato Bellagamba, Michelangelo Chiesa, Gerolamo Oneto, Gaetano Schiaffino, deputy councilmen. Among them, only Tassara and Queirolo were not shipowners.

5.4.1. THE INSTITUTION OF THE NAUTICAL SCHOOL (1874)

Still, in the 1870s, local shipowners and the administrative authorities decided to centralise the nautical education to Camogli to provide continuity to the long-standing maritime traditions of the place. Before that, countless captains used to obtain an informal education in private schools⁵⁸⁸ or, otherwise, went to the nautical school of Genoa, founded at the beginning of the century.

Arguably, the decision stemmed from the positive shipping phase which Camogli was experiencing and was also in line with the proliferation of similar institutions in the surrounding towns, as in Recco, Rapallo or Chiavari. It was natural that Camogli's elites, aspiring to stand apart from the local milieu, conceived as overwhelmingly attractive the possibility to host a nautical school in their territory.

Thus, in 1874, the school was founded – the town administration being led by Fortunato Bertolotto – and the activities started the following year. To emerge among the many competitors, the town requested the Ministry of Education the “governmental” label, a prestigious formal recognition. Its obtainment, however, was slowed down by the high competition in the area. In 1878, the closure of the schools of Recco and Rapallo led the government to grant the demanded acknowledgement⁵⁸⁹. Nonetheless, though the nautical school (in 1882 entitled to Cristoforo Colombo) was steered in a prosperous direction, the materialisation of various issues in the early 1880s put a strain on its development. After creating a program for naval engineers (1883) to attract more students, the town council lamented its inability to cover the costs and opted for suppressing the school.

Indeed, the community's economic conditions had radically changed from the previous decade: the global adverse conjuncture for maritime freights and more locally-based issues had impoverished the class of shipowners and, by extension, the community itself. Nonetheless, in the government's

⁵⁸⁸ Various information are reported about a school founded in 1780, which lasted until the end of the Napoleonic period. Then, the education of the future captains was administered on a private basis: there some testimonies about the activity of the local priest Erasmo Schiaffino and about other initiatives of this kind. See, M.S. Rollandi, *Istruzione e sviluppo nella Liguria marittima (1815-1921)*, Genova: Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 2005, pp. 352-353; G. Guidotti, “Il nautico di Camogli dalla Fondazione ai giorni nostri”, in *Il Nautico. 1875-1975*, numero unico a cura del Comune di Camogli e dell'Istituto Nautico “C. Colombo”, 1975, p. 9.

⁵⁸⁹ Idem, pp. 354-355.

eyes, the nautical school of Camogli had now become strategic and, therefore, received extraordinary contributions⁵⁹⁰. From this moment onwards, however, it is possible to observe the following dialectic between the town and the central state: the former repeatedly threatened to shut down the institute, and the latter responded with the grant of extraordinary subsidies⁵⁹¹.

The pivotal studies of M.S. Rollandi about the life and activities of the institute delineate relatively good numbers. After the promising beginning in 1874, with 114 students, the school entered into a troublesome phase for a decade (1877-1887), during which the average enrolled students were slightly more than seventy (72,45). Then, in the wake of few remarkably positive years (in 1892 the number was 125), the institute entered again in a depressing trend (whose worst result corresponded to 57 students in 1895), from which recovered only with the turn of the century (an average of 143,5 students per year between 1900 and 1914)⁵⁹². Besides, Rollandi outlined some qualitative analysis about the origins and the class into which the students enrolled (deck officials or engineers). Therefore, her studies provide an even more accurate evaluation of the quantitative figure. The first noteworthy element corresponds to the percentage of the students residing in Camogli, which passed from 82,36% (1875-1878) to 37,17% before the First World War. Throughout this period, the turning point occurred in the late 1890s, before definitively established in the 1900s⁵⁹³.

Apart from the most proximal area (Recco, Sori, Pieve and Bogliasco), it is possible to observe how, in the twentieth century, the contribution of the province of La Spezia steadily increased until the 13,36%. On the same level, the rise of the group labelled as «other Italians» might be even more impressive, as it exceeded 15% in the last period.

These data provide an unconventional insight into the conditions of local shipping and the interconnections between the nautical school and Camogli seafarers. In the beginning, the primary

⁵⁹⁰ Idem, p. 356.

⁵⁹¹ Again in 1887, the town council decided for its closure just to be receive extraordinary subsidies from the Ministry. The suppression of the school of Chiavari, one of the last remaining in the area, convinced even more the government to sustain the institute of Camogli. Idem, p. 356-358.

⁵⁹² Data drawn from: M.S. Rollandi, *Istruzione e sviluppo*, pp. 362-364.

⁵⁹³ Idem, p. 369.

pool from which students could be gathered was that of Camogli: the fleet numbers and the characteristics of the labour system – defined as «endogenous» in the next chapter – allowed the school to count on significant and continuous inflows of students. The foundation of the nautical school was instrumental to creating a locally-based shipping system, in which the community itself provided the basic requirements for shipping (capital, maritime insurances, supplies of specialized seafarers and low workforce).

Later, the chain failure of the nearby competitors – though its fruits became substantial only from the new century – rendered Camogli a collecting centre for nautical education within the whole region lying eastward than Genoa.

Finally, the last key to interpreting the quantitative data of the school corresponds to the numeric comparison between the class of engineers and deck officials. In the most critical phase of sail shipping, engineers represented a suitable alternative to deck professions: from 1886 to 1897, the two categories almost rivalled with each other, and in 1887 and 1888, engineers outnumbered the class of deck officials⁵⁹⁴. In the twentieth century, however, captains and mates regained their primacy until 1913. Theoretically, the crisis of sail would have been a factor in pushing prospective seafarers to engine careers: in fact, few people from Camogli found employment aboard steamers, almost none as engineers⁵⁹⁵. The sailing tradition of Camogli was too deep-rooted, and the entanglements between shipowners and deck officials were too robust for the system to leave valuable human resources which could pursue engineering careers.

5.4.2. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE TEATRO SOCIALE OF CAMOGLI (1876)

Although a significant part of the efforts aimed to improve the community's infrastructural and economic resources, some energies were channelled into alternative projects. The case of the

⁵⁹⁴ Idem, pp. 362-363.

⁵⁹⁵ See, chapter 5.

construction of the Social Theatre of Camogli⁵⁹⁶, for example, can be perceived as an attempt to raise the cultural level of the community and to consolidate the social status of its elites, transformed by the vertiginous economic escalation of the previous years. These social and educational purposes were made clear in the shareholders' first declarations at the moment of the foundation: the theatre was built «to embellish the city, to bring prestige to the promoters who associated their names to a magnificent work, and to be the vehicle to educate and instruct the population»⁵⁹⁷.

Started in 1874, the foundation of the Social Theatre involved many shipowners: among the leading personalities, it is possible to recognize Fortunato Bertolotto, president and legal representative of the Society. Indeed, the foundation of a social theatre envisaged the creation of a formal association, composed of shareholders, who financed and administered the theatre's activities.

Anna Pizzi Baroffio, relying on posterior sources and testimonies, ascribed the foundation of the theatre to the liberal faction of Camogli⁵⁹⁸. Instead, the examination of Camogli's notarial deeds disclosed an outstanding source, witnessing the formal partition of the theatre boxes assigned to each shareholder by the draft process⁵⁹⁹. This source is remarkable for a double set of reasons: first, for its objective historical importance associated with the role which the Social Theatre played within the community; secondly, it is fundamental to identify some of the members of the mentioned liberal faction, which overlaps with the second generation of shipowners of Camogli and, for extension, corresponds to many subscribers of the *Nuova Camogliese*.

The list of coparticipants was composed of sixty-one people, all shipowners born and resident in Camogli, except for the notary Marco Mosto and the doctor Luigi Leale, born in Pozzolo Formigaro

⁵⁹⁶ The main bibliographical reference is constituted by the essay of Anna Pizzi Baroffio, who studied the activities of the theatre from its foundation to the second half of the twentieth century. See: A. Pizzi Baroffio, "Il Teatro Sociale di Camogli: eventi", in G.B.R. Figari (ed.), *Camogli da borgo a città*, pp. 86-132.

⁵⁹⁷ ASGe, *Notai III Sezione*, b. 679, n. 235.

⁵⁹⁸ A. Pizzi Baroffio, "Il Teatro Sociale di Camogli", pp. 92-93.

⁵⁹⁹ ASGe, *Notai III Sezione*, b. 679, n. 235. The notary was Angelo Doberti: the division took place within the hall of the theatre, on the 21st September 1876.

(Lombardy) but living in Camogli⁶⁰⁰. During the operations, all the sixty theatre boxes belonging to the first three levels were distributed – by draft – to the associates in proportion with the shares. The primary shareholder was, not surprisingly – being president and inspirator – Fortunato Bertolotto, son of Michele, to whom belonged four shares and, therefore, four boxes; then, apart from Giovanni Schiaffino, son of Erasmo, who had two shares, the remaining participants possessed only one share each; some of them even at half.

The juxtaposition of the list of shareholders of the Social Theatre with the members of the *Nuova Camogliese* led us to single out twenty-two recurring people. Given the incompleteness of the subscribers of the *Nuova Camogliese* obtained through the Trade Court papers, the process might provide even more consistent results. Leaving aside Fortunato Bertolotto, some of the most prominent shipowners of Camogli appeared in both of the lists: still in 1881, ten of them possessed almost 20 ships in the mid of the crisis. The list included Emanuele Boggiano, owner of the barques *Fedele* (478 t.), *Quaker's City* (872 t.) and *Rocco Schiaffino* (1030 t.); Andrea Cichero, who had inscribed to the *Mutua* his ships *Lucchina C.* (529 t.) and *Manin Cichero* (540 t.) and Antonio Degregori, son of Agostino, to whom belonged the barques *Ricordo* (781 t.) and *Sei Fratelli* (577 t.)⁶⁰¹. To the Social Theatre also participated Fortunato Ottone, owner of three barques, the *Antonietta O.* (941 t.), the *Madre Rosa* (740 t.) and the *Ottone* (644 t.)⁶⁰².

These people might be indeed reconducted to the so-called "second generation of shipowners", the descendants of those who guided the community through the Black Sea phase. They usually owned more than one ship and engaged steadily in the oceanic freight market, as emerged from the dealings of Emanuele Boggiano in London, mentioned in the previous chapter⁶⁰³.

Resuming with the economic organisation and the fortunes of the social theatre, this notarial deed allows us to advance the following considerations. Firstly, the ownership of theatre boxes constituted only one of the shareholders' benefits. The theatre had four rows, but only the boxes of

⁶⁰⁰ Ibidem.

⁶⁰¹ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Elenco dei bastimenti iscritti nella Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese (1883).

⁶⁰² Ibidem.

⁶⁰³ See Chapter 3.

the first three were distributed among the associates. The last one was reserved for outsiders, and the revenues from their selling and their hiring were divided accordingly⁶⁰⁴. Moreover, trading theatre boxes was an allowed practice, both between members and outsiders: the ownership could be alienated, but such operation did not lead to the automatic transfer of the relative shares. In this regard, a general survey of notarial sources led us to identify various transactions involving the purchase or sale of theatre boxes. According to these documents, the value of the boxes could vary depending upon their position: in 1891, for example, Assunta Schiaffino, daughter of Lorenzo, had inherited a first-line theatre box and sold it to Lorenzo Mortola for 300 lire plus 50 more for the furniture⁶⁰⁵. A few months later, Stefano Repetto, son of Gio. Batta Gaetano "Perrucca", purchased a second line box for 250 plus 50 lire from Gottardo Bertolotto⁶⁰⁶. In the same year, however, the liquidators of one of the local credit institutions, the *Banca operaia marittima*, assessed the value of the theatre boxes as «reduced to almost nothing»⁶⁰⁷.

Indeed, after a promising beginning from the cultural and economic point of view, the theatre's activities followed a downward trend. The economic crisis affecting the city from the early 1880s was reflected in the cultural programme: operas and dramaturgy gradually rarefied to be substituted by private feasts, conferences and public assemblies (in 1880, the First General Congress of Italian Shipowners took place in the hall of the theatre)⁶⁰⁸.

5.5. Camogli's shipowners in front of transition (1874-1888)

In the early 1870s, the favourable conditions of the international freight market, the gross revenues of maritime business and the abundant availability of credit created the conditions for a rapid

⁶⁰⁴ ASGe, *Notai III Sezione*, b. 679, n. 235.

⁶⁰⁵ ASGe, *Notai III sezione*, b. 1614, n. 174.

⁶⁰⁶ ASGe, *Notai III sezione*, b. 1615, n. 325. In this context, the notary also provides a brief description of the furniture, which consisted of «a golden mirror and four wooden chairs».

⁶⁰⁷ *Idem*, n. 173.

⁶⁰⁸ A. Pizzi Baroffio, "Il Teatro Sociale di Camogli", pp. 95-105.

expansion of the town of Camogli (which in 1877 was given the status of «city») under all regards: economic, infrastructural, political, and cultural. Nevertheless, the future decline for sailing vessels, the appearance of negative shipping cycles, in which the fall of freights played a critical role, were all factors in determining a radical inversion of the trend. The late 1870s crisis hit Camogli and its shipowners harshly and strain on the survivability of the local shipping system. Many factors, both endogenous and exogenous, contributed to the escalation of such a crisis. First, resuming the personal trajectory of Fortunato Bertolotto, we will examine the hypertrophic growth of Camogli's shipping system, which led to the large chain of bankruptcies of 1878. Then, resorting to the activism of the local institutions to elicit a national discussion about the conditions of the merchant marine and the measures to be taken to improve them, we will evaluate the response of the local shipowners to the test of time. In broader terms, the last paragraph will try to identify and examine the attitudes and proposals of Camogli shipowners towards transition and, therefore, the reasons which brought them to opt for resilience within marginal sailing freight markets instead of converting to steam.

5.5.1. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMUNITARIAN MARITIME CREDIT SYSTEM (1878-1888)

The late 1870s represented a crucial breakthrough for Camogli's history. On the one side, the international freight market entered a downward spiral, which hampered the development of Camogli. On the other side, local events brought the community to the edge of a collective bankruptcy, which severely damaged the local business structure and limited the shipowners' ability to react to the ongoing shipping transformations.

The role of Fortunato Bertolotto, son of Michele, within this framework was critical. Leaving aside his shipowning career, Fortunato Bertolotto became a point of reference for many shipowners, as a banker, politician, or, more generally, as a leading member of the community⁶⁰⁹. In this case, the

⁶⁰⁹ See, above for his shipping properties. Compare also with his influence in the matters of the *Nuova Camogliese*, in the decision to found the Nautical School and as president of the Social Theatre. In general, about this fundamental

primary interest lies in the foundation and administration of the *Banco Camogliese Fortunato Bertolotto*, a credit institution that became hugely influential throughout the 1870s. As G.B.R. Figari reported, the *Banco Camogliese* was founded in 1870 as a limited partnership, with an initial capital stock of 800.000 lire, which increased to 1.500.000 in the following year⁶¹⁰. As seen, the *Banco Camogliese* handled the administrative operations of the mutual insurance *Nuova Camogliese*, from which it retained 0,20% of the total insured value per year⁶¹¹.

From notarial sources and the papers left by the Trade Court of Genoa, it is possible to infer how Fortunato Bertolotto – who, meanwhile, in 1874 was elected mayor, founded the nautical school and led the construction of the social theatre – played a critical role in financing and supporting the life of the community and, in particular, its shipping sector. Firstly, he exerted almost absolute control on the mutual insurance *Nuova Camogliese*; secondly, in his role of director of the *Banco Camogliese*, Fortunato Bertolotto supplied with outstanding amounts of maritime credit the community of Camogli and, in particular, the group of people of his closest acquaintance – most of them found in the *Nuova Camogliese* or as subscribers of the Social Theatre. The resources to sustain such a great endeavour consisted of stocks of the *Cassa Marittima*, a private credit institution located in Genoa. As seen in Chapter 3, in the early 1870s, the fleet of Camogli was systematically enlarged and transformed into a modern tramp fleet to engage in the oceanic markets⁶¹². Meanwhile, Bertolotto's financial operations must have provided a fundamental contribution to these processes, as confirmed by the numbers of his fleet (from four to nine vessels) and by those of his closest collaborators (see Table 5.8).

figure for the history of Camogli, there are various contributions produced by local historians. Gio. Bono Ferrari, for instance, mentions his nickname “*Barbin*” and, furthermore, outlines his rather apologetic portray: G.B. Ferrari, *La città dei mille bianchi velieri*, pp. 422-424. According to Ferrari, Fortunato Bertolotto enjoyed of an outstanding reputation among the society of Camogli's shipowners: nevertheless, most of the events and the characteristics of the role which Bertolotto covered in the years of crisis, which we reconstructed from archival sources, found implicit confirmations in Ferrari's account.

⁶¹⁰ G.B.R. Figari, *La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: 1853-1888*, p. 29.

⁶¹¹ See, above.

⁶¹² See Chapter 3.

In 1877, however, the hypertrophic financial system set up by Fortunato Bertolotto started to waver. The first element to fall was the *Nuova Camogliese*, which had suffered from scarce subscriptions from the moment of its foundation. In 1862, the original *Mutua* had prescribed a minimum number of associates of one hundred members to cover the costs of possible wrecks and accidents and maintain the singular expenses to sustainable levels⁶¹³. The *Nuova Camogliese* never reached these numbers and handled bigger ships, resulting in more expensive mutual repartitions. As liquidators were appointed Giacomo Schiaffino and Pellegrino Marciani, subscribers of the *Nuova Camogliese*⁶¹⁴. Afterwards, it was the turn of the *Banco Camogliese* to collapse. In February 1877, Fortunato Bertolotto had mortgaged his real estates to cover loans for 120.000 lire: his properties were composed of a mansion, three apartments, two pieces of land – one cultivated with vineyards, the other with olives – and a building under construction, consisting of eight apartments⁶¹⁵. Then, in autumn, the *Banco Camogliese* entered in liquidation: Emanuele Boggiano (shipowner), Gio. Batta Mosto (notary) and Luigi Degregori (shipowner), who represented the *Banco* in court against both its creditors (mainly the *Cassa marittima*) and debtors (half of the shipowners of Camogli and Fortunato Bertolotto himself). The obtainment of a neat picture of all the ongoing trials turned out to be impossible; nonetheless, the court papers shed light on some significant features. Firstly, the *Banco* and many shipowners had contracted loans with the *Cassa marittima* for hundreds of thousands of lire. In collecting its credits, the *Cassa marittima* moved in two directions: on the one hand, it sought the condemnation of Fortunato Bertolotto for more than 500.000 lire in stocks as director of the *Banco*⁶¹⁶. The legal action involved the foreclosure and preservation of Bertolotto's private properties: then, he was condemned to the payment of 155.000 lire.

⁶¹³ See, footnote 98.

⁶¹⁴ These two figures are mentioned in various litigations and liquidations concerning the *Nuova Camogliese* and its associates. For instance, see: ASGe, *Tribunale di commercio*, Fallimenti, r. 1603-1605; Idem, *Sentenze*, r. 941, n. 537.

⁶¹⁵ ASGe, *Notai III Sezione*, b. 680, n. 404.

⁶¹⁶ ASGe, *Tribunale di commercio*, *Sentenze*, r. 944, 1220.

Secondly, the *Cassa marittima* sued many morose shipowners, who had indebted themselves through Bertolotto's intermediation. This processual course of action generated dozens of trials⁶¹⁷. Meanwhile, in virtue of their role, the liquidators of the *Banco* began analogous credit collections from the morose associates and called to trial Fortunato Bertolotto himself. According to their conclusive report, Fortunato Bertolotto had alienated 2397 and a half shares of the *Cassa Marittima* from the *Banco* to his personal properties: thus, on 13th August 1878, Bertolotto was condemned to refund the *Banco* for 239.950 lire.

From a broader perspective, the meltdown of the financial bubble – in which it is impossible to deny Bertolotto's responsibilities – occurred within an already deteriorated framework (the freights contraction) and, thus, paved the way for serial bankruptcies among shipowners. Indeed, just in 1878, nine shipowners bankrupted with an aggregate liability of 3.794.276 lire⁶¹⁸.

This fact opens a stimulating window on the traditional arguments used by historians to explicate the unsuccessful transition from sail to steam of small-scale seafaring communities. Indeed, the lack of transition is often ascribed to the absence or insufficiency of maritime credit⁶¹⁹. Quite the opposite, contemporary observers pointed out the dramatic effects of credit overabundance, which allowed improvised individuals to engage in shipping without possessing skills and a well-rounded knowledge of the international freight market. In this regard, it is possible to mention the words of Ulrico Risch (Director of the Risch-Eberle company, creditor) and Luigi Pescetto (Director of the *Cassa Marittima*, major creditor). In the pages of their conclusive report as liquidators of Antonio Olivari, son of Emanuele, bankrupted with 428.500 lire of passive, they lucidly expressed the reasons underlying the generalised crisis of Camogli's shipping:

[...] based on all these reasons, we can infer that a potential cause of disasters lied in the fact that those shipowners had built their ships counting on (we should say abusing of) the advantages provided by a large availability of credit.

⁶¹⁷ Idem, r. 937-948. For instance, we can mention the trials against Niccolò Mortola (15.000 It. Lira), Prospero Schiaffino and Gio. Batta Ansaldo (24.000 It. Lira), Santo Sanguineti (8.000 It. Lira), Giuseppe Brigneti (17.000 It. Lira).

⁶¹⁸ ASGe, *Tribunale di commercio*, Fallimenti, 1602-1604.

⁶¹⁹ See, in particular, M. Doria, "Attività economiche e cambiamento nei secoli di un borgo rivierasco", in C. Campondonico and M. Doria (eds.), *Camogli: persistenza e trasformazioni di un borgo di mare*, pp. 30-31.

It often happens that the value of the interests on these sums, besides granting the expected profits, added to the original debt, thus making it grows indefinitely. This assumption seems to find a confirmation in the bankruptcy of Antonio Olivari, since, from the inspection of his conditions, it was easily noted that he had undertaken the construction of his ships without no personal means or at least possessing a capital commensurate to the stature of the affair, but, on the contrary, relying on the abundant availability of credit, often awarded lightly.⁶²⁰

The broad availability of credit was a recurring argument for liquidators to identify the underlying reasons for bankruptcies. In the case of Gio. Batta Ansaldo, son of Filippo, they denounced «the abuse of credit and the excessive range of operations»⁶²¹. Then, they added, «disposing of limited capitals, he [Ansaldo] engaged to seaborne trade on a large scale and, lacking the financial means, resorted to credit by exploiting the good reputation the shipowners of Camogli enjoyed»⁶²².

The list of their debts can highlight, once more, the prominent role of the *Banco Bertolotto* and the *Cassa marittima*. As emerges from Table 5.9, these institutions contributed to form the financial bubble denounced by most of the liquidators in their memories.

Table 5.9. List of credits of *Nuova Camogliese*, *Banco Camogliese Fortunato Bertolotto* and *Cassa marittima* toward bankrupted Camogli's shipowners.

	<i>Antonio Olivari</i>	<i>Pellegrino Schiaffino</i>	<i>Bartolomeo Figari</i>	<i>Cristino Razeto</i>	<i>Gio. Batta Ansaldo</i>	<i>Gio. Batta Demarchi</i>	<i>Prospero Schiaffino</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Nuova Camogliese</i>	3.000	2.944		2.000		1.400	1.900	11.244

⁶²⁰ ASGe, *Tribunale di commercio*, Fallimenti, r. 1602, n. 472, Deposito di relazione da parte degli stralciari del fallimento di Antonio Olivari fu Emanuele.

⁶²¹ Idem, r. 1604, n. 799. Liquidators of this bankruptcy were Gio. Batta Patrone and David Viale.

⁶²² Idem.

<i>Banco</i>	19.000			29.000	23.000	12.400	57.000	140.400
<i>Bertolotto</i>								
<i>Cassa</i>	100.000	6.274	11.152	117.000	25.000		87.000	346.426
<i>Marittima</i>								

Source: ASGe, *Tribunale di commercio*, Fallimenti, 1602-1605.

Also, another feature – limitedly to the cases of Pellegrino Schiaffino, Gio. Batta Ansaldo, Gio. Batta Demarchi, Bartolomeo Figari and Prospero Schiaffino – related to the existence of a so-called «*giro di comodo*», namely the practice to share among many people revenues and debts deriving from personal obligations⁶²³.

Despite apparently innocuous, it was labelled as a «malicious system of loans and traffic of promissory notes», a «reckless practice» because «whereas the revenues were divided among the informal associates, at the same time they contracted the whole debt personally»⁶²⁴. Resorting to the «*giro di comodo*» implied a direct correlation with the emergence of serial bankruptcies among the contractors.

The case of Bartolomeo Figari – inherently tied with that of Pellegrino Schiaffino – might be worth mentioning⁶²⁵. According to the liquidators, «after having struggled to make a fortune in America», Bartolomeo Figari, son of Gerolamo, «returned to his hometown and began to build, with the assistance of his friends, a ship»⁶²⁶. Then, they added, «it was notorious that Figari, illiterate, entrusted the management of his business to Pellegrino Schiaffino who, not only abused of his

⁶²³ See, *Ibidem*; Idem, r. 1605, n. 949 (bankruptcy of Pellegrino Schiaffino).

⁶²⁴ Idem, r. 1604, n. 799.

⁶²⁵ The same outcomes concerned the bankruptcy of Gio. Batta Demarchi, son of Antonio. According to his liquidators, «the declaration of bankruptcy of his brother-in-law, Pellegrino Schiaffino, affected severely his [of Demarchi] conditions, due to the fact that the suppliers of the *Rosa D.* [Demarchi's ship], also creditors of Schiaffino, refused to delay more and asked for immediate payments».

⁶²⁶ Idem, r. 1602, n. 428. Liquidators were Carlo Pantassi (agent of the *Banco di sconto e sete* of Turin) and Santo Monteverde (merchant living in Genoa).

position, but also used Figari's signature to throw him in burdensome obligations and, as a result, to drag him down with him»⁶²⁷.

In its extremity, the illiteracy of Bartolomeo Figari – rare among Camogli's shipowners – links to another distinguishing feature reported by liquidators: the total absence or misuse of bookkeeping and accounting. The negative judgement about business records and account books was indeed widespread and targeted all the bankruptcies analyzed. For instance, about Pellegrino Schiaffino, his liquidators wrote that «[they] could not expect from the bankrupted to keep the books in the strict sense, owing to his attitude and the long-established abuse, among the shipowners of Camogli, to consider this activity as an unnecessary luxury»⁶²⁸.

The analysis of the critical issues recorded within the shipping environment of the community, however, cannot obscure the role of the exogenous processes lying beyond the actual control of Camogli's shipowners. Undoubtedly, endogenous factors, such as individual and collective responsibilities, more familiar to local historians than academicians, played a crucial role in pushing shipping to overperform in comparison to their practical possibilities. In this way, creating a precarious system based on abstract credit rather than substantial shipping revenues led many shipowners to be financially exposed and unprepared to global transformations. This coexistence of exogenous factors with the mentioned malpractices can be found in the liquidators' accounts. For example, about the bankruptcy of Cristino Lazzaro Razeto, owner of *Delfino P.* and *Nuovo Rosina Canepa*, his liquidators observed:

It is well-known the widespread absence of freights and, likewise, it is well-known the miserable fate of shipowners who, often, rather than obtaining profits from shipping, incur losses because of the disproportion between the operating costs and the freights collected.⁶²⁹

In the early 1880s, the shipowners of Camogli became aware of the ongoing conditions of the shipping market and focused on the role of transition from sail to steam in determining their crisis.

⁶²⁷ Idem.

⁶²⁸ Idem, r. 1605, n. 949.

⁶²⁹ Idem, r. 1604, n. 696 (bankruptcy of Cristino Lazzaro Razeto).

These arguments became objects of various discussions, culminating in the organization of the First General Congress of the Italian Shipowners (1880) and were then confronted with other realities in the context of the Parliamentary Inquiry about the conditions of the Italian merchant marine (1881-1882).

5.5.2. THE PARTICIPATION OF CAMOGLI SHIPOWNERS IN THE NATIONAL MARITIME DEBATE (1880-1883)

As we saw in the third chapter, from 1874 ca. onwards, the effects of the global transformations and the decline of sailing shipping hit Camogli and his shipowners.

The shipowning elites did not remain passive in front of the upcoming crisis. Conversely, not only they stimulated an active debate among Italian shipowners, but they also elicited a dialogue with the national maritime institutions. Thus, in 1880, in Camogli was organised the First General Congress of Italian Shipowners, an occasion to address and discuss the main issues of the Italian merchant marine⁶³⁰. Afterwards, they took an active part within the 1882 Inquiry into the conditions of the Italian merchant marine, which was carried out by the congressman Paolo Boselli in all the major shipping centres of the country.

On 10th and 11th October 1880, the First General Congress of Italian Shipowners was gathered in Camogli. As expressed at the welcoming greetings, the purpose of the event was to propose to the government the measures to rescue the Merchant Marine from its critically declining status. In this context, the primary causes of the crisis were identified in the diminution of traffics and foreign competition, made incredibly unsustainable by the French laws, which introduced public subsidies to shipping⁶³¹.

More than three hundred shipowners (323) congregated to the assembly: Giuseppe Bozzo, mayor of Camogli, oversaw the operations as president of the Committee of Camogli Shipowners, the first nucleus and promotor of the event. Among the main objectives lay the reform of the *Cassa Invalidi*

⁶³⁰ See, P. Gardini (ed.), *Atti e resoconto stenografico ufficiale del Congresso degli Armatori Italiani in Camogli*, Genova: Giovanni Sambolino, 1880.

⁶³¹ P. Gardini (ed.), *Atti e resoconto stenografico*, pp. 5-6.

della Marina Mercantile – to relieve shipowners from these subsidies – and the reduction of consular and maritime health customs, which weighed too much on the balances of shipping voyages⁶³². The discussion then moved on to the French law about public subsidies to the national merchant marine (1879), which had completely upset the international shipping paradigm, forcing concurrent shipowners to develop and propose the measures to resist and oppose them.

The participation of the shipowners of Camogli was active and highly knowledgeable: Francesco Schiaffino, son of Gaetano, and a member of the family Olivari (his name is never mentioned), raised their voices repeatedly. Another leading figure was David Viale, a shipowner and liquidator from Genoa, who had established long-standing acquaintances and private interests in Camogli to be almost included in society (he was a member of the Committee of Camogli Shipowners). Viale was also among Camogli's participants in the Inquiry into the conditions of the merchant marine, taking place in Camogli on the 22nd August 1881. On that occasion, he was very active, provided many details about the state of his business and formulated various proposals⁶³³.

The declining status of the Italian merchant marine was always at the core of the discussions: indeed, according to the vivid expression proposed by Viale, «the disaster [was] blatant and self-evident»⁶³⁴. To corroborate with data his assumptions, the Genoese shipowner reported how, in the previous years, the shipping values insured to the Ligurian mutual insurance societies had fallen from 114 to 68,5 millions of lire and, thus, the yearly mutual repartition of damages had increased from 3% to 5%⁶³⁵. The reasons for the decline were reconducted to different spheres of interest: firstly, commercial, in connection with the international shipping trends; secondly, technological, addressing the correlation of the decline of sail shipping with the rise of steam navigation; thirdly,

⁶³² Idem, p. 11.

⁶³³ The whole list of the people questioned in Camogli comprehended: 1) Giuseppe Bozzo, mayor of Camogli; 2) Filippo Schiaffino, son of Giuseppe, director of the *Mutua Assicurazione Camogliese*; 3) David Viale, shipowner and liquidator; 4) Antonio Carbone, shipowner and councilman of the *Cassa Invalidi della marina mercantile*; 5) Gerolamo Nossardi, shipowner and director of the *Mutua* of Nervi; 6) Gaetano Cavalli, shipowner; 7) Emanuele Boggiano, shipowner; 8) Gaetano Mortola, son of Biagio, shipowner. See, *Inchiesta sulle condizioni della marina mercantile*, vol. 1, pp. XXII-XXIII.

⁶³⁴ P. Gardini (ed.), *Atti e resoconto stenografico*, p. 18.

⁶³⁵ Idem.

institutional, related to the unequal customs and tariffs system which the Italian ships underwent in comparison with foreign competitors.

Coeval observers, such as the economist Jacopo Virgilio, were well aware of the fall of freights, which, for instance, he had measured in a 35-40% decrease between 1875 and 1880, even on the marginal routes of the Far East rice (-38%), Peruvian guano (-40%) or U.S. wheat (-25%)⁶³⁶. Concerning the technological factor instead, more than one shipowner of Camogli underlined the decisive role of technological improvements, such as reducing coal consumption (from 3 kg to 0,82 Kg per ton/mile) to increase steam competitiveness over the sail⁶³⁷.

In the eyes of Camogli's shipowners, the institutional framework was critical. In this regard, adopting a comparative perspective was fundamental to develop effective countermeasures to adapt to the international scenario. The suffocating taxation imposed by the Italian State over the shipping business was the primary target. The congress calculated the average customs and fees pending on Italian ships in comparison with the leading European countries:

Table 5.10. Comparison of average maritime and consular taxes by flags.

<i>Country</i>	<i>Tariffs (lire per ton)</i>
<i>Italy</i>	1,40
<i>Austria</i>	0,92
<i>France</i>	0,95
<i>Germany</i>	0,50
<i>United Kingdom</i>	0,42

Source: P. Gardini (ed.), *Atti e resoconto stenografico ufficiale del Congresso degli Armatori Italiani in Camogli*, Genova: Giovanni Sambolino, 1880, pp. 18-19.

⁶³⁶ Idem.

⁶³⁷ Idem, p. 28. See, Chapter 3.

The primary responsibility for the discrepancies between Italy and the other maritime powers was identified in consular fees, which the assembly proposed to cut for 75% of their value⁶³⁸. Then it was the turn of the tax on movable properties, which resulted in a 13,20% yearly rise in shipping expenses⁶³⁹.

Many complaints also targeted the unsustainable bureaucracy which Italian ships suffered in comparison with foreign ships. The events involving the ship *Ricordo* – reported by Ravenna, president of the *Associazione marittima di Genova* – were emblematic to illustrate these issues. The ship left from Brazil, where it was forced by an incident to repair in a port contaminated by yellow fever; after a long route with no cases onboard, it arrived in Genoa. According to the national rules, having spent – in the crossing – more than a quarantine with no ill people, the ship ought to be subjected to a lighter and shorter version of quarantine. Instead, it was forced to the so-called «hard quarantine», which prescribed the discharge of the cargo in a dedicated place. Meanwhile, a British ship – to which the *Ricordo* had consigned part of the cargo in Brazil – arrived from the same destination to Genoa with one ill person. With some diplomatic pressure, the ship was rapidly freed from its obligations and discharged⁶⁴⁰.

In addition, steamships were generally favoured over sailing vessels: they could load and unload the cargo during nights and were given priority to access the docks⁶⁴¹.

Finally, the most critical discourse regarded the opportunity to request shipping subsidies to support the Italian fleet in the wake of the French case. Therefore, the debate was transformed into a broader discourse about political economics and the subject of maritime protectionism; in this

⁶³⁸ See, Idem, pp. 68-71. The Congress expressed this measure in the ninth article of the proposal sent to the government.

⁶³⁹ About the so-called Tassa sulla ricchezza mobile, the shipowners of Camogli published a specific pamphlet to oppose against its application to ships. See, Difesa degli armatori di Camogli, attori contro le Regie Finanze convenute, per l'esonero dalla tassa di ricchezza mobile, Genova: Tipografia del commercio di Genova, 1879, in ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Inchiesta parlamentare sulle condizioni della marina mercantile, b. 4, Camogli.

⁶⁴⁰ P. Gardini (ed.), *Atti e resoconto stenografico*, pp. 32-33.

⁶⁴¹ Idem, p. 39.

sense, it related to the gradual shift of the Italian political atmosphere from the free market to protectionism⁶⁴².

Traditionally, the shipowners of Camogli opposed protectionism, despite the many benefits enjoyed through flag privileges at the exordium of the Black Sea period. Various people openly sustained the *laissez-faire* policies and requested the State to annihilate the bureaucratic and fiscal obstacles to free market and free navigation. Thus, the primary target of their requests naturally became the reduction of tax burdens. However, the French law on subsidies altered this situation: the need to compete against foreign protectionist policies pushed Camogli's shipowners toward maritime protectionism. To shed light on this process, the long intervention of Francesco Schiaffino is emblematic:

[...] until today, we were satisfied with requesting to the government to relieve us from the burden of taxes and customs affecting us; [...] then came out the French law about subsidies, which will strike the deadly blow to our marine which, aside from being subjugated to the usual vicissitudes which have already exhausted it, will be annihilated by the impossible competition with the ships of the mentioned country. [...] Given the law above, the total abolition of taxes to the flourishing marines of Sweden and Norway, the similar upcoming laws in Russia, the tangible facilitations and subsidies which, albeit not openly, are conceded to the Austrian ships, our committee, according to the famous saying *in extremis, extremity*, decided to gather together in order to identify the best measures to arm ourselves against the incipient ruin. [...] The lowering of taxes, which has been the object of all our requests so far, today would be just a

⁶⁴² E. Del Vecchio, *La via italiana al protezionismo: le relazioni economiche internazionali dell'Italia, 1878-1888*, voll. 1-5, Roma: Archivio Storico, 1979-1980. More specifically on the Italian maritime protectionism, see: E. Corbino, "Il protezionismo marittimo in Italia: le industrie marittime fino al 1885", *Giornale degli economisti e rivista di statistica*, 61, No. 11, 1921, pp. 370-389; Idem, "Il protezionismo marittimo in Italia", *Giornale degli economisti e rivista di statistica*, 62, No. 2, 1922, pp. 65-81; E. Giretti, "I succhioni della marina mercantile", *Giornale degli economisti*, 30, 1905, pp. 37-59.

disappointment, a medication applied to a wooden leg, as opposed to the grants of foreign marines and, in particular, of the French one.⁶⁴³

The French law granted to the national flag various typologies of subsidies, both for ship constructions and navigation. The subventions for national constructions aimed at stimulating and protecting national shipyards: on the one hand, every shipowner received an amount of money proportionated to ship tonnages, a great aid to reduce the impact of starting costs on shipowners; on the other hand, ship-building was concentrated into national shipyards, thus providing them large and incessant orders. The second type of subsidies regarded navigation: they consisted of direct subventions of 1,50 Fr. per 1000 miles and 1,50 Fr. per ton, with little or no limitations. Through subsidies, French governors granted considerable advantages to the national flag, estimated to a 1/3 of a freight: in this way, French captains could lower the freights to unsustainable levels for Italians⁶⁴⁴.

As a reaction, the shipowners of Camogli claimed analogous subsidies to grant the Italian flag the same conditions as foreign competitors. These demands, however, moved past *laissez-faire* policies and took the form of open encouragements for maritime protectionism. The development of the proposals was long and laborious: in 1880 emerged a program articulated into ten points, which, during the 1881 Inquiry, the people gathered in Camogli substantially re-submitted in the same form. Notwithstanding various details, which underwent several modifications before the law became active in 1885, some features are worth noting to discuss the general disposition of Camogli shipowners and their understanding of the national and international scenarios.

The most debated argument, for example, consisted of identifying the beneficiaries. Naturally, this discourse opened much broader discussions about the evolution of the international market and the fate of sail and steam. Whereas the previous chapter addressed the competition between sail and steam through objective factors (coal consumption, market segmentation etc.), the following pages will focus on the subjective side of the same argument, formed by the partial perceptions of Camogli's contemporary observers.

⁶⁴³ P. Gardini (ed.), *Atti e resoconto stenografico*, pp. 15-16.

⁶⁴⁴ *Idem*, pp. 19-20.

Implementing the economic concept of «path dependence» might be appropriate to delineate Camogli's general disposition in front of technological transition. By resorting to «path dependence», we intend to underline the role played by past events and decisions to influence later evaluations related to the adoption of new technologies⁶⁴⁵. In the case of Camogli, the «path dependence» can be reconducted to different processes: firstly, from a cultural and social perspective, it was correlated to the long-standing attachment to sailing traditions, which had made the fortunes of the community. Secondly, by stressing the economic factor, the «path dependence» materialized in protecting the previous investments in sailing shipping, which had peaked in the early 1870s. These two elements, traditional thinking and investment protection, represent the primary endogenous factors in determining Camogli's slow transition from sail to steam.

In the sources, the «path dependence» was expressed by refusing the incipient decline of sail. Although some shipowners perceived iron and steam vessels as the future for shipping, many professed their faith in the profitable alternatives offered by marginal tramping routes: that was, in fact, the market sector to which most of Camogli's ships engaged until the First World War. There were also some intermediate positions, still involving path dependence, as in the case of Viale. During his intervention to the Congress – and in the oral and written memories produced for the National Inquiry – Viale articulated his discourse around the distinction between transformation to and creation of a modern iron-hulled steam-propelled fleet⁶⁴⁶. The conditions of the Italian merchant marine made impossible the «transformation» from sail to steam but required its «creation» from scratch. In the meantime, the Italian State ought to protect the interests of the existing sailing fleet because sail still represented the wealth and the capital of Italian shipping. In other words, protecting the existing fleet and shipping capitals constituted the priority. The protection of sailing shipping was fundamental to endure the negative cycle; then, as soon as a positive phase occurred, the collection of abundant capitals would have gathered the resources needed to create a steam fleet.

⁶⁴⁵ For a general overview, see: P. Garrouste and S. Ioannides (eds.), *Evolution and Path Dependence in Economic Ideas. Past and Present*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001.

⁶⁴⁶ P. Gardini (ed.), *Atti e resoconto stenografico*, p. 22.

Therefore, in Camogli's proposals, sail shipping still played a critical role. Indeed, the shipowners recognized the need to protect it in the short/medium run. Some even pushed for the complete equalization of sail and steam to benefit from construction and navigation subsidies. Olivari even proposed to grant an identical sum (50 It. Lira per ton) to wooden and iron constructions: he was optimistic about the future of wooden-hulled vessels and praised the plenty of wood within the Italian territory, compared to the paucity of iron and steel⁶⁴⁷.

Then, in 1885, drawing from the copious set of proposals collected during the Inquiry, the Italian government opted for maritime protectionism by determining subsidies to the national merchant marine⁶⁴⁸. In historical discourses, shipping subsidies are traditionally associated with steam navigation, used to finance strategic transports, such as postal services⁶⁴⁹. With the 1885 law, instead, the Italian State committed itself to protect the merchant marine in its entirety: in particular, it aimed to support it on the international stage and stimulate its modernisation. This involvement acted in three different regards: 1) construction subsidies; 2) navigation subsidies for coal transports; 3) general navigation subsidies⁶⁵⁰.

The articles from 1 to 7 regulated the subsidies favouring constructions: steamships and iron-hulled sailing vessels were aligned and received 60 lire per ton. Instead, wooden-hulled vessels were given 15 lire per ton⁶⁵¹.

The eighth article prescribed 1 lira bonus per ton of coal carried to the Italian ports from outside the Gibraltar Strait⁶⁵². This measure interested both sail and steam vessels and reflected the Italian

⁶⁴⁷ Idem, p. 55.

⁶⁴⁸ See, *Legge 6 dicembre 1885, n. 3547. Sui provvedimenti riguardo alla marina mercantile*, artt. 1-14 and its 1896 update: *Legge 23 luglio 1896, n. 318. Riflettente la concessione di compensi di costruzione e premi di navigazione ai piroscafi ed ai velieri nazionali*, artt. 1-18. See, also: E. Corbino, "Il protezionismo marittimo in Italia: le industrie marittime fino al 1885", pp. 383-389; Id., "Il protezionismo marittimo in Italia", pp. 65-73.

⁶⁴⁹ See Chapter 3.

⁶⁵⁰ Legge 6 dicembre 1885, n. 3547.

⁶⁵¹ Idem, art. 1.

⁶⁵² Idem, art. 8.

needs for this strategic transport: as seen in Chapter 3, some ships of Camogli exploited these subsidies to increase the cost-effectiveness of the return leg to the Mediterranean.

Finally, the tenth article granted 0,65 lire per ton and the same amount per 1000 miles to the vessels navigating beyond Suez or the Gibraltar Strait⁶⁵³.

Summing it up, the efforts made by Camogli shipowners found satisfaction in the publication of the 1885 law. The inauguration of the protectionist phase for the Italian merchant marine was seen as a necessary evil to withstand foreign competition⁶⁵⁴. However, the characteristics of Camogli's fleet were subjected to more rapid changes: from the mid-1880s, and in particular, at the end of the century, most of the shipping investments were directed to second-hand foreign-built ships, which were not covered by the Italian state subsidies. Indeed, although intended to guide the Italian merchant marine to transition, the shipping subsidies obtained the most tangible results toward Italian iron and steam shipbuilding⁶⁵⁵. Thus, the subsidies never became a structural source of income for Camogli, which was progressively cut off from the Italian bounty system and relegated to a secondary role within the Italian merchant marine.

5.6. Conclusions

In 1888, even the original *Mutua* was liquidated. The shipping capital and the number of associates were no more sufficient to cover the expenses⁶⁵⁶. A few years before, in 1884, a group of shipowners had founded another mutual insurance, the *Associazione di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima "Cristoforo Colombo"*⁶⁵⁷. The *Cristoforo Colombo* targeted a distinct shipping market, as the statute prescribed the prohibition for the insured ships to cross the Strait of Gibraltar and sail beyond

⁶⁵³ Idem, art. 10.

⁶⁵⁴ Both construction and navigation subsidies were diminished by the law number 745 of the 13th July 1911. See: *Legge 13 luglio 1911, n. 745. Che approva provvedimenti a favore dell'industria delle costruzioni navali.*

⁶⁵⁵ E. Giretti, "I succhioni della marina mercantile", pp. 37-59.

⁶⁵⁶ G.B.R. Figari, *La Società di Mutua Assicurazione Marittima Camogliese: 1853-1888*, pp. 39-41.

⁶⁵⁷ CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*, Statuto della Mutua Assicurazione Marittima "Cristoforo Colombo" in Camogli, 10 Luglio 1884.

Constantinople⁶⁵⁸. Thus, it mainly concerned cabotage ships, a factor confirmed by introducing a threshold value of 15.000 lire for coverage.

The disappearance of the *Mutua* and the gradual recovery of Camogli's shipping elicited various modifications to the statute of the *Colombo*. In 1907, it was wholly reformed: now, it accepted iron and steel vessels only and increased the maximum value of insurance to 150.000 lire. Indeed, those who survived the 1880s crisis began to purchase second-hand iron-hulled ships on the foreign market and engage in tramp shipping of bulk merchandises⁶⁵⁹. Joint partnerships became the dominant pattern of business: the individualistic competition among the members of the same family – mitigated by the whole set of risk-sharing tools described above – was substituted by mutual collaboration and capital concentration. This was perceived as the only way to contrast the massive rise in costs determined by technological advance.

However, although Camogli's maritime activities slightly recovered in the 1900s, the flourishing past was over. The widespread community of shipowners, who exceeded two hundred elements in 1883, was reduced to few elements. Then, the First World War stroke the final blow. Even fewer survived the war period. Although Camogli had lost its shipowning position within the international scenario, the community preserved its maritime projection through seafaring labour. Under this light, the foundation of the nautical school, with its 242 students of local origins between 1909 and 1913⁶⁶⁰, represented the most durable accomplishment of the «golden age of sail» of Camogli.

⁶⁵⁸ Idem, Articolo Addizionale del 3 Ottobre 1884.

⁶⁵⁹ See, Chapter 3.

⁶⁶⁰ M.S. Rollandi, *Istruzione e sviluppo nella Liguria marittima*, p. 372.

6. Maritime labour in the age of transition

6.1. Introduction

This chapter addresses Camogli seafarers' lives through the lens of the transformations that the transition from sail to steam triggered on the community's individual lives and collective structures. Differently from the previous chapter, in the following pages, the subject shifts from shipping business and the shipowning elites to maritime labour and sea workers, in the attempt to grasp the impact of technological advancements from a social, more than economic, perspective of seafaring communities. In so doing, the resilience of Camogli's shipping will be reinterpreted under the light of maritime labour, that is, the evolution of vertical mobility, salaries, the duration and continuity of seafaring careers and the tensions within onboard relationships and discipline. Whereas usually, historiography tends to examine seafaring communities ashore in selected maritime towns and districts for studying seafarers' social tensions and dynamics, our primary point of research will be the ship, the seafaring community on board the vessel. Indeed, particularly concerning small seafaring towns, there seems to be an inherent link between worlds at sea and ashore, and ships can be viewed as entire microcosms reproducing all the dynamics and tensions belonging to the community. In other words, ships might be conceived as full-fledged «floating communities», social and human places where ashore communitarian dynamics are repeatedly transferred and evolve in new directions.

6.2. The sources

The chapter draws on a broad set of unexplored archival sources, which entail different levels of analysis for their heterogeneity.

The bulk of information about Camogli's seamen careers is drawn from the *Matricole della gente di mare* registries, kept at the State Archives of Genoa⁶⁶¹. Then, concerning specific questions, this material is complemented by crew lists and logbooks, which, on their hand, provide evidence on themes like crews composition, professions and wages. Finally, more qualitative sources, withdrawn from the miscellaneous archival collections produced by the administration of the Italian merchant marine⁶⁶², will be fundamental to broaden the spectrum and provide vivid samples of some phenomena, such as tensions, insubordinations and desertion.

The *Matricole della gente di mare* were based on the French system of the *Inscriptions maritime*, introduced in Liguria during the Napoleonic period and then inherited by the Savoy administration. This classification, into distinct categories, dated as back as to the 1689 *Ordonnances de la marine*, subsequently updated in 1795⁶⁶³. In the Sardinian and later Italian context, in order to work, every seaman needed to register into the first or the second category of maritime professions: the former was reserved to the navigating personnel and high seas fishers; the latter hosted shipbuilders and coastal fishers⁶⁶⁴. From an archival perspective, the sources available include every Ligurian seafarer who had registered in the first category of seamen between 1843 and 1886.

Formally, these registers varied over time due to the juxtaposition of diverse bureaucratic adjustments; nonetheless, all records contain comparable data, including enrolment years, career advances, few basic details concerning the embarkment and the date and cause of the career's cessation. Due to the modifications introduced, the source is organised into two serial progressions: the first series begins in 1843 and proceeds up to 1866 (numbers 1192-25367). Because of the publication of a new Code for the Merchant Marine, the series restarted from zero. Furthermore, the archives present a few gaps in terms of serial continuity. The Genoa State Archives possess only 15 registers of the second series, from 1868 to 1886 (numbers 4324-28423). Despite the limits, this material contains data of extraordinary value for more than thirty thousand seafarers. The records

⁶⁶¹ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, registers 1-39.

⁶⁶² ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici Diversi, 1860-1869.

⁶⁶³ J. Captier, *Étude historique et économique sur l'inscription maritime*, Paris: V. Giard & E. Brière, 1907; P. Villiers and P. Currelier, "Du système des Classes à l'Inscription Maritime", *Revue Historique des Armées*, 147/2, (1982), 44-53.

⁶⁶⁴ *Codice per la marina mercantile del Regno d'Italia*, Milano: Fratelli Bursani, 1866, art. 18, pp. 11-12.

are collected in registers, each of them embracing an average of six-seven hundreds of individuals: then, each folio was divided into three horizontal sections, each of them reserved to different subscribers. Then, each line was further divided into columns: the first displayed personal data, such as serial numbers, names, surnames, family details, place and date of birth, place of living, date of enrolment and career advancements. Then, the list of embarkments occupies the second column to the end of the following page: in this section, there is the date of the beginning and end of service, the name and type of the ship, the captain's name, the seafarer profession, the prospective destinations, some of the ports of call and the days of active service.

Despite its outstanding value for nineteenth-century research in maritime history, Italian academia never approached this material. Firstly, the problematic accessibility of the sources might constitute an important reason.⁶⁶⁵ Then, arguably, the immense amount of available data could discourage single researchers, particularly in the context of wide-ranged and comparative studies. On the contrary, the existing literature usually relied on aggregate data, tables and statistical analyses processed by the Italian public maritime administrations⁶⁶⁶. Aggregate data, although useful for broader regional analyses and national-level overviews, conceal the local development of small communities.⁶⁶⁷ For instance, Camogli's unique evolution disappears in these analyses, which, instead, bring out Genoa's administrative district as the central statistical unit.

⁶⁶⁵ For example, in Genoa these registers are kept in a peripheral storage house, accessible just once every two weeks under reservation. This is a general issue for nineteenth-century maritime sources, a problem which has not really changed since Paolo Frascani complained revealing this problem in the early 2000s: P. Frascani, "Una comunità in viaggio: dai racconti dei giornali di bordo delle navi napoletane", in Idem, *A vela e a vapore*, pp. 109-139.

⁶⁶⁶ See, M.S. Rollandi, *Lavorare sul mare. Economia e organizzazione del lavoro marittimo fra Otto e Novecento*, Genova: Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, XLII/2, 2002. In particular, we point at the fundamental source represented by the yearly statistical publication about the conditions of the Italian merchant marine. *Sulle condizioni della Marina Mercantile Italiana al 31 dicembre. Relazioni del Direttore generale della Marina Mercantile a S. E. il Ministro della Marina*, Roma, 1896-1914.

⁶⁶⁷ There is some sparse reference to Camogli concerning the national distribution of tonnage by cities, which we mentioned in Chapter 3.

Compared with the international scenario, the study of career-length sources analogous to the *Matricole* is rare in the literature on nineteenth-century maritime labour⁶⁶⁸. Most scholars conducted their studies by focusing mainly on the economic side of onboard labour relationships, devoting most attention to wages and retribution. Accordingly, the existing literature takes seafarers into account as a part of a collective entity, the crew: as a result, scholars privileged crew lists, logbooks and crew agreements instead of career records⁶⁶⁹. Similarly to the Italian context, these studies were also largely drawn upon aggregate and state-produced data to reconstruct seafarers national markets from a quantitative point of view. On the international ground, in the Scandinavian countries, there is no mention of archival material comparable to the Italian *Matricole*; in the UK, Sarah Palmer and David M. Williams confirm the existence of sources comparable to the *Matricole* (the Registrar General of Shipping and Seamen), whose utilisation was, nonetheless, deemed as «a theoretical rather than practical possibility»⁶⁷⁰.

In France, instead, similar archival material has been extensively used to investigate single communities: one example is the recent work of Nicolas Cochard about Le Havre⁶⁷¹. Cochard developed an exemplar micro-historical approach to deal with the seafarers born in Le Havre in the nineteenth century; his results represent the closest possible comparison to the present work. Indeed, part of his methodology provided inspiration for our analysis.

⁶⁶⁸ See, P.C. Royen, J. Bruijn and J. Lucassen (ed.), *Those emblems of hell?: European sailors and the maritime labour market, 1570 – 1870*, Saint John's: Memorial Univ. of Newfoundland, 1997; L.R. Fischer (ed.), *The market for seamen in the age of sail*, Saint John's: Memorial Univ. of Newfoundland, 2019; R. Gorski, *Maritime Labour: Contributions to the History of Work at Sea, 1500-2000*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007.

⁶⁶⁹ Y. Kaukiainen, *Sailing into Twilight*, pp. 102-104; K. Davids, "Maritime labour in the Netherlands, 1570-1870", in P.C. Royen, J. Bruijn and J. Lucassen (ed.), *Those emblems of hell?*, pp. 41-72; S. Palmer and D.M. Williams, "British sailors, 1775-1870", in Idem, *Those emblems of hell?*, pp. 93-118; M. North, "German sailors, 1650-1900", in Idem, *Those emblems of hell?*, pp. 253-266.

⁶⁷⁰ S. Palmer and D.M. Williams, "British sailors, 1775-1870", p. 107.

⁶⁷¹ N. Cochard, *Les marins du Havre: gens de mer et société urbaine au XIXe siècle*, Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2020.

6.2.1. METHODOLOGY

From *Matricole*, we gathered a sample composed of three hundred seamen to analyse Camogli's seafaring population for the 1840s-1910s. Accordingly, we classified the sample into three groups according to their date of birth⁶⁷². The first group (1*) includes one hundred seafarers born from 1825 to 1835. These seamen undertook seafaring from the late 1830s to 1852. The second group (2*) encompasses seafarers born during 1845-1855: they began their professional career at sea between 1855 and 1871. The third group (3*) includes those born during the 1865-1875 period who embarked from the late 1870s until 1886.

The chronological span depends on the chronological boundaries of the archival sources. Nevertheless, provided that each registration recorded seafarers' entire careers, the three groups embrace up to seventy years of Camogli's maritime history (from 1843 to 1914).

Throughout data collection, we recorded quantitative and qualitative information related to seamen, particularly apart from seafarers' data – including origin, service duration, and career advancements – the *Matricole* offered several details regarding their career paths. The sources provide evidence about the ports of call and the prospective destinations of each embarkment. Recording and comparing these data for each seaman – considering the thousands of service registered – would be impossible due to the following two reasons. Firstly, because processing this kind of data would engage a whole team of researchers. Secondly, there are severe gaps and discrepancies in the details provided in the different registers. As a solution, our methodology required broader categories to include different career paths according to their characteristics. To this purpose, it was adopted the Italian juridical classification of shipping, based on geographical range criteria. Thus, from the Merchant Marine Code (1866), we distinguished *cabotaggio*, *gran cabotaggio* and *lungo corso*⁶⁷³. *Cabotaggio* – coastal or short-range navigation – corresponded to

⁶⁷² In the analysis of the statistical sample, the sources taken into consideration will be referred to the database drawn from: ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, from register 1 to register 39, n. 1788-28423, covering the period 1843-1888. In 1867, as a consequence of the publication of a new Code for the Merchant Marine, the serial progression was interrupted and restarted from zero. Therefore, there will be two serial progressions, each of them around thirty thousand registrations.

⁶⁷³ *Codice per la marina mercantile del Regno d'Italia*, art. 59, pp. 20-21.

national sea routes; *gran cabotaggio* included «the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea, the Azov Sea and, leaving the Strait of Gibraltar, along the oceanic coasts of Spain, Portugal, France and the British islands, the North and the Baltic Sea and the western African coast, up to Senegal»⁶⁷⁴; *lungo corso*, finally, was unlimited and encompassed all the routes outside these geographical borders⁶⁷⁵.

6.2.2. MARITIME ACTORS

Provided the differences between their embarkments, seafarers occupied different roles on board and possessed different skills; this awareness led to further categorisation. In this regard, recent international studies – tackling the impact of technological advance on nineteenth-century maritime labour – suggested a categorisation based on seafarers' professional level, linked to the possession of specialised skills and the execution of definite activities on board⁶⁷⁶. Limitedly to the age of sail, this operation led to the subdivision of maritime workers into three categories: low-skilled, middle-skilled and high-skilled seamen⁶⁷⁷. Within this model, under the first category fell cabin-boys, deck-boys and ordinary seamen: since their tasks were mainly physical, these profiles required little or no skills to fulfil their duties at sea. The second category included able-bodied seamen, stewards and boatswains: they handled more complicated tasks, whose pursuit required routine skills and a certain degree of expertise. On top stood ship-officers – masters and mates – who combined practical experience with abstract knowledge to manage navigation.

This categorisation revealed to be substantially suitable and quite representative of Camogli's seafaring professional trajectories, not without bringing up some practical terms of comparison. In

⁶⁷⁴ Ibidem.

⁶⁷⁵ See Chapter 3 for an extensive presentation of Camogli's traffics throughout the oceanic phase.

⁶⁷⁶ J. Ojala, J. Pehkonen and J. Eloranta, "Deskilling and decline in skill premium during the age of sail: Swedish and Finnish seamen, 1751–1913", *Explorations in economic history*, 2016; S.M. Hynninen, J. Ojala and J. Pehkonen, "Technological change and wage premiums: Historical evidence from linked employer–employee data", *Labour Economics*, 2013, 24, pp. 1-11; A. Chin, C. Juhn, and P. Thompson, "Technical change and the demand for skills during the second industrial revolution: evidence from the merchant marine, 1891–1912", *The Review of economics and statistics*, 2006, 88:3, pp. 572-578.

⁶⁷⁷ J. Ojala et al., "Deskilling and decline in skill premium during the age of sail".

particular, the representation of the lowest category, that of cabin boys and ordinary seamen, raised some issues concerning their positioning in relation to the upper professional groups. According to these studies⁶⁷⁸, low-skilled seafarers were distinguished from the other categories based on a supposed labour competition that shipowners triggered to increase the share of low-skilled seafarers and, consequently, diminish labour costs. On the contrary, according to a model that might be replicable to other seafaring communities, the case of Camogli lacks market competition between cabin-boys and expert seafarers. On the one hand, Shipowners did require cabin-boys and ordinary seamen to handle low-skilled activities; it was only natural and expected that the other more skilled seamen would train them. Therefore, in a narrow labour market as the one of Camogli, as we will see, the existence of labour competition between younger (below than eighteen years old) and older seamen seems hardly sustainable in the long term, as low-skilled professions represented more a formative step within the seafaring career than a class on its own.

Provided this clarification, the skill-biased model fits appropriately into the Italian legal and customary hierarchy on board. Initially, this model was first applied to the analysis of skill-premia, a concept to measure the evolution of wage differentials between skilled and unskilled seafarers⁶⁷⁹, an argument which will be the object of further discussion throughout the chapter. The first step consisted of adjusting the model to the Italian maritime labour framework and legislation.

To be recognised as *marinaio* (sailor as a general reference, able-bodied seaman according to the broadly recognised British terminology), seafarers must reach eighteen years old and spend twenty-four months at sea⁶⁸⁰. Before that, Italian seamen were either *mozzi* (cabin and deck-boys) or *giovinotti* (ordinary seamen), depending on the experience acquired. During their first twelve months, cabin and deck-boys were engaged in basic physical tasks and learned more about ship handling and navigation by observing their more experienced peers. There was a thin line of

⁶⁷⁸ See, footnote n. 620.

⁶⁷⁹ See the historiographical debate presented in S.M. Hynninen et al., "Technological change and wage premiums", pp. 1-2 and in A. Chin et al., "Technical change and the demand for skills during the second industrial revolution", pp. 572-573.

⁶⁸⁰ *Codice per la marina mercantile del Regno d'Italia*, art. 21, p. 11.

distinction between work and apprenticeship: in slightly more than 8% of the cases, cabin-boys did not receive a salary throughout their period at sea⁶⁸¹.

Then, cabin-boys were upgraded to the rank of *giovinotto*. The sources, however, indicate discrepancies between shipping practices and Maritime Law. On the one hand, the Italian Code of the Merchant Marine never mentioned the rank of *giovinotti*. On the other hand, Ligurian crew agreements included this rank and, accordingly, the role of *giovinotto* is repeatedly found in Camogli's crew agreements from the 1830s to the first decade of the twentieth century⁶⁸². What is more, to make things even more complicated, sometimes shipmasters tended not to distinguish them from cabin-boys in the compilation of crew agreements. Nonetheless, in terms of practice, this distinction seems to be fundamental to clarify some evident discontinuities in the earliest stages of seafarers' careers, concerning wages: evidence suggests, that ordinary seamen or, when this nomenclature is missing, more experienced cabin-boys, received almost double salary than their less experienced counterparts⁶⁸³.

Then, after twenty-four months at sea – and when seamen reached the age of eighteen – the completion of the apprenticeship period onboard led to the obtainment of the qualification of *marinaio* (able-bodied seaman), which meant a somewhat experienced seaman with little or no professional education. Reaching this level qualified seamen to handle routine tasks, for which a certain degree of expertise was required. With some degree of exaggeration, a contemporary Ligurian shipowner asserted that «to become able-seamen takes at least ten years; they must begin as cabin-boys on sailing vessels to acquire the expertise and bravery needed to fight against winds and seas»⁶⁸⁴. In the age of sail, able-bodied seamen represented the crucial productive workforce onboard: handling the ropes and sails to manoeuvre the ship was their principal duty, actions requiring high expertise.

Above able-seamen stood the *nostromo* (boatswain) and the *dispensiere* (steward). Despite being well-established in the Italian crews, these figures lacked a clear definition within the Italian

⁶⁸¹ See *infra*. ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1831-1865.

⁶⁸² . ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1831-1865; Idem, *Giornali nautici*.

⁶⁸³ See *infra*, Table 5.9.

⁶⁸⁴ *Inchiesta Parlamentare sulle condizioni della Marina Mercantile*, vol. I, p. 56.

maritime legislation. Theoretically, the *nostramo* (boatswain) ranked among petty officers, along with coastal pilots and master carpenters (whose responsibilities were limited to the respective spheres of competence): boatswains were in charge of ship equipment and directed the execution of manoeuvring operations under masters' and mates' direct orders⁶⁸⁵. Also, boatswains were the low personnel's representatives before officials and, usually, the most experienced seamen – even more than captains – on board.

Italian laws were even less generous of details in describing the stewards (*dispensiere*). This figure is mentioned just in one instance, where lawmakers pointed to the captain's responsibilities to «declare, during the enrolment, the qualification of *nostramo* and *dispensiere*»⁶⁸⁶; all the other qualifications had specific legal requirements. Therefore, the Code for the Merchant Marine nowhere mentions any description of the stewards' job at sea. To worsen the situation, as far as the literature about nineteenth-century Italian maritime labour is concerned, the role of *dispensiere* received little or no attention, despite his vast recurrence in maritime sources⁶⁸⁷. Likewise, nautical vocabularies were short in details, too: stewards were generically considered in charge of the hold of provisions and managed their distribution to the crew⁶⁸⁸. By considering that cooks are never mentioned in sailing vessels' crew agreements, arguably, stewards were also in charge of cooking. Apart from that, it is not clear whether they hold responsibilities on provisions and food supplies in ports or not, and to what extent they were also engaged in works on board as regular sailors. In sum, boatswains were required on board for their expertise; stewards for possessing collateral practical skills.

Finally, a group of highly skilled, experienced and educated seafarers – masters and mates – stood above low and middle-skilled seamen. The role of formal education was crucial in distinguishing

⁶⁸⁵ Codice per la marina mercantile del Regno d'Italia, art. 66, pp. 23-24.

⁶⁸⁶ *Regolamento per la Marina Mercantile*, art. 430, in M. Vocino (ed.), *Codice marittimo*, Firenze: G. Barbera, 1921, pp. 212-213.

⁶⁸⁷ For instance, in her work on the Italian maritime labour, Maria Stella Rollandi only mentions once the figure of *dispensiere*, without providing any detail: M.S. Rollandi, *Lavorare sul mare*, p. 377.

⁶⁸⁸ See, *Dispensiere* in S. Stratico, *Vocabolario di marina in tre lingue. Tomo I*, Milano: Stamperia Reale, 1813, p. 171; *Dispensiere* in F. Piqué, *Dizionario di marina*, Milano: Natale Battezzati Editore, 1879, p. 160.

one group from another. Able-bodied seamen and boatswains were not required to possess theoretical education: their requisites were founded solely on practical experience. Only officers were required to have a formal theoretical education. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Code for the Italian Merchant Marine differentiated shipmasters' into three categories: *padroni*, *capitani di gran cabotaggio* and *capitani di lungo corso*⁶⁸⁹. These labels were bound to specific geographical navigational limits: home waters for cabotage (*padroni*), international waters for great cabotage (*capitani di gran cabotaggio*) and high-seas for deep-sea going shipping (*capitani di lungo corso*). All the seaman aspiring to those positions needed to possess specific prerequisites: the *padroni*, at least of the age of 22 years old, were asked for a three-year experience at sea; the *capitani di gran cabotaggio*, had the same age requirements but needed four years of navigation; the *capitani di lungo corso*, had to be of a minimum age of 24 years old and to comply with four years of navigation, including one year spent outside the Mediterranean⁶⁹⁰.

6.3. The ships of Camogli: "floating communities"

The present section outlines the primary characteristics of Camogli's maritime labour system and the mechanisms ruling its labour market, before and after the transition from sail to steam affected the evolution of local shipping and led to its marginalisation into the transport of oceanic bulk commodities. Moreover, we will focus on the persistence of family and communitarian structures within onboard social relationships, a fundamental feature for Camogli's shipping.

6.3.1. THE ENDOGENOUS LABOUR MARKET BEFORE THE 1880s

The last element taken into account deviates from shipping business to embrace maritime labour in the attempt to grasp the impact of technological advancements from a social, rather than


⁶⁸⁹ See, *Codice per la marina mercantile del Regno d'Italia*, art. 57-65, pp. 20-23.

⁶⁹⁰ *Idem*, art. 62.

economic, perspective of seafaring communities. In so doing, the resilience of Camogli's shipping is reinterpreted under the light of maritime labour: throughout this section, the primary focus will be on the characteristics of Camogli's maritime labour market in the age of transition. Instead of focusing on seafaring communities ashore – in selected maritime towns and districts – for studying seafarers' social tensions and dynamics, our primary research point is the ship, the seafaring community on board the vessel.


In the years of the Black Sea trade, a mostly endogenous labour market was a crucial characteristic of Camogli's maritime labour system. This concept is drawn upon the combination of shipownership and maritime labour within the same space and human community, leading to a framework where local demand and supply for maritime labour tended to their mutual satisfaction. Data evidence seem to support this hypothesis – at least before Camogli's vessels were regularly ousted from Mediterranean navigation.

Map 6.1. Birth-place of crew members on board of Camogli-owned ships (1853-1865) – Liguria.



Source: Data processed from ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1831-1865.

Figure 6.1. Birth-place of crew members on board of Camogli-owned ships (1850-1865).



Source: Data processed from ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1831-1865.

Map 6.1 and Figure 6.1 display the origins of seafarers onboard Camogli-owned ships between 1831 and 1865. Among them, seamen born in Camogli cover nearly half of the figure; in general, the Ligurian area provides 88% of the total maritime workforce. Out of this percentage, the high share of towns and villages surrounding Camogli might enlarge the perspective to a broader sub-regional area, in which various neighbouring communities referred to Camogli as the primary source of maritime labour. The labour relationship established between Camogli and the surrounding communities (mainly Recco, Santa Margherita and Portofino) is worth noting: owing to the dimensions of its merchant fleet, Camogli demanded exceptionally high quantities of maritime labour, which could not always be satisfied by local supplies. Therefore, several seamen were recruited from the nearby villages, where their long-standing maritime traditions had not achieved as exceptional results on the international stage as Camogli. The situation portrayed by Map 6.1 and Figure 6.1, therefore, configures an almost endogenous labour market based on a slightly broader sub-regional labour pool, composed by Camogli itself and its most proximate communities (Recco, Santa Margherita and Portofino), which supply, altogether, two-third of the navigating personnel embarked on Camogli ships.

Furthermore, the relative share of Genoese sailors (despite the administrative borders of the leading regional city blur the sources) sheds light on another characteristic of Camogli' shipping, which has

not been mentioned yet. For its structure and its limited dimensions, from the early nineteenth century, the port of Camogli ceased to be frequented by local vessels; instead, they based all the operation in Genoa. Therefore, the presence of a discrete amount of seamen born in Genoa cannot be explained without referring to the fact that part of the recruiting operations was performed in the city and, therefore, for Genoese-born sailors, it was not complicated to find employment on Camogli ships. Finally, the relevance of the other categories like the "Other Italian States" and "Other origin" is very low (respectively 7% and 5%). Until the last decades of the nineteenth century, Camogli's maritime labour pool was entirely Ligurian.

Furthermore, the results shown in Figure 6.1 encourage us to widen the perspective. The rupture of the imaginative borders of Camogli's seafaring community and their enlargement to a broader sub-region suggest a new framework in which Camogli's leadership created relationships (in terms of seafaring demand and supply) with the neighbouring communities. Camogli witnessed a demographic boom in the nineteenth century due to the extraordinary growth of its shipping activities, which created new labour opportunities. Demographic data are available from 1861 onwards: in 1881, the local population had passed from roughly eight thousand to more than ten⁶⁹¹. In the decade between 1861 and 1881, the growth rate was 19,2%, in contrast with a 6,8% average of the neighbouring towns⁶⁹².

The evolution of Recco in the same period, for example, followed the opposite trend. From the times of the Republic of Genoa until the mid-nineteenth century, Recco had represented the hegemonic power in the area, whereas Camogli was a poorly populated fishing village. Still, in 1859, according to the readjustment of Ligurian administrative units, Camogli was subordinate to Recco, although the former outnumbered the latter in terms of population. Then, the subsequent rise of Camogli found recognition only in 1877, when of its number inhabitants were double that of Recco and was officially promoted as a city⁶⁹³.


⁶⁹¹ Istituto Centrale di Statistica (ISTAT), *Comuni e loro popolazione ai censimenti dal 1861 al 1951*, Roma: Azienda Beneventana Tipografica Editoriale, 1960, pp. 53-54.

⁶⁹² Idem.

⁶⁹³ G.B. Roberto Figari (ed.), *Camogli da borgo a città. Notizie storiche e spunti di ricerca*.

Moreover, by adopting an alternative approach, which differentiates crew members according to professional categories and skill levels, it is possible to achieve a more refined interpretation of Camogli's labour market.

Figure 6.2. Birth-place by skill levels.



Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1831-1865.

According to Figure 6.2, the highest concentration of Camogli-born seamen lies in the high-skilled group, composed of shipmasters and mates. In their case, indeed, the figure accounted for 67% of the records. Such data evidence is fundamental to underline the familiar and communitarian dimension of Camogli's maritime labour; indeed, before becoming independent and founding single-ship enterprises, shipowners underwent nautical education and spent years at sea, often holding commanding positions on their relatives' vessels. In continuity with previous long-standing traditions, according to which shipowners served as masters over their ship (a custom protracting up to the early 1860s), in Camogli, masters' and shipowners' relationships were as tight as possible and, usually, the appointment of masters and mates fell within the core members of the shipowners' households. Then, the rest came from Genoa and the Eastern Riviera. On the other side, it is in low-

skilled seafarers (ship-boys and ordinary seamen) that the Camogli-born seamen accounted slightly beyond the average (43%).

Aggregate data fails to effectively outline a large number of cases that are representative of this era. On the one hand, on the brig *Alfa* (221 t.), in 1859, there were eleven seamen, all of them – from master to cabin-boys – from Camogli⁶⁹⁴. On the other hand, the brig *Regolo* in 1864, was composed only of three people from Camogli – the master, the steward and a cabin-boy –, whereas the others lived in nearby towns, such as Recco, Rapallo, Nervi and Portofino⁶⁹⁵.

The relatively high numbers of ship officials born in Camogli testifies the strong correlation between masters and shipowners. As we will see later, more clearly⁶⁹⁶, in selecting shipmasters, kinship and trust relationships played fundamental roles. Therefore, it was understandable that the shipowners' preference targeted captains from a community-based labour pool market. An analogous discourse, then, ruled the recruitment of cabin boys who, in several cases, were close relatives either of owners or masters.

Conversely, to understand the features of the endogenous labour market, we can overturn the perspective adopted in Figure 6.1. There, the geographical distribution of the seamen embarked on Camogli-owned vessels is shown; now, we address the analysis of the embarkments of the sailors from Camogli, whether they embarked on Camogli-owned vessels or not. The results outline how, before the late 1880s, the seamen of Camogli found employment in the domestic fleet, with little or no exceptions; only afterwards, as a result of the downgrading conditions of local shipping, some seafarers sought further opportunities into different markets, particularly on cargo and passenger steamers⁶⁹⁷.

As presented in the previous chapters, in the 1840s and 1850s, most seamen began their careers in cabotage, pursuing long-standing local interests along the Tyrrhenian routes, especially those for

⁶⁹⁴ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 2227.

⁶⁹⁵ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 16, n. 4684.

⁶⁹⁶ See, *infra*.

⁶⁹⁷ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, registers from 1 to 39.

charcoal transports⁶⁹⁸. Then, they engaged on longer deep-sea going routes towards the Black Sea trade, which represented a trademark for most of them, before moving even further to oceanic navigation. Camogli's shipping stimulated considerable demands for the workforce throughout its rising phase, which led shipowners and captains to expand to neighbouring towns labour markets. This phenomenon might also explain the low rates of cases of desertion aimed to embark on foreign ships, a well-established and widespread phenomenon in other merchant marines⁶⁹⁹, up to the late 1880s. Before the last decades of the nineteenth century, desertion, whose evolution will be further discussed in the next chapter, responded to different needs and was tied to migration flows, according to which some seafarers quitted the ships and sought a new life in the Americas.

Notwithstanding the last phase (the 1880s-1910s), therefore, the existence of an endogenous labour market – ruling local demand and supply of seafaring workforce – represents a fundamental characteristic of Camogli's maritime evolution. From a social perspective, this endogenous way to form the crews resulted in the persistence of the land features at sea. Family ties, kinship and, more broadly, all sorts of direct relationships established ashore were continued on board, into crew inter-relationships and in the mechanisms of keeping discipline during navigation. Life onboard, therefore, was a sort of re-enactment of the life ashore. In a contemporary polemical pamphlet, these characteristics were neatly described through a metaphor, which compared every ship to a moving migrant family:

Since the ships were relatively scarce [in numbers and tons], their crews were composed of people from the same town, where shipownership was concentrated; yet, the supply of sailors exceeded their demand. This led to limited and contiguous relationships, which never went beyond the local and narrow geographical and professional clusters. Also, this resulted in the fact that all these people, anxious for their livelihoods, had to remain bound, industrious

⁶⁹⁸ See, Chapter 1 and the similarities with the 17th century British case outlined in: R. Davis, *The rise of the English shipping industry in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries*.

⁶⁹⁹ See, Chapter 6.

and disciplined. Every ship, therefore, is like *a family that emigrates for some time*.⁷⁰⁰

However, in Camogli’s case study, this persuasive metaphor, which the author used to blame Ligurian backwardness in shipping, can be pushed further, from family to community. Indeed, under this light, the fleet of Camogli can be conceived as a multitude of “floating communities”.

6.3.2. KINSHIP AND COMMUNITY: ONBOARD RELATIONSHIPS IN TRADITIONAL SEAFARING

In Camogli, seafaring careers began relatively early, soon after completing primary school, representing the highest degree of education for most seamen (except the masters). Maritime culture and traditions played a crucial role in directing most of the boys towards seafaring. In broad terms, the most common behaviour consisted of taking service between age eleven and fourteen and for short voyages to adapt to life at sea progressively.

Table 6.1 Age of first enrolment (series 1-3).

<i>Range of age</i>	<i>1* (1825-1835)</i>	<i>2* (1845-1855)</i>	<i>3* (1865-1875)</i>
>11	3	14	0
11-12	47	54	21
13-14	38	20	53
15-16	11	11	24
16>	1	0	3
<i>Average (y-d)</i>	12 y - 240 d	12y – 36 d	13y – 259 d

Source: ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, registers from 1 to 39.

In the years preceding the first official embarkments, several youngsters underwent their own informal “baptism of the sea”, in the context of seasonal fishing campaigns – like those for anchovies

⁷⁰⁰ G. De Rossi, “La Marina mercantile italiana”, *Nuova Antologia*, 1881, p. 5, in ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Commissione parlamentare sulle condizioni della marina mercantile, b. 4.

in Gorgona⁷⁰¹ – where they learned the fundamentals of navigation. Afterwards, upon parental permission, which was mandatory for under-aged seafarers⁷⁰², these prospective sailors enrolled within the first ranks of the Italian merchant marine as *mozzi*. The first steps of the cabin boys in the maritime world constituted a fundamental stage in the sailors' practical education. Indeed, in sailing ship navigation, the transfer of seafaring knowledge was an intergenerational process involving all the crew members. Professional expertise was handed down from one generation to another through observation and first-person repetition of the fundamental operations performed at sea. In broader terms, the ship – to be perceived as a communitarian human space – attended to its social responsibilities toward the community's younger members rather than demanding a cheap labour force. Cabin-boys represented a transitional workforce; they were active members of the community, and their participation in its maritime activities was part of their maturity to manhood and seamanship. In this framework, the dimensions of family and community overlapped, as testified by the broad recurrence of father-son relationships between masters and cabin-boys observed in the crew agreements of the Black Sea period. This was, for instance, the case of Giuseppe and Gio. Batta Bozzo, respectively shipmaster and cabin-boy, enlisted in the crew of the barque *N.S. della Concezione* (305 t.), which left Genoa in June 1859 to the Azov Sea⁷⁰³. The same pattern is seen for Giacomo and Diodato Schiaffino of the brig *Genio* (338 t.) where Giacomo was both owner and captain⁷⁰⁴. In selecting the crew members, shipowners and shipmasters coexisted and shared their control; yet, when these figures merged in the same individual, family relationships on board became the rule.

Apart from the need for the education of future captains and shipowners, which represented the most common typology of kinship relationships on board, the composition of the crews may consist in the transfer of entire families at sea. In 1862, Agostino Degregori, owner of the brig *Dante* (278 t.), appointed his two sons, Gio. Batta and Luigi, respectively, as shipmaster and mate. Two years later, as soon as Luigi was licensed as captain, he was promoted to master, whereas his brother Gio. Batta

⁷⁰¹ See, Chapter I.

⁷⁰² *Codice per la marina mercantile del Regno d'Italia*, art. 73, in M. Vocino, *Codice marittimo*, p. 25.

⁷⁰³ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 3783.

⁷⁰⁴ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 6803.

was given the command of the barque *Italico* (369 t.), still owned by Agostino⁷⁰⁵. Moreover, on the brigs *Eto* (143 t.) and *Le Due Marie* (144 t.), same family members on board were respectively three and four, shipmaster, mate and boatswain in the former, and shipmaster, mate, boatswain and a cabin-boy in the latter⁷⁰⁶. Besides, these extraordinary cases shed light on the fluid definition of the role of boatswains onboard. In the previous section, boatswains were defined as responsible for the ship equipment and the more complicated operations at sea. Their duties required long-term experience in navigation, and boatswains were usually chosen among the most skilled seamen available. On the other hand, archival evidence suggests the existence of underlying mechanisms that complicate the adoption of this straightforward paradigm. For instance, data concerning the age of boatswains resulted in the average age of 34,5 years and less than 25 years in some records⁷⁰⁷. Such cases are the boatswains Luigi Olivari (*Eto*) and Fortunato Aste (*Le Due Marie*), 20 years old, at their embarkments⁷⁰⁸. Both embarked under their respective fathers, shipmasters, and Aste Fortunato was even in his two brothers' company, enlisted as a mate and cabin boy. In the course of their careers, both Luigi and Fortunato became shipmasters after a few years⁷⁰⁹.

In these cases, the extension of family ties to crew members implied the partial reshaping of boatswains' character. This phenomenon is connected with overabundant supplies of high-skilled and educated seamen in seafaring communities distinguished for solid shipowning traditions. The absence of law requirements to embark as boatswain allowed underaged, but qualified, masters and mates to compete for the same position: the aim was to accumulate months of navigation and to spend the time intercurrent between the completion of the school and the minimum age to be

⁷⁰⁵ See, *Idem*, serie 14, n. 9498 and serie 16, n. 4631 and 8959. See also, ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, register 6, n. 6802 and *Idem*, register 10, n. 11920.

⁷⁰⁶ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 13, n. 4031 and serie 14, n. 6798, brigs *Eto* (143 tons.) and *Le due Marie* (144 tons.), both of them headed to Black Sea ports (Odessa and Galatz).

⁷⁰⁷ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1831-1865.

⁷⁰⁸ *Idem*, serie 13, n. 4031 and serie 14, n. 6798.

⁷⁰⁹ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, register 6 and 11. Luigi Olivari (n. 7142) became master in 1861 and then upgraded his licence for oceanic routes in 1867. Fortunato Aste (n. 11482), was promoted to master in 1867 and in 1868 commanded the brick bark *Aste Giuseppe* (named after his father) along great cabotage routes. See, ACS, *Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea*, box. 436.

officially mates and masters. Thus, the boatswains' professional profile, whose trademark was the superior experience on board, was technically turned upside down: boatswains were no more experienced sailors but became a temporary position for young prospective deck officials.

Apart from increasing the control of shipowners over the ship's life at sea, through the imposition of family members, the communitarian dimension shaped the social attitude of shipowners towards sailors. Northern European and American scholars have used nineteenth-century literature to support evidence on a widespread and generalised negative stance of shipowners against seamen based mainly on the British and American societies⁷¹⁰. Common seafarers are described as rude, uneducated, prone to drunkenness, violence and all sorts of malicious behaviours; yet, owners needed them to operate their ships and, therefore, devised any kind of measure to control and limit their "spontaneous" malice. Camogli's endogenous and community-based pool for recruiting sailors raises a striking contrast with this general interpretation. Shipowners and seamen are respected members of cohesive family communities with close relations. There are no clues about shipowners' judgemental or harsh behaviour against crews, a sharp difference related to the enclosed society and shared space where behaviour on board was immediately made known ashore.

Most of the shipowners' kinship was limited to the ruling ranks (plus cabin-boys, for the mentioned educational purposes): sons and relatives usually filled the best positions, such as shipmaster, mate and boatswain. Shipowners' direct relatives were rarely engaged to low and middle-skilled positions for long periods. Some instances of close-relatives enlisted as able-bodied seamen exist, but these cases tend to be scarce and short-termed in the expectation of more qualified positions. This is the case, for instance, of Andrea and Filippo Razeto, cousins between each other and respective sons of the shipmaster and mate of the brig *La Rosa*. They enlisted as AB seamen at age nineteen, but as soon as they acquired more experience, both of them obtained the licence of captain⁷¹¹.

In other instances, the concentration of relatives on board could entail some drawbacks and produce problems within the hierarchy and the crew's control. It might have been the case, for instance, of what occurred on the ship *Nuovo Filadelfo*, where a conflict between the shipmaster

⁷¹⁰ G.J. Milne, *People, Place and Power on the Nineteenth-Century Waterfront. Sailortown*, Palgrave Macmillan: 2016, pp. 32-39.

⁷¹¹ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 6593; ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, register 11, n. 11355 and 11588.

Carlo Aste and his steward Gio. Batta Vaccarezza took place. In 1867, the latter was denounced to the Italian consul of Cardiff for his violent conduct against the captain. This fact triggered an official inquiry, performed by the consul who later transmitted it to the Ministry, to shed light on the events. According to the consul, the dispute had started because of the steward's insubordination against the master, which led to a fight between the two parts. The captain had denounced the affair relying on his solid juridical position, as he had witnesses to his favour, the ship's mate and the boatswain. However, since both the mate and the boatswain were brothers to the captain, the consul considered that their testimony was not impartial and, therefore, they were not accepted as witnesses⁷¹².

The same incident might also be worth noting and emblematic for another purpose. Indeed, the following events might represent a most convincing case of what was previously theorised as the transfer of the communitarian dynamics outside the geographical borders of the community. Every ship of Camogli was a small community and, with their voyages, they could transfer the community to foreign countries and ports. While the ship was anchored, as the procedures were still ongoing, captain Carlo Aste was approached by Giacomo Vaccarezza, master of the barque *Avola Pellegrina* – newly arrived in Cardiff – and brother of the steward mentioned above. Informed about the facts, captain Vaccarezza verbally and physically attacked Carlo Aste to support his own brother's position on the quarrel. To intricate even more the situation, the consul reported that, in the previous years, captain Aste had served as mate under captain Vaccarezza's command.

The *Nuovo Filadelfo* affair in Cardiff draws on just one of the several files kept in the Archives of the merchant marine. However, the mixture of personal and professional relationships, which involved five people belonging to two different families, is emblematic to outline the pervasiveness of the communitarian and family structures in Camogli's shipping, in different geographical areas in which all these events took place.

6.3.3. THE SEAFARERS OF CAMOGLI AND THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE

⁷¹² ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici Diversi 1860-1869, b. 436.

As Camogli's maritime activities expanded to the oceanic shipping market, its locally-based and endogenous labour system gradually changed, losing some of its main features and entangling with international and global dynamics and tensions. Discussions about the existence and the formation, from the 1850s onwards, of a global and integrated maritime labour market, set against different historians, who have developed their analyses on this theme. Although most of the scholars agreed on the effective transformation of maritime labour as a result of technological advance and globalisation, remained wide range for dissensus whether it was possible to attach the label global to this new system or not. The main issue, raised among others by Lewis Fischer, concerned the existence of real integration in wage differentials. In his work on Norwegian communities, Fisher contested the effective integration drawing on capillary archival research, which led the author to outline how even the existence of a national maritime labour market was debatable. His assumptions rooted in the persistence of substantial wage differentials between several Norwegian ports still in the late nineteenth-century⁷¹³. The discourse addressing the effective integration within national maritime labour markets might also be translated to the Italian context, which, also owing to a recent national unification, presented several incongruences and discontinuities from one place to another. Whereas specific studies have targeted local labour markets, few have produced comparative analyses suitable for an organic reconstruction of the Italian market for seafarers. M.S. Rollandi, in her original work on the Italian maritime labour, has been one of the few to address these subjects, drawing on the data provided by the Parliamentary Inquiry.

Table 6.2. Comparison of AB seamen average wages in different Italian ports (1871-1880).

	1871	1872	1873	1874	1875	1876	1877	1878	1879	1880
<i>Genova</i>	65	65	65	65	63	63	60	55	55	50
<i>Livorno</i>	54	57	60	59	59	58	59	55	51	56
<i>Napoli</i>	40	49	36	46	47	48	45	50	47	41
<i>Castellammare</i>	45	46	45	45	42	41	41	40	40	40

⁷¹³ L.R. Fisher, "The efficiency of maritime labour markets in the age of sail: the post-1850 Norwegian experience", in Idem (ed.), *The market for seamen in the age of sail*, St. John's, Newfoundland: International Maritime Economic History Association, 1994.

<i>Messina</i>	47	45	48	48	47	45	44	40	38	40
<i>Palermo</i>	46	48	48	55	55	56	53	41	46	46

Source: *Inchiesta parlamentare sulle condizioni della marina mercantile italiana*, vol. III, p. 188; M.S. Rollandi, *Lavorare sul mare*, Tabella 2. Medie mensili dei salari (in lire) dei marinai imbarcati nei porti italiani (1871-1880), p. 321.

The average wages reported in Table 6.2 represent a unique comparison tool provided by the Italian authorities in 1881. Out of it, none of the aggregated data and statistical tables produced and published up to the First World War contained reliable and helpful information concerning the evolution of salaries in general and from one port to another. Nevertheless, Table 6.2 needs to be used in the awareness of its limited period and in the light of the international context, dominated by the fall of freight rates, which dramatically modified the price for maritime labour in all the merchant marines⁷¹⁴. Therefore, though the relative convergence of salaries might indicate the progressive diminution of geographical wage differentials, the absence of data beyond this limited period impedes further analyses. Lacking the tools of the classical economy to assess national and global maritime labour markets, we can investigate the influence of the increased geographical mobility of seafarers between previously self-governing worlds on maritime labour systems. Indeed, the discourse concerning the existence of an integrated global maritime labour market exceeds the purposes of this dissertation; yet, the encounters and entanglements between the local and international markets for seafarers had their undeniable effects, which will be at the core of the following pages.

The intensification of seamen mobility can be included among the most evident results of the historical evolution of Camogli's shipping. As outlined in the previous chapters, since the last phase of the Black Sea trade, Camogli-owned vessels, accustomed to navigating within the borders of the Inner Sea, moved beyond them and established a firm foothold along Northern European and oceanic routes. These vessels were indeed operated by seafarers, who had been traditionally bounded to the Mediterranean in the same manner: this process began as intragenerational, with middle-aged seamen, reminiscent of their past along short-cabotage routes, embarking on new

⁷¹⁴ See chapter 3.

challenges. Then, it became intergenerational, as most of their descendants grew well-aware of their enlarged working environment and, perhaps, a little oblivious of their past.

Table 6.3. Percentage of employment in different categories of navigation (months 1-24).

	<i>cabotaggio</i>	<i>gran cabotaggio</i>	<i>lungo corso</i>	<i>fishing</i>
<i>1* (1825-1835)</i>	65%	33%	2%	–
<i>2* (1845-1855)</i>	20%	76%	2%	2%
<i>3* (1865-1875)</i>	13%	42%	40%	5%

Source: ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, registers from 1 to 39.

Table 6.3 divided Camogli seafarers' first embarkments (months 1-24) into three categories (plus fishing) according to the type of trade routes. These categories were drawn from the Italian legislation, which identified short-cabotage, Mediterranean cabotage (including the Black Sea and Northern Sea) and oceanic navigation. Compared to the increase of long-cabotage and oceanic navigation in the latter two, the pre-eminence of short-cabotage observed among the first row members is an adequate reproduction of the different stages of Camogli's maritime activities. As argued in the previous section, first embarkments responded to educational purposes as to labour demands. Therefore, seafarers' initiation to navigation was more likely conducted on shorter and safer voyages than mature and more experienced seamen, whose employment depended exclusively on the needs of the shipping market. However, the dramatic fall of short-cabotage emerging in the second and third cohorts is more or less in line with the market framework. The high percentage of youngsters – from the third row – who embarked straight on oceanic voyages is a clear representation of the relative dismissal of the low-paced, discontinuous and staged formation onboard to gain a more rapid adaptation to high seas navigation.

Table 6.4. Percentage of employment in different categories of navigation (months 25-400).

	<i>cabotaggio</i>	<i>gran cabotaggio</i>	<i>lungo corso</i>	<i>fishing</i>
<i>1* (1825-1835)</i>	27%	59%	13%	1%

Leonardo Scavino

2* (1845-1855)	7%	55%	37%	1%
3* (1865-1875)	8%	30%	58%	4%

Source: ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, registers from 1 to 39.

Table 6.4 translates the same categorisation into the careers of middle-skilled and high-skilled Camogli's seamen and considers the embarkments from their twenty-fourth month to the end of their careers. These data derive from the approximation of seamen's embarkments, which has been based on the duration of employment: each seafarers' career was divided into a maximum of four sections, each of them corresponding to roughly one hundred months of service at sea. The first section comprehended the embarkments from month 25 to month 100; the second section, months 101 to 200; the third, months 201-300; the last section, from 300 months to over four hundred (only eight seamen out of our three hundred samples worked for more than four hundred months). Finally, every career section was labelled according to the category of relative majority within each timeframe. The outcomes, albeit rough from a statistical perspective, represent the achievable results that reflect the robust correlation between maritime labour and shipping evolutions.

To the first cohort (1*) belonged the first generation of seafarers who underwent the progressive abandonment of Tyrrhenian cabotage in favour to the Black Sea trade (59,30%); in their latest years of service, a discrete group of them (12,98%) lasted as long as to move to the oceanic phase. The second cohort (2*) lived through the economic peak of Camogli's shipping: these seamen started on board three-masted barques, sailing from the Black Sea to the British ports (54,68%) and ended up on iron-hulled "cape horners" (37,43%). Instead, the third (3*) underwent the most troublesome shipping cycles of the 1870s-1890s and the progressive marginalisation of sailing vessels to peripheral markets (58,44%). The utilisation of inter-generational samples allowed us to observe the steady transition from local to global, which Camogli's seafarers underwent within the 1840s-1900s period. Simultaneously, the coexistence of different categories within the same cohort provides us with clues about intra-generational transformations, which led seamen trained in short-cabotage to sail in oceanic waters. One of them was Gaetano Giovanni Figari, born in 1825 from Gio.

Batta and Maria Morchio⁷¹⁵. Gaetano Giovanni enrolled for the first time in 1843, relatively late for Camogli's standards, six months before turning eighteen years old. In his first six years of service, he embarked continuously on short-cabotage vessels, where he acquired 65 months of experience, most of them at the service of the same master Mortola⁷¹⁶. Afterwards, Gaetano Giovanni began to serve in the Black Sea trade for 220 months until 1871. Only then, he turned to oceanic navigation, reaching ports such as Cape Town, Montevideo, Valparaiso and Rangoon. On 1st September 1883, after a whole career as an able-bodied seaman, Gaetano Giovanni embarked on board the ship *Indus* (captain Bozzo) as boatswain. This was his last voyage as, in 1885, when he reached age 60, he moved definitively to Buenos Ayres after 409 months of navigation.

Different, instead, was the personal trajectory of Andrea Dellacasa, who was born in 1833⁷¹⁷. Having obtained his parents' permission, Andrea embarked as cabin-boy at age ten and collected more than 60 months of navigation, divided between short and Mediterranean cabotage, before turning eighteen. In 1855, after a few Black Sea voyages as a sailor, he suspended his services until 1860. Arguably, this period was devoted to studying for his shipmasters' exams, as in 1861, Andrea was licensed for great cabotage. In 1867, he received his first command on board of the brig *Luchino* (293 t.) toward the ports of Azov. In the same year, Andrea had obtained the license for unlimited navigation and, thus, from the early 1870s, regularly engaged in oceanic routes, particularly in the North American timber trade, at the command of the three-masted schooner *Salvatore* (400 t.)⁷¹⁸. Finally, in 1889 he retired after 337 months of navigation.

These seamen – and all their peers – were first-person witnesses of the radical transformations in Camogli's shipping throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. Some of these changes began in the Black Sea phase before ascending to further levels at the 'global turn'.

⁷¹⁵ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, register 4, n. 3741. Then, in 1863, he was passed to the a new serial number, in Idem, register 28, n. 19570.

⁷¹⁶ In the sources, he is defined as *padrone* which identified masters who were allowed to navigate on short-cabotage routes only.

⁷¹⁷ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, register 4, n. 4020. Then, in 1879, he was registered in Idem, register 27, n. 20240.

⁷¹⁸ *Registro navale italiano*, 1887, p. 169.

6.3.4. LOCAL AND GLOBAL IN CONFLICT


Uniformity and cohesion onboard were natural consequences of resorting to local endogenous labour resources (see Figure 6.1). During the Black Sea phase, the vast majority of seafarers was recruited in Camogli and then embarked in the port of Genoa; the main alternatives to this pattern were Marseille and Livorno, the two Mediterranean ports which were complementary to Genoa within the Black Sea trade framework. Sometimes, the captain of a ship headed to one of these two cities needed to replace some seamen or even change the entire crew; the new crew was recruited in that place to save time and not call to Genoa unnecessarily. Sometimes, due to the relative proximity of these ports to Liguria, the new elements were directly summoned from Camogli. It was the case, for instance, of the brig *Mercurio* (180 t.), which changed the entire crew (except the master) in Livorno (1861). Among the nine new sailors embarking (including the mate, the boatswain, five AB seamen and two cabin-boys), seven were from Camogli, the remaining from other Ligurian towns⁷¹⁹.

Nevertheless, in some instances, the need to replace sailors occurred in more distant ports. Death at sea, desertions or agreed discharges were frequent events within ship voyages. These resulted in more casual replacements, depending on the availability of sailors in that specific port. Priority was conceded to seafarers from Camogli and Liguria, but, in several cases, captains had to enrol foreign seamen. During this phase, it is possible to observe the earliest entanglements between different national labour forces: despite the relatively negligible numbers, the advent of Greeks (1,12%), Austrians (0,64%) and English (0,47%) must have had an impact on previously relatively homogeneous groups. However, more impressive was the number of seafarers from other pre-unitarian Italian states (6,77%), whose integration remained ineffective for an extended period⁷²⁰. Therefore, there is no surprise if the expansion of Camogli's shipping range blew a significant hit on its traditional local system.

⁷¹⁹ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, serie 14, n. 6743. The brig *Mercurio*, owned by Giuseppe Mortola and captained by Luigi Mortola, arrived in Livorno in late November 1860, from Berdyansk with a grain cargo. The new crew was embarked on the 12th January 1861.

⁷²⁰ See *infra*.

Figure 6.3. Geographical origins of crew members of Camogli-owned ships (1885-1905).



Source: ASGe, *Giornali nautici*.

The main radical change emerging from Figure 6.3 compared to the Black Sea phase crews' composition (Figure 6.1) is represented by the fall of Ligurian share from 88% to 63%. The gap was filled by the increment of other Italian seafarers (from 7% to 25%) and the more than double figure of foreigners (from 5% to 12%). Non-Ligurian Italians reached almost the same share as those from Camogli; their increased statistical weight on board is a sign of the broadening of Camogli's labour market, whose local and endogenous characteristics were gradually replaced by the opening to the national and global dimensions. Within this framework, the interplay between the increased mobility of seafarers and desertion accelerated the nationalisation and, then, globalisation of Camogli's crews. For instance, the presence of dense national communities in Latin American ports, such as Buenos Ayres and Montevideo, facilitated the recruitment of Italian seamen to replace deserters or legal emigrants.

Notwithstanding the discourse about wage differentials, the matter of national integration in the Italian merchant marine is crucial to advance our understanding of the nineteenth-century

maritime labour transformations. Unfortunately, so far, no studies have been attempted to deal, organically and comparatively, with this issue, which remains, however, beyond the scopes and possibilities of the present dissertation⁷²¹. Of course, the massive paperwork collected in the archives of the Italian merchant marine witnessed the problematic relationships deriving from onboard dynamics, several of which involved Ligurians and southerners. Although clashes and fights among crew members and especially between higher and lower ranks were frequent in all the world merchant marines, even among individuals coming from the same place, the introduction of foreigners aboard could boost these tensions. Ligurian seafarers, for example, lamented the «unfair competition» engaged by southern Italian seamen seeking employment in Genoa. Here, local demands for maritime labour were higher than the other national ports, which played a crucial role in the varying concentration of seafarers in the Ligurian city⁷²².

Desertion, which will be the object of more extensive analysis in the next chapter, was another factor that affected the communitarian homogeneity onboard. The rise of desertion among Italian seamen, particularly in the American ports, stroke severe implications on the formation of crews. From the owners' and captains' perspectives, desertion constituted a significant economic and social issue because numerous sailors needed to be replaced in foreign ports. However, such practice led to rising labour costs since seamen were recruited according to the average salaries of the specific port they were needed, which were commonly higher than those of Italy. Such a dynamic is plainly outlined by the 1869 *Commissione per la repressione delle diserzioni*:

Frequently, when captains reach foreign ports – in particular those of America – sailors jumped their ships; this causes the interruption of work [discharging and charging the cargo] and delays the departure. Therefore, new seamen were

⁷²¹ The lack of an Italian perspective (together with the Greek one) in the most exhaustive attempt to study the European maritime labour market is somehow surprising: see, P.C. Royen, J. Bruijn and J. Lucassen (ed.), *Those emblems of hell?: European sailors and the maritime labour market, 1570 – 1870*, Saint John's: Memorial Univ. of Newfoundland, 1997; L.R. Fischer (ed.), *The market for seamen in the age of sail*, Saint John's: Memorial Univ. of Newfoundland, 2019.

⁷²² M.S. Rollandi, *Lavorare sul mare*, p. 350. A striking problem between North and South was on wage differentials, reported in every economic sector. See: V. Daniele and P. Malanima, “Regional Wages and the North-South Disparity in Italy after the Unification”, *Rivista di Storia Economica*, No. 33: 2, 2017, pp. 117-158.

needed, at higher costs; furthermore, these seamen often lack good reputation and ethical behaviour and, during the journey, they can easily endanger the captain's life and the interests of shipowners and merchants.⁷²³

Therefore, the increased mobility of seafarers and desertion accelerated the nationalisation and, then, globalisation of the Italian crews. The presence of dense national communities in Latin American ports, such as Buenos Ayres and Montevideo, facilitated the recruitment of Italian seamen to replace deserters or legal emigrants. In some instances, these sailors embarked for shorter voyages, often limited to the American continent. This was the case, for instance, of the events involving the barque *Cadice*, which witnessed the desertion of seven sailors in Buenos Ayres. There, the captain recruited two Italians (from Palermo and Castellammare), three Britons, one Portuguese and an Argentinian citizen. Then, six of them disembarked in Pensacola where, for sailing back to the Mediterranean, the master was obliged to employ two more Englishmen, two Germans, one Danish and a man from New York⁷²⁴. The crew of *Cadice*, which in June 1897 had left Marseille with twelve Italians out of thirteen members (one Mexican), less than a year afterwards (February 1898) departed from Pensacola to the Mediterranean with more than half of the crew composed of foreign citizens. This example, and several other of the same kind, may provide a strong representation of the effects of globalisation on Camogli's crews.

6.4. Wages and professionalization: the evolution of upward mobility

The extension of the geographical range of the maritime activities, the dismantlement of the endogenous labour system, and the loss of communitarian cohesion on board might have been among the factors that transformed Camogli's maritime labour from the 1880s onwards. Furthermore, these broader processes impacted more measurable labour features, such as vertical mobility and wages, which will be at the core of the following pages.

⁷²³ ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Miscellanea Uffici Diversi, b. 474, folder 15.

⁷²⁴ ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, n. 353/1, Cadice.

First, vertical mobility and wages are deeply intertwined between each other. On a ship, higher wages are associated with higher positions throughout maritime professional ranks. Skill-premiums represent this correlation between wage differentials among crew members and labour expertise. The existence or absence of regulations to control vertical mobility from one rank to another and the transformation of the relative distribution of skilled labourers onboard are crucial factors determining skill-premiums evolution over time. Scholarly studies underlined how, whilst facilitating the growth of international trade and shipping, technological change and globalisation led to deskilling in maritime labour and reducing skill premiums and relative demands for skilled labour⁷²⁵. If this assumption has been repeatedly validated for steam navigation⁷²⁶, Jari Ojala transferred the theory in the context of Scandinavian sailing fleets with valuable findings⁷²⁷. This section will attempt to test such analysis on Camogli's sample to validate or discuss the potential transferability of this theory within a Mediterranean seafaring community specialised in sail shipping.

6.4.1. FROM "SHARE" TO SALARY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS

To investigate the evolution of wages and the usage of other forms of payment will be crucial to assess skill-premiums and, in broad terms, to measure the economic value of vertical mobility. Throughout Camogli's maritime labour history, wages became the prevalent form of remuneration only from the 1860s onwards (still in 1859, wages were used in 43% of the instances⁷²⁸), when they

⁷²⁵ A. Chin et al., "Technical change and the demand for skills during the second industrial revolution: evidence from the merchant marine, 1891–1912", pp. 572-583; S.M. Hynninen et al., "Technological change and wage premiums: Historical evidence from linked employer–employee data", pp. 1-11.

⁷²⁶ S.M. Hynninen et al., "Technological change and wage premiums: Historical evidence from linked employer–employee data", pp. 1-11.

⁷²⁷ J. Ojala, J. Pehkonen and J. Eloranta, "Deskilling and decline in skill premium during the age of sail: Swedish and Finnish seamen, 1751–1913".

⁷²⁸ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1831-1865.

substituted the previous method to distribute single-voyages profits among crew members, in accordance to predetermined proportions (called *alla parte*). The form of payment *alla parte* was rooted in long-standing traditions dating back to the Middle Age; from the sixteenth to the late eighteenth century, it represented the customary way to provide remunerations for seafarers, particularly concerning small communities devoted to coastal cabotage and fishing⁷²⁹. In 1692, in describing all the coeval forms of remuneration, Carlo Targa, a Genoese jurist, defined the one *alla parte* as «the most utilised method in the context of small ships, [...] which consisted in halving the freight revenues and the profits collected by the vessel in its voyages, after having subtracted common expenses»⁷³⁰. In general, it consisted of a share-system – which was clearly distinguished from share-ownership tools (*carati*⁷³¹) – and was tied to single-voyage enterprises, at the end of which all the profits were distributed in proportion to previous agreements. The purpose underlying this system was to adopt risk-sharing mechanisms to cover single enterprises; thus, shipowners were required fewer investments that were limited to hull and equipment supplies and maintenance. Then, at the end of the voyage, profits were divided according to roles onboard; during the 1850-1865 period, Camogli's crew list witness this average distribution:

Table 6.5. Shares distribution in Camogli's vessels to the Black Sea.

	<i>Shares (1850-1860)</i>
<i>Shipmasters</i>	2,00
<i>Mates</i>	1,50
<i>Boatswains</i>	1,25
<i>Stewards</i>	1,15

⁷²⁹ Several references might be found in scholarly literature about Ligurian shipping in early modern era. For instance, see: L. Lo Basso, *Gente di bordo. La vita quotidiana dei marittimi genovesi nel XVIII secolo*, Roma: Carocci, 2016, pp. 108-111; P. Calcagno, "A caccia dell'oro rosso. Le comunità del Ponente ligure e la pesca del corallo nel XVII secolo", *Rivista mediterraneennes*, No. 57, 2018, p. 29; E. Grendi, *Il Cervo e la Repubblica. Il modello ligure di antico regime*, Torino: Einaudi, 1993, p. 191.

⁷³⁰ C. Targa, *Ponderazioni sopra la contrattazione marittima*, Genova, 1803, pp. 203-204.

⁷³¹ See Chapter 4.

<i>AB seamen</i>	1,00
<i>Ordinary seamen</i>	0,70
<i>Cabin-boys</i>	0,33

Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*.

Afterwards, beginning with the late 1850s, the allocation of monthly salaries gradually replaced the usage of share systems. Such transformation might have stemmed from the geographical expansion of the trade routes, which increased voyage durations, or from Camogli's establishment on multi-purposes enterprises, as in the wheat-coal integrated routes with British ports. These factors contributed to the dismissal of the shares' system and the definitive establishment of wages. Nevertheless, the traditional forms of payment remained long associated with short-range maritime activities, as fishing or coastal-cabotage, whereas they progressively disappeared along international and oceanic routes. According to David Viale, in 1882, «share system was limited to coastal cabotage to an almost negligible extent, being absent even in a great part of coal transports from Sardinia and Maremma»⁷³².

Table 6.6. Average salaries within Camogli's merchant marine (1850-1900).

<i>Profession</i>	<i>1850-1865</i>	<i>1885-1905</i>
<i>Shipmasters</i>	107,67	161,50
<i>Mates</i>	87,81	107,18
<i>Boatswains</i>	76,69	78,90
<i>Stewards</i>	68,33	73,57
<i>AB seamen</i>	56,12	55,00
<i>Ordinary seamen</i>	40,53	34,86
<i>Cabin-boys</i>	20,88	18,03

Sources: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*; ASGe, *Giornali nautici*.

⁷³² *Inchiesta Parlamentare sulle condizioni della marina mercantile*, Vol. I, p. 158.

The data provided in Table 6.6 illustrate the evolution of average salaries from the Black Sea phase to the edge of the century. Due to the lack of data, we could not provide reliable information regarding the 1865-1885 decades within which Camogli's shipping business peaked before the international freight crisis hampered it. Although, in the proceedings of the Parliamentary Inquiry concerning the national merchant marine, the Italian government provided some data covering the 1870-1880 timespan, albeit limitedly to able-bodied seamen.

Table 6.7. Average monthly wages of Italian sailors in Genoa (1871-1880).

<i>Year</i>	<i>1871</i>	<i>1872</i>	<i>1873</i>	<i>1874</i>	<i>1875</i>	<i>1876</i>	<i>1877</i>	<i>1878</i>	<i>1879</i>	<i>1880</i>
<i>Average wage</i>	65	65	65	65	62,5	62,5	60	55	55	50

Source: *Inchiesta parlamentare sulle condizioni della marina mercantile*, Vol. III, p. 188.

The evidence of Table 6.7, if compared with Camogli's data, confirms an upgrading trend until 1874, followed by a dramatic downturn from which Italian shipping recovered only at the beginning of the new century⁷³³. These figures were corroborated by some oral interventions in which shipowners and captains reported the drastic fall of shipmasters' average salaries, which had risen to 300 Italian lire «in the age of prosperity»⁷³⁴, before falling again into the 150-200 Italian lire range in 1882⁷³⁵. The fall of freight rates had a substantial impact on market salaries, but, in the long term, its consequences did not hit all the professional categories with the same strength. In Table 6.8, the lack of evident mutations of middle and low-skilled seamen's wages compared with the exceptional growth of high-skilled salaries might be crucial to introduce an analysis of relative salaries' historical evolution.

⁷³³ See, Chapter 3.

⁷³⁴ *Inchiesta parlamentare sulla marina mercantile*, Vol. I, p. 160.

⁷³⁵ *Idem*.

Table 6.9. Relative crew wages in relation to AB seamen salary (AB Seamen=100).

	<i>1850-1865</i>	<i>1885-1905</i>	<i>+/-</i>
<i>Shipmasters</i>	192	294	102
<i>Mates</i>	157	195	38
<i>Boatswains</i>	137	143	6
<i>Stewards</i>	122	134	12
<i>AB seamen</i>	100	100	0
<i>Ordinary seamen</i>	72	63	-9
<i>Cabin-boys</i>	37	33	-4

Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*; ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*.

Table 6.9 illustrates the relative salaries of crew members in relation to able-bodied seamen's ones. This table was achieved using AB seamen wages as a constant reference to evaluate variations in relative salaries and the relative evolution of skill-premia. The divergence between high-skilled professions and AB seamen increased remarkably (+102 for shipmasters and +38 for mates); skill-premia within the same middle-skilled group show a slight growth for boatswains and stewards; ordinary seamen (-9) and cabin-boys (-4) relative wages, instead, decreased to a limited extent.

6.4.2. TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE, LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY AND DESKILLING

Since the first approaches of maritime history to nineteenth-century shipping, scholars have investigated the correlation between technological advance and labour productivity⁷³⁶. Despite the

⁷³⁶ See: J. Lucassen and R.W. Unger, "Labour productivity in ocean shipping, 1450-1875", *International Journal of Maritime History*, 12, 2000, pp. 127-141; Idem, "Shipping, productivity and economic growth", in R.W. Unger (ed.), *Shipping and economic growth, 1350-1850*, Leiden: Brill, 2011; J. Van Lottum and J.L. Van Zanden, "Labour productivity and human capital in the European maritime sector of the eighteenth century", *Explorations in economic history*, 2014. For shipping productivity in general, see Chapter 3.

reasonable criticism of Lucassen and Unger⁷³⁷, the ratio of tons per man on board has remained the most practical tool for measuring labour productivity. As anticipated in Chapter 3, where the impact of improvements in nautical technology has been correlated to the productivity of the maritime business, the enhancement of labour productivity played a decisive role in cutting the costs and making shipping more efficient. Such discourse cannot be limited to steam navigation since sailing shipping underwent profound transformations, particularly in average tonnage. The fleet of Camogli, for instance, passed from 176,3 tons on average in 1853 to 456,4 in 1896⁷³⁸. As a result, the analysis of crew lists and logbooks suggests that ton-man ratios fell approximately from 6,99 (for 100 tons) to 1,83 in the same period⁷³⁹.

Table 6.10. Estimation of the number of seamen employed by Camogli merchant marine (Ton/man ratio per total tonnage).

	<i>Total tonnage</i>	<i>Ton/man ratio (100 t.)</i>	<i>E seamen employed</i>
<i>1853</i>	25.045	6,99	1.751
<i>1861</i>	49.060	5,03	2.468
<i>1879</i>	182.774	2,25	4.112
<i>1896</i>	79.407	1,83	1.453


Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1861; CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*; ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, 1896; *Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile*, Roma, 1896; A.N. Kiaer (ed.), *Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: II. Les marines marchandes*, Christiania: Bureau Central de Statistique du Royaume de Norvège, 1883.

⁷³⁷ J. Lucassen and R.W. Unger, "Labour productivity in ocean shipping", p. 127.

⁷³⁸ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1861; CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*; ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, 1896; *Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile*, Roma, 1896; A.N. Kiaer (ed.), *Statistique internationale. Navigation maritime: II. Les marines marchandes*, Christiania: Bureau Central de Statistique du Royaume de Norvège, 1883.

⁷³⁹ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*; 1831-1865; ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, 1896.

Figure 6.4. Estimation of the number of seamen employed by Camogli merchant marine (Ton/man ratio per total tonnage).



Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1861; CMMC, *Assicurazioni varie*; ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, 1896; *Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile*, Roma, 1896.

Therefore, within an endogenous labour market, the increase in labour productivity might have affected the equilibrium between demand and supply on which Camogli's shipping system was grounded. As we can see, in Table 6.10, we estimated Camogli's demands for maritime labour in correlation with the comparative evolution of total tonnage and labour productivity (ton/man ratio): the estimated outcomes (Figure 6.4) draw a curve that reached the peak at the end of the 1870s, to decline then to the 1850s levels at the end of the century. Substantially, these data and estimations allow us to measure the direct consequences of the improvements in labour productivity on sea workers. From the 1880s onwards, although shipowners showed resilience and were able to resist and adapt to the needs of the international freight market, their resilience might have led to a severe occupational crisis among Camogli's sea workers. The effects of this crisis included the transition from sail to steam shipping, the abandonment of maritime labour and emigration, as we will see in the following pages.

However, the analysis of labour productivity, notwithstanding the shipowner's perspective to reduce labour costs, can be approached from another perspective, which substitutes place of work (the ship and the ton-man ratio) with time as the primary focus. With the adoption of a more social

and labour approach, labour productivity can also be measured in terms of working days in a year to evaluate the social impact of maritime labour on seafarers' lives. For instance, in this direction, the rapid transition from cabotage to the Black Sea and, finally, to oceanic routes had an undeniable social price in terms of more qualitative aspects of maritime labourers' lives, such as the time spent within the community and familiar environments. In this regard, a systematic analysis of workdays through different cohorts did not show remarkable discrepancies between each other (the percentage of months spent in navigation out of the total career measures about 62-63% in the three cohorts⁷⁴⁰). These results might be related to two different issues: first, to the relatively high degree of approximation of the data, which take months into account instead of days; secondly, to the fact that all the shipping categories (cabotage, great cabotage, oceanic navigation) cross the three cohorts, thus diminishing the effects of such distinction.

Nevertheless, with the purpose to illustrate what we perceive as a fundamental trait of seafaring – the ratio between the time at sea and ashore – we opted for individual surveys on three different subjects (one from each cohort), which possessed various shipping typologies within their careers.

Table 6.11. Individual careers of three Camogli's seamen.

				Qualify as AB		
Cohort	Surname	Name	Date of birth	seaman		
1*	Schiaffino	Giuseppe	17-03-1825	07-07-1843		
	Type	Beginning	End	Embarkments	Working Months	Workdays / Year (%)
1	<i>cabotaggio</i>	30-06-1847	16-07-1849	6	14	58%
2	<i>gran cabotaggio</i>	17-12-1849	20-10-1873	30	238	86%
3	<i>lungo corso</i>	31-07-1874	18-06-1883	11	80	75%
4	<i>cabotaggio</i>	07-01-1884	01-07-1887	3	12	25%
				50	344	72%
				Qualify as AB		
Cohort	Surname	Name	Date of birth	seaman		
2*	Olivari	Gio.Batta	17-03-1855	14-07-1877		

⁷⁴⁰ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, cohorts 1-3.

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					Working	Workdays / Year
Type	Beginning	End	Embarkments	Months	(%)	
1	<i>gran cabotaggio</i>	14-10-1877	25-10-1879	3	20	83%
2	<i>lungo corso</i>	13-01-1880	10-06-1892	12	128	86%
3	<i>gran cabotaggio</i>	12-12-1892	29-10-1897	5	53	91%
4	<i>lungo corso</i>	06-12-1897	17-11-1909	12	122	85%
				32	323	84%
					Qualify as AB	
Cohort	Surname	Name	Date of birth	seaman		
3*	Figari	Lorenzo	11-01-1871	26-06-1890		
					Working	Workdays / Year
Type	Beginning	End	Embarkments	Months	(%)	
1	<i>lungo corso</i>	17-11-1890	30-05-1893	3	27	90%
2	<i>lungo corso</i>	12-01-1894	09-01-1902	4	87	90%
3	<i>cabotaggio (steam)</i>	05-06-1902	30-10-1906	5	43	82%
4	<i>gran cabotaggio (steam)</i>	27-11-1906	11-08-1912	2	64	92%
5	<i>lungo corso (steam)</i>	13-08-1912	10-11-1915	3	34	89%
TOT			19	258	86%	

Source: ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, cohorts 1-3.

The findings shown in Table 6.11 are fundamental to deepen our analysis on able-bodied seamen work performances and, meanwhile, give us some insights concerning the evolution of Camogli's maritime labour market. The first sample, Giuseppe Schiaffino, was born in 1825⁷⁴¹: in his years as cabin-boy and ordinary seaman, Giuseppe acquired more practice than needed (61 months), while later, albeit qualified for the profession, waited until 1847 to reembark as a sailor. After brief service on coastal-cabotage vessels, in 1849 began to work on longer routes, spending more than half of his career in the Black Sea trade. Then, he was employed on ocean-going vessels for a decade before returning to small cabotage in sight of retirement. Gio. Batta Olivari⁷⁴², instead, born in 1855, divided his career between great cabotage (the Black Sea and North-European routes) and ocean navigation

⁷⁴¹ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, register 4, n. 4174 and register 28, n. 19657.

⁷⁴² Idem, register 14, n. 12846 and register 39, n. 28374.

in which he collected most of his embarkments (24) and spent the vast majority of his career (250 months). Finally, Lorenzo Figari⁷⁴³ experienced a peculiar professional trajectory; until 1902, at age 31, he worked on the latest Camogli's ocean-going vessels. Then, Lorenzo moved to steam navigation and, onboard steamers crossed all the typologies⁷⁴⁴.

The working days in a year of two out of three samples are higher than the mentioned averages. Both Gio. Batta Olivari and Lorenzo Figari present several and continuative services on ocean-going vessels, which seem to be an upgrading factor of working days per years. Oceanic voyages lasted for several months, sometimes more than two years; however, in time of occupational crisis and downgrading salaries for sea workers, to remain more than a couple of months at home might have been an option.

Finally, in recent literature, deskilling has been included among the most evident consequences of technological advancement applied to navigation. The increase of labour productivity (measurable through men-tons ratio) have also been interrelated to labour efficiency. Within sail shipping, the main transformations entailed a simplification of rigging and, therefore, the operations underlying their handling and management. These changes, which have been poorly studied, might have led to middle-skilled seamen gradual substitution with unskilled workers. Relative labour shares emerged as one of the primary measures to analyse this phenomenon. For instance, evidence from Scandinavian marines suggested increasing unskilled labourers relative shares, which ascended from 22,7% to 49,5% in a century (1791-1913)⁷⁴⁵. Within this extended period, the most substantial increase occurred between the 1830s and 1850s (from 30% to 49%)⁷⁴⁶, before the advent of Camogli's oceanic cross-trade and the ton-man escalation associated with this shipping phase. Similarly, similar surveys of Camogli's merchant marine led to profoundly different results regarding relative labour shares among skill-biased groups.

⁷⁴³ *Idem*, register 39, n. 28005.

⁷⁴⁴ More details about Camogli's seamen working on steamers are found in the 5.4.1 paragraph.

⁷⁴⁵ J. Ojala, J. Pehkonen and J. Eloranta, "Deskilling and decline in skill premium during the age of sail: Swedish and Finnish seamen, 1751–1913", Table 2, p.7.

⁷⁴⁶ *Ibidem*.

Table 6.12. Skill-groups relative labour shares (1850-1905).

	<i>High-skilled</i> (<i>captains, mates</i>)	<i>Medium-skilled</i> (<i>boatswains, able seamen</i>)	<i>Low-skilled</i> (<i>ordinary seamen, cabin boys</i>)
<i>1850-1865</i>	9,56%	66,66%	23,77%
<i>1885-1905</i>	9,52%	57,82%	32,65%

Source: ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*; ASGe, *Giornali nautici*.

From Table 6.12, we can assume that relative labour shares among different skill-groups maintained a relatively continuous distribution between the 1850s and 1890s. Moreover, despite adopting the same categorisation, the absolute values of each category seem highly divergent from those of Scandinavian marines⁷⁴⁷. There is, in fact, a slight increase of low-skilled seamen shares at the expense of medium-skilled workers; nevertheless, the absolute values are nowhere near to almost half of the shares as in the Scandinavian benchmark.

Concerning Camogli, we can assume the role of traditional labour structures in mitigating the impact of deskilling on relative distribution onboard. Indeed, within the framework of seafaring communities, practical experience was accessible to all the members willing to spend their lives at sea. The social composition of the crews was substantially different from those merchant marines opened to agricultural and industrial workers, attracted into seafaring by economic needs. In Camogli, vertical mobility was achievable through expertise, which impacted able-bodied seamen relative weight onboard compared to other realities. The presence of unskilled labourers onboard Camogli's vessels responded to educational needs and promote the intergenerational transmission of practical skills and manual know-how rather than stemming from shipowners' business decisions to reduce labour expenses and increase relative cost-effectiveness. Accordingly, we may argue the substantial inconsistency of any division between low or medium-skilled seafarers within Camogli's

⁷⁴⁷ In coincidence with the same period, Ojala records these relative shares.

1850-1865: high-26,9%; medium-26,0%; low-47,1%.

1881-1895: high-28,7%; medium-23,5%; low-47,8%.

merchant marine due to efficient upward mobility, as confirmed by the low rate of abandonment in the age of cabin-boys (4,2%)⁷⁴⁸.

6.4.3. PROFESSIONALISATION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF MASTERS

Within maritime studies, the role of shipmasters and captains has attracted a great deal of attention, both for the relatively high availability of sources concerning this figure compared to common seafarers and for the ruling and representative (of the shipowner) position which captains covered on board and ashore. During the nineteenth century, captains underwent various changes that concerned their prerogatives, activities, and relationships with shipowners, a comprehensive set of transformations that recent historiography has categorised under the label of «professionalisation»⁷⁴⁹.

In addition to experience and age requirements, prospective shipmasters' (and mates) necessitated public licences from local and central institutions after completing a mandatory theory examination. In the Mediterranean maritime societies, the historical roots of these state-controlled tests dated back to the seventeenth century, a highly distinguishing feature from the British and Dutch environments where public examinations became active only in the nineteenth century⁷⁵⁰.

⁷⁴⁸ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*. The fundamental discourse about abandonments will be treated in the following sections.

⁷⁴⁹ K. Davids, "Technological change and the professionalism of masters and mates in the Dutch mercantile marine, 1815-1914", *Colectanea maritima*, 1991, 5, pp. 282-303; V. Burton, "The Making of a Nineteenth-Century Profession: Shipmasters and the British Shipping Industry", *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association*, 1990, 1:1, pp. 97-118; Garcia, E., "Losing Professional Identity? Deck Officers in the Spanish Merchant Marine, 1868–1914." *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 26: 3, 2014, pp. 451–470; R. De Oliveira Torres, "Handling the Ship: rights and duties of masters, mates, seamen and owners of ships in nineteenth-century merchant marine", *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 26: 3, 2014, pp. 587-599.

⁷⁵⁰ K. Davids, "Technological change and the professionalism of masters and mates in the Dutch mercantile marine, 1815-1914", *Colectanea maritima*, 1991, 5, pp. 282-303; V. Burton, "The Making of a Nineteenth-Century Profession: Shipmasters and the British Shipping Industry", *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association*, 1990, 1:1, pp. 97-118.

In the Republic of Genoa, the first steps of this public overtaking onto maritime education concerned the institution of exams (1698), which prospective masters ought to do to be recognised as capable of directing a ship⁷⁵¹. This decision was inspired by the French *Ordonnance de la Marine* of 1681, the leading international reference of the seventeenth and eighteenth-century Genoese lawmakers. However, the institution of public exams was not associated with the implementation of formal education. Still, in the last decades of the following century, the principal and sufficient requirements to command a vessel were ship-ownership or official appointments by shipowners – through a notarial deed⁷⁵². Indeed, the absence of binding educational requirements allowed uneducated seamen to the rank of the shipmaster. Ship-ownership, share-ownership or either mere kinship could be more relevant than specialised know-how and advanced skills in the art of navigation.

As said, in the days of the Republic of Genoa, apart from examinations, there was no evidence about the existence of formal institutions to impart education to prospective shipmasters'; instead, the exams were prepared upon private initiative. Something changed after Vienna's Congress when, due to the imposition of Savoy rule onto Liguria, the publication of a new *Regolamento per la Marina Mercantile* in 1816 and its update in 1827 led to the foundation of state-driven nautical schools for prospective masters of all sorts⁷⁵³.

This decision was in line with the gradual extension of public control over shipmasters' education, spreading in several European countries⁷⁵⁴. In this way, the increasing professionalization of these occupations affected long-standing traditions, which were transformed in favour of a progressive passage from private to public control. These schools were intended to impart theoretical education

⁷⁵¹ L. Lo Basso, *Gente di bordo*, pp. 37-63. The author reports that, from 1698 onwards, Genoese captains were required to pass an exam in order to be patented.

⁷⁵² *Ibidem*.

⁷⁵³ *Nuovo Regolamento per la Marina Mercantile*, 1827, Cap. V, art. 32-34. In general, see: M.S. Rollandi, *Istruzione e sviluppo nella Liguria marittima*, p. 268.

⁷⁵⁴ See, England: V. Burton, "The Making of a Nineteenth-Century Profession: Shipmasters and the British Shipping Industry", pp. 99-100; Low Countries: K. Davids, "Technological change and the professionalism of masters and mates in the Dutch mercantile marine, 1815-1914", pp. 284-285.

for shipmasters; their organisation varied through the second half of the nineteenth century due to several reforms, which did not alter the general schedule⁷⁵⁵. In 1865, the diploma for cabotage and great cabotage masters took only one year, whereas ocean-going masters extended up to three years⁷⁵⁶. Then, in 1873, the great cabotage degree widened to two years, while the duration of the second degree remained unscathed. Several subjects were common to all the courses, like Italian, geography, history, trade law, arithmetic, geometry, hydrography, marine equipment and manoeuvring (French and English language courses were elective)⁷⁵⁷. In general, prospective ocean-going captains were taught more complicated branches of each subject, as spherical trigonometry, applied astronomy and nautical calculations. Nevertheless, the educational programmes might be helpful to outline the figure and role of shipmasters' in the Italian merchant marine. Masters' know-how was mainly theoretical: their advanced education aimed to acquire general knowledge and highly specialised skills to handle navigation in open seas. Along with technical and scientific advancements (for instance, Maury's contribution to oceanography⁷⁵⁸), masters' monopoly of navigational skills on board increased accordingly, accruing social and professional distances between crews' top and bottom.

However, the coexistence of theoretical education and practical experience represented one of the most troublesome matters for the organisation of these learning paths. For instance, Edoardo Salviati, professor of mathematics and astronomy at the nautical school of Camogli, in 1882, expressed his criticism toward the existing system and raised his concerns about the need of finding a compromise between theory and practice⁷⁵⁹. Nautical schools admitted students from age nine onwards and, therefore, licensed prospective shipmasters at a maximum of age 15, almost a decade

⁷⁵⁵ See, M.S. Rollandi, *Istruzione e sviluppo nella Liguria marittima*, pp. 241-278.

⁷⁵⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁵⁷ *Idem*, p. 253.

⁷⁵⁸ M.F. Maury, *The Physical Geography of the Sea*, New York: Harper & Brothers publishers, 1858. His fundamental role in developing the modern oceanography and, as a result, in the optimization of oceanic shipping, is recognized by the Italian economist Epicarmo Corbino: E. Corbino, *Economia dei trasporti marittimi*, p. III.

⁷⁵⁹ *Inchiesta Parlamentare sulle condizioni della marina mercantile*, Vol. III, pp. 53-58. More details on his figure can be found in: M.S. Rollandi, *Istruzione e sviluppo nella Liguria marittima*, pp. 478-484.

before becoming eligible for these positions. As a result, well-educated seamen were forced to enrol as cabin-boys until age 18 and able-bodied seamen between age 18 and 21, when they were finally entitled to be mates. Among the consequences of such a feature, apart from the already mentioned issue concerning underaged boatswains, we may also report the institution of the so-called «flag captain» (*capitano di bandiera*). This figure responded to the need of the shipowner to appoint licenced captains to handle navigation, whereas another person, less experienced, managed most of the economic operations. In 1881, while arguing with Giuseppe De Rossi, author of an inflammatory pamphlet concerning the backwardness of Ligurian shipping, David Viale outlined this figure and provided a practical explanation for its institution:

Mr De Rossi refers to flag captains, who take responsibility for navigation, whereas another person of lower rank is entrusted with economic management. There is nothing wrong with it, and it happens when the shipowner has a relative on board who, even though he has already obtained his licence, does not fulfil the necessary age requirements.⁷⁶⁰

The diminution of shipmasters' authorities on board, deriving from introducing an intermediate figure to handle the managerial business, generated multiple problems and led sailors to file various complaints. For instance, the crew members of the barque *Adele*, in 1866, denounced the wrongful food administration which they underwent during a trip between Pernambuco and Cardiff (the ship had departed from Marseille on the first haul)⁷⁶¹. Right in the British port, seamen complained to the Italian consul for having been administered poor-quality food and blamed the mate's unusual interference into the affairs of the ship «at the point that the same captain was denied to have a say on food administration⁷⁶²». Another interesting case concerned the actions of Carlo Dapelo, mate of the barque *Cadice* and relative to its shipowner⁷⁶³. In 1897, Dapelo, licenced for great cabotage, commanded the ship from Cadiz to Marseille. While signing the crew agreement, he declared

⁷⁶⁰ *Inchiesta Parlamentare sulle condizioni della marina mercantile*, Vol. I, p. 159.

⁷⁶¹ ACS, *Direzione generale della marina mercantile*, Miscellanea Uffici Diversi, box 361, folder 118.

⁷⁶² *Idem*.

⁷⁶³ ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, giornale generale, Cadice, 353/1.

himself as shipowner of the barque (presumably, he was just a shareholder and legal representative of the shipowners). Then, unable to sail across the Atlantic, Dapelo appointed his mate, Gio. Batta Caprile (who possessed the required license), as navigating captain. The following events shed light on a more complicated scenario. Once in Santos, after several sailors complained about Dapelo's short-tempered behaviour and lousy administration, captain Caprile denounced its mate (and employer) before the consul, specifying that he «had always tried to hide the evil actions of Dapelo in respect of his family»⁷⁶⁴. Finally, following a brutal fight with Caprile, Carlo Dapelo left the ship and never returned on board, at the point that the captain was forced to denounce him as a deserter. Interestingly, although motivated by age requirements and the shipowners' need for trusted representatives on board, the institution of «flag captains» anticipated the evolution of captainship into an ultra-specialised navigational profession, with little or no involvement in the commercial and economic management⁷⁶⁵. On the contrary, traditionally, shipmasters' role extended well beyond the art of navigation; in a society characterised by slow information flows and little or no communications, masters were in charge of all the organizational and commercial operations, as contracting freights, negotiating loans, handling incidents in the open sea and ports, administering justice and, in general, embracing all the necessary decisions on shipowners' behalf. The evolution of shipmasters inspired extensive and well-reasoned historiography, which developed specific research axes involving onboard authority⁷⁶⁶, professionalisation, and the overturn of customary owner-captain relationships by introducing the figures of managing owners⁷⁶⁷. In *ancient regime* societies, captains were commonly owners or shareholders of the ship:

⁷⁶⁴ Idem.

⁷⁶⁵ See, as an element for comparison, the study of Apostolos Delis about the introduction of «directors» on board of the Syros fleet: A. Delis, «Le rôle du capitaine et la figure du «directeur» de navires dans la marine à voile à Syra au milieu du XIXe siècle», in G. Buti, L. Lo Basso and O. Raveaux (eds.), *Entrepreneurs des mers: capitaines et marins du XVIe au XIXe siècle*, Paris: Riveneuve éditions, 2017.

⁷⁶⁶ J.M. Witt, ««During the Voyage Every Captain is Monarch of the Ship»: The Merchant Captain from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century», *International Journal of Maritime History*, 13, No. 2, 2001, pp. 165-194.

⁷⁶⁷ H. Doe, «Power, Authority and Communications: The Role of the Master and the Managing Owner in Nineteenth-Century British Merchant Shipping», *International Journal of Maritime History*, 25, No. 1, 2013, pp. 103-125; R. Craig,

due to the impossibility to communicate at long distances, masters carried out managerial actions and exerted their control over all the commercial and operational decisions. Then, due to nineteenth-century technological advancements in logistics and communications⁷⁶⁸, together with the transition from share ownership to the advent of shipping stock companies, masters progressively forfeited some attributions of their traditional «power near to God⁷⁶⁹» and were reduced to high-skilled employees. The primary responsibilities of the latter were confined to safe navigation.

If these developments are taken for granted concerning the significant part of the nineteenth-century shipping world, the “sheltered” environment of a seafaring community, as Camogli, might represent a remarkable observatory. Camogli had several owning captains in analogy with other maritime communities, who naturally merged economic management and navigation in a single figure. In the first half of the century, the relative share of owning captains was elevated (44% in 1831), whereas, in coincidence with the geographic leap from the Black Sea to oceanic navigation, it fell dramatically (15% in 1865)⁷⁷⁰. Moreover, by combining owning captains with the figure of direct familiar relationships between shipowners and captains (identical surnames), evidence suggests an even neater decline from 81% to 35% (1831-1865)⁷⁷¹. Besides, relationships of acquired kin (as in the case of sons-in-law commanding fathers-in-law’s vessels) remained out of our evaluation, owing to material obstacles to conducting analytical surveys on almost a thousand individuals.

Nevertheless, the extensive recurrence to such feature, drawn from notarial sources, might have probably increased the figure. In fact, in a communitarian environment, marriage was a fundamental tool for bonding relationships, as in Erasmo Schiaffino, who married his four daughters to as many shipmasters who served on his vessels⁷⁷². Finally, when considering the end of

“Printed guides for master mariners as a source of productivity change in shipping, 1750-1914”, *The Journal of Transport History*, 3, 1982, pp. 24-35.

⁷⁶⁸ See Chapter 3.

⁷⁶⁹ J.M. Witt, “«During the Voyage Every Captain is Monarch of the Ship»”, pp. 166-184.

⁷⁷⁰ ASGe, *Ruoli di equipaggio*, 1831-1865.

⁷⁷¹ Idem.

⁷⁷² See Chapter 2.

the century, owning captains almost disappeared (5%)⁷⁷³. Therefore, in the framework of Camogli's shipping, the progressive demise of owning-captains might be reconducted to various factors: among them, we might include the increase of the amount of capital needed to start shipping business, which delayed and hindered the most sought «transition from employee to employer»⁷⁷⁴, one of the main life-objectives of Camogli's shipmasters.

Based on the mentioned findings, the trend observed in the case of Camogli may allow us to enter the debate about the proletarianization of maritime labour⁷⁷⁵. In this regard, the first crucial breakthrough might be recognised in the abandonment of shared remuneration to the advantage of wages. Whereas pre-industrial seafarers actively participated in maritime enterprises, being directly related to profits and losses of a single voyage, the introduction of wages set sea workers apart from the entrepreneurial section of the shipping business. Thus, seafarers renounced their direct participation in the earnings in favour of more reliable fixed payments, which, at the same time, allowed shipowners to manage their business more cost-effectively. Within the balance of single-voyage enterprises, maritime labour became a fixed cost, whose relative weight fell gradually in the nineteenth century due to the decrease of the ton-men ratios and, therefore, to the improvements of labour productivity.

Furthermore, although all the categories of maritime workers underwent profound transformations in this period, not all the groups were affected to the same extent. Despite shipmasters losing their peer-to-peer relationship with shipowners, their vertical mobility was severely affected by the shrinkage of the shipowning ranks; on the other hand, from an economic perspective, professionalization increased their average wages, both in relative and absolute terms.

On the contrary, technological improvements hit more severely Camogli's middle and low-skilled maritime workers, both socially and economically. Although deskilling might not be as effective as

⁷⁷³ ASGe, *Giornali nautici*. The only one is Dapelo Carlo, commanding the barque *Cadice*: ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, *Giornale generale e di contabilità*, Cadice, 353/1.

⁷⁷⁴ K. Davids, "Technological change and professionalism", pp. 299-300.

⁷⁷⁵ E. Sager, "Seafaring Labour in Maritime History and Working-Class History", *International Journal of Maritime History*, II, No. 1, 1990, pp. 259-274; B. Beaven, "From Jolly Sailor to Proletarian Jack: The Remaking of Sailortown and the Merchant Seafarer in Victorian London", in B. Beaven et al. (eds.), *Port towns and urban cultures. International Histories of the Waterfront, c.1700—2000*, London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016, pp. 159-178.

in other merchant marines, labour productivity growth affected sailors' wage retribution, whose relative ratio compared with high-skilled seafarers decreased by more than one-third. Moreover, as we will see in the following pages, while masters' highly-specialised know-how and skills allowed them a smoother transition to more advanced labour markets (steam shipping), middle and low-skilled seafarers faced more obstacles in reconverting to steam or enduring within the maritime labour sector.

6.5. Abandoning Camogli's fleet

The clash between local and global markets, the evolution of Camogli's maritime activities into oceanic tramp shipping and the broader process of transition from sail to steam created the ground for the gradual dismantlement of the local communitarian structures upon which Camogli's shipping system was founded. The loss of the occupational consistency between local labour demand and supply resulted in various behaviours: some seafarers sought employment at national steam shipping companies, such as NGI (Navigazione Generale Italiana); others quitted navigation or transferred abroad in search of maritime or even land-based jobs. Whereas the first two groups (those who moved to steam and who abandoned navigation) will be dealt with in the following pages, to the latter will be dedicated the sixth and last chapter of the present thesis, due to the crucial entanglements between geographical transfer, desertion and migration flows which compose a fundamental part of the history of Camogli.

6.5.1. THE TRANSITION FROM SAIL TO STEAM OF CAMOGLI'S SEAMEN

As seen, the extraordinary dimensions of Camogli's sailing fleet prevented most of the local workforce to switch to steam navigation. Camogli's maritime labour market was endogenous and self-sufficient; shipping absorbed local labour supplies and even extended to the labour markets of the nearby communities to meet its workforce demands. These conditions lasted for decades until the fall in freight rates and the progressive marginalisation of sail vessels to peripheral markets led to the reduction of Camogli's fleet. As seen, the impoverishment of local shipping business and the

increase of labour productivity diminished the demands for sea workers dramatically (see Table 6.11 and Figure 6.2) and, for the contraction of job opportunities available to seamen, some sought employment into a separate labour market, in the steam merchant marine⁷⁷⁶.

Table 6.12. Percentage of sailors and officials with at least 12 months of service on board steamships (cohorts 1-3).

	1* (1825-1835)	2* (1845-1855)	3* (1865-1875)
<i>Unskilled (cabin-boys, OS)</i>	0	0	100%*
<i>Medium-skilled (AB, boatswains, stewards)</i>	1,50%	3,70%	25,75%
<i>High-skilled (mates, captains)</i>	0	4,16%	64,71%

Source: ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*. *There is only one unskilled seaman who quitted his career before completing his 24-month apprenticeship⁷⁷⁷.

The impressive rise of sail-to-steam mobility, which Table 6.12 describes, among the members of the third cohort is clear evidence of the crisis that Camogli's traditional labour system underwent from the late 1880s onwards. Although the earliest steamers' services of Camogli's seamen dated to 1888, most of them took place at the turn of the century. From the observation of data, we were able to point out some distinguishing traits. First, the extraordinary rise of the passages to steam in the third cohort compared with the previous two: this trend might found a consistent explanation in

⁷⁷⁶ See, chapter 3.

⁷⁷⁷ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, register 38, serial number 25986. The career of Luigi Bertolotto (n. 25986) is exceptional within our sample: enrolled in 1884 at age of fourteen, he embarked as cabin-boy on a short-cabotage journey (23 days) and, then, on a long-cabotage ship to Swansea, where got ashore after just 56 days at sea. Three years later, he enrolled as fifth engineer on the Italian steamship *Robilant*, where travelled for more than seven months among long-cabotage routes. Between 1884 and 1887, Luigi must have performed some theoretical studies in order to enrol as fifth engineer, which corresponded to engine room operators (*fuochista*) within Italian engine ranks. In the following years, he never embarked again. The uniqueness of his career, however, impedes us to adequately evaluate the effects of transition on unskilled seamen.

the influence of the international scenario on the communitarian shipping system. Second, the sharp difference shown in the percentages of high-skilled seamen (64,71%) instead of middle-skilled ones (25,75%). Third, no seaman from Camogli engaged to the steam shipping new professions (engineer, stokers, coal trimmers) but maintained the same sailing shipping roles when employed on steamers. Finally, once transferred to steam, few reconverted to sail – and no one definitively. First, the timeframe within which labour transition occurred has been primarily anticipated in the previous paragraphs. The decades between the 1880s and 1900s represent the real breakthrough for Camogli's maritime history and, although shipping survived on marginal routes, the combination of the financial crisis and technological improvements stroke a decisive hit on maritime labour. The transfer from sailing vessels to steamers was among the decisions available to counterbalance the decrease of labour demands on Camogli's sailing ships.

The discrepancy emerging from the comparison of high and middle-skilled seamen's conversion rates might be fundamental to outline some distinguishing features of the Italian maritime labour market. From a technical perspective, shipmasters could indeed engage either to sail or to steam navigation without distinction. According to the existing legal framework, captains were not required to have additional skills or knowledge when commanding steamers since the engine room was under the engineer's full responsibility. On the one hand, this feature gave engineers immediate recognition of their high degree of specialisation, often associated with handsome salaries⁷⁷⁸. On the other hand, since shipmasters were still needed for the navigational part, such a system facilitated the transition of high-skilled and publicly licenced seamen from sail to steam. In describing Camogli's trend, Table 6.12 witnesses the extraordinary capability of local captains to adapt and reconvert to the new market. However, despite the smooth transition suggested by the data, this passage from sail to steam had implications from a more qualitative perspective. First of all, the remunerations for captains and deck-officials on steamers were levelled down in comparison to

⁷⁷⁸ See, R.G. Milburn, "The emergence of the engineer in the British merchant shipping industry, 1812-1863", *International Journal of Maritime History*, 28, No. 3, pp. 559-575. For the administrative framework within the Italian merchant marine, see: *Regolamento per la Marina Mercantile*, artt. 206-213, in M. Vocino (ed.), *Codice marittimo*, pp. 161-163.

sailing vessels: for instance, the data provided by M.S. Rollandi⁷⁷⁹ show that, between two equivalent class of vessels (in terms of tonnage), masters could lose up to 30% of the salary on steamers (from 207 lira average to 139). Secondly, in turning to steam, some experienced sailing captains retroceded to ship-officials for a certain period, a backstep in their careers, which had apparent repercussions on the prestige of their occupation and from an economic point of view. This tendency, for example, is shown in the case of Captain Prospero Schiaffino (n. 26194), who, after having commanded Camogli's vessels for more than one hundred months of navigation, when engaged to steamers in 1891 was embarked on the *Giovanni M.* as the first mate⁷⁸⁰. The same happened to Antonio Marini (n. 26292) who, immediately after his first command on the barque *Battistina Madre* in 1893, switched to steam and spent almost fifteen years as a second or first official, until he received his second command in 1907, on the steamship *Città di Palermo*⁷⁸¹.

Meanwhile, in the case of middle-skilled seamen, source evidence underlines a remarkable continuity between sail and steam about their roles on board. Indeed, until the First World War, most of the steamships retained rigging and sails, thus giving meaning to the presence of experienced deck-sailors on board. The case of Camogli, in this sense, is noteworthy because all the AB seamen, stewards or even boatswains maintained their qualifications on steamers. This feature sheds light on some characteristics of the Italian late-nineteenth-century maritime labour market. Middle-skilled seamen's competencies and the lack of formal education pushed them towards the equivalent jobs in the steam merchant marine, whose demands for experienced sailors, however, were progressively contracting.

Furthermore, the presence of medium-skilled seamen lost centrality: this is evident in numeric presence on board and wages. On steamers, the employment share of sailors, in line with Chin's, Juhn's and Thompson's considerations on British data⁷⁸², fell dramatically from 60-70% (depending

⁷⁷⁹ M.S. Rollandi, *Lavorare sul mare*, Appendice 2. Composizione degli equipaggi, pp. 427-467.

⁷⁸⁰ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, register 38, n. 26194.

⁷⁸¹ Idem, n. 26292.

⁷⁸² A. Chin, C. Juhn, and P. Thompson, "Technical change and the demand for skills during the second industrial revolution: evidence from the merchant marine, 1891-1912", Table 1. Composition of the crew: sail voyages versus steam voyages, p. 575.

on the period) to around 25%⁷⁸³. Likewise, middle-skilled seamen wage share fell accordingly, from 65% to 20%⁷⁸⁴. The lack of competencies suitable to the steam maritime labour market limited the range of job opportunities to which Camogli's seafarers could engage. Apart from engineers, whose extraordinary skills and know-how positioned almost at the same level as deck-officials and even captains, a significant part of the crew could also be drawn from the agricultural and urban unskilled proletariat due to the low level of specific competencies required to work in the engine room. As a result, stokers, coalmen and coal trimmers received lower salaries on average⁷⁸⁵, which experienced middle-skilled seafarers seemed not willing to accept. As we will see both in the next paragraph and in the following chapter, rather than engaging in steam professions, several seafarers from Camogli, in particular the middle-skilled group, decided either to quit the maritime career or to leave the Ligurian community to sail in foreign merchant marines or to settle abroad.

6.5.2. QUITTING A MARITIME CAREER

If the passage from sail to steam allowed Camogli's seafarers to retain their occupation within the Italian merchant marine, other solutions could lead to an anticipated end of their professional paths. Throughout the ranks of Italian sea workers, professional continuity was fundamental, for instance, to preserve their rights over the public social security fund for the merchant marine, the *Cassa degli invalidi per la marina mercantile*. Founded in Genoa in 1816 (under a different denomination, as *Cassa di risparmio e beneficenza di Genova*) as ideal prosecution of the *Magistrato per il riscatto degli schiavi*, this fund was aimed, on the one hand, at providing economic aid to invalid seafarers, widows and orphans and, on the other hand, supported retired sea workers, from

⁷⁸³ ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, 1886-1914; M.S. Rollandi, *Lavorare sul mare*, Appendice 2. Composizione degli equipaggi, pp. 427-467.

⁷⁸⁴ Idem.

⁷⁸⁵ See M.S. Rollandi, *Lavorare sul mare*, Appendice 2. Composizione degli equipaggi, pp. 427-467.

age sixty-five⁷⁸⁶. In 1851, the starting age to benefit from this fund was lowered to sixty years old⁷⁸⁷. Ten years later, willing to uniformise the national social security system for seafarers, Cavour created the *Cassa degli invalidi della marina mercantile* – divided into regional independent administrative units – which lasted in its new configuration until 1913. According to law regulations (limitedly to Genoa’s fund, since every local fund followed its own rules), every seaman of age sixty with a minimum of twelve years of service onboard could enjoy a yearly pension of a variable entity, depending on the overall years of employment and professional ranks⁷⁸⁸.

Table 6.13. Pension subsidies (in Italian lira) in favour of the members of the *Cassa degli invalidi della marina mercantile di Genova*.

<i>Years of navigation</i>	<i>Ocean-going captains</i>	<i>Great cabotage captains</i>	<i>Coastal cabotage captains</i>	<i>Sailors</i>
12	100	80	65	54
15	125	100	80	72
20	250	200	130	103
25	300	240	160	133
35	400	330	215	183

Source: *Regio Decreto 15 novembre 1868*, n. 2081, art. 42, Tabella I.

As seen in Table 6.13, at the maximum level, the yearly value of the subsidies accounted for less than a fourth of the average salaries (15,23 lira compared with the 55-60 lira average in the 1860s-70s). Furthermore, since the contribution to the social fund was charged to shipowners, none or minor improvements were achieved in this direction until the early twentieth century. Conversely, on

⁷⁸⁶ *La Cassa degli Invalidi della marina mercantile con sede in Genova. Origine e svolgimento: note storiche – giuridiche – amministrative*, Genova: Stabilimento Fratelli Pagano, 1906, pp. 19-20.

⁷⁸⁷ *Idem*, pp. 28-32.

⁷⁸⁸ See, *Regio Decreto 15 novembre 1868*, n. 2081.

several occasions, its sheer existence was endangered by shipowners' protests against what was perceived as an unnecessary additional expense on labour⁷⁸⁹.

The analysis conducted on Camogli seafarers about the length of their careers shows an increasing pattern of quitting maritime professions throughout the nineteenth century. Indeed, whereas in the first cohort half of the sailors (49%) abandoned navigation in the proximity of their retirement age, or after the 400 months of service required for pension subsidies, in the following cohorts, the share of sea workers who pursued a maritime career until its natural end gradually decreased up to the 19% of the third group⁷⁹⁰. The reasons behind this impressive phenomenon might lie in a wide array of factors, including transition and the global crisis of freights, which, from the 1880s onwards, endangered the sustainability of the Camogli maritime system. The loss of reliable sources of employment provided by locally-owned ships ruled according to the endogenous labour market characteristics shown in the previous pages, affected careers continuity in the long run.

Table 6.14. Percentage of Camogli's sailors employed until pension and the average age of quitting (cohorts 1-3).

	<i>% of sailors navigating until pension</i>	<i>Average age of quitting</i>
<i>1*</i>	49%	37y 255d
<i>2*</i>	26%	29y 329d
<i>3*</i>	19%	27y 278d

Source: ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*.

Furthermore, the average age of quitting navigation might be another valuable parameter to measure this tendency, as it fell from 37 years and 255 days for the seafarers born between 1825 and 1835 to an average of 27 years and 278 days as far as the 1865-1875 group is concerned⁷⁹¹. The overall

⁷⁸⁹ See, for instance, the debate developed during the Parliamentary Inquiry on the merchant marine. *Inchiesta sulle condizioni per la marina mercantile*, vol. II, pp. 256-260. Also, Chapter 4.

⁷⁹⁰ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*.

⁷⁹¹ *Idem*.

analysis for abandonments underlines the correlation between local demands for maritime labour and the contraction of global and local shipping economies in the 1870s-1890s.

Moreover, apart from the quantitative examination of the retirement –abandonment ratio among Camogli's sea workers, the necessary step forward in our analysis would be to evaluate the following occupational destinations of the latter group, to improve our understanding of their professional trajectories outside – and beyond – the working environment of Camogli. However, the registration model provided in the *Matricole* lack further details regarding the activities to which sailors dedicated after the abandonment of navigation, with the partial exception of those living until 1909 when the state censuses findings were attached to every single record.

To captains, for instance, quitting life at sea could epitomise the most sought accomplishment of this social class, namely the “promotion” to shipowners, as in the case of Prospero Schiaffino, son of Gio. Batta, born in Camogli in 1868⁷⁹². Embarked for the first time in 1884 onboard the brig *Schiaffino Padre* under his father's command, Prospero was soon transferred on the brig *Draguette* (728 t.) along oceanic routes carrying rice, teak and sugar⁷⁹³. From 1890 onward, Prospero sailed to Asian and American destinations at the command of *Draguette* until July 1898, when he shipwrecked offshore from Tamatave (Toamasina, Madagascar)⁷⁹⁴. After a few years of service as deck official on the brig *Castello Dragone* (663 t.), owned by Adeodato Schiaffino from Camogli⁷⁹⁵ and some embarkments on NGI steamers, in 1902, Prospero Schiaffino retired from the navigation. Before that, he had collected 186 months of service (116 as ocean-going master), being at sea for 82% of the time between his first and last embarkments. Then, Prospero's life choices are unknown until 1909, when he is registered in the Italian census as «shipowner settled in Camogli»⁷⁹⁶. Nevertheless, his

⁷⁹² ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, r. 38, n. 26194.

⁷⁹³ ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Divisione premi compensi e tasse, b. 61, Moulmein (1887).

⁷⁹⁴ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, r. 38, n. 26194.

⁷⁹⁵ RINA, 1902, p. 233, n. 38. Despite Prospero and Adeodato had the same surname, any direct kinship is unknown.

⁷⁹⁶ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, r. 38, n. 26194.

career as shipowner did not last long – and, probably, was not successful – since, in 1911, he began again to sail on Italian steamers for a couple of years⁷⁹⁷.

Instead, for sailors, the information is more varied and sparse, to the extent that it might be impossible to draw veritable statistics about the types of employment following their retirement from the navigation. Some of them moved to local craftsmanship (i.e. Agostino Domenico Mortola, who abandoned fishing for shoemaking in 1888), but most of the details for these workers could not be collected. Although Camogli underwent an expansive phase under different parameters at the end of the nineteenth century, its economic and social structure could not absorb the increasing unemployment that originated from the crisis of the local shipping sector. The transition from sail to steam within the Italian merchant marine, developed in the previous chapter, constituted a reliable alternative for Camogli’s high-skilled seafarers, slightly less for the medium and low-skilled groups (more than 20% in the last cohort). The rate of abandonments finalised to the change of occupation ashore in Camogli, Genoa or different Italian regions accounted for the 21%, 28% and 30% of the respective cohorts. These figures, however, were almost evenly matched by the percentage of Camogli sea workers who decided to leave their country to settle, either temporarily or permanently, in foreign countries (see Table 6.15).

Table 6.15. Reasons behind career end among Camogli sea workers (cohorts 1-3).

	<i>Pension</i>	<i>Abandonment (Italy)</i>	<i>Abandonment (Foreign countries)</i>	<i>Dead at sea</i>	<i>Other</i>
<i>1*</i>	49%	21%	19%	6%	5%
<i>2*</i>	26%	28%	23%	11%	12%
<i>3*</i>	19%	30%	31%	8%	12%

Source: ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*.

Therefore, in the case of Camogli, the local shipping sector crisis intermingled with broader historical processes, such as Italian migration waves to the Americas and led to different results

⁷⁹⁷ Idem.

depending on a wide array of factors. The outcome developed into a multi-faceted phenomenon, in which the shortage of maritime employment was critical to intensify underlying trends in general migration, which had experienced a preliminary phase before the crisis but, later, increased to unprecedented extents.

Among the seafarers of Camogli who left their hometown to settle abroad in the second half of the nineteenth century, we can isolate various groups depending on different criteria. First, as far as the means of abandonment are concerned, we can distinguish between legal and illegal measures, with a particular emphasis on desertion. Secondly, the same argument can be approached from different angles, aiming to underline the professional fields in which sea workers engaged in the destination context. The theme of desertion, crucial to Camogli seafaring lives as well as to the whole Italian shipping, will be treated to contextualise this «social plague» – in the eyes of the national merchant marine – within the coeval economic and social context, and in the attempt to individuate push factors, at home, and pull factors, abroad. Then, we will adopt the latter approach and propose a distinction between those who pursued seafaring careers abroad and those who definitively quitted navigation for many different types of employment.

6.6. Conclusions

From the ancient regime period, and in analogy with several small seafaring communities, Camogli's shipping had inherited an endogenous maritime labour system, according to which local labour supply and demand found mutual satisfaction. Furthermore, the identarian origins and spirit of Camogli's crews led to a remarkable transposition of the communitarian structures in the onboard life. Familiar ties and trust relationships ruled the appointment of crew members, particularly as far as the upper ranks were concerned. Although being fundamental to the sorts of local shipping, the first historical phase of expansion to the Black Sea did not alter labour and enrolment mechanisms that remained inherently connected with the community members even more interestingly abroad. From the sailors' perspective, as far as the maritime activities of the community expanded and the local shipping business developed, the seafarers of Camogli could rely on a growing labour market for their employment. Then, the accrued national and international competitiveness owed to the transition from sail to steam, the fall of freights and the progressive marginalisation of sailing shipping into peripheral markets undermined this system. Whereas, as

seen in Chapter 3 and 4, maritime activities *per se* and shipping business were able to resist or, at least, be resilient to the ongoing global transformations, from the 1880s, Camogli's maritime labour fell into a downward spiral. The loss of occupational perspectives hit more severely the lower ranks (low and middle-skilled sailors), who resisted more to the conversion to steam than their highly-skilled counterparts. Shipmasters and officials, on their hand, owing to the higher levels of professionalization acquired throughout the century, seemed to be more capable of adapting to the new demands of the shipping market. Although most of them failed to the long-sought transition from employee to employer (from captain to shipowner), several reconverted to the steam shipping sector.

On the other hand, among the seamen born in the last generation (1865-1875), few worked until pension, whereas more than sixty per cent of them left either navigation or the country. Either way, their abandonments testified the collapse of the endogenous locally-based maritime labour system. The direction of their careers and their following activities will be the main subject of the following chapter.

7. Leaving the community: professional transfer and labour migration

7.1. Introduction

After having treated shipping business and maritime labour and its protagonists, the present chapter will deal with the foreign projection of the people of Camogli who, for various reasons, decided to leave the community to settle more or less definitively abroad. Differently from the first three chapters, where Camogli's fleet and shipping were at the core of the analysis, this chapter focuses on the people movements independently from shipping business.

The turning point is represented by the abandonment of Camogli's endogenous shipping system, by desertion or legal emigration: from that moment onwards, the seafarers discarded their affiliation to Camogli's shipping to embrace different roles; maritime labourers within foreign merchant marines or of migrants. This distinction draws a basic line to understand the aim of the present chapter.

Nevertheless, in particular in the case of migrants, the origins and connections with the native town are fundamental to shape the outward community abroad, its nature and distinguishing features. The reference to Baily's «village-outward» methodology⁷⁹⁸, classical among migration scholars, is essential to comprehend Camogli's external projection and to analyse the creation of social and labour networks in the contexts of destination. Furthermore, the outgoing movement of Camogli

⁷⁹⁸ S.L. Baily, "The Village-Outward Approach to Italian Migration: A Case Study of Agnonesi Migration Abroad, 1885–1989", *Studi Emigrazione* 29, No. 105, 1992, pp. 43–68.

seafarers will be examined through the existing dialectic between migration and maritime professions, which determined unique patterns of integration within the hosting societies.

The first section analyses the distinguishing features of desertion and emigration as the primary gateways to flee from the community. In so doing, it aims to provide a methodological framework to consider desertion and emigration as parts of distinct but entangled processes.

The second section analyses Camogli's maritime labour transfer to the fleets of other European countries and calls for major research on the diffusion of Italian seafarers into the international merchant marines.

The third section draws on the dense argument of Camogli's migration to Latin America. It provides an historical and methodological background to contextualise the position of Camogli within the broader Ligurian phenomenon. Then, it analyses the individual trajectories and careers of some immigrants from Camogli: firstly, in continuity with maritime labour; secondly, in the attempt to reconstruct a model of migrant entrepreneurship.

Finally, the fourth and last section will delineate the exceptional case-study of the settlement of two sailors from Camogli to the remotest island of Tristan da Cunha. Their story constitutes an exemplar case-study for maritime-related migrations after shipwrecks, an understudied phenomenon which rarefied with the nineteenth-century shipping improvements and globalisation. Nevertheless, it still represents a remarkable feature to characterise seafaring, its risks and its opportunities.

7.2. Emigration and desertion of Camogli's global seafarers

The first paragraph will try to sketch out the figure of late nineteenth-century Camogli seafarers and, thereafter, illustrate the relationship between pull and push factors and the different ways for seamen to emigrate. During the nineteenth century, the nature of seafaring put sailors in a unique position among all the professions in relation to geographical movement. However, although seamen have been long considered as transnational characters *par excellence*⁷⁹⁹, not all the seafarers

⁷⁹⁹ See, in particular, the arguments provided by Maria Fusaro in identifying the connections between maritime history and global history: M. Fusaro, "Maritime History as Global History? The Methodological Challenges and a Future Research Agenda", in M. Fusaro and A. Polonia (eds.), *Maritime History as Global History*, St. John's Newfoundland:

were effectively subjected to long-range voyages and to foreign encounters. Having compared the routes of Camogli's late-eighteenth-century sea workers with those of one hundred years afterwards, for instance, we provided clear evidence of how nineteenth-century technological advancements and the adaptation of Camogli to the evolution of the shipping market had changed dramatically seafarers' relationship with the international scenario. The enlargement of the range of shipping produced undeniable effects on the social and economic position of Camogli's seamen. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, they frequented highly internationalised ports and confronted with foreign crews on salaries, onboard discipline and further fundamental aspects of the life at sea. Together with shipping business, in less than fifty years, Camogli seafarers passed from the local to the global dimension⁸⁰⁰. As outlined in the previous chapter, the same characteristics of their professional routines changed along with the geographical expansion. These transformations and the maturation of transnational identities were, in some instances, channelled into quit behaviours from Camogli's endogenous labour market, such as desertion and migration, in response to various pull and push factors.

For seafarers, among the several ways to abandon a maritime career and flee abroad, desertion was one of the most common and, at the same time, troublesome. According to the Code of the Italian Merchant Marine (art. 264), «any crew member who, both in national or foreign ports, jumped ship or did not embark on the day of departure, with no authorisations of maritime and consular authorities, is declared deserter»⁸⁰¹. Then, in the following article, the law prescribed that, when caught, deserters could end up in prison for a variable period of time – up to one year – and must pay a fine from 50 to 200 lira⁸⁰². Therefore, Italian nineteenth-century maritime workers were aware of the legal interpretation of desertion, which represented a severe crime, punishable with jail reclusion; nevertheless, in particular throughout the second half of the century, countless Italian

IMEHA, 2010, pp. 267-282. For a contemporary comparison, see: I. Acejo, "Seafarers and Transnationalism: Ways of Belongingness Ashore and Aboard", *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, No. 33: 1, 2012, pp. 69-84; M. Borovnik, "Are Seafarers Migrants? Situating Seafarers in the Framework of Mobility and Transnationalism", *Geographer*, No. 60: 1, 2004, pp. 36-43.

⁸⁰⁰ See, chapter 5.

⁸⁰¹ *Codice per la marina mercantile del Regno d'Italia*, art. 264.

⁸⁰² *Idem*, art. 265.

seafarers chose to desert whatsoever. From 1860s to the First World War, desertion became an endemic phenomenon for oceanic voyages, in spite of the various efforts made by the State to put an end to this continuous drain of sea going personnel.

The post-unitarian administration of the Italian merchant marine tried to control desertion since its earliest establishment: in December 1868, indeed, the King Vittorio Emanuele II appointed a special committee to «develop measures to remedy the extremely serious inconvenience of many desertions which occur too frequently»⁸⁰³. Interestingly, the members of this committee were all from Genoa or Liguria, and among them appeared the count Andrea Danovaro, «shipowner»⁸⁰⁴, and Pietro Badaracco, captain. Among the papers delivered from the committee to the Minister of the Marine – whose proposals will be discussed further – some statistical tables represent, already in the late 1860s, the weight of desertion within the Italian maritime framework since, in the 1868-1870 period, almost two thousands sea labourers deserted. Their analysis also tried to individuate the typologies of seafarers who were more likely to desert, both with regard to their regional provenience and from a professional point of view.

Firstly, commissaries highlighted the considerable rate of Ligurian sailors, which composed 52,8% of the total, among Italian deserters. In fact, a fundamental share of the Italian seafaring personnel came from Liguria, in particular from the maritime communities lying on the western and eastern sides of the region. Few years after the national unification, Liguria provided 37.287 seamen out of 149.563 (24,8%)⁸⁰⁵. Therefore, the weight of deserters was much more significant in terms of proportion than the Ligurian share of sailors. The primary reason for such discrepancy lied in the earlier establishment of Ligurian shipping in the oceanic freight market: their fleet measured more in terms of both average and total tonnage⁸⁰⁶.

⁸⁰³ ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici Diversi 1866-1869, b. 474, 6th December 1868.

⁸⁰⁴ It is with high certainty the same Andrea Danovaro mentioned in Chapter 2 as one of the main Black Sea grain buyers. Interestingly, in the first draft of the decree, Andrea Danovaro was labelled as both merchant and shipowner.

⁸⁰⁵ See, *Statistica del Regno d'Italia. Movimento della navigazione nei porti del Regno. Anno 1867*, pp. LVIII-LIX.

⁸⁰⁶ *Ibidem*.

In addition, the existence of a correlation between desertion and migration, which will be discussed further, might associate Ligurian outstanding numbers for deserters with the first migration wave to Latin America, of which Ligurian middle-skilled and educated migrants (often with maritime and commercial backgrounds) were essential components, as opposed to the later agricultural low-skilled waves in which much more people from Southern Italy participated.

Secondly, the public inquiry underlined how desertion concerned mainly able-bodied seamen, who reached the outstanding figure of 89,95% of the total, followed at great distance by ship-boys (9,62%), whereas shipmasters and mates deserted in the rarest occasions (respectively 0,16% and 0,27%)⁸⁰⁷. Likewise, the sources material on Camogli seafarers illustrate analogous outcomes, since among the whole group of deserters (9,66% of the sample), no one was mate or master at the time of desertion. Inter alia, the case of Gio. Batta Fravega is worth noting: in 1866, he deserted in Genoa (probably he did not present himself at the time of the embarkment), one year prior the obtainment of his license as mate⁸⁰⁸.

The absolute concentration of cases among low and middle-skilled sea workers is in line with most of the historiographical interpretations of such phenomenon. In particular, the identification of onboard conflicts with class struggles, between low «proletarian» ranks and shipmasters, had stimulated various studies which dealt with desertion more or less in conformity with the Marxist theories⁸⁰⁹. Within this ideological framework, desertion was a mean for seafarers to express their class-conscious dissensus against masters' and owners' (representants of authoritarian societies)

⁸⁰⁷ ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici Diversi 1866-1869, b. 474, Quadro statistico delle diserzioni avvenute nella marina mercantile durante il triennio 1868-69-70.

⁸⁰⁸ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, r. 19, n. 15053.

⁸⁰⁹ See: A. Cabantous, *La Vergue et les fers. Mutins et déserteurs dans la marine de l'ancienne France*, Edition Taillierand, 1984. Very influential was also the work of Marcus Rediker: M. Rediker, *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. See also, the roundtable discussions related to this volume and published within the *International Journal of Maritime History*: M. Rediker, "Reviews of Marcus Rediker, *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750*", *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 2, 1989, pp. 311-336; Idem, "The Common Seamen in the History of Capitalism and the Working Class", *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 2, 1989, pp. 337-357.

dominance onboard. Accordingly, deserting was a constructive action which sailors took to re-exert their control over their own labour. The correlation of desertions with working conditions, in general, and with professional and economic subordination, in particular, found fertile ground in the analysis of masters' absolute authority over the crew⁸¹⁰.

Conversely, other scholars tried to contextualise desertion in a broader economic and sociological framework, in which class struggle made space to more individualistic and market-driven causes⁸¹¹. With regard to Finnish shipping, for example, the research of Jari Ojala and Jaakko Pehkonen provided a fundamental toolset to analyse the reasons of desertion from a wider perspective, which included wage differentials, navigational conditions (mean tonnage, length of voyage, destinations) and purely individual characteristics (as marital status or age)⁸¹². Moreover, this exercise on Finnish sailors was in clear continuity with Lewis Fischer's work on deserting seamen within St. John's merchant marine, where desertion was tested, with contrasting results, in light of wage differentials and market-driven opportunities⁸¹³.

The Italian case, as it emerges from state inquiries and Camogli's sample, can be compared with the Finnish situation, due to various similarities in the respective geographic and shipping conditions. In the second half of the nineteenth century, both the Italian and Finnish merchant marines engaged to cross-trading as their dominant form of shipping. Likewise, despite all due differences, their typical routes were comparable: both began in peripheral waters, with little or no outbound cargoes available, and called to British ports as the real point of departure. These analogies affected the working conditions of seafarers in similar ways, in particular with regard to the voyage length and the subsequent prolonged distance from home. Furthermore, both the seamen populations

⁸¹⁰ See, J.M. Witt, "«During the Voyage Every Captain is Monarch of the Ship»: The Merchant Captain from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century", pp. 165-194.

⁸¹¹ See, for instance: L.R. Fischer, "A dereliction of duty: the problem of desertion on nineteenth century sailing vessels", in R. Ommer and G. Panting (eds), *Working Men Who Got Wet*, St. John's Newfoundland: Maritime History Group, pp. 51-70.

⁸¹² J. Ojala and J. Pehkonen, "Not Only for Money: An Analysis of Seamen's Desertion in Nineteenth-Century Finland", *International Journal of Maritime History*, No. 18:1, 2006, pp. 25-53; J. Ojala, J. Pehkonen and J. Eloranta, "Desertions in nineteenth-century shipping: modelling quit behaviour", *European Review of Economic History*, No. 17, 2013, pp. 122-140.

⁸¹³ L.R. Fischer, "A dereliction of duty: the problem of desertion on nineteenth century sailing vessels", pp. 51-70.

suffered from negative wage differentials in relation to market averages, which implied a comparable disposition to desert in favour of foreign employments.


Ojala and Pehkonen quantitative analyses, for example, revealed that below-average aged and unmarried seamen were keener to desert than their more mature and engaged counterparts; in Camogli, despite lacking serial information concerning seafarers' marital status, the average age of deserters was 23 years and 101 days⁸¹⁴. In this regard, the relative youth of deserters might have correlated with draft evasion, which the 1868 Commission included among the most critical reasons for desertion⁸¹⁵. Indeed, in the contemporary perception, military service represented an undesirable duty, which wealthier families were able to circumvent more easily than the lower ranks: normally, at the moment of the draft, most of the seafarers had already selected their substitutes. Usually, the shipowners allotted part of their legacy to exonerate their sons from service in case of a positive draw in the draft: this was the case, for example of Prospero Razeto, who, in 1856, destined 4000 lire to this specific purpose⁸¹⁶. Instead, the absence, for aged sailors, of draft evasion among the factors to determine desertion might have favoured regular emigration. According to the Italian laws, indeed, seamen under the draft age were forbidden to legally settle abroad, whereas elder seafarers were more easily authorised.

Furthermore, a great deal of emphasis was put on the correlation between desertion and long-term oceanic routes, measured through the analysis of average tonnages, voyage durations and destinations. Whereas the Finnish sample targeted seafaring communities and towns devoted to both coastal and trans-oceanic shipping, the maritime evolution of Camogli from the mid-nineteenth century onwards makes the Ligurian town an excellent case-study to evaluate the impact of the enlargement of shipping routes on desertion patterns. The evolution of desertion rates followed the progressive abandonment of the Mediterranean and increased in the period of oceanic tramp shipping.

⁸¹⁴ See, ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, registers 1-39.

⁸¹⁵ ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, *Miscellanea Uffici Diversi 1861-1869*, b. 474, *Commissione per la repressione delle diserzioni*.

⁸¹⁶ ASGe, *Notai II sezione*, r. 174, n. 75.

Figure 7.1. Seafarers leaving the community of Camogli (1840-1914).

Source: ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*

Figure 7.1 compares the quantitative evolution of desertion and legal emigration among Camogli seafarers from 1840s to 1910s. Firstly, the curve of desertion shows two periods of rising discontinuity, the first during the 1860s and the second in the 1880s. Taking into consideration just the economic perspective, these two periods present opposite characteristics: between 1860 and 1870, the shipping business of Camogli underwent its most rewarding and profitable phase; in the following decades, the global freight crisis, the competition with steam shipping and the local financial collapse stroke an heavy blow on Camogli's maritime system⁸¹⁷. However, whereas the respective economic factors differed, the two periods have something in common: the geographic escalation of Camogli's maritime activities, from the Mediterranean to the British Isles in the former case (1860s), and from the European waters to the oceanic setting in the latter (1880s)⁸¹⁸.

Also the 1868 Commission – targeting the whole country – outlined the correlation between desertion and the widening of the Italian shipping range to the Atlantic environment: in their

⁸¹⁷ See, Chapter 3 and 4.

⁸¹⁸ See, Chapter 2 and 3.

statistics, the overwhelming majority of Italian sea workers deserted in Latin American ports (66%), followed by British territories (7%) and the U.S. (6%)⁸¹⁹. The extraordinary amount of desertions in Latin America is a distinguishing feature differentiating Italian seafarers from those of the anglophone and Northern countries. In the literature on St. John's and Scandinavian deserters, the percentage of Latin American destinations never exceeded 10%, whereas British and U.S. ports accounted for most of the cases⁸²⁰.

The case of Camogli, instead, represents a junction point between the two worlds: because of Camogli's outstanding accomplishments in international shipping, its characteristics stood out from the Italian average.

Table 7.1. Destinations of seafarers leaving the community of Camogli (1840-1914).

	<i>Latin America</i>	<i>British and Northern European ports</i>	<i>North America</i>	<i>Other</i>
<i>Desertion</i>	38,71%	41,93%	12,90%	6,45%
<i>Legal emigration</i>	64,58%	14,58%	12,50%	8,33%

Source: ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*.

Indeed, the data provided by Table 7.1 seem to align the case of Camogli to the international standards. Differently from the Italian trend, Camogli seafarers deserted more in the British and Northern European ports than in Latin America, thus showing similar characteristics to those of Scandinavians. In broader terms, some Camogli seafarers acted more in line with international than national trends for deciding the ports where to desert.

⁸¹⁹ Data drawn from: ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, *Miscellanea Uffici Diversi* 1861-1869, b. 474, *Commissione per la repressione delle diserzioni*.

⁸²⁰ L.R. Fischer, "A dereliction of duty: the problem of desertion on nineteenth century sailing vessels", p. 58; J. Ojala and J. Pehkonen, "Not Only for Money: An Analysis of Seamen's Desertion in Nineteenth-Century Finland", p. 45.

Furthermore, the place of desertion affected the occupational prospects of deserters, as we will delineate in the next section. The unique character of Camogli's data within the Italian framework invited us to broaden the analysis to compare desertion with the legal emigration flows to America. The widening of the perspective is crucial to move forward with the analysis of the exogenous reasons for desertion, which require a much wider contextualisation within migration movements⁸²¹.

Behind the choice to desert either in Cardiff or in Buenos Ayres lied highly different individual and environmental reasons: naturally, the desertion led also to opposite results. In the first case (British and Northern European destinations), deserting was usually aimed at prosecuting the maritime career: seafarers sought for more rewarding employments and decided to disembark, even illegally, in ports where it was possible to satisfy their expectations. In the second case (Latin American ports), desertion usually resulted into stable settlements abroad, sometimes connected to the abandonment of a maritime career or, at least, to its reconfiguration (e.g. from oceanic routes to cabotage). Although the former situation is almost exclusive of desertion, the latter one forced us to inscribe the deserting behaviours in a broader framework which comprehended migration itself. Under a chronological point of view, legal emigration follows a similar pattern to desertion: 65,11% of the migrations occurred between 1880 and 1899 (see Figure 7.1). The most contrasting results emerge under the geographical perspective: migrating seafarers chose the Latin American ports in 64,58% of the instances (as opposed to the 38,71% of desertion), whereas only 14,58% opted for British or Northern European ports (as opposed to 41,93% of desertion).

These data imply a fundamental element of distinction: for deserters, professional continuity played a decisive role in determining the abandonment of the community. This feature could also be associated to the sudden nature of desertion as opposed to the meticulous planning allowed to migration.

The next section, therefore, examines the diverging trajectories of those who continued a maritime profession according to the nature of their abandonment of the community, either by desertion or migration.

⁸²¹ Ojala and Pehkonen have already attempted to analyse desertion through migration models: see, J. Ojala, J. Pehkonen and J. Eloranta, "Desertions in nineteenth-century shipping: modelling quit behaviour", pp. 130-132.

7.3. Different flag, same sails: maritime labour migration to the European merchant marines

As seen in the previous chapter, notwithstanding the method adopted, almost one third (31%) of the sample of Camogli seafarers born between 1865 and 1875 decided to leave the community to settle abroad. Although maritime labour sources are mostly silent toward foreign employments or activities abroad, the utilisation of more qualitative sources might shed some light on them. The present analysis will begin by taking into account those who continued into maritime professions: in this sense, we will sketch out a sharp contraposition between high-seas and cabotage foreign careers.

While the transfer from sail to steam shipping was a late phenomenon which impacted severely on Camogli's shipping crisis from the late 1870s onwards, the abandonment of the «floating communities» in favour of foreign sailing vessels anticipated the crisis and the gradual dismantlement of the communitarian economic system. Immediately after Camogli's ships crossed the Mediterranean borders and reached out more attractive maritime labour markets (such as the British one), the local Italian consuls began to record countless desertions of seafarers⁸²². Among the places where Camogli's seamen chose to jump ship, British ports were much likely related to the decision to embark on foreign vessels.

Interestingly, scholarly literature indicates that serving on foreign merchant marines was not as common for Italians as for other nationalities. For example, the pivotal studies on the Scandinavian merchant marines have long established how switching flag was a common behaviour among Northern European sea workers⁸²³, whose professional and ethical qualities were of great

⁸²² See, ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, *Miscellanea Uffici Diversi 1861-1869*, b. 474, *Commissione per la repressione delle diserzioni*.

⁸²³ This element arose within the discussion concerning the integration of Northern European sailors within the international maritime labour market: L.R. Fischer, "The Efficiency Of Maritime Labour Markets In The Age Of Sail: The Post-1850 Norwegian Experience", in Idem (ed.), *The market for seamen in the age of sail*, pp. 111-140. The same

appreciation in the most labour-demanding fleets, such as the British one. For instance, according to the data retrieved from a sample database of British crew agreements, the Scandinavians provided 19,09% of the deck personnel and, thus, constituted the second regional group (after the Britons, 56,56%) within the British merchant marine⁸²⁴. The comparative success of Scandinavian sailors reached even Camogli's fleet: in 1898, when the ship *Edinburgh* was anchored at Pensacola, in order to replace a couple of Southern Italian deserters, the captain embarked a Finnish able-bodied seaman and a Danish ordinary seaman⁸²⁵.

On the other side, despite the relatively low labour costs – which the British consuls praised and blamed at the same time – Italian sailors were less demanded within foreign merchant marines⁸²⁶. In particular, historiography tends to relate this trend to moral prejudices which blamed most of the Southern-European countries⁸²⁷. Until now, maritime scholars have completely ignored the presence of Italian maritime labourers in the foreign merchant marines. Conversely, a thorough research on the vast archival corpuses (particularly in the British case) might contribute to the reconsideration of this neglected aspect of the Italian and European maritime history and, perhaps, shed light on unexpected entanglements. In particular, a systematic research on foreign crew lists might be fundamental to evaluate, with more awareness, the effective attractiveness of the foreign maritime labour market on Italian seamen and, thus, its correlation with desertion.

Lacking such data and owing to the fact that, after desertion, the individual career records were naturally interrupted, we resorted to a tentative analysis of the most frequent places of desertion and to the usage of more qualitative sources, in the attempt to discuss the occurrence of Camogli seafarers working on foreign vessels.

phenomenon is repeatedly mentioned in: J. Ojala, J. Pehkonen and J. Eloranta, "Desertions in nineteenth-century shipping: modelling quit behaviour", pp. 123-125.

⁸²⁴ The database is outlined and discussed in M.Cooper, "Maritime Labour And Crew Lists Analysis: Problems, Prospects And Methodologies", p. 190.

⁸²⁵ ASGe, *Giornali nautici*, Giornale generale, Brigantino a palo *Edinburgh*, 602/1.

⁸²⁶ See, chapter 2.

⁸²⁷

As pointed out in the previous paragraph, about 41% of Camogli deserters chose to jump ship in British or Northern European ports. This figure is outstandingly high in comparison with the Italian average (less than 10% total)⁸²⁸. Therefore, Camogli seafarers seem to represent an exceptional case-study within the Italian maritime context; whereas most of the Italian deserters aimed at Latin American countries to settle there, a remarkable share of Camogli's seamen deserted in ports where embarking on foreign vessels represented the most attractive option. Within this framework, the most favourite places for sailors to desert were Cardiff, Newcastle and Liverpool, not surprisingly among the leading ports for the Atlantic sea borne trade. There, the comparison with British (or American) working conditions and salaries might have encouraged displeased, young and unmarried seamen to secretly disembark with the purpose to sign new employments aboard of foreign ships.

The absence of a clear legislation and, in particular, of bi-lateral and international agreements on desertion – as the 1868 Commission noted – facilitated such misconduct⁸²⁹. Furthermore, the relative absence of Camogli's legal migrants to the UK ports, as opposed to the high figure of desertion in the same area, suggests a correlation between desertion and the continuation of maritime careers in foreign merchant marines. To this group can be added those sailors who decided to stop legally in the British ports and never embarked again on Italian vessels (2,3 % of the total sample, 10,6% of foreign abandonments, see Table 6.12).

In sums, the reemployment within foreign oceanic merchant marines suggests the existence of professional continuity. Camogli' sailors engaged to foreign international shipping to achieve better salaries and ameliorate their working conditions. Although these subjects abandoned Camogli's endogenous labour market, they remained within its broader container, the international maritime labour market. The high level of mobility associated with high-seas careers prevented sailors from permanently settling abroad.

⁸²⁸ See, ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, *Miscellanea Uffici Diversi 1861-1869*, b. 474, *Commissione per la repressione delle diserzioni*.

⁸²⁹ *Ibidem*. To the same argument refer also Ojala Pehkonen: J. Ojala and J. Pehkonen, "Not Only for Money: An Analysis of Seamen's Desertion in Nineteenth-Century Finland", p. 39.

All these features draw a thick line of distinction between pursuing a maritime career in foreign merchant marines and engaging to cabotage. The decision of jumping ship to engage to foreign vessels was inherently less durable and one-way than a professional readjustment to cabotage in another country. As we will see, the latter option was usually pursued in Latin America, in the broader context of permanent or semi-permanent migration to this continent. For these reasons, before tackling the argument of Camogli's readjustments to Latin American cabotage, we will first proceed with a brief digression about the characteristics of Ligurian migration to two specific areas, Peru and the Plata region, where most of Camogli's seafarers directed in the second half of the nineteenth century.

7.4. The Ligurian Migration to Latin America (1830s-1914)

In the reconstruction of the Italian migration flows to Latin America, there is wide consensus in representing the Genoese people as a definite group holding some distinctive traits. Firstly, in connection with Ligurian chronological primacy within the Italian migration flows to Latin America; secondly, because of the unique push and pull factors determining their emigration. Various scholars noted how cultural factors carved a role within this Ligurian primacy⁸³⁰. The Genoese people grew in the «mobility culture»⁸³¹ and possessed a natural predisposition to geographical movement, rooted into centuries of shipping and commercial practices. These traits lied at the basis of their earlier settlement in the Latin American continent and deeply influenced the characteristics of their establishment within the social and economic framework of the hosting societies. The inclusion of Camogli within this paradigm is however a late accomplishment. As seen

⁸³⁰ See, for instance the literature concerning the first waves of Italian emigration to Argentina and Uruguay: M.C. Crescimbeni, "Storia della collettività italiana in Argentina (1835-1965)", in *La popolazione di origine italiana in Argentina*, Torino: Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1987, pp. 209-242; F.J. Devoto, "Un caso di migrazione precoce. Gli Italiani in Uruguay nel secolo XIX", in *L'emigrazione italiana e la fondazione dell'Uruguay moderno*, Torino: Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1993, pp. 1-35.

⁸³¹ The same terms are used in: G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana. Una visione storica*, Torino: Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1999, p. 32. See, also: G. Chiaramonti, "Italiani in Perú fra otto e novecento: marinai, commercianti, imprenditori di origine ligure", *Zibaldone. Estudios italianos*, p. 57.

in the previous chapters, its shipping developed a transnational dimension only from the 1830s onwards: previously, the geographical context to which they referred was restrained within the narrow borders of the Tyrrhenian Sea and rarely Camogli's vessels sailed outside the Mediterranean. «Mobility culture» did play a role in bringing Latin American countries closer to Genoa, but within a more intricate framework where long-standing interests and durable entanglements intervened. The relationships between Liguria and Latin America before the eighteenth century had been a neglected field of studies until the recent volume of Catia Brillì⁸³² shed light on the Latin American side of the centuries-old business entanglements which the Genoese merchants maintained with Spanish monarchs. In this context, the greater relationships with this area manifested from the second half of the eighteenth century under the direction of the group of Genoese traders settled in Cadiz⁸³³. The penetration of Genoese entrepreneurs in Latin America can be contextualised within the Spanish designs to enhance and develop the colonial trade, in particular with the surroundings of Buenos Ayres. Thus, various individuals settled there and opened trade activities, in particular in the retail sector (*pulperias*); some of them became successful and survived to the dramatic transformations observed at the turn of the century⁸³⁴.

After the commercial and shipping crisis determined by Napoleonic Wars, the Genoese recovered their communications with Plata, which assumed continuous characters from the 1830s onwards. Meanwhile, since the early 1820s, several members of the Ligurian community settled around the Plata basin engaged to maritime-related professions, in particular river navigation and shipbuilding⁸³⁵, to which were gradually added the newcomers establishing in the same area from the 1830s onwards. For this group of immigrants – among which it is possible to include those from Camogli – shipping business represented the gateway to migration. First, it provided the means and the occasion to migrate; whether deserting or regularly leaving the ship, many of these migrants presented a maritime background which concurred to their arrival to the American continent. Secondly, shipping business and its affiliated industries were underdeveloped sectors in the area:

⁸³² C. Brillì, *Genoese Trade and Migration in the Spanish Atlantic, 1700-1830*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

⁸³³ Idem, p. 95.

⁸³⁴ Idem, pp. 89-134.

⁸³⁵ Idem, pp. 164-202.

thus, countless Ligurians were able to fill the void and engaged to river navigation, coastal cabotage and shipbuilding⁸³⁶.

The same pattern is observed on the opposite shore of the Latin American subcontinent, in Peru and Chili where, for being less numerous, the Italian communities were even more evidently related to maritime emigration⁸³⁷. There, Ligurian immigrants started to arrive with continuity from the early nineteenth century, in the wake of their independence.

In general, the Ligurian emigration to Latin America has been interpreted as an early chain migration. Early, because it took place before the effective development of the Italian mass migration flows to the same area. Still in 1871, the immigrants of Ligurian origins represented the 53% of the Italian population settled in the American continent⁸³⁸. Therefore, migration historians have naturally decided to label the pre-1870 migration wave as the Ligurian phase⁸³⁹. Then, with the growth of the emigration flows from other areas of the country, the Genoese component lost its dominant role in terms of relative participation; nevertheless, Ligurian people continued to transfer to Latin America in the following decades. Indeed, despite the characteristics of Ligurian migration were tailored on the mid-nineteenth century context, the same features can be seen throughout the subsequent period.

Within this framework, the history of Camogli's emigration to Latin America can be explicated through a three-step process. First: the immigrants arrived there as seafarers and decided to abandon the ship – either by deserting or under permission of the captain/shipowner. Second: they found employment within local cabotage and prosecuted with their maritime careers. Third: at the top, shipping business was gradually associated with investments in trade, agricultural production

⁸³⁶ See: F.J. Devoto, "Un caso di migrazione precoce. Gli Italiani in Uruguay nel secolo XIX", pp. 1-15.

⁸³⁷ G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana*, pp. 29-35; G. Chiaramonti, "Italiani in Perú fra otto e novecento: marinai, commercianti, imprenditori di origine ligure", p. 61; J. Worral, "Italian Immigrants in the Peruvian Economy, 1860-1914", *Italian Americana*, No. 2:1, 1975, pp. 50-63; V. Maino, "I marinai italiani in Cile a metà del secolo XIX", in *Il contributo italiano allo sviluppo del Cile*, Torino: Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1993, pp. 157-195.

⁸³⁸ *Statistica generale del Regno d'Italia - Censimento degli italiani all'estero (31 dicembre 1871)*, Roma: Stamperia Reale, 1874.

⁸³⁹ M.C. Crescimbeni, "Storia della collettività italiana in Argentina (1835-1965)", pp. 209-242.

and industry; at the bottom, it was abandoned for the retail and wholesale sectors. Indeed, this pattern underwent an intergenerational differentiation: usually, first-comers (arrived between 1830s and 1860s) reached the third step at the top; instead, late-comers (1870s-1910s) – arrived as a result of mechanisms of chain migration – were employed in already-established activities and were rarely able to climb the Latin American social ladder.

7.4.1. CAMOGLI'S MARITIME LABOUR MIGRATION TO PERU AND ARGENTINA

When arrived to Latin America, the main tools at disposal of the people of Camogli were the maritime background and the related professional expertise. Despite many specificities, the same characteristics were shared by most of the immigrants of Ligurian origins. As a result, they successfully integrated within all the shipping-related industries, in particular cabotage and shipbuilding. Within the wide range of opportunities offered by the fluid Latin American societies, the places of origin of the “Genoese” influenced their choices. Camogli's people, like many from the Eastern Ligurian Riviera, founded shipping companies and engaged to local cabotage. On the other side, immigrants from places with deeply-rooted traditions in the shipbuilding industry were more likely to open shipyards. Several shipwrights and carpenters from Varazze, one of the leading shipbuilding centres of Liguria, arrived in Buenos Ayres and Montevideo and founded shipyards there⁸⁴⁰. Instances like these are emblematic to highlight the professional continuity tying the hometown with the migrant environment.

In the aftermath of the Latin American independence process, the extant political and social climate was favourable for Europeans to make great profits within societies under construction. In Peru, since the mid-nineteenth century, «the Italians owned almost all of the cabotage under the

⁸⁴⁰ See the case of the brothers Franco, Giuseppe and Luigi Fazio and Giuseppe, Vincenzo and Gio. Batta Cerruti reported in: F.J. Devoto, “Un caso di migrazione precoce. Gli Italiani in Uruguay nel secolo XIX”, pp. 5-6. See also, the case of Matteo Amico, from Loano to Peru: G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana*, pp. 85-88. For Buenos Ayres, see: M.C. Crescimbene, “Storia della collettività italiana in Argentina (1835-1965)”, p. 246.

Peruvian flag»⁸⁴¹. According to the Italian consul in Lima, «in order to practice fishing and cabotage, and to be equalised to locals» many Ligurian emigrants «had inscribed themselves in the Peruvian rolls»⁸⁴². In 1853, the only data available to analyse the mid-nineteenth century Peruvian merchant marine, record at least eighteen vessels – out of one hundred twenty (6,66%) – belonging to Ligurian shipowners⁸⁴³.

Scholarly reconstructions underline how, at the beginning of its independent history, the Peruvian society lacked both the means and the know-how to create its own merchant marine and, accordingly, favoured foreign investments in this sector⁸⁴⁴. The Ligurian shipowners engaged mainly to the Latin American cabotage, where they imposed their rule, and more rarely adventured to international trade: in that sector, for the outstanding success of guano trade, British, American and French were powerful and resourceful competitors.

Thus, Peru turned into an attractive maritime labour market for Ligurian seamen. However, the enrolment of Italian citizens within the Peruvian rolls and the transfer to the foreign flag was perceived as a problematic drain of resources by the Italian authorities. From the consular correspondence, for instance, it is possible to observe the efforts to achieve bi-lateral agreements with the Peruvian state aimed at obtaining the fiscal equalisation between the Italian and Peruvian merchant marines⁸⁴⁵. This type of agreement would have diminished the drain of resources and, perhaps, would have pushed the resident shipowners to return to the Italian flag. In addition,

⁸⁴¹ ACS, *Ministero della marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici Diversi, b. 271, Lettera di Pietro Castelli al Ministro della Marina (1866).

⁸⁴² AMAE, *Ministero degli affari esteri*, b. 817, Lima, 1865.

⁸⁴³ R. Melo, *Historia de la Marina del Perú*, Lima: Carlos F. Southwell, 1907, p. 217-220. The figure might indicate an overestimation of the Ligurian penetration within Peruvian shipping business: however, later sources and historiography identified many more Italian-owned ships in Peru, in particular of Giuseppe Canevaro and Gio. Bono Figari. See, M. C. de Mendoza, *El transporte marítimo en la Inmigración China*, Lima, 1989, p. 68, mentioned in G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana*, p. 70.

⁸⁴⁴ G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana*, pp. 64-66.

⁸⁴⁵ AMAE, *Affari Esteri*, b. 817. In the proposed treaty, the consul aimed at obtaining free fishing and free cabotage for the Italian flag. However, he was not optimistic about the fact that this action on itself could prevent Italian citizens from enlisting into the Peruvian rolls.

consular correspondence shed light on another factor of attractiveness of Peru in the eyes of Italian seafarers: to contrast desertion, the consul proposed the introduction of a minimum salary within the Italian merchant marine – equal to the local market level. Such proposal underlines the existence of considerable salary differentials between the two maritime labour markets and their role to determine desertions and labour migration to Latin America.

Moreover, another advantage of the Peruvian labour market in comparison with the Italian one involved the mechanisms of upward professional mobility. Several low and middle-skilled seamen deserted in the Pacific Latin American country to obtain, in short time, remarkable and profitable commands within the local merchant marine⁸⁴⁶. Interestingly, the consul pleaded their case, inviting the Italian public authorities to acknowledge a de facto situation and regularise their positions, in order to let them serve for the national fleet as well⁸⁴⁷.

In Peru, as well as in the Plata region, Camogli's migration inscribes into the chain migration model. By means of «diffusion» and «feedback»⁸⁴⁸, the mechanisms of chain migration led to the creation of communitarian-based clusters, in which kinship and shared origins played a fundamental role.

Bartolomeo Figari is an example of this migrating pattern⁸⁴⁹. Born in 1831 from Gio. Batta and Rosa Ottone, he began his maritime career in Tyrrhenian cabotage routes at age twelve. From 1850 to 1854, Bartolomeo served in the Peruvian merchant marine for more than forty months. In Peru, he sailed on the ship *Santiago*, captain Giacomo Gotuzzo, and on the ship *Carmen*, under the command of captain Giuseppe Garibaldi. Interestingly, the latter embarkment, on board of *Carmen*, is related to one of the most famous voyages of Garibaldi as shipmaster, because of the long-standing debate about Garibaldi's alleged participation to the *coolie* trade⁸⁵⁰. Nevertheless, both the

⁸⁴⁶ Idem.

⁸⁴⁷ Idem.

⁸⁴⁸ J.D. Gould, "European Inter-continental Emigration: The Role of «Diffusion» and «Feedback»", *The Journal of the European Economic History*, 2, 1980, pp. 267-315.

⁸⁴⁹ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, r. 3, n. 3166.

⁸⁵⁰ The main elements of this debate can be followed in: F. Capece Galeota, "Il «secondo esilio» di Giuseppe Garibaldi", *Mediterranea Ricerche Storiche*, No. 14, 2008, pp. 651-666. The main voice raised against the idea that the "Hero of Two

Carmen (owned by Pietro Denegri⁸⁵¹) and the *Santiago* surely employed a lot of Italian-born maritime personnel. In Latin America the integration of newly-arrived immigrants within the already-existing Italian activities responded to a common pattern for Ligurian emigration. The individual trajectory of Bartolomeo Figari was in line with this model: in Lima, he had relatives orbiting around the business of Giovanni Figari, one of the foremost members of the Italian community in Peru⁸⁵².

From the sources, it is also possible to reconstruct some unfortunate cases, which, nevertheless, can say something about the characteristics of Camogli's chain migration to Peru. For example, this was the case of the shipmaster Carlo Cichero who, for «his extremely miserable conditions»⁸⁵³, repeatedly demanded to the Italian consul in Callao to be repatriated at state expense. In this circumstance, the existence of a "supporting network" based on communitarian ties was even more important since it allowed the consul to find at least temporary employment to the captain, as a second pilot on the Italian ship *Dominga*⁸⁵⁴.

Similar conditions facilitated the integration of Camogli' seafarers in the area surrounding the Plata basin. There, the characteristics of Camogli's migration are hardly distinguishable from the Ligurian microcosm crowding the alleys of Buenos Ayres and Montevideo. Indeed, the conditions predisposed by the dictatorship of Juan Manuel de Rosas (1835-1852) in Argentina attracted several Ligurian seafarers to Buenos Ayres⁸⁵⁵. Rapidly, a great part of the cabotage fleet and the navigation

Worlds" had engaged the *coolie* trade can be found in: P.K. Cowie, "Nuova luce su Garibaldi in Perù (1851-1853)", *Rassegna storica del Risorgimento*, 1981, pp. 325-331.

⁸⁵¹ AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Lima, I. According to the consul Giuseppe Canevaro, his brother-in-law, Pietro Denegri was born in Casella (Liguria). He was arrived in the Peruvian port in the early 1830s and had accumulated substantial fortunes with trade and shipping.

⁸⁵² See, *infra*.

⁸⁵³ AMAE, Affari Esteri, 881.

⁸⁵⁴ *Idem*.

⁸⁵⁵ See, N. Cuneo, *Storia dell'emigrazione italiana in Argentina, 1810-1870*, Milano: Garzanti, 1940, pp. 351-352; M.C. Crescimbeni, "Storia della collettività italiana in Argentina (1835-1965)", pp. 209-213; F.J. Devoto, "Un caso di migrazione precoce. Gli Italiani in Uruguay nel secolo XIX", pp. 4-5.

along the river Plata came into the hands of Ligurian shipowners⁸⁵⁶. In analogy to what it has been observed in the Peruvian case, the cabotage fleet hoisted the Argentinian and Uruguayan flags. The adoption of local flags was particularly effective for engaging to the navigation of the internal rivers (Paraná, Uruguay and even Paraguay), accessible to national vessels only⁸⁵⁷. Indeed, as a general feature, the Plata region was a transnational space for Ligurian immigrants: through fluvial navigation, they moved incessantly between different national states back and forth⁸⁵⁸. This trait is fundamental to understand the unique characteristics of the Ligurian presence in the area as opposed to the later Italian migration flows which need to be forcibly contextualised in the consideration of the receiving societies.

After the turbulent last years of Rosas, the Ligurian dominance within cabotage and fluvial navigation regained its momentum at the point that, in 1865, the Italian consul described the current situation with these words:

From high-seas vessels to port rafts, from shipowners, importers and exporters to captains, sailors and ship-boys, to shipbuilders, caulkers and sailmakers, almost all of them belong to one Ligurian riviera or to the other.⁸⁵⁹

In this phase, however, it is not common to find people from Camogli in this area. As seen, the first sizable waves of immigrants from the Ligurian town date from the second half of the nineteenth century onward and were deeply interrelated with the worsening conditions of the local shipping business. It is in that moment that the mechanisms of chain migration gradually increased the number of immigrants. Nevertheless, the earliest news of Camogli's people in the Plata basin fit the characteristics of Ligurian immigration and, by witnessing the continuity to maritime labour and

⁸⁵⁶ Official data are not available for this period: as Crescimbene reports, the Ligurian dominance in cabotage fluvial navigation is widely recognized by specialists. For instance, between 1845 and 1848, 43% of the vessels leaving the port of Buenos Ayres to cabotage destinations hoisted the Sardinian flag. See, M.C. Crescimbene, "Storia della collettività italiana in Argentina (1835-1965)", p. 222.

⁸⁵⁷ F.J. Devoto, "Un caso di migrazione precoce. Gli Italiani in Uruguay nel secolo XIX", p. 5.

⁸⁵⁸ Idem, p. 8.

⁸⁵⁹ L. Chapperon, "La Repubblica Orientale dell'Uruguay. Cenni geografici, statistici e commerciali", in *Bollettino Consolare Italiano*, 1865, p. 540.

shipping, coincide with the above-mentioned second step of Camogli's immigration pattern. For example, it is possible to mention the cabotage captain B. Schiaffino, who, in 1853, left the port of Montevideo to Gualeguaychu at the command of the ship *Sole*⁸⁶⁰.

Indeed, the most noteworthy period to analyse Camogli's immigration to Buenos Ayres and the nearby cities took place from the late 1870s onwards. In these years, both desertions and legal migrations reached the zenith in Latin American countries, with Buenos Ayres (34,8%) and Montevideo (7%) being the foremost destinations for Camogli seafarers either deserting or settling abroad⁸⁶¹. There, the seamen from Camogli, both deserters and regular immigrants, found regular employment in the maritime sector. In 1885, more than 54% of the tonnage of the Plata, despite covered by Latin American flags, belonged to Italian shipowners⁸⁶². Such considerable amount of vessels, albeit of limited dimensions (most of them weighted below 150 tons), could obviously provide a vast source of maritime labour for several Italian migrants settled abroad. These are the cases, for instance, of Carlo Oneto, sailor, found in Buenos Ayres in 1881: part of a numerous family composed of six male brothers, Carlo was emigrated to Argentina in the previous years, whereas three brothers of him were still employed on board of Camogli's vessels and two were farmers⁸⁶³. Another one was Benedetto Figari, captain, who appeared as witness in a notarial deed from Buenos Ayres together with Fortunato Cichero, owner of a *pulperia*⁸⁶⁴. A decade later, Camogli's notarial sources witness the presence in Buenos Ayres of Cesare Gotuzzo and Fortunato Maggiolo, captains⁸⁶⁵. Most interesting is the case of Giuseppe Caprile, who, in 1885, had found employment as a coalman⁸⁶⁶.

⁸⁶⁰ AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Buenos Ayres, b. 2.

⁸⁶¹ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, registers 1-39.

⁸⁶² AMAE, *Serie Politica A*, b. 3, Buenos Ayres.

⁸⁶³ ASGe, *Notai III Sezione*, b. 501, n. 255.

⁸⁶⁴ *Idem*, b. 503, n. 631.

⁸⁶⁵ *Idem*, b. 1616, n. 544 and 658.

⁸⁶⁶ *Idem*, b. 688, n. 2852.

More rare, but still present, is Camogli's maritime labour migration to Chile. There, with different dimensions, the gradual integration of Ligurian captains and seafarers within the Chilean merchant marine can be observed from the 1820s⁸⁶⁷. Already in 1835, the English consul in Valparaiso recorded six Italian captains (Schiattino, Viale, Ferrari, Garassino, Allao and Capurro) as opposed to only eight Chilean captains⁸⁶⁸. Others could be added to this list and even more followed afterwards⁸⁶⁹. Between 1851 and 1865, 17% of the captains and 19% of the vessels of the Chilean fleet were Italian⁸⁷⁰. Among them, it is not easy to distinct those from Camogli from those who arrived from the nearby communities, such as Santa Margherita and Recco. Surnames like Bozzo, Capurro, Chiesa, Cichero, Ferrari and Viacava can be equally reconducted either to Camogli or to those places. Thus, widening the perspective adopted to embrace this broader trans-communitarian area seems to be a necessary operation to shed light on the characteristics of Camogli's maritime immigration to Chile. Within this group, Gio. Batta Cichero owned the major numbers of ships, five⁸⁷¹. Similarly to Emanuele Bozzo, Benedetto Capurro, Antonio Chiesa, Niccolò Ognio, B. Repetto and Gio. Batta Viacava, he was also shipmaster, employed despite his several ownerships⁸⁷². These captains and ships mostly engaged to cabotage along the Pacific coast of the Latin American subcontinent and seldomly went beyond this borders⁸⁷³.

Although being employed in the maritime sector represented a common fate for most of the seafarers who, from Camogli, arrived in Latin America, the duration of their maritime careers was

⁸⁶⁷ V. Maino, "I marinai italiani in Cile a metà del secolo XIX", in *Il contributo italiano allo sviluppo del Cile*, Torino: Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1993, pp. 157-195.

⁸⁶⁸ *Idem*, p. 169.

⁸⁶⁹ *Ibidem*. The author reports the names of Giuseppe Ferro, Niccolò Revello and Geronimo Costa.

⁸⁷⁰ *Idem*, p. 182.

⁸⁷¹ *Idem*, p. 184, Tabella 1 – Armatori Italiani della flotta cilena, 1850-65.

⁸⁷² *Idem*, p. 187, Tabella 2 – Capitani Italiani della flotta cilena, 1850-65. The same Gio. Batta Cichero can be found in L. Pandolfini, "Emigrazione italiana al Chili", *Bollettino consolare italiano*, 1868, p. 141.

⁸⁷³ The author mentions extraordinary exceptions to this general rule, such as in the case of Pietro Alessandri, but it seems that none of the captains reported above actually engaged to international trade. V. Maino, "I marinai italiani in Cile a metà del secolo XIX", pp. 171-177.

usually limited within the first years spent in the hosting societies. Afterwards, on the one hand, the most successful collected enough resources to found shipping firm and, in a certain perspective, followed a parallel evolution to their counterparts in Camogli. They relinquished the role of owning-captains and sought for social and economic recognition in shipownership. On the other hand, many abandoned shipping to engage to other activities. Within this framework, the case history is multifaceted. In general, most of them went upstream the supply chain, from transport to distribution up to production: firstly, they opened retail shops (*pulperias*), then passed to wholesale commerce (*almacen*) and, finally, acquired land for cultivation or engaged to industrial production.

7.4.2. CAMOGLI'S SHIPPING BUSINESS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN LATIN AMERICA

As said, from a chronological perspective, the bulk of Camogli's migration to Latin America is not in line with the analogous broader Ligurian movement. This factor covered a role in determining the integration of the people of Camogli within the Italian and receiving societies. The practice of maritime occupations represented a common trait to delineate the first steps of Camogli's people into the new world; instead, the subsequent entrepreneurial success was largely dependent on environmental factors and on the opportunities available. For example, in the age of guano (1840s-1870s), Peru was flourished and highly attractive to prospective emigrants; later, in particular after the War of the Pacific (1879-1884), which deprived the country of most of its nitrate deposits, it entered in a downward economic spiral. Thus, when taking into account long-term entrepreneurial trajectories, a crucial differentiation between the few first-comers (1830s-1860s) and the more extensive group of late-comers (1870s-1910s) is needed.

Indeed, at the mid-nineteenth century, the opening of the Black Sea trade and the overall evolution of local shipping represented a source of attractiveness from which few people of Camogli refrained. One of them was Giovanni Figari (1810-1873), who emigrated to Callao (Peru) in 1832⁸⁷⁴.

⁸⁷⁴ See, AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Lima, Lettera del console Luigi Baratta, 1842; G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana*, pp. 43-44.

Although several references will be made to other characters from different places, the unusual abundance of sources about the life and business of Giovanni Figari allow us to reconstruct his activities and discuss his model of successful entrepreneurship in comparison with other cases.

Arrived in 1832, Giovanni Figari was able to collect a discrete fortune in less than ten years, as he was included in a short list of the thirteen most wealthy persons of Italian origins in Peru⁸⁷⁵. The Sardinian consul in Lima, Luigi Baratta, described him as a «merchant settled in Lima, married and with family for more than twelve years, who is not willing to return to his native country, and who holds a fortune of more than thirty thousand *pezzi*»⁸⁷⁶. Within this ranking, the position of Giovanni Figari followed those of Giuseppe Canevaro (150.000 *pezzi*), the Mazzino bros. (80.000 *pezzi*) and Pietro Parodi (50.000 *pezzi*). Then, at the same level of Giovanni Figari, appeared also Antonio Boggiano (from Chiavari), Pietro Denegri (from Casella), Giuseppe Saccone and Angelo Macera⁸⁷⁷. These people were at the top of the Ligurian community of Peru: in particular, Giuseppe Canevaro and Pietro Denegri, merchants and shipowners, became the most influential of them, along with Figari⁸⁷⁸.

Apparently, Giovanni Figari did not settle abroad on his own: he was probably accompanied by his brother, Angelo, who owned a *pulperia* (retail shop) in Lima⁸⁷⁹. Probably, other members of the family Figari moved to Peru: for example, within a list of the Peruvian fleet in 1853 a certain Hilario (Ilario) Figari is reported to be the owner of the schooner *Diana* (136 t.)⁸⁸⁰.

In 1842, Giovanni Figari was defined as a «merchant» and still in 1853 he does not figure among the Peruvian shipowners: arguably, soon after his arrival, Figari had collected his fortune through trade, as owner of a *pulperia* or even an *almacén* (wholesale shop). Afterwards, he surely returned to shipping and became one of the leading shipowners involved in the transport of *coolies* from China.

⁸⁷⁵ AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Lima, Lettera del console Luigi Baratta, 1842.

⁸⁷⁶ *Idem*.

⁸⁷⁷ *Idem*.

⁸⁷⁸ Giuseppe Canevaro was the Sardinian and later Italian consul between 1847 and 1864. See, G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana*, p. 295.

⁸⁷⁹ *Idem*, p. 69.

⁸⁸⁰ R. Melo, *Historia de la Marina del Perú*, Lima: Carlos F. Southwell, 1907, p. 219.

Indeed, as seen in Chapter 3, Giovanni Figari was reported as the owner of the full-rigged ship (*Provvidenza*, 564 t.) and a barque (*Lima*, 255 t.) which from January 1865 to June 1866 sailed three times along the Macao-Callao route with a total of 908 coolies⁸⁸¹. In 1872, to the company *Figari & Hijos* belonged five out of twenty-six ships which arrived to Callao loaded with *coolies* between January and October 1872⁸⁸². Finally, according to a calculation of Mario Castro de Mendoza – reported by Giovanni Bonfiglio – Giovanni Figari had deployed twenty-two ships to the *coolie* trade throughout the whole period, second to Giuseppe Canevaro only (43 ships)⁸⁸³.

The considerable revenues collected through this activity strengthened even more Figari's position within the Italian community of Lima. His commitment to the communitarian social institutions found recognition in 1862, when Giovanni Figari was elected president of the *Società Italiana di Beneficenza* of Lima (Italian Mutual Aid Society)⁸⁸⁴. The next year, Rocco Pratolongo succeeded to him in the same position and Figari was appointed treasurer, still a prestigious role⁸⁸⁵. The foundation of mutual aid societies and hospitals was a cornerstone for the consolidation of the Italian immigrant communities in Latin America⁸⁸⁶. These societies were intended to provide social and economic services to the associates: the membership fees and the incomes deriving from collateral activities were gathered into a social fund destined to support infirmed or indigent members. Furthermore, after they gathered sufficient capitals and assets, these societies performed

⁸⁸¹ See, Chapter 3 and: ACS, *Ministero della Marina*, Direzione generale della marina mercantile, Miscellanea Uffici Diversi 1861-1869, b. 273.

⁸⁸² W. Stewart, *Chinese bondage in Peru*, p. 83; G. Chiaramonti, "Italiani in Perù fra Otto e Novecento", p. 72.

⁸⁸³ M. C. de Mendoza, *El transporte marítimo en la Inmigración China*, Lima, 1989, p. 68, mentioned in G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana*, p. 70.

⁸⁸⁴ G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana*, p. 104.

⁸⁸⁵ AMAE, *Affari Esteri*, b. 881, Lima, Società Italiana di Beneficenza – Commissione amministrativa pel corrente anno 1863, Elenco dei soci.

⁸⁸⁶ See, for instance: S.L. Baily and A. Scarli, "Las sociedades de ayuda mutua y el desarrollo de una comunidad italiana en Buenos Aires, 1858-1918", *Desarrollo Economico*, No. 84, 1982, pp. 485-514; S.L. Baily, "The Adjustment of Italian Immigrants in Buenos Aires and New York, 1870-1914", *The American Historical Review*, No. 88, 1983, pp. 281-305; F.J. Devoto, "Las sociedades italianas de ayuda mutua en Buenos Ayres y Santa Fe. Ideas y problemas", *Studi Emigrazione* XXI, No. 75, 1984, pp. 320-342.

additional services, tied with the construction of «schools, medical clinics, hospital care, pharmacies, restaurants»⁸⁸⁷. They also provided job placement services, working as the operational arm of the Italian immigrant societies and the basic element of its social networking.

From 1862 to 1881, the number of associates to the Italian mutual aid society of Lima increased from 121 to 1125⁸⁸⁸. Among the subscribers of 1863, it is possible to single out the components of Camogli's community within the broader Italian group: besides Giovanni Figari, the list records three more members of the same family, Luigi, Bartolomeo and Andrea, to which must be added Giovanni's sons, Bartolomeo and Giovanni Figari-Rosas⁸⁸⁹. In addition, other associates might originate from Camogli, such as Gio. Batta Bozzo, Bartolomeo Schiaffino, Giuseppe Olivari and Michele Razeto⁸⁹⁰. Then, in 1881, the mutual aid society gathered the funds to construct the Italian Hospital of Lima, founded on 20th September⁸⁹¹. Less than a decade later, the company *Giovanni Figari & Hijos* hold ten shares of this institution⁸⁹².

Although his active participation to mutual aid societies and, more generally, to the social networks of the community, the figure of Giovanni Figari cannot be easily restricted to the mainstream endogenous character of Ligurian immigrant communities in Latin America. Indeed, the networking role of these institutions compensated for the troublesome integration of foreign elements within the hosting societies. The emergence of this factor is evident in Peru, where several Italians were subjected to vexations by the authorities and suffered from complicated relationships with the natives. Illegal imprisonments, beatings and murders were commonplace: in 1864, for instance, a thirteen years old boy, Giacomo Figari (whose kinship with Giovanni is not clear) was

⁸⁸⁷ S.L. Baily, "The Adjustment of Italian Immigrants in Buenos Aires and New York", p. 293.

⁸⁸⁸ G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana*, p. 104-105.

⁸⁸⁹ AMAE, *Affari Esteri*, b. 881, Lima, Società Italiana di Beneficenza – Commissione amministrativa pel corrente anno 1863, Elenco dei soci.

⁸⁹⁰ Idem.

⁸⁹¹ AMAE, *Serie Politica A*, b. 80, Lima, Società Italiana di Beneficenza in Lima – Relazione del presidente sulla gestione dell'anno 1888 all'assemblea generale.

⁸⁹² Idem.

strangled⁸⁹³. In the same period, an old man Schiaffino was assassinated in Lima. In Callao, two *pulperos* were murdered: one, named Garibaldi, was shot and the other had his throat cut⁸⁹⁴. The climate of hostility was even fostered by clergymen, who contributed to flare the tempers of the Peruvians against the Italian community, whose members were labelled as «thieves and bandits»⁸⁹⁵. Therefore, having in mind long term projects, it was natural to feel the need to integrate as much as possible within the Peruvian society or, at least, to expand outside the borders of the Italian community. Thus, it was natural that, in 1838, Giovanni Figari married Eulalia Rosas Barragan, daughter of Nicolas Rosas (probably of Italian origins, but in Peru since 1807 at least) and of a local woman⁸⁹⁶. Between 1840 and 1854, the couple had nine sons, five boys and four girls. Then, Giovanni Figari carried out a careful marriage policy aimed at spreading the familiar connections in various directions. Bartolomeo (1840-1915), Pedro (b. 1851) and Manuel (b. 1847) married women of local descents; Juan Jacinto (Giovanni, 1843-1912) and Luis Lucas (Luigi, 1854-1934) married women of Italian origins, descendants of Luigi Figari and Pietro Denegri respectively; Maria Dolores (1846-1919) and Clorinda (d. 1919) were given to Emile and Jules Fort, French merchants living in Lima⁸⁹⁷; finally, Carmen (1844-1916) married Adolphe Harismendi, merchant of Basque origins. Then, these unions resulted into thirty-one grandsons from the original household of Giovanni Figari.

Besides the unique case-study of Giovanni Figari, although with fewer details, it is possible to reconstruct alternative trajectories of Camogli's immigrants in Peru. According to scholarly reconstructions, a great deal of the Italian business in Peru was severely damaged by the outbreak of the Pacific War and the subsequent Chilean invasion of the country (1880-1883) which turned into a widespread lawlessness targeting foreigners in particular. For example, G.B. Ferrari reports

⁸⁹³ AMAE, *Affari Esteri*, b. 817, Lima.

⁸⁹⁴ Idem.

⁸⁹⁵ AMAE, *Affari Esteri*, b. 1384, Lima.

⁸⁹⁶ The genealogy of Giovanni Figari was made available online by Francisco Javier Carbone Montes, a distant descendant. It can be seen at:

<https://gw.geneanet.org/fracarbo?lang=es&n=figari+olivari&oc=0&p=giovanni>

⁸⁹⁷ This information is corroborated by Teodoro Hampe Martinez: see, T.H. Martinez, "Una dinámica de integración social: Inmigrantes europeos y norteamericanos en Lima (siglo XIX)", *Ibero-amerikanisches Archiv*, No. 17:4, p. 358.

about the considerable damages suffered by Giovanni Diego Schiaffino, Gaetano Figari and Emanuele Cevasco, seemingly all proprietors of retail shops⁸⁹⁸. In the same period, it was in the valley of Chinchá that the Italian residents lamented the greatest damages⁸⁹⁹. There, some other business activities belonging to individuals from Camogli were founded and, then, flourished in the following decades. The settlement of members of the families Mortola and Oneto provides an emblematic example.

The first penetration to this vast agricultural region took place between 1850 and 1870: first, it regarded the port area (Tambo de Mora), where several Ligurians founded cabotage shipping companies. Afterwards, in compliance with the mentioned pattern from transport to production, many opened retail and wholesale shops to handle the distribution of the most commercialized local commodity, wine. After that, some moved to the countryside and purchased lands cultivated with vineyards. The relative backwardness – in terms of agricultural exploitation and production – of the area delayed of a couple of decades the closure of the access to new immigrants within this business. It is in this context, for example, that, before 1879, Niccolò Oneto managed to acquire a piece of land and founded a wine-producing enterprise in Chinchá Alta: then it was improved by his wife Elisa Mortola until a Genoese collateral acquired it in 1916⁹⁰⁰. To the name Mortola, but probably a different branch of the family, was tied another wine-making firm: it is reconducted to

⁸⁹⁸ G.B. Ferrari, *La città dei mille bianchi velieri*, p. 306. The author reports confusing data concerning both locations and time. First, he locates the shop of Gaetano Figari, son of Niccolò, in «Barranquerra Alta», which is not a Peruvian toponym, but most likely corresponds to an Argentinian town. Secondly, he dates the attacks to the Italian properties to an alleged «Peruvian Revolution» occurred on 12th March 1875, an event which is never reported by the historiography. Some elements might suggest that he referred to the 1895 Revolution – which took place during the Cacerés' overthrowing by Piérola – when riots and attacks to the Italian community were repeated in the same fashion of the Chilean occupation (1880-1883). See, G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana*, p. 191. However, some data about age (Gaetano Figari arrived at Callao in 1859 at age 38, so he was 74 in 1895) and other internal textual references make us not incline toward this option. Most likely, G.B. Ferrari made confusion and wanted to refer to the years of the Chilean occupation (1880-1883).

⁸⁹⁹ G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana*, pp. 213-215.

⁹⁰⁰ The Italian entrepreneurship in the valley of Chinchá is deeply analysed in: G. Bonfiglio, *Gli Italiani nella società peruviana*, pp. 210-239.

the entrepreneurship of Anna Massa, widow of a Mortola, whose success allowed her to expand to other sectors, including a banking institute and a constructions company⁹⁰¹.

Conversely, the width and variety of the Italian community on the other side of the Latin American subcontinent (the Plata basin) complicated the identification of Camogli's entrepreneurs. To this specific regard, the news provided by local historians and the scattered references found in academic literature delineate a pattern of business in line with the dominant model of Ligurian immigration, given the chronological delay of Camogli's emigration and its results. Since maritime labour was the gateway to migration, the earliest immigrants invested mainly in shipping. Apart from several single-ship enterprises engaging to fluvial cabotage, which are hardly identifiable from the sources, the people of Camogli invested also in collateral activities connected with port service. For example, Gio. Batta Lavarello (d. 1869) founded a tug boats company operating in the port of Buenos Ayres⁹⁰². Already in 1862, Lavarello met Nicolas Mihanovic (born nearby Dubrovnik, in the Austrian Empire), destined to become one of the most important shipowners of the Argentinian capital⁹⁰³: after the death of Gio. Batta, his wife Caterina Balestra offered to Mihanovic the direction of the company together with her elder sons, Francesco and Elia Lavarello. A few years later, in 1872, Nicolas married Caterina⁹⁰⁴. Since Gio. Batta's death, it is possible to follow the participation of his six sons throughout the business evolution of Nicolas Mihanovic, culminated in the foundation of the *Sociedad de Navegación a Vapor Nicolás Mihanovich* in 1888⁹⁰⁵. The structure of the firm, indeed,

⁹⁰¹ Idem, p. 218.

⁹⁰² He is mentioned with no further details in: M.C. Crescimbene, "Storia della collettività italiana in Argentina (1835-1965)", p. 246. Then, see: L.I. Zanotti de Medrano, "De imigrante a empresário: formação e atuação da empresa de navegação fluvial de Nicolás Mihanovich (1875-1919)", *Historia Unisinos*, No. 9:3, 2005, pp. 198-210.

⁹⁰³ On this figure: L.I. Zanotti de Medrano, "De imigrante a empresário: formação e atuação da empresa de navegação fluvial de Nicolás Mihanovich (1875-1919)", pp. 198-210; L.G. Caruso, "La Mihanovich: trabajo marítimo, condiciones laborales y estrategia patronal en las primeras décadas del siglo XX", *Trabajadores*, No. 2, 2011, pp. 128-156; B. Kadic, "Los hermanos Mihanovich, fundadores de la Flota Mercante Argentina", *Studia Croatica, Revista de Estudios Políticos y Culturales*, No. 2, 1961.

⁹⁰⁴ L.I. Zanotti de Medrano, "De imigrante a empresário: formação e atuação da empresa de navegação fluvial de Nicolás Mihanovich (1875-1919)", p. 201.

⁹⁰⁵ L.G. Caruso, "La Mihanovich: trabajo marítimo, condiciones laborales y estrategia patronal", p. 131.

reflected the co-participation of the family Lavarello to Mihanovic's business, despite it hold the name of its founder. Elia was vice-president and managing director, whereas Giovanni and Luigi were directors⁹⁰⁶. The *Mihanovic* company engaged also to shipbuilding: Carlo Lavarello was the director of this branch and Giovanni and Luigi were council members⁹⁰⁷.

Apart from the specific case of the Mihanovic-Lavarello, the Ligurian fluvial entrepreneurship in the area rarely led to the creation of big shipping companies. Limitedly to Camogli's case, for example, it is possible to observe a line of continuity in terms of shipping business practices between the hometown and the migrant communities. Chain migration was primarily on familiar basis and then expanded to the town; occasional partnerships with exogenous members were possible (e.g. G.B. Ferrari speaks about the *Mortola & Canevaro*, in Buenos Ayres or the *Risso & Schiaffino* at Montevideo)⁹⁰⁸, but they rarely acquired permanent character. Thus, the shipping activities of Camogli's expatriates in this area lacked capital concentration and, therefore, the means to sustain foreign competition on the long run.

Finally, several seafarers from Camogli, settled in Argentina and Uruguay, having retired from a maritime career, sought for new opportunities in different markets: some remained in the shipping sector and opened ship-chandler shops, many hold *pulperias* at the Boca, others went to the inner regions of these countries. Unfortunately, the research conducted in the sources kept in the archives of the Sardinian and Italian Foreign Affairs was rather unsuccessful⁹⁰⁹. Five members of the family Schiaffino were registered within the Sardinian population in Rosario (1855): Antonio, Gaetano and Francesco were defined as traders, Prospero was a painter and Rocco was labelled as merchant and owner⁹¹⁰. Another Schiaffino, Niccolò, is mentioned among the subscribers of the construction

⁹⁰⁶ L.I. Zanotti de Medrano, "De imigrante a empresário: formação e atuação da empresa de navegação fluvial de Nicolás Mihanovich (1875-1919)", p. 202.

⁹⁰⁷ Idem.

⁹⁰⁸ G.B. Ferrari, *Capitani di mare e bastimenti di Liguria*, p. 428.

⁹⁰⁹ The papers related to the Sardinian period can be found in Turin: AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Buenos Ayres,

⁹¹⁰ AST, *Consolati nazionali*, Buenos Ayres, b. 2, Primi elementi pel censo italiano a Rosario, Paranà, Santa Fé e Diamante, nella Confederazione Argentina.

company to construct the Italian Hospital in Buenos Ayres, in 1863⁹¹¹. Then, Antonio Capurro, Giovanni Cichero and Eugenio Ferrari appear in the list of the Italian citizens who were damaged during the siege of Paysandù, an Uruguayan city attacked by the Brazilian troops in 1864⁹¹².

Nevertheless, these scattered data are incomplete and unsystematic. Therefore, in this case, a brief reference to the sparse news provided by local historians is needed, at least to delineate a general framework of Camogli's entrepreneurship in Argentina and Uruguay.

In 1894, at age 12, Gio. Bono Ferrari, the major local historian of Camogli, migrated to Buenos Ayres personally to reach his father, Giuseppe Ferrari (1859-1933), son of Gio. Bono. Giuseppe had spent his first years embarked on the brig *Geronima Ferrari*, owned by his father, but he never obtained the captain's license. He married young, in 1881, and, in the following year, left Camogli to make fortune in Argentina: after a short period in Bahia Blanca, Giuseppe was employed on board of the steamer *Carhué*, commanded by his uncle Francesco Bisso and, then, was embarked on sailing vessels engaging to fluvial navigation in the Paranà. Afterwards, he founded a trade company with an acquired cousin from Recco (Gaetano Cavalli): this business earned good profits, as during the 1890s it consisted of three shops and employed various people. Finally, in 1904, Giuseppe Ferrari decided to return to Camogli⁹¹³.

As said, his son Gio. Bono reached him to Buenos Ayres in 1894: until 1904, the future founder of Camogli's maritime museum worked in the familiar business. Afterwards, not willing to continue in retailing, Gio. Bono moved to the interior, to work as accountant in a grain trade company settled in the region northward than Santa Fé. On these bases, there is a deep methodological difference between the representativity of Gio. Bono Ferrari's accounts on Camogli's history, based on the collection of oral witnesses, and the sections about the late nineteenth-century Buenos Ayres, grounded on first-person knowledge.

⁹¹¹ AMAE, *Affari Esteri*, b. 867, Buenos Ayres, *Commissione edilizia dell'Ospedale Italiano*. On this argument, see: D. Sacchi, "I consoli e l'ospedale: le prime collette per la fondazione dell'ospedale italiano di Buenos Ayres (1853-1858)", *Quaderni storici*, No. 41:3, 2006, pp. 639-669.

⁹¹² AMAE, *Serie Politica A*, b. 3, Elenco dei reclami presentati alla Regia Delegazione Consolare d'Italia a Paysandù dai sudditi italiani ivi stabiliti.

⁹¹³ Part of these information come from: Gio. Bono Ferrari, *Fasti e nefasti della famiglia Ferrari*.

According to G.B. Ferrari, the number of the owners of *pulperias* (retail shops) and *almacen* (wholesale shop) from Camogli was almost uncountable: surnames as Antola, Olivari, Mortola, Repetto, Maggiolo, Massa, Schiaffino, Valle and Simonetti are all reported in his account⁹¹⁴. Then, for their limited numbers, the author is more detailed when describing the activities of those who engaged to the productive sectors. There were small-scale industrials, such as Aurelio and Eugenio Ferrari: the former founded a factory of textiles, the latter one engaged to wooden and iron manufactures. Lorenzo Schiaffino, instead, opened a lumbermill. Samuele Ansaldo explored the mines of Catamarca, in the Andin region, at the north-western borders of Argentina. Salvatore Ferro embarked on a colonization process in Patagonia; Federico Valle became a wheat merchant in Santa Fé; a Mortola tried to set up a mulberry plantation in an island along the Paraná river⁹¹⁵.

7.5. A case of migration by accident: the foundation of the Camogli's community in Tristan da Cunha (1892)

This last and short section deviates from the systematic analysis of Camogli's migration flows and aims at reconstructing the unique case-study of the permanent settlement of two sailors from Camogli, Andrea Repetto and Gaetano Lavarello, in the island of Tristan da Cunha, in the Atlantic Ocean. For its exceptionality, the event is well-known in Camogli and local historians reconstructed it in details. Most of the information arises from the personal memory of the sailor Agostino Lavarello, cousin to Gaetano, who, in 1892, shipwrecked together with him on the Atlantic island⁹¹⁶. Indeed, the origins of Camogli's community in Tristan da Cunha were rooted on a specific event, the shipwreck of the barque *Italia* (1074 t.), built in 1882 by B. Cerruti in the shipyards of Varazze⁹¹⁷.

⁹¹⁴ G.B. Ferrari, *Capitani di mare e bastimenti di Liguria*, p. 427.

⁹¹⁵ Idem, p. 428.

⁹¹⁶ CMMC, *Il naufragio del Brigantino a Palo "Italia"*. The memory was then published into the second publication of Camogli's maritime museum: A. Bertolotto (ed.), *Agostino Lavarello. Ultimo viaggio del brigantino a palo Italia nel 1892*, Camogli: Quaderni del Museo 2, 1973.

⁹¹⁷ *Registro Italiano per la classificazione dei bastimenti. Libro registro 1890*.

The barque belonged to the Michele and Andrea Dall'Orso, shipowners of the Ligurian city of Chiavari, ca. 20 kilometres distant from Camogli. As seen in Chapter 2, during the first half of the nineteenth century, several members of the Dall'Orso family had engaged into the Black Sea grain trade, both as merchants and carriers. In the following years, some of them continued to practice shipping (in 1890, Michele and Andrea owned seven barques)⁹¹⁸. It was not uncommon for Camogli's seafarers to be employed on board of ships belonging to the nearby communities, especially because of the crisis which Camogli's shipping was experiencing in the last decades of the century. Indeed, at the moment of the departure, in May 1891, the crew of the barque *Italia* was composed of seventeen people: the captain Orlando Perasso (from Chiavari), a Genoese mate, five seaman from Camogli (including the boatswain), seven seamen from Grottamare, on the Adriatic side of Central Italy (including the steward, two ordinary seamen and a ship-boy), another ordinary seaman from Lavagna, and two cabin-boys, one from Genoa and the other from Milan.

The group from Camogli included: Fortunato Schiappacasse (boatswain), Agostino Lavarello (able seaman), Gaetano Lavarello (able seaman), Antonio Gardella (able seaman) and Andrea Repetto (able seaman).

The research throughout the *Matricole* allowed us to reconstruct the careers of Gaetano Lavarello and Andrea Repetto, the founders of Camogli's community to Tristan da Cunha. Gaetano Lavarello, son of Gio. Batta and Cecilia Oneto, was born on the 9th December 1867; Andrea Antonio (his second name) Repetto, son of Agostino and Maria Lagno, was born on the 13th January of the same year.

Gaetano's first embarkment took place in 1879, as ship-boy on board of the barque *Paola Revello*, where he remained for almost one year engaging to the Black Sea and British trades. After four services along these routes, Gaetano's first transoceanic voyage occurred in 1883 (as ordinary seaman), on the barque *Paola R.* to Montevideo. Then, he continued his maritime career along the oceanic routes; finally, on the 5th May 1891, Gaetano embarked on the barque *Italia*, from where he disembarked in Tristan da Cunha on the 3rd October 1892, as a result of the shipwreck⁹¹⁹.

Andrea began his maritime career in September 1880; throughout the first two years, Andrea collected less than four months at sea, as ship-boy in voyages of Tyrrhenian cabotage. Then,

⁹¹⁸ Idem.

⁹¹⁹ ASGe, *Matricole della gente di mare*, r. 27, n. 19781.

between 1883 and 1887, he engaged to transoceanic routes, in particular to North American destinations. Finally, in 1891, he resumed navigation and got on board of the barque *Italia*⁹²⁰.

The written memory left by Agostino Lavarello offers many details useful to describe the routes and the traffics of the barque *Italia*. Departed from Genoa with a mineral cargo, the barque arrived thirty-five days later to Swansea. There, it loaded coal and embarked upon a long voyage – it lasted one-hundred and six days – to Penang. After a brief passage on ballast to Rangoon, the barque *Italia* was chartered with a teak cargo to Greenoch, in Scotland. The passage lasted one-hundred and forty-seven days. Finally, on the 3rd August 1892, it received a coal cargo to be consigned at Cape Town⁹²¹.

On the 28th September, the crew noticed that the coal cargo had caught fire. After several unsuccessful attempts to extinguish the fire, the captain opted for controlling it in order to endure as much as possible and to sail toward Tristan da Cunha. During the night of the 2nd October, then, the hold exploded without destroying completely the barque, which was still 50 miles far from Tristan da Cunha. On the following day, they were able to disembark on the desert and rocky side of the island and, therefore, spent there the next eight days before being able to find help from the local community. Finally, on the 14th October, the crew arrived to Edinburgh of the Seven Seas, the only inhabited site of the island⁹²².

At the time of the arrival of the Italian shipwrecked, Tristan da Cunha was populated by forty-seven people. The earliest permanent settlements to this remote island date to 1816-1817, when the English navy sent a garrison to prevent any possible attempt to free Napoleon from Saint Helena. After 1821, most of the garrison left, apart from a small number of people, among which was William Glass, who became the first governor of the island. In the following years, groups of black women from Saint Helena and South Africa were sent to Tristan da Cunha to integrate with the dominant male population. In 1836, an American schooner shipwrecked, and three of the people on board decided to stop. Among them, there was the Dutch Peter William Groen (later Green), governor in 1892. The

⁹²⁰ Idem, r. 30, n. 21917.

⁹²¹ A. Lavarello, *Ultimo viaggio del brigantino a palo Italia nel 1892*, pp. 2-3.

⁹²² Idem, pp. 4-16.

population was mainly composed by women: in 1885, male inhabitants represented only 14,67% of the total.

The economy of the island was obviously based on subsistence: farming, fishing and potato crops provided to the population the means for survival. Since Tristan da Cunha was located outside the average routes, it was rarely reached by vessels. The only exception was represented by American whalers, which anchored there for provisions in exchange of clothes and textiles⁹²³. Thus, before being completely rescued (apart from Gaetano and Andrea, who decided to remain there), the Italian crew was hosted for four months by the residing community. Actually, the first group (the mate and some sailors) embarked, after fifteen days, on an American barque directed to Adelaide (Australia): the lack of sufficient provisions impeded to the whole crew to do the same⁹²⁴. In the following weeks, various whalers arrived to the island but refused to take the Italian sailors to Cape Town in order to not waste the hunting season. Meanwhile, the remaining sailors gradually integrated with the local community: since the island was prevalently populated by women, the presence of strong young males was naturally more than welcomed. Furthermore, their manual skills were highly appreciated: according to Agostino, «the people of the island regarded us as people fell from the sky, due to the fact that we were able to do anything and we were hard workers»⁹²⁵. For instance, they made potato sacks with the remaining sails and the boatswain, being a decent carpenter, was able to repair the chariots⁹²⁶.

Seemingly, it was during these months spent as members of the community that Gaetano Lavarello fell in love with a local, «Gini Glass»⁹²⁷ and decided to marry her and settle in the island for his future days. The same decision was then taken by Andrea Repetto. Finally, the rest of the group, including Agostino Lavarello was embarked on the schooner *Wild Rose* (250 t.) on the 21st January 1893⁹²⁸.

⁹²³ Idem, p. 20.

⁹²⁴ Idem, pp. 22-23.

⁹²⁵ Idem, p. 21.

⁹²⁶ Ibidem.

⁹²⁷ Idem, p. 23.

⁹²⁸ Idem, pp. 23-25.

7.6. Conclusions

The present chapter aimed at reconstructing the actions of those who abandoned the community of Camogli to establish abroad.

The analysis of desertion rates outlined how occupational continuity was crucial in determining the choices of Camogli seafarers. The remarkable rates of desertion observed in a positive period for the local shipping business and the pattern of deserting ports make Camogli an exceptional case-study within the Italian framework. In the 1860s, the seafarers of Camogli implemented a market-driven professional choice at the moment of desertion: they disembarked in the British ports, where it was easier to find more profitable employments in the same sector. Thus, they demonstrated market awareness and to be able to move within an international maritime labour market, pointing out an approach more similar to that of Northern Europeans than to those of their fellows Italians.

The examination of Camogli's migration patterns to Latin America, instead, inscribed our case-study within the broader Ligurian model. The predominance of maritime-related occupations in the countries of destination is as fundamental for Camogli's outward migration as for several nearby communities (e.g. Recco, Santa Margherita, Chiavari, Sori etc.). Moreover, apart from few exceptions, Camogli's immigrants arrived in already-existing Ligurian communities, which favoured their integration. Thus, from a general perspective, the pattern of Camogli's migration was consistent with the Ligurian model, albeit some peculiarities. Firstly, Camogli's immigration started at least with a gap of one generation in comparison with the Ligurian average (1820-1830), due to Camogli's exceptional success in shipping which deprived its inhabitants from most of the push factors until the 1870s. Secondly, the correlation with maritime activities was even stricter than in the case of Ligurians, at the point that it is hardly possible to find newly-arrived immigrants employed in different occupations than shipping.

These characteristics led the way to propose a positive business model for Camogli's immigrants in Latin America: after their arrival as seafarers, they were firstly employed in the shipping business, mostly in cabotage (Peru) and fluvial navigation (the Plata basin). Then, the most successful among them became shipowners and integrated with the upper ranks of the Italian migrant societies (Giovanni Figari and the Lavarello Bros.): these people covered important positions within the social and economic networks of the Italian community (e.g. mutual aid societies and hospitals).

Others decided to definitively abandon shipping and devoted themselves to alternative businesses: in general, the sources delineate an upstream movement through the supply chain, from transport (shipping) to retail (*pulperias*), from wholesale (*almacén*) to production (wine factories, wood and iron manufactures, cultivation etc.).

Finally, we provided an account on an extraordinary case-study for the underdeveloped theme of migrations determined by shipwrecks. This kind of events became progressively rarer, because the development of world shipping enhanced the sea borne connections with the remotest places of the globe. Nevertheless, the settlement of two sailors from Camogli to Tristan da Cunha, occurred at the end of nineteenth century, might represent one of the most emblematic results of the globalisation process to which the Ligurian community actively participated.

Conclusions

From charcoal cabotage to oceanic tramp shipping, the trajectory of Camogli throughout the nineteenth-century is emblematic for the history of Mediterranean sailing shipping communities. The passage from traditional coastal transports (late eighteenth century – 1830) to the handling of Black Sea grain (1830-1870) is related to the improvement of market integration and the enlargement of the geographic range. In the previous chapters, the causes of such step-forward were identified in the inner shipping potential of the community and in the extraordinary capability of its shipping elites to concentrate the investments in a profitable venture, the Black Sea grain trade. Before the Crimean War, Camogli's specialisation into shipping provided the Genoese merchants with a strong and reliable fleet, manned by experienced seafarers who visited the Black Sea ports with unbroken continuity. In the 1860s, the opening to foreign merchants and the access to Greek networks determined the transition from the Mediterranean to the British markets. The arrival of Camogli ships to the ports of the United Kingdom represented a decisive breakthrough in the history of the Ligurian community: from the creation of an integrated wheat-coal route in and out the Mediterranean, the captain-shipowners of Camogli established initial contacts with the British freight market. Afterwards, when steam competitiveness rose and steamships seized the Black Sea grain trade, the people of Camogli were ready to expand to oceanic shipping.

Each step-forward of Camogli was determined by previously established relationships: similarly to a chain, every phase was preliminary to the next one. The transport of grain for Ligurian merchants was needed to mature expertise of the Black Sea market; the integration with the Greek networks was pivotal to access the British shipping world; the establishment of a wheat-coal route opened to Camogli the coal trade; later, the international demands for coal unlocked other trades, particularly South-Eastern Asian rice and North-American timber. Until the late 1870s, the rise of the Camogli's shipping business could be measured by the observation of their route network and range;

afterwards, geographic expansion and economic growth ceased to be directly correlated. From the 1880s, the fleet of Camogli was gradually marginalised into low-profitable transports, whose scarce viability inverted the curve and exacerbated the decline of the community. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, Camogli lost its position within the international shipping world. At the turn of the century, the attempts to realise the transition from sail to steam represented the last backlash. Since the previous period, the shipowners of Camogli had replenished their fleets by operating on the second-hand market: the same pattern was followed for the construction of the steam fleet, whose outdated structural characteristics and tonnage prevented these shipowners from retrieving remarkable profits.

Throughout these processes, the community itself changed dramatically. Firstly, it underwent a demographic boom, as a result of the generally improved economic conditions and of the new position which the old fishing village had acquired within its sub-regional area. Secondly, the shipping revenues favoured the promotion of a modern shipping elite, which invested in the amelioration of the local infrastructures, and founded educational and cultural institutions which survived to their fortunes. Thirdly, Camogli became a point of reference for the Italian maritime sector: in 1880, the city hosted the First Congress of the Italian Shipowners and, on the following year, the local shipowners partook to the National Inquiry over the conditions of the merchant marine. In these occasions, from Camogli emerged economic policies of national interest which shaped the Italian maritime world for the next decades. Fourthly, Camogli's maritime labour underwent dramatic transformations. The old-fashioned mutualistic structure based on «share» payments was substituted by modern salaries and, to a certain extent, to the proletarianization of seafarers. The ranks of shipownership were gradually closed to newcomers from below: the professionalisation of masters and the increased business volume required to engage to shipping curbed vertical mobility. The optimisation of labour productivity and the contraction of the fleet concurred to disrupt the pre-existent endogenous labour market by curtailing the demands for maritime labour. In force of this, several seafarers abandoned either navigation or, physically, the community itself. The most qualified made the transition to steam: based on the local nautical school, Camogli produced deck and engine officials for the Italian merchant marine long after its demise as a shipping centre. Others abandoned the community and the Italian shipping to found more profitable employments abroad: among them, a first group embarked on foreign European

fleets, following career paths comparable to those of the Northern European seafarers. A second group, instead, transferred to Latin America. There, they found reception among the pre-existent Ligurian communities, to which also belonged a restricted list of early-comers from Camogli. At first, they were employed in maritime-related businesses, such as cabotage or fluvial shipping; afterwards, several quitted navigation to dedicate to commerce and production.

Throughout this century-old history, the effects of global-scale processes, such as the transition from sail to steam and the globalisation, played a crucial role in the configuration of the community. From the desertion of the Black Sea trade onwards, the trajectory of Camogli's shipping was determined by the global competition of sail against steam. Momentous events occurring on the broader scale, such as the construction of the Suez Canal, exerted their impact on Camogli and his seafarers. Besides, other technological innovations, such as the invention of cable telegraph, transformed the nature of maritime professions and disrupted the previously established social and power relationships.

The present thesis aimed to analyse the global transformations which invested the nineteenth-century maritime world in response to the transition from sail to steam. Selecting the case-study of Camogli intended to glance at an understudied area for the nineteenth-century maritime studies, the Mediterranean Sea. Under this light, the Ligurian community represented a privileged observatory to the world. Holding together macro and micro-historical tools of analysis, this study of the seafaring community of Camogli aimed at the representation of broader processes to validate Camogli as a potential model to deal with maritime communities in the age of transition. Although putting the accent on the global scale is fundamental to enhance the potential of Camogli for multiple comparisons, in and out the Mediterranean basin, it must not obliterate the local dimension. The community of Camogli grew in the wake of global transformations but, at the same time, its members were responsible for the unique responses, reactions and readjustments. The establishment in the Black Sea trade, the 1860s-1870s massive campaign of constructions, the correlated path-dependency, and the financial bubble of 1878 – only to mention some of the most distinguishing features – compose a unique picture, which could not be found elsewhere with identical characteristics. Camogli cannot constitute a fixed paradigm; however, it is a wide-ranging and in depth case-study, whose representativity must be continuously questioned and readdressed through the development of further research and studies.

Appendixes

Appendix 1. Distribution by town of the Italian merchant fleet for oceanic shipping and Mediterranean cabotage (1885).

<i>Region</i>	<i>Maritime district</i>	<i>Town</i>	<i>Oceanic shipping</i>		<i>Mediterranean cabotage</i>		<i>Total</i>	
			<i>N.</i>	<i>Tons.</i>	<i>N.</i>	<i>Tons.</i>	<i>N.</i>	<i>Tons.</i>
<i>Campania</i>	Castellammare di Stabia	Castellammare di Stabia	21	11584	6	1757	27	13341
<i>Campania</i>	Castellammare di Stabia	Meta	66	29428	12	3542	78	32970
<i>Campania</i>	Castellammare di Stabia	Sant'Agnello	19	10211	1	99	20	10310
<i>Campania</i>	Castellammare di Stabia	Sorrento	41	19960	4	1523	45	21483
<i>Campania</i>	Castellammare di Stabia	Torre Annunziata			1	250	1	250

<i>Campania</i>	Castellammare di Stabia	Vico Equense	1	259			1	259
<i>Campania</i>	Gaeta	Gaeta	11	6823	8	2126	19	8949
<i>Campania</i>	Napoli	Forio	2	1343			2	1343
<i>Campania</i>	Napoli	Napoli	37	15584	12	2033	49	17617
<i>Campania</i>	Napoli	Procida	49	19538	11	2406	60	21944
<i>Campania</i>	Napoli	San Giorgio a Cremano	1	749			1	749
<i>Campania</i>	Napoli	San Giovanni a Teduccio	1	383			1	383
<i>Campania</i>	Napoli	Torre del Greco	1	314	18	2433	19	2747
<i>Lazio</i>	Civitavecchia	Civitavecchia	1	478			1	478
<i>Lazio</i>	Civitavecchia	Roma			1	417	1	417
<i>Liguria</i>	Genova	Bogliasco	19	11153	6	2687	25	13840
<i>Liguria</i>	Genova	Camogli	190	125111	77	32770	267	157881
<i>Liguria</i>	Genova	Genova	137	96498	40	16918	177	113416
<i>Liguria</i>	Genova	Nervi	22	14144	22	8643	44	22787
<i>Liguria</i>	Genova	Pegli	5	3135	2	897	7	4032
<i>Liguria</i>	Genova	Portofino	1	980	1	442	2	1422
<i>Liguria</i>	Genova	Pra	3	1565			3	1565
<i>Liguria</i>	Genova	Quinto	11	2053	5	2053	16	4106

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<i>Liguria</i>	Genova	Rapallo	2	1111			2	1111
<i>Liguria</i>	Genova	Recco	18	12032	5	1514	23	13546
<i>Liguria</i>	Genova	Sampierdarena	3	2946	1	361	4	3307
<i>Liguria</i>	Genova	Santa Margherita Ligure	2	901	1	306	3	1207
<i>Liguria</i>	Genova	Sori	10	4451	6	2247	16	6698
<i>Liguria</i>	Porto Maurizio	Oneglia			1	292	1	292
<i>Liguria</i>	Porto Maurizio	Porto Maurizio			1	179	1	179
<i>Liguria</i>	Porto Maurizio	San Remo	1	240			1	240
<i>Liguria</i>	Porto Maurizio	Santo Stefano	1	496			1	496
<i>Liguria</i>	Savona	Loano	11	8193	4	1731	15	9924
<i>Liguria</i>	Savona	Pietra Ligure	12	9070	1	241	13	9311
<i>Liguria</i>	Savona	Savona	15	8174	8	2415	23	10589
<i>Liguria</i>	Savona	Spotorno	1	913			1	913
<i>Liguria</i>	Savona	Varazze	3	3297	1	147	4	3444
<i>Liguria</i>	Spezia	Bonassola	1	1010			1	1010
<i>Liguria</i>	Spezia	Carrara	1	434	3	614	4	1048
<i>Liguria</i>	Spezia	Chiavari	36	22630	4	413	40	23043
<i>Liguria</i>	Spezia	Deiva marina	2	1459			2	1459
<i>Liguria</i>	Spezia	La Spezia	9	4719			9	4719

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<i>Liguria</i>	Spezia	Lavagna	6	3679	1	41	7	3720
<i>Liguria</i>	Spezia	Lerici	5	2876	2	283	7	3159
<i>Liguria</i>	Spezia	Porto Venere			2	474	2	474
<i>Liguria</i>	Spezia	Sestri Levante			3	212	3	212
<i>Liguria</i>	Spezia	Zoagli	5	2501			5	2501
<i>Marche</i>	Ancona	Ancona			1	68	1	68
<i>Puglia</i>	Bari	Barletta			9	1664	9	1664
<i>Puglia</i>	Bari	Molfetta			1	420	1	420
<i>Sardinia</i>	Cagliari	Cagliari	2	1222			2	1222
<i>Sicily</i>	Catania	Augusta	1	270	3	1024	4	1294
<i>Sicily</i>	Catania	Catania	5	1882	2	822	7	2704
<i>Sicily</i>	Catania	Riposto	8	976	1	307	9	1283
<i>Sicily</i>	Messina	Iatti	1	436			1	436
<i>Sicily</i>	Messina	Lipari			1	205	1	205
<i>Sicily</i>	Messina	Messina	6	2466	8	1840	14	4306
<i>Sicily</i>	Messina	Milazzo	2	607	2	521	4	1128
<i>Sicily</i>	Messina	Reggio Calabria	1	430	1	159	2	589
<i>Sicily</i>	Palermo	Palermo	11	6939			11	6939
<i>Sicily</i>	Trapani	Marsala			1	113	1	113
<i>Sicily</i>	Trapani	Trapani	2	962	11	1863	13	2825

<i>Tuscany</i>	Livorno	Livorno	7	2820	28	5178	35	7998
<i>Tuscany</i>	Livorno	Massa			2	329	2	329
<i>Tuscany</i>	Livorno	Viareggio			3	807	3	807
<i>Tuscany</i>	Portoferraio	Rio Marina (Elba)			4	1276	4	1276
<i>Veneto</i>	Venezia	Burano			1	223	1	223
<i>Veneto</i>	Venezia	Udine			1	218	1	218
<i>Veneto</i>	Venezia	Venezia	20	7974	23	5474	43	13448

Source: *Sulle condizioni della marina mercantile al 31 dicembre 1885. Relazione del direttore generale della marina mercantile a S.E. il Ministro della Marina*, Roma: Tipografia Ditta Ludovico Cecchini, 1886.

Appendix 2. Italian major shipbuilding centres (1862-1886).

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<i>Year</i>	<i>Loano</i>	<i>Savona</i>	<i>Varazze</i>	<i>Sestri</i>	<i>Chiavari</i>	<i>Lavagna</i>	<i>Lerici</i>	<i>TOT</i>	<i>Limite</i>	<i>Viareggio</i>
	<i>Ponente</i>							<i>LIGURIA</i>		
1862	792	3308	3033	5646	276	14	348	13417	730	863
1863	736	2826	5385	13768	319	57	553	23644	1023	889
1864	1361	1930	6542	14028	907	546	730	26044	429	960
1865	1488	5419	8442	21041	1337	1398	969	40094	301	875
1866	1129	6634	11534	15805	1532	1442	1973	40049	749	1310
1867	1244	6023	7797	22747	4780	704	2078	45373	730	634
1868	845	7098	16258	25379	3607	3498	80	56765	388	835
1869	2691	6233	14809	30199	4692	4154	1173	63951	960	360
1870	2118	8825	12677	21827	6486	5167	849	57949	453	526
1871	1832	6272	9030	19527	627	3483	595	41366	387	193
1872	1390	7889	5791	15866	2003	163	10	33112	364	350
1873		9327	6658	16846	1366	1311	593	36101	441	680
1874	18	7354	12002	24991	5635	200	292	50492	371	733
1875	836	8118	9790	21795	5408	3913	80	49940	978	416
1876	2550	5509	8375	13119	3208	627	1532	34920	365	258
1877		2548	4312	11237	1207	1294	402	21000	157	70
1878		1451	4281	7851	1007	722	27	15339	308	199

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<i>1879</i>	932	1158	2841	4196	279	80	35	9521	92	350
<i>1880</i>	969	517	1441	3139	669	137	127	6999	617	165
<i>1881</i>		660	2030	2119	180	117	229	5335	351	247
<i>1882</i>		1345	3012	2073	92	813	131	7466	362	327
<i>1883</i>	738	1420	2376	1316	1407	71	31	7359	193	460
<i>1884</i>		432	2500	2536	1019	783		7270	106	603
<i>1885</i>		248	452	1581	432	109	145	2967	435	930
<i>1886</i>	105	152	292	1668	116	38	8	2379	137	1081
<i>TOT</i>	21774	102696	161660	320300	48591	30841	12990	698852	11427	14314

<i>Year</i>	<i>Gaeta</i>	<i>Procida</i>	<i>Torre del Greco</i>	<i>Castellammare</i>	<i>Sorrento</i>	<i>Alimuri</i>	<i>Molfetta</i>	<i>Chioggia</i>	<i>Venezia</i>	<i>Riposto</i>	<i>Trapani</i>	<i>TOT Italy</i>
1862	930	1246	965	576	2107	568	173			150	199	21924
1863	1140	769	695	1581	831	1166	319			280	159	32496
1864	636	1182	988	2092	1272	1300	155			158	255	35471
1865	479	1166	1550	2104	1970	2787	305			187	327	52145
1866	1135	2342	1626	1325	1685	398	282			195	185	51281
1867	646	1642	1080	3430	2525	1579	215	1603	1353	37	229	61076
1868	1954	1966	1343	4466	1245	1701	120	515	746	80	170	72294
1869	879	1029	1503	8755	2038	53	324	1990	1376	180	179	83577
1870	2340	1416	1805	3210	2220	1471	66	1478	329	219	256	73738
1871	1017	579	1044	1656	2420	1415	101	1345	1071	177	274	53045
1872	371	1248	1716	1329	2165	2231	141	1598	1602	194	135	46556
1873	737	517	1487	2320	2554	1220	160	721	330	301	159	47728
1874	996	870	1846	2818	2722	2083	93	1330	1104	244	275	65977
1875	1546	420	1018	4211	3522	3195	63	1310		240	391	67250
1876	3992	2024	763	3459	1437	2880	203	844	712	153	208	52218
1877	166	448	1081	2388	2274	521	240	1583		173	156	30257

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<i>1878</i>	803	565	501	1237	2537	1426	126	767		114	19	23941
<i>1879</i>	1396		1088	1384	1510	1639	117	787	397	195	20	18496
<i>1880</i>	286		861	612	1057		122	587	69	96	78	11549
<i>1881</i>	330		1247	469			119	708		238	187	9231
<i>1882</i>	190		778	557		990	174	782		215	150	11991
<i>1883</i>	51	16	776	412		513	12	723		123	97	10735
<i>1884</i>	38	632	259	1187	791		78	676		272	141	12053
<i>1885</i>	220		1473	774	217		92	927	68	212	101	8416
<i>1886</i>	156	379	1530	941	1788		105	839		18	207	9560
<i>TOT</i>	22434	20456	29023	53293	40887	29136	3905	21113	9157	4451	4557	963005

Appendix 3. Camogli's fleet in 1853.

<i>Tons</i>	<i>Ships</i>	<i>Surname</i>	<i>Name</i>
280	<i>Mardocheo</i>	Ansaldo	Antonio
135	<i>Principe di Moldavia</i>	Ansaldo	Filippo
116	<i>Boschetto</i>	Ansaldo	Giuseppe
224	<i>Francesco</i>	Antola	Francesco
169	<i>Orione</i>	Antola	Francesco
158	<i>Due Marie</i>	Aste	Giuseppe
200	<i>Nereo</i>	Avegno	Gio. Batta
158	<i>Amicizia</i>	Bellagamba	Fortunato
174	<i>Giorgina</i>	Bertolotto	Bartolomeo
388	<i>India</i>	Bertolotto	Fortunato
185	<i>Laura</i>	Bertolotto	Lazzaro
156	<i>San Fortunato</i>	Bertolotto	Lorenzo
163	<i>San prospero</i>	Bertolotto	Lorenzo
247	<i>Le Grazie</i>	Bertolotto	Luigi
138	<i>Delia</i>	Bertolotto	Prospero
160	<i>Dio mi vede</i>	Boggiano	Giuseppe
151	<i>Buoni Genitori</i>	Bozzo	Benedetto
94	<i>Boschetto</i>	Bozzo	Pietro
198	<i>Lorenzo</i>	Brigneti	Antonio
237	<i>Regolo</i>	Brigneti	Antonio
81	<i>Due Fratelli</i>	Brigneti	Biagio
110	<i>S. Fortunato</i>	Brigneti	Biagio
161	<i>Sacra Famiglia</i>	Brigneti	Biagio
150	<i>Apocalisse</i>	Capurro	Filippo

265	<i>Saturno</i>	Capurro	Filippo
232	<i>Indipendenza peruviana</i>	Capurro	Fortunato
154	<i>Felicina</i>	Casabona	Antonio
199	<i>Camoglino</i>	Cichero	Antonio
199	<i>Nadir</i>	Cichero	Antonio
168	<i>Nadir</i>	Cichero	Gio. Bono
143	<i>Nuovo Diligente</i>	Cichero	Gio. Bono
133	<i>Purito</i>	Costa	Prospero
160	<i>Speranza</i>	Dapelo	Gio. Batta
135	<i>Due Terese</i>	Degregori	Agostino
173	<i>San Rocco</i>	Degregori	Agostino
158	<i>N. S. del Carmine</i>	Degregori	Bernardo
144	<i>S. Bernardo</i>	Degregori	Bernardo
295	<i>S. Paolo</i>	Degregori	Bernardo
141	<i>Timoleonte</i>	Degregori	Fortunato
169	<i>Gloria</i>	Degregori	Giuseppe
168	<i>Prudente</i>	Degregori	Giuseppe
153	<i>Gutemberg</i>	Demarchi	Rosa
282	<i>Oriente</i>	Ferrari	Domenico
109	<i>San Gio. Batta</i>	Ferrari	Emanuele
148	<i>Antonio</i>	Ferrari	Gio. Batta
199	<i>Spirito Santo</i>	Ferrari	Giovanni
165	<i>S. Giuseppe</i>	Ferrari	Niccolò
237	<i>Società</i>	Ferro	Fortunato
197	<i>S. Raffaello</i>	Fravega	Carlo
104	<i>Cardiano</i>	Gardella	Gio. Batta
145	<i>L'Amore</i>	Lavarello	Gaetano
247	<i>Conte Corvettp</i>	Lavarello	Ignazio

167	<i>Bonafede</i>	Lavarello	Prospero
114	<i>Eliseo</i>	Lavarello	Prospero
130	<i>Filadelfo</i>	Lavarello	Prospero
372	<i>Guardia</i>	Lavarello	Prospero
176	<i>Tigre</i>	Lavarello	Prospero
104	<i>Emilio</i>	Maggiolo	Giuseppe
158	<i>Giorgiana</i>	Marchese	Francesco
138	<i>origina</i>	Massa	Giacomo
217	<i>germanico</i>	Massone	Prospero
274	<i>Mentore</i>	Mortola	Fratelli
153	<i>Rosario</i>	Mortola	Fratelli
205	<i>Solone</i>	Mortola	Giovanni
109	<i>Assunta</i>	Mortola	Giuseppe
249	<i>Due Fratelli</i>	Mortola	Giuseppe
192	<i>Innocenza</i>	Mortola	Giuseppe
171	<i>Mercurio</i>	Mortola	Giuseppe
142	<i>Nuovo San Prospero</i>	Mortola	Lorenzo
117	<i>Montenero</i>	Mortola	Sebastiano
158	<i>Petrarca</i>	Ognio	Antonio
151	<i>N. S. della Guardia</i>	Olcese	Antonio
161	<i>San Prospero</i>	Olivari	Benedetto
110	<i>Imparziale</i>	Olivari	Biagio
272	<i>Lucchino</i>	Olivari	Biagio
117	<i>Zenobio</i>	Olivari	Biagio
161	<i>Angiolina</i>	Olivari	Fortunato
170	<i>Protezione</i>	Olivari	Fortunato
127	<i>Fortuna</i>	Olivari	Francesco
208	<i>Radamisto</i>	Olivari	Giacomo

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140	<i>S. Caterina</i>	Olivari	Gio. Bono
136	<i>San Prospero</i>	Olivari	Luca
146	<i>N. S. della Città</i>	Olivari	Niccolò
233	<i>Antonietta</i>	Ottone	Fortunato
263	<i>Fenice</i>	Pellerano	Filippo
175	<i>Nome di Maria</i>	Pendibene	Antonio
158	<i>Rosario</i>	Razeto	Antonio
185	<i>Annetta</i>	Razeto	Giacomo
145	<i>Provvidenza</i>	Razeto	Gio. Batta
158	<i>Regina Ester</i>	Razeto	Martino
170	<i>Prospero</i>	Razeto	Prospero
153	<i>Lercaro</i>	Razeto	Stefano
265	<i>Agostino</i>	Repetto	Gio. Batta
117	<i>Boschetto</i>	Repetto	Gio. Batta
165	<i>Boschetto</i>	Repetto	Gio. Batta
120	<i>Bucefalo</i>	Sanguinetti	Gio. Batta
139	<i>Nome del Padre</i>	Sanguinetti	Gio. Batta
148	<i>Licurgo</i>	Schiaffino	Agostino
219	<i>Perseverante</i>	Schiaffino	Agostino
136	<i>Salvatore</i>	Schiaffino	Agostino
145	<i>Ave</i>	Schiaffino	Antonio
160	<i>grimaldo</i>	Schiaffino	Antonio
260	<i>Speranza</i>	Schiaffino	Antonio
221	<i>Alfa</i>	Schiaffino	Diego
198	<i>N. S. della Consolazione</i>	Schiaffino	Domenico
158	<i>Baciocchino</i>	Schiaffino	Emanuele
168	<i>Chiara</i>	Schiaffino	Erasmus
188	<i>San Carlo</i>	Schiaffino	Erasmus

158	<i>Stefano</i>	Schiaffino	Erasmus
117	<i>Mercede</i>	Schiaffino	Fortunato
160	<i>Pace</i>	Schiaffino	Francesco
197	<i>Pegaso</i>	Schiaffino	Francesco
171	<i>Ernesto</i>	Schiaffino	Gerolamo
177	<i>S. Giovanni Battista</i>	Schiaffino	Gerolamo
252	<i>Teti</i>	Schiaffino	Gerolamo
155	<i>Antenore</i>	Schiaffino	Giacomo
175	<i>Boschetto</i>	Schiaffino	Gio. Batta
142	<i>Concezione</i>	Schiaffino	Gio. Batta
203	<i>Costante</i>	Schiaffino	Gio. Batta
161	<i>N.S. del Boschetto</i>	Schiaffino	Gio. Batta
113	<i>Boschetto</i>	Schiaffino	Giuseppe
116	<i>Didone</i>	Schiaffino	Giuseppe
153	<i>Indle Carrubais</i>	Schiaffino	Giuseppe
244	<i>Iside</i>	Schiaffino	Giuseppe
153	<i>N. S. dell'Orto</i>	Schiaffino	Lorenzo
267	<i>Passò quel tempo Enea</i>	Schiaffino	Lorenzo
282	<i>Gaetano</i>	Schiaffino	Martino
210	<i>Elia</i>	Schiaffino	Niccolò
160	<i>Pallade</i>	Schiaffino	Niccolò
158	<i>Dacia</i>	Schiaffino	Prospero
219	<i>Enea</i>	Schiaffino	Prospero
245	<i>Industria</i>	Schiaffino	Prospero
110	<i>Magnanimo</i>	Schiaffino	Prospero
181	<i>Prosperoso</i>	Schiaffino	Prospero
138	<i>Rosina</i>	Schiaffino	Prospero
137	<i>Volontà di Dio</i>	Schiaffino	Prospero

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290	<i>Costanza</i>	Schiaffino	Rocco
116	<i>L'Unione</i>	Schiappacasse	Giovanni
290	<i>Legnano</i>	Schiappacasse	Giovanni
144	<i>Telemaco</i>	Schiappacasse	Giovanni
168	<i>Fiammetta</i>	Senno	Prospero
129	<i>San Prospero</i>	Simonetti	Biagio

Appendix 4. Camogli's fleet in 1883.

<i>Tons.</i>	<i>Ship</i>	<i>Surname</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Construction Year</i>
624	<i>Alfa</i>	Ansaldo	Fortunato	1871
512	<i>Credito</i>	Ansaldo	Giuseppe Eredi	1869
407	<i>Tulla</i>	Ansaldo	Giuseppe Eredi	1864
619	<i>Nuovo Matteo</i>	Ansaldo	Lorenzo Eredi	1871
580	<i>Carbone</i>	Ansaldo	Niccolò	1870
638	<i>Padre</i>	Ansaldo	Prospero	1871
512	<i>Geronima Antola</i>	Antola	Francesco Eredi	1865
424	<i>M. Teresa (ex Nicoletta)</i>	Antola	Gio. Batta	1866
621	<i>Campidoglio</i>	Aste	Domenico	1868
523	<i>Aste Giuseppe</i>	Aste	Giuseppe Eredi	1867
349	<i>Torquato</i>	Aste	Giuseppe Eredi	1863
675	<i>Armenia</i>	Avegno	Gio. Batta	1875
471	<i>Deadema</i>	Avegno	Gio. Batta	1869
552	<i>Mario B.</i>	Bertolotto	Angelo	1867
550	<i>Album</i>	Bertolotto	Antonio	1871
655	<i>Giorgina</i>	Bertolotto	Cottardo	1870
427	<i>Maria B.</i>	Bertolotto	Filippo	1867
521	<i>Bertolotto Savona</i>	Bertolotto	Gio. Batta	1868
1331	<i>Fede e Amore</i>	Bertolotto	Gio. Batta	1883
878	<i>Religione e Libertà</i>	Bertolotto	Gio. Batta	1872
645	<i>Michele B.</i>	Bertolotto	Giuseppe	1874
554	<i>Virginia</i>	Bertolotto	Giuseppe	1870

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641	<i>Carmelita B.</i>	Bertolotto	Gregorio	1872
481	<i>Antonietta B.</i>	Bertolotto	Luigi Eredi	1869
769	<i>Filippo</i>	Bertolotto	Prospero e figlio Filippo	1875
478	<i>Fedele</i>	Boggiano	Emanuele	1868
872	<i>Quaker's City</i>	Boggiano	Emanuele	1876
1030	<i>Rocco Schiaffino</i>	Boggiano	Emanuele	1875
708	<i>Oblio</i>	Boggiano	Mario	1872
602	<i>Borzone</i>	Borzone	Paolo	1870
723	<i>Maria</i> <i>Margherita</i> <i>Borzone</i>	Borzone	Paolo	1876
760	<i>Benham</i>	Bozzo	Andrea	1872
505	<i>Olivari</i>	Bozzo	Andrea	1869
468	<i>Suocero</i>	Bozzo	Andrea	1866
504	<i>Lido</i>	Bozzo	David	1866
559	<i>Franceschino</i>	Bozzo	Francesco	1870
770	<i>Monte A.</i>	Bozzo	Gio. Batta	1874
815	<i>Nuova</i> <i>Provvidenza</i>	Bozzo	Gio. Batta	1867
636	<i>Luigi C.</i>	Bozzo	Giuseppe	1870
480	<i>Guido</i>	Bozzo	Niccolò	1864
1001	<i>Mou</i>	Bozzo	Niccolò	1875
493	<i>Delfino</i>	Brigneti	Antonio	1869
484	<i>Brigneti</i>	Brigneti	Gio. Pietro	1868
750	<i>Geronima Madre</i>	Brigneti	Prospero Eredi	1876
608	<i>Lorenzo</i> <i>Campodonico</i>	Campodonico	Lorenzo	1873

524	<i>Due Cognati</i>	Campodonico & Bisso		1869
578	<i>Bolivar</i>	Capurro	Fortunato	1871
321	<i>Stella d'Oriente</i>	Casabona	Antonio Eredi	1858
478	<i>Antonio Casabona</i>	Casabona	Bartolomeo	1869
743	<i>Madre</i>	Casabona	Fratelli	1874
672	<i>Maria Casabona</i>	Casabona	Gaetano	1872
519	<i>Nuova Rosa</i>	Causi	Antonio	1871
616	<i>Maria</i>	Cervetto	Giuseppe	1878
513	<i>Biagino</i>	Chiesa	Biagio	1868
756	<i>Cortesia</i>	Chiesa	Biagio	1872
586	<i>Rosa C.</i>	Chiesa	Biagio	1873
730	<i>Angioletta Bozzo</i>	Chiesa	Giuseppe	1874
529	<i>Lucchina C.</i>	Cichero	Andrea	1869
540	<i>Manin Cichero</i>	Cichero	Andrea	1868
197	<i>Etra</i>	Cichero	Andrea	1854
949	<i>Caccin</i>	Cichero	Gio. Batta	1876
650	<i>Nuova Verità</i>	Cichero	Gio. Bono	1871
590	<i>Nuovo Dovere</i>	Cichero	Gio. Bono	1870
370	<i>Angela C.</i>	Cichero	Gio. Bono fu Antonio	1857
769	<i>Galileo C.</i>	Cichero	Salvatore	1876
938	<i>Rissetti</i>	Cichero	Salvatore	1875
544	<i>Lealtà</i>	Cichero		1871
742	<i>Prosperità</i>	Costa	Paolo	1875
284	<i>Vergine</i>	Costa	Francesco	1857
944	<i>Bice</i>	Costa	Giuseppe	1877
800	<i>Caterina B.</i>	Cuneo	Luigi Eredi	1877

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731	<i>Union</i>	Cuneo	Niccolo	1875
318	<i>Maritimo</i>	Dapelo	Carlo e Andrea	1860
682	<i>Nuovo Dapelo</i>	Dapelo	Gio. Batta	1876
781	<i>Ricordo</i>	Degregori	Antonio	1869
577	<i>Sei Fratelli</i>	Degregori	Antonio	1870
663	<i>Unico</i>	Degregori	Bernardo	1872
554	<i>Maria Madre</i>	Degregori	Filippo	1873
892	<i>Fratellanza</i>	Degregori	Fortunato	1878
615	<i>Prosperina</i>	Degregori	Fortunato	1864
475	<i>Zehlima</i>	Degregori	Fortunato	1860
830	<i>Degregori A.</i>	Degregori	Francesco	1874
453	<i>Nipote</i>	Degregori	Francesco Eredi	1872
758	<i>Baron Podestà</i>	Degregori	Gio. Batta	1874
748	<i>Bernardo</i>	Degregori	Gio. Batta	1876
474	<i>Esempio</i>	Degregori	Gio. Batta	1869
544	<i>Moderato</i>	Degregori	Gio. Batta	1870
527	<i>Speme</i>	Degregori	Gio. Batta	1867
465	<i>Patrocinio</i>	Degregori	Giuseppe Eredi	1865
868	<i>Biagio</i>	Degregori	Luigi	1876
549	<i>Baciccia</i>	Dellacasa	Gio. Batta	1870
518	<i>Demarchi</i>	Demarchi	Giacomo	1869
434	<i>Spero</i>	Demarchi	Gio. Batta	1867
457	<i>Britannia</i>	Demartini	Andrea	1868
589	<i>Giuseppe</i> <i>Emanuele</i>	Denegri	Filippo	1874
738	<i>Silenzio</i>	Denegri	Filippo	1875
463	<i>Pellegra</i>	Fasce	Domenico	1860
672	<i>Fedeltà</i>	Fasce & Gardella		1868

503	<i>Agostino Felugo</i>	Felugo	Agostino	1868
488	<i>Nicoletta F.</i>	Felugo	Agostino	1874
643	<i>Domenico</i>	Ferrari	Domenico	1872
538	<i>Uniti</i>	Ferrari	Domenico e Prospero	1875
511	<i>Amelia</i>	Ferrari	Fortunato	1866
757	<i>Francesco</i>	Ferrari	Fortunato	1875
650	<i>Romolo</i>	Ferrari	Fortunato	1872
534	<i>Emilia F.</i>	Ferrari	Gio. Batta	1869
478	<i>Nilo</i>	Ferrari	Gio. Batta	1867
717	<i>Nicola</i>	Ferrari	Giuseppe	1874
604	<i>Famiglia Ferro</i>	Ferro	Fortunato	1873
618	<i>Fratelli Ferro</i>	Ferro	Fortunato	1873
487	<i>Marianna Ferro</i>	Ferro	Fortunato	1869
522	<i>Margherita F.</i>	Ferro	Gio. Batta	1869
500	<i>Moscino</i>	Ferro	Paolo	1871
835	<i>Gratitudine</i>	Figari	Angelo	1874
626	<i>Vero F.</i>	Figari	Angelo	1870
595	<i>Mariquita</i>	Figari	Fortunato	1866
728	<i>Minerva</i>	Figari	Fortunato	1873
849	<i>Negrizuola</i>	Figari	Fortunato	1873
654	<i>Pellegra Figari</i>	Figari	Niccolò	1874
506	<i>Fortunato G.</i>	Gardella	Fortunato	1866
580	<i>Alba</i>	Gardella	Maria (vedova)	1870
310	<i>Argentina</i>	Gardella	Simone	1860
418	<i>Biagino G.</i>	Gennaro	Biagio	1864
690	<i>Giulia Anna</i>	Guerello	Domenico	1875
423	<i>Avvenire</i>	Lavarello	Gaetano	1867
498	<i>Cileno</i>	Lavarello	Giacomo	1869

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752	<i>Sirena</i>	Lavarello	Giacomo	1874
1111	<i>Indus</i>	Lavarello	Giuseppe	1874
466	<i>Gio. Batta</i> <i>Lavarello</i>	Lavarello	Prospero	1864
330	<i>Buon Pastore</i>	Lavarello	Prospero	1878
444	<i>Michele</i>	Maggiolo	Antonio Eredi	1867
353	<i>Metilde Maggiolo</i>	Maggiolo	Carlo	1883
472	<i>Fratelli Maggiolo</i>	Maggiolo	Fratelli	1868
674	<i>Caterina G.</i>	Maggiolo	Gerolamo	1874
386	<i>Ascolta</i>	Marciani	Fratelli	1865
695	<i>Bartolomeo</i> <i>Marciani</i>	Marciani	Fratelli	1875
1025	<i>Tripudio</i>	Marini	Fortunato	1883
452	<i>Nuova Oregina</i>	Massa	Giacomo	1867
498	<i>Buoni Parenti</i>	Massa	Prospero Eredi	1860
731	<i>Angelo</i>	Mortola	Biagio	1875
607	<i>Emilio M.</i>	Mortola	Biagio e Fratelli	1874
377	<i>Due Fratelli</i>	Mortola	Fratelli	1860
530	<i>Fratelli M.</i>	Mortola	Gaetano	1869
531	<i>Gerolamo</i> <i>Mortola</i>	Mortola	Giacomo	1867
570	<i>Giacomo Mortola</i>	Mortola	Giacomo	1869
598	<i>Emma D.</i>	Mortola	Gio. Batta	1870
526	<i>Merlo</i>	Mortola	Gio. Batta	1870
522	<i>Vagliano</i>	Mortola	Gio. Batta e Luigi Fratelli	1870
474	<i>Lazzaro</i>	Mortola	Giuseppe	1869
664	<i>Franceschino S.</i>	Mortola	Luigi Emanuele	1872

624	<i>Antonia Madre</i>	Mortola	Francesco	1871
390	<i>Buon Padre</i>	Mortola	Fratelli	1861
450	<i>Medora</i>	Mortola	Giacomo	1868
810	<i>Pellegra Madre</i>	Mortola	Gio. Batta	1876
370	<i>Ida</i>	Mortola	Niccolò	1864
493	<i>Olcese</i>	Olcese	Giuseppe	1869
625	<i>Sarò Caino</i>	Olivari	Bartolomeo	1872
481	<i>Gio. Battista O.</i>	Olivari	Biagio	1870
793	<i>Lucchino</i>	Olivari	Biagio	1876
515	<i>Lucco</i>	Olivari	Biagio	1867
892	<i>Prospero e Davide</i>	Olivari	Biagio	1881
321	<i>Aurelia</i>	Olivari	Fortunato	1862
470	<i>Fortunata Camilla</i>	Olivari	Fortunato	1867
489	<i>Giuseppe Revello</i>	Olivari	Fortunato	1868
826	<i>Teresa Olivari</i>	Olivari	Fortunato	1870
436	<i>Maria M.</i>	Olivari	Gerolamo	1868
185	<i>Annetta</i>	Olivari	Giacomo	1851
738	<i>Zio Battista</i>	Olivari	Gio. Bono	1875
773	<i>Papà Olivari</i>	Olivari	Giuseppe	1870
573	<i>Olivari Pietro</i>	Olivari	Giuseppe	1875
493	<i>Teodolinda</i>	Olivari	Luigi	1863
402	<i>Mio Cognato</i>	Olivari	Prospero	1864
698	<i>Urbano</i>	Olivari	Prospero	1873
787	<i>Gerolamo Olivari</i>	Olivari	Salvatore Eredi	1875
495	<i>Fortunato Padre</i>	Olivari	Francesco	1871
641	<i>Anna Oneto</i>	Oneto	Andrea	1869

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468	<i>Giuseppe Oneto</i>	Oneto	Andrea	1866
759	<i>Volpini</i>	Oneto	Davide	1874
543	<i>Guanito</i>	Oneto	Francesco	1870
390	<i>Noemi</i>	Oneto	Niccolò	1864
616	<i>Volpe</i>	Oneto	Francesco	1867
570	<i>Etta</i>	Ottone	Antonietta	1868
502	<i>Zia G.</i>	Ottone	Emanuele	1870
941	<i>Antonietta O.</i>	Ottone	Fortunato	1882
740	<i>Madre Rosa</i>	Ottone	Fortunato	1871
644	<i>Ottone</i>	Ottone	Fortunato	1869
744	<i>Ottone Padre</i>	Ottone	Gio. Batta	1872
680	<i>Paola</i>	Pace	Giovanni	1875
548	<i>Fabio</i>	Pastorino	Fratelli	1871
678	<i>Maddalena</i>	Pellerano	Fratelli	1859
469	<i>Adem</i>	Pellerano	Giuseppe	1865
712	<i>Zeffiro</i>	Pellerano	Giuseppe	1877
327	<i>Dori</i>	Peragallo	Ferrando	1862
490	<i>Ferrando P.</i>	Peragallo	Ferrando	1864
813	<i>Lincelles</i>	Razeto	Antonio	1858
590	<i>Maria Volpino</i>	Razeto	Antonio	1862
638	<i>Monte Tabor</i>	Razeto	Antonio	1873
456	<i>Marinetta</i>	Razeto	Augusto	1867
980	<i>Provvidenza R.</i>	Razeto	Emanuele	1876
622	<i>Razeto (ex Zio Lorenzo)</i>	Razeto	Emanuele	1871
734	<i>Parenti</i>	Razeto	Ettore	1874
635	<i>Avo G.</i>	Razeto	Francesco	1870
467	<i>Gaetano</i>	Razeto	Gaetano	1864

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555	<i>Monte Allegro</i>	Razeto	Gaetano	1869
759	<i>Paolina R.</i>	Razeto	Gaetano	1874
764	<i>C. Boschetto</i>	Razeto	Gio. Batta	1875
499	<i>Razeto Padre</i>	Razeto	Gio. Batta e figlio Stefano	1869
482	<i>Padovano Antonio</i>	Razeto	Gio. Francesco Eredi	1868
597	<i>Anita Garibaldi</i>	Razeto	Giovanni	1865
307	<i>Dittatore Garibaldi</i>	Razeto	Giovanni	1861
678	<i>Emilia M.</i>	Razeto	Giovanni	1873
602	<i>Boschetto</i>	Razeto	Martino	1871
466	<i>Camogli</i>	Razeto	Martino	1864
625	<i>N. S. del Boscheto</i>	Razeto	Martino	1871
442	<i>Prospero Razeto</i>	Razeto	Martino	1868
260	<i>Federico</i>	Razeto	Prospero	1856
800	<i>Gentili</i>	Razeto	Stefano	1875
800	<i>Gentili</i>	Razeto	Stefano	1875
714	<i>Martinin</i>	Razeto	Stefano	1878
906	<i>Lorenzino</i>	Razeto	Stefano di Martino	1882
425	<i>Luigina</i>	Repetto	Antonio	1865
544	<i>Prospero</i>	Repetto	Giacomo	1872
517	<i>Agostino Repetto</i>	Repetto	Gio. Batta	1868
615	<i>Beppino R.</i>	Repetto	Gio. Batta	1872
428	<i>Boschetto M.</i>	Repetto	Gio. Batta	1865
717	<i>Fortunato Repetto</i>	Repetto	Gio. Batta	1874
622	<i>Gaetano Repetto</i>	Repetto	Gio. Batta	1869

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843	<i>Maria Repetto</i> <i>Figlia</i>	Repetto	Gio. Batta	1876
617	<i>Stefano Repetto</i>	Repetto	Gio. Batta	1875
685	<i>Maria Repetto</i>	Repetto	Stefano	1872
1244	<i>G. B. Repetto</i>	Repetto	Gio. Batta	1883
448	<i>Fortunato O.</i>	Revello	Bartolomeo	1862
814	<i>Paola R.</i>	Revello	Lorenzo	1872
689	<i>Entella</i>	Roncagliolo	Romolo	1868
751	<i>Castel Dragone</i>	Schiaffino	Adeodato	1878
872	<i>Mosca</i>	Schiaffino	Agostino	1875
522	<i>Virginia</i>	Schiaffino	Agostino	1867
781	<i>Battistina Madre</i>	Schiaffino	Andrea e Gio. Bono Fratelli	1874
803	<i>Maria Schiaffino</i>	Schiaffino	Antonio	1875
474	<i>Perserverante</i>	Schiaffino	Antonio	1867
432	<i>Splendido</i>	Schiaffino	Antonio	1867
840	<i>Marinin</i>	Schiaffino	Emanuele	1874
493	<i>Ottavina</i>	Schiaffino	Emanuele	1866
605	<i>Agostino S.</i>	Schiaffino	Enrico	1871
557	<i>Angela Schiaffino</i>	Schiaffino	Enrico	1871
949	<i>Enrichino</i>	Schiaffino	Enrico	1876
533	<i>Pace Schiaffino</i>	Schiaffino	Erasmus Eredi	1868
414	<i>Temo</i>	Schiaffino	Erasmus Eredi	1864
332	<i>Emanuel</i>	Schiaffino	Filippo di Giuseppe	1863
577	<i>Akyab</i>	Schiaffino	Fortunato	1867
479	<i>Corso</i>	Schiaffino	Fortunato	1866
630	<i>Ottavia Stella</i>	Schiaffino	Fortunato	1872
619	<i>Industria</i>	Schiaffino	Fortunato di Prospero	1873

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466	<i>Caterina S.</i>	Schiaffino	Francesco	1864
788	<i>Marchin</i>	Schiaffino	Francesco	1876
484	<i>Gilda</i>	Schiaffino	Fratelli	1868
478	<i>Lorenzo Padre</i>	Schiaffino	Fratelli fu Lorenzo	1868
382	<i>Zio</i>	Schiaffino	G. Cesare	1867
598	<i>Gerolamo Figari</i>	Schiaffino	Gaetano	1872
474	<i>Pietro</i>	Schiaffino	Gaetano	1867
472	<i>Prospero</i>	Schiaffino	Gaetano Eredi	1868
676	<i>Orione</i>	Schiaffino	Gerolamo	1876
659	<i>Gimello</i>	Schiaffino	Giacomo	1872
778	<i>Draguette</i>	Schiaffino	Gio. Batta	1882
514	<i>Liscio</i>	Schiaffino	Gio. Batta Eredi	1864
423	<i>Nina Schiaffino</i>	Schiaffino	Giovanni	1867
576	<i>Nina Seconda</i>	Schiaffino	Giovanni	1872
434	<i>Vittorio S.</i>	Schiaffino	Giovanni	1878
492	<i>Maria Laura</i>	Schiaffino	Giuseppe e figlio di Filippo	1868
529	<i>Emilia Revello</i>	Schiaffino	Giuseppe Fortunato e Francesco fratelli	1868
617	<i>Confidenza</i>	Schiaffino	Lorenza	1869
498	<i>Eraclio</i>	Schiaffino	Lorenzo	1865
442	<i>Orto</i>	Schiaffino	Lorenzo Eredi	1866
540	<i>Caterina</i>	Schiaffino	Luigi Eredi	1869
296	<i>Camilla</i>	Schiaffino	Pellegro	1859
508	<i>Ernesta</i>	Schiaffino	Pellegro	1867
571	<i>Nuova Galatea</i>	Schiaffino	Pellegro	1870
469	<i>Pellegro</i>	Schiaffino	Pellegro	1865
760	<i>Zio Pellegro</i>	Schiaffino	Pellegro	1875

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400	<i>Nuova Gemma</i>	Schiaffino	Pietro	1868
625	<i>Pefetta</i>	Schiaffino	Prospero	1872
801	<i>Famiglia S.</i>	Schiaffino	Prospero Eredi	1875
490	<i>Maria Lauretta</i>	Schiaffino	Prospero Eredi	1868
542	<i>I Tre Giuseppi</i>	Schiaffino	Rocco	1869
808	<i>Iside</i>	Schiaffino	Rocco	1875
622	<i>Lorenzo</i>	Schiaffino	Rocco	1870
	<i>Schiaffino</i>			
440	<i>Giacomino</i>	Schiaffino	Rosa (vedova)	1867
636	<i>Battaglia</i>	Schiaffino	Biagio Eredi	1874
474	<i>Nuovo S. Marco</i>	Schiaffino	Francesco	1867
657	<i>Pietro G.</i>	Schiaffino	Francesco	1871
506	<i>Gehon</i>	Schiaffino	Giuseppe	1866
556	<i>Maria Simone</i>	Schiaffino	Niccolò	1869
672	<i>Galileo S.</i>	Schiaffino	Pellegro	1874
600	<i>Grimaldo</i>	Schiaffino	Prospero di Girolamo	1871
559	<i>Schiaffino</i>	Schiaffino	Prospero Eredi	1870
308	<i>S. Giovanni</i>	Schiaffino	Simone	1859
	<i>Evangelista</i>			
609	<i>Due Amici</i>	Schiaffino & Olcese		1870
361	<i>Aquila</i>	Schiappacasse	Fortunato	1860
450	<i>Argonaute</i>	Schiappacasse	Fortunato	1866
657	<i>Senno</i>	Senno	Gio. Andrea	1874
619	<i>Caterina S.</i>	Simonetti	Andrea	1873
717	<i>Padre Francesco</i>	Valle	Andrea Eredi	1874
442	<i>Progresso Valle</i>	Valle	Francesco	1866
574	<i>Due Cecilie</i>	Valle	Gio. Batta Antonio	1870

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432	<i>Salvador</i>	Valle	Lorenzo Francesco	1866
685	<i>Cecilia Madre</i>	Valle	Santo	1881
443	<i>N. S. della Salute</i>			1868

Appendix 5. Camogli's fleet in 1902.

<i>Tons</i>	<i>Ship</i>	<i>Owner</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Hull Type</i>
220	<i>Luigi Repetto</i>	Bertolotto	Filippo di P.	wood
243	<i>Torasco</i>	Bertolotto	Filippo di P.	wood
1909	<i>Stefano Razeto</i>	Bertolotto	Gio. Batta di Giuseppe	wood
782	<i>Battistina Madre</i>	Bertolotto	Gregorio	iron
1290	<i>Elise</i>	Bertolotto	Vittorio	wood
786	<i>Lacaruna</i>	Bertolotto	Vittorio	wood
1181	<i>Prospero Repetto</i>	Bertolotto	Vittorio	wood
1315	<i>Vega</i>	Bertolotto		wood
739	<i>Aline</i>	Bertolotto	& Schiappacasse	steel
1270	<i>Narcisus</i>	Bertolotto & Valle	F. & A.	wood
1237	<i>Dilbhur</i> (steamship)	Bozzo	Emanuele	iron
1038	<i>Paola Madre</i>	Bozzo	Emanuele	wood
1099	<i>Luigina</i>	Bozzo	Francesco	wood
570	<i>Padre</i>	Bozzo	Francesco	wood
1611	<i>Warrior</i>	Brigneti	L&P Fratelli	wood
1191	<i>Provvidenza</i>	Capurro	Maria	wood
1582	<i>Annibale</i>	Casabona		iron
1601	<i>Avon</i>	Casabona		iron
382	<i>Camelia</i>	Cichero	Teresa	iron
823	<i>Filippo Denegri</i>	Costa	Giuseppe	wood
377	<i>Francesco Bozzo</i>	Dapelo	A. fu A.	wood
478	<i>Teresa Madre</i>	Dapelo	A. fu A.	wood

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1338	<i>Euphemia</i>	Dapelo	Carlo fu G.	wood
323	<i>Ida</i>	Dapelo	Simone	wood
72	<i>Teresa A.</i>	Dapelo	Simone	wood
872	<i>Angela</i>	Degregori	Luigi	iron
1099	<i>Steinvora</i>	Denegri	Filippo Eredi	wood
589	<i>Albarese</i>	Denegri	Giuseppe	steel
1344	<i>Casabona</i>	Figari	Antonio	iron
358	<i>Antonio P.</i>	Figari	Giacomo	iron
651	<i>Amicizia</i>	Figari	Gio. Batta	steel
1299	<i>Fede</i>	Lavarello	Gaetano Eredi	wood
1270	<i>Gaetano</i>	Maggiolo	G.	wood
	<i>Casabona</i>			
542	<i>Marion</i>	Marini	G.	wood
1050	<i>Oriana</i>	Marini	G.	wood
638	<i>Emilio M.</i>	Massa	Antonio	wood
689	<i>Angelo</i>	Mortola	Biagio	iron
800	<i>Gregorio</i>	Mortola	Biagio	wood
153	<i>I Buoni Parenti</i>	Mortola	Biagio	wood
1499	<i>Ines Elisa</i>	Mortola	Biagio	wood
749	<i>Filippo</i>	Mortola	Fortunato	wood
421	<i>N.S. della Salute</i>	Mortola	Francesco & Fortunato	wood
919	<i>Andaman</i>	Mortola	Fratelli fu Agostino Antonio	iron
627	<i>Caterina G.</i>	Mortola	Fratelli fu Agostino Antonio	iron
737	<i>Elmstone</i>	Mortola	Fratelli fu Agostino Antonio	wood
750	<i>Giuseppe P.</i>	Mortola	G. & C.	wood

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1401	<i>N.S.</i>	<i>del</i>	Mortola	Gio. Batta	wood
	<i>Boschetto</i>				
367	<i>Filippo Chicca</i>		Mortola	Giuseppe	wood
1287	<i>Giulia R.</i>		Mortola	Giuseppe	wood
583	<i>Ilia</i>		Mortola	Giuseppe	wood
168	<i>Maria</i>		Mortola	Giuseppe	wood
744	<i>Maria Madre B.</i>		Mortola	Giuseppe	wood
993	<i>Minerva</i>		Mortola	Giuseppe	wood
531	<i>Splendidezza</i>		Mortola	Giuseppe	wood
978	<i>Vermont</i>		Mortola	Giuseppe	wood
1624	<i>Trojan</i>		Mortola	Luigi fu Agostino	wood
160	<i>Elba</i>		Mortola & Schiappacasse	Gio. Batta & Fortunato	wood
1425	<i>Gio.</i>	<i>Batta</i>	Mortola & Schiappacasse	Gio. Batta & Fortunato	wood
	<i>Repetto</i>				
723	<i>Martinin</i>		Olivari	A.	wood
1300	<i>Teresa</i>		Olivari	A. fu P.	wood
878	<i>Bice</i>		Olivari	Davide fu Biagio	iron
1300	<i>Raghan Castle</i>		Olivari	G.	wood
597	<i>Gio. Batta Padre</i>		Olivari	G. & M.	wood
525	<i>Angela</i>		Olivari	Gaetano Davide di	iron
	<i>Schiaffino</i>				
806	<i>teresa Olivari</i>		Olivari	Gaetano Davide di	wood
	Fortunato				
239	<i>Celestina O.</i>		Olivari	Gio. Batta	iron
348	<i>Maria Teresa</i>		Olivari	Prospero	wood
494	<i>Rigel</i>		Olivari	Prospero & Davide	wood
821	<i>Prospero Padre</i>		Olivari	S.B.	wood
972	<i>Northern Empire</i>		Razeto	Antonio di Giacomo	wood

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944	<i>Bianchetto</i>	Razeto	Emanuele	iron
1111	<i>Indus</i>	Razeto	Emanuele	wood
920	<i>Olive Mount</i>	Razeto	Emanuele	wood
1120	<i>Sophocles</i>	Razeto	Emanuele	wood
1180	<i>Prosperoso</i>	Razeto	Prospero	wood
1321	<i>Luigino</i>	Razeto	Prospero fu Francesco	wood
547	<i>Lilly G.</i>	Razeto	Roberto	wood
185	<i>Benedetta</i>	Razeto	Stefano fu Antonio	iron
	<i>Mortola</i>			
822	<i>Cognati</i>	Razeto	Stefano fu Martino	iron
1104	<i>Corona</i>	Razeto	Stefano fu Martino	iron
	<i>(steamship)</i>			
1258	<i>Due Cugini</i>	Razeto	Stefano fu Martino	iron
	<i>(steamship)</i>			
279	<i>Emilia S.</i>	Razeto	Stefano fu Martino	wood
1591	<i>Pellegrina O.</i>	Razeto	Stefano fu Martino	wood
900	<i>Prospero &</i>	Razeto	Stefano fu Martino	wood
	<i>Davide</i>			
697	<i>Jamaica</i>	Razeto		wood
896	<i>Provvidenza R.</i>	Razeto & Simonetti		wood
623	<i>Attilio Dapelo</i>	Repetto	Angelo	iron
1008	<i>Olivari</i>	Repetto	Fortunato	wood
832	<i>Anna M.</i>	Repetto	Fratelli	iron
399	<i>Avvenire</i>	Repetto	Fratelli	iron
706	<i>Scottish Chief</i>	Repetto	Fratelli	wood
1469	<i>Drumpark</i>	Repetto	R. di S.	iron
	<i>(steamship)</i>			
846	<i>Venezian</i>	Revello	Fortunata	wood

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863	<i>Francesco R.</i>	Schiaffino	Adeodato	wood
1544	<i>Beecroft</i>	Schiaffino	Amilcare Prospero fu Filippo	iron
264	<i>Felicita S.</i>	Schiaffino	Andrea di Lorenzo	wood
608	<i>Irvine</i>	Schiaffino	Benedetto di G.B.	wood
1135	<i>Stella del Mare</i>	Schiaffino	Celestino	wood
1280	<i>Ellida</i>	Schiaffino	Enrico fu A.	wood
664	<i>Castello</i>	Schiaffino	F.	iron
	<i>Dragone</i>			
1290	<i>Edinburgh</i>	Schiaffino	Filippo fu Prospero	wood
199	<i>Maria</i>	Schiaffino	Filippo fu Prospero	wood
	<i>Ausiliatrice</i>			
1533	<i>Vanloo</i>	Schiaffino	Filippo fu Prospero	wood
1362	<i>Vanduarra</i>	Schiaffino	Fratelli	wood
704	<i>Columbus</i>	Schiaffino	G.B. fu Prospero	iron
1508	<i>Precursore</i>	Schiaffino	G.B. fu Prospero	wood
773	<i>Lincelles</i>	Schiaffino	Giuseppe	wood
1494	<i>Papà Emanuele</i>	Schiaffino	Giuseppe	wood
861	<i>Stella B.</i>	Schiaffino	Luigi	wood
839	<i>Amore</i>	Schiaffino	P.	wood
604	<i>Regina</i>	Schiaffino	P.	wood
403	<i>Rosalba</i>	Schiaffino	P.	wood
609	<i>Riconoscenza</i>	Schiaffino	Prospero fu Prospero	wood
701	<i>Silenzio</i>	Schiaffino & Magnasco		wood
990	<i>Farezia</i>	Schiaffino & Rosasco		wood
345	<i>Taiwan</i>	Valle	Felicina	wood
572	<i>N.S. del</i>	Valle & Ferrari	A. & G.M.	wood
	<i>Boschetto</i>			

462 | *Walter G.*

Valle & Mortola

wood

Appendix 6. Camogli's fleet in 1915.

<i>Tons</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Ship</i>	<i>Surname</i>	<i>Name</i>
359.5		<i>Sant'Antonio</i>	Bertolotto	Vittorio fu Lazzaro
1755.28		<i>Andreta</i>	Bertolotto	Vittorio fu Lazzaro
2218.99	Steamship	<i>Deipara</i>	Bozzo	F.lli D. & E.
3344.45	Steamship	<i>Elio</i>	Bozzo	F.lli D. & E.
3523	Steamship	<i>Eliofilo</i>	Bozzo	F.lli D. & E.
3344	Steamship	<i>Eliopoli</i>	Bozzo	F.lli D. & E.
999.49	Steamship	<i>Espero</i>	Bozzo	F.lli D. & E.
1970.78	Steamship	<i>Luigino B.</i>	Bozzo	Edoardo
819.56		<i>Colbert</i>	Crovari	G.B. di Pietro
529.71		<i>Padre</i>	Crovari	Pietro fu Giovanni
396		<i>Camelia</i>	Dapelo	Angelo & Carlo
103.53		<i>Agostino F.</i>	Dapelo	Sim. & Fassio A.
208		<i>Daino</i>	Dapelo	Simone fu F.
447		<i>Filippo</i>	Dapelo	Carlo Andrea
112		<i>Giuseppe</i>	Dapelo	Simone fu F.
1293.56	Steamship	<i>Polynesia</i>	Degregori	Antonio e Bernardo F.lli
3244	Steamship	<i>Ascaro</i>	Degregori & Gennaro	
4202	Steamship	<i>Messicano</i>	Degregori & Gennaro	
1602	Steamship	<i>Patras</i>	Denegri	Angelo fu Fil.
739		<i>Silenzio</i>	Denegri	Eredi
1775	Steamship	<i>Arethusia</i>	Denegri	Fratelli
1498		<i>Drumpark</i>	Figari	Giacomo di Fortunato
1353		<i>Teresa</i>	Figari	Giacomo di Fortunato
3154	Steamship	<i>Antonio</i>	Maggiolo	G. fu A.

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3384	Steamship	<i>Avala</i>	Maggiolo	G. fu A.
2600	Steamship	<i>Maddalena</i>	Maggiolo	G. fu A.
3306	Steamship	<i>Prudenza</i>	Maggiolo	G. fu A.
3154	Steamship	<i>Antonino</i>	Maggiolo	Gaetano fu Giacomo
107		<i>Togo</i>	Magnasco	F.
876		<i>Anna M.</i>	Mortola	B. fu A. & Figli
1527		<i>Blanche</i>	Mortola	Giuseppe fu G.B.
1505		<i>Cognati</i>	Mortola	Giuseppe fu G.B.
1059		<i>Limena</i>	Mortola	F. & C.
1711		<i>Loch Garve</i>	Mortola	Giuseppe & Biagio
1669		<i>Bianchetto</i>	Mortola & Bozzo	Giuseppe & Emanuele
1717		<i>Combermere</i>	Mortola & Bozzo	Giuseppe & Emanuele
1873		<i>Eurasia</i>	Mortola & Bozzo	Giuseppe & Emanuele
1624		<i>Macdiarmid</i>	Mortola & Bozzo	Giuseppe & Emanuele
1395		<i>Merioneth</i>	Mortola & Schiappacasse	
742		<i>Aline</i>	Mortola	Elisa
499		<i>Rigel</i>	Mortola & Schiappacasse	
401		<i>Benedetta Madre</i>	Mortola	Giovanni di Fortunato
316		<i>Fortunato Mortola</i>	Mortola	Giovanni di Fortunato
1507		<i>Ortrud</i>	Mortola & Bozzo	Giuseppe & Emanuele
1114		<i>Luigino</i>	Mortola	Giuseppe fu G.B.
1283	Steamship	<i>Trentino</i>	Mortola	Giuseppe fu G.B.
1360		<i>Rosa M.</i>	Mortola	Luigi
2070		<i>Biagio O.</i>	Olivari	Davide
1432		<i>Herat</i>	Olivari	G.B. fu A.
1136		<i>Sophocles</i>	Olivari	G.B. fu A.

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63	<i>Caterina Madre</i>	Olivari	Gaetano di A.
1353	<i>Doris</i>	Olivari	Gaetano di A.
1423	<i>Fenice</i>	Pellerano	G.
3132	Steamship <i>Oriana</i>	Razeto	Stefano
64	<i>Rosa M.</i>	Revello	Niccolò fu B.
998	<i>Earl Derby</i>	Schiaffino	Elena
1385	<i>Ausiliatrice</i>	Schiaffino	Cognati
1165	<i>Stella del Mare</i>	Schiaffino	Cognati
1233	<i>Nera</i>	Schiaffino	Maria di Giuseppe
1331	Steamship <i>Spica</i>	Schiappacasse & Bertolotto	F. & M.
1675	<i>Lena</i>	Tassara	Agostino & Serafina
567	<i>Lilly G.</i>	Valle	Antonio fu Emanuele
587	<i>Roberto G.</i>	Valle	Francesco
750	<i>Oromaso</i>	Valle	Santo Eredi
124	<i>Assunta V.</i>	Viacava	Assunta fu Francesco

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